I was re-reading Baptista's quotes from E. Goffman:
>>[co-presence]: "persons must sense that they are close enough to be
perceived in whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and
close enough to be perceived in this sensing of being perceived.” (Behavior in
Public Places, 1963, p. 17). “When in each other’s presence individuals are
admirably placed to share a joint focus of attention, perceive that they do so,
and perceive this perceiving.” (The Interaction Order, 1983, p.3).
>As far as I know, this is a kind of "mutual
>manifestness" _avant la lettre_. Any thoughts?
---
Mmm -- let's check again this with _la lettre_ (S&W 1986).The notion is
introduced on p. 42 -- ch. i, section 8 ('cognitive environments and mutual
manifestness') -- and, not to be pedantic, the _logical form_ of an ascription of
'mutual manifestness' and an ascription of 'co-presence' seem to differ
(although one could perhaps be defined in terms of the other?). Thus, while Goffman
obviously ascribes 'co-present' to persons, S&W ascribe on the other hand
'manifest' to _fact_:
(I)
"a fact is _manifest_ to an individual
... iff [s]he is capable ... of representing
it mentally and accepting its
representation as ... probably true."
(S&W, 1986, p. 39)
It is from the idea of a manifest fact that S&W arrive definitionally to
'mutually manifestness' (p. 42). Although they don't offer it explicitly, the
definition would naturally run, as per (I), adding merely the qualifier 'mutual':
(II)
"a fact is _mutually manifest_ to
[utterer and addresse] iff [they] are
capable of representing it mentally and
accepting its representation as ...
probably true."
-- the phrase 'probably true' (in I and II) is intended to indicate that
what's manifest (patent, ostensive) may not necessarily be what's _known_ -- just
'believed' (although this is surely 'implicatural', since if x is true, x is
_probably_ true).
While S&W 1986 do not explicitly quote Schelling 1960 (The strategy of
conflict, Harvard) they cite and criticise Schiffer (_Meaning_) and his reliance on
'mutual knowledge', and, more to the point here, Lewis's _Convention_ (1969);
the relevant footnote being no. 29 (on p. 284):
"What, for instance, Lewis (1969:56) calls a
_basis_ for common (i.e. mutual) knowledge
is roughly equivalent to our mutual
manifestness. ... See also Clark & Marshall
['Mutual Knowledge'] 1981."
Finally, it is interesting to point out that while Grice's 'Meaning
Revisited' was first published in N. V. Smith's _Mutual Knowledge_ (proceedings of
symposium at USussex/Falmer -- see details in WOW) he definitely shows doubts
(there and elsewhere) about the ultimate utility of the notion that gave title to
the Academic-Press volume, e.g.:
"[M]y general strategy was to look for
the kind of regresses which Schiffer and
others have claimed to detect concealed
beneath the glossy surface...: ifninite
and vicious regresses which they propose
to cast out, substituting another regressive
notion, such as _mutual knowledge_, instead;
raising somewhat the question why their
regresses are good regresses and mine
are bad ones." (WOW, p. 299)
Cheers,
JL
J L Speranza
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