Re: RT, Modified Occam's Razor, and Disambiguation

From: J L Speranza (jls@netverk.com.ar)
Date: Fri Feb 23 2001 - 16:30:57 GMT

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    Thanks to Christoph for his interesting comments.

    JL:
    "It seems we can loosely speak of syntactic "disambiguation" here ["old
    books and maps"] in terms of scope (and thus leading to the constitution of
    an "explicature"), but surely no strict lexical or semantic "polysemy" is
    involved, and thus, I'm not sure if the phenomenon involves a case of
    standard Gricean implicature - or even a RT "explicature", for that matter".

    Christoph:
    "Why should scope ambiguities be different from lexical ambiguities as far
    as pragmatic interpretation is concerned? I don't see the point: both
    phenomena impact the proposition conveyed by an utterance, i.e. it's
    explicature, and both have to be disambiguated pragmatically. Although in
    your example, 'old books and maps', this process can be helped in oral
    communication by the use of intonation/pause."

    I guess I was (and partly still am) confused by the different concepts of
    "polysemy" and "ambiguity". It was I think JD Atlas who favours the view
    that the Gricean programme is best interpreted as prooposing UNIGUITY (or
    monguity, I forget - I prefer the latter term) PLUS Implicature.

    In this case, UNIGUITY opposes to POLYSEMY. The locus classicus, and within
    my special focus of interest, the logical connectives, the idea that - as
    held in Oxford e.g. by LJ Cohen, of Queen's, if not by the early Strawson of
    "An Intro to Logical Theory", or earlier still, by Ryle in a number of
    essays - that "and" has (at least) two meaning (and is thus ambiguous or
    multiguous, or polyguous) - "and = &" (The Russellian interpretation
    favoured by Grice), and "and = and then" (or, to use Ryle's example, "He
    died and drank the poison", "and as a consequence then").

    But I suppose one can see "POLYSEMY" (genuine one, as in the case of Grice's
    example, "vice", and "row" - meaning row in a river and row of chairs,
    coming from different Anglo-Saxon roots) as just *one* special type of
    ambiguity - After all, according to Wm. Empson (and we have been talking
    here of the legacy of I. A. Richards) there were SEVEN!

    Interestingly (for me, but I have to revise Grice's arguments in detail),
    when Grice deals with his Modified Occam's razor (in "Further notes") - as
    applied to the alleged to meanings of "or" (inclusive and exclusive - he
    does mention the word "ambiguity" if not "polysemy". Also, when in "Meaning
    Revisited" (also repr. in Studies in the Way of Words), he discusses whether
    there are really two "senses" of "meaning" (natural and non-natural) he also
    appeals to the Modified Occam's Razor to conclude that there is just one
    meaning and, perhaps, different usages.

    One should consider that for Frege, as much as terms (like "vice", "row",
    "meaning", "bank") or predicates may be have to have senses, propositions
    are also said to have both sense and reference. I forget what Frege thought
    the sense of a proposition was, but I recall he thought the reference of a
    proposition was a truth value. (Dummett's book on Frege was too thick
    (literally) for me. :)).

    On the other hand, and back to Grice, there's the maxim, "avoid ambiguity"
    (under the Fourth and Last Category of Manner of perspicuity), but the two
    examples he offers there (Wm Blake's poem, and "Peccavi") could hardly be
    said to deal with polysemy. The first (Blake's poem) seems to be a case of
    syntactic scope or parsing, and the latter is so contrived, that I would
    hardly call it "conversational". It refers to an historical event, as my
    Oxford Dict of Quotations shows).

    In all muddled thoughts, my ideas have, most recently, been influenced by
    the English computational linguist Adam Kilgariff's PhD thesis on "Polysemy"
    (U Sussex, Brighton), and his article "I don't believe in word senses", and
    by LR Horn's dictum, "Do not spit if you can lump" - which Horn applies less
    liberally than I myself do!

    As I recall, Sperber/Wilson's first example of "disambiguation" (in their
    Pragamtics Microfiche essay of Grice repr. in P. Werth) concerned the item
    "bank". I have not analysed THAT item in due detail, since, being an
    etymologist extraordinaire, I find it difficult to find the two SENSES or
    meanings of "bank". Italian blooded as I am, I find that they are rather two
    "usages" of the same word - as imported into the English language! (As Eve
    Sweester would say, a diachronic study of "bank" would show that what is at
    play is really a figurative extension of one onl original sense into
    multiple uses, I suppose).

    Best,

    JL
    Bs.As, Arg.



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