Mind the Tone. Or Grice on a Great War ditty.
"The tone is a great thing to consider".
Gottlob Frege, Begriffschrift.
S. Olmos, of Dublin, writes:
>I'm researching on discourse connectives in English, in particular
>the contrastive marker 'but'. I wrote my MA dissertation
>on this connector according to Relevance Theory & am at present
>trying to find out what other work has been done on this particular
>field, and especially if there is anything that other
>Neo-Gricean pragmaticists have written about this. I would appreciate
>a lot if anyone could provide me with any info regarding this.
It's not clear if you'll concentrate on _discourse markers_ in general now
(of which there's _loads_ written from all different sorts of perspectives,
Gricean and non-Gricean alike) or again, on "but". I hope you'll
concentrate on "but" which I find a delightful particle. At present I'm
analysing the mis-use by linguists (and philsophers) of the odd theories of
Gottlob Frege, and so a nice thing would be to analyse the sense and
nonsense of his ideas on _force_ (Kraft), _reference_ (Bedeutung), _sense_
(Sinn) and _tone_ (_Tone_).
My reading of Frege (at present) is based on the work of Grice's
_successor_ as philosophy tutor at St John's, G. P. Baker (e.g. _Language,
Sense, & Nonsense, Blackwell). But one relevant piece at this stage is
indeed Dummett's _The Seas of Language_ and indeed the bit by Dummett in A.
Kasher's vol. 2 of Critical Concepts of Pragmatics (review circulated in
this forum). Dummett seems to have been one of the few to have taken
Frege's idea of "tone" seriously... I did learn of Frege's "tone" via who
Levinson characterises (in _Conversational Implicature_) as the "obdurate
Gricean", i.e. K. Bach. In his 'The Myth of Conventional Implicature' at
http://online.sfsu.edu/~kbach/Myth.htm
Bach writes:
"The Intuitive case for Conventional Implicature. What reasons have been
given for thinking there is such a thing as conventional implicature? [...]
The case for the convenational impliature-thesis seems to rest almost
entirely on intuition. All those who share this intuition and see no need
to back it up at least enjoy the good company of Frege and Grice. ... Grice
is usually credited with the discovery of conventional
implicature, but it was actually Frege's idea -- Grice merely labeled it.
(i) In 'Ueber Sinn & Bedeutung', Frege writes: "Subsidiary clauses
beginning with 'although' express complete thoughts. This conjunction
actually has no sense and does not change the sense of the clause but only
illuminates it in a peculiar fashion (Similarly in the case of "but"). We
could indeed replace the concessive clause without harm to the truth of the
whole by another of the same truth value; but the light in which the clause
is placed by the conjunction might then easily appear unsuitable, as if a
song with a sad subject were to be sung in a lively fashion. (Frege 1892:
155) (ii) Frege puts his idea in 'The Thought' this way: ""but" differs
from "and" in that with it one intimates that what follows is in contrast
with what would be expected from what preceded it. Such a suggestion in
speech make no difference to the thought" (Frege 1918: 522). In other
words, "but", beyond its conjunctive import, has no bearing on the truth or
falsity of what is said. Like Grice, Frege, beyond appealing to intuition,
does not even try to justify what he says about "but". We may define
conventional implicature as follows: "a proposition is a conventional
implicature of an utterance just in case (a) U (speaking seriously) is
committed to the truth of the proposition, (b) which proposition that is
depends upon the (or a) conventional meaning of some particular linguistic
device in the utterance, but (c) the falsity of that proposition is
compatible with the truth of the utterance." As is clear from the passages
quoted above, this is essentially what Frege (and later Grice) had in mind.
One of Frege's remarks might confuse the issue here. He characterizes the
import of "but" as merely "hinted" or "intimated", but this could be taken
to mean that the relevant dimension is degree of the utterer's commitment.
That can’t be right (or what Frege meant), for U could be as much committed
to what he is implicating as to what he is saying. Or it might seem that
Frege is saying that the import of words like "but" is not fully explicit.
But is this so? ... The question seems to be, rather, whether they affect
the truth-conditions of what is said. Accordingly, the CI-thesis should not
be read to mean that such terms have non-truth-conditional meaning (There
are other interesting phenomena that will not be taken up here, involving
what Frege called “coloring”, or what is popularly known as “connotation”,
and contrasts like ‘policeman’ vs. ‘cop’, ‘essen’ vs, ‘fressen’ (in
German), and ‘vous’ vs. ‘tu’ (in French)). Utterance modifiers do not
contribute to what is said but indicate something about the act of saying
it. They do not encode an element of thought but are essentially
communicative devices. But most of the expressions which have been put
forward, from Frege and Grice on, as sources of conventional implicatures
do contribute to what is said."
Bach develops his own view on 'but' in that essay. He works with the
following examples:
(1) Shaq is huge but he is agile.
(2) Shaq is huge but he is rich.
(3) Shaq is huge and he is rich.
(4) Shaq is huge and, unlike most huge people, he is agile.
(5) Shaq is huge and, unlike others on the list, he is agile.
(6) Shaq is huge and, contrary to what you said, he is agile.
(7) Shaq is huge, Shaq is agile, and there is a certain contrast between
being huge and being agile.[25]
Oratio obliqua test:
(8) Marv says that Shaq is huge, that he is agile, and that there is a
certain contrast between being huge and being agile.
(9) Marv says that Shaq is huge but that he is agile
Grice on "but". Bach writes: "Grice acknowledges that his “favored sense of
say” is somewhat stipulative, as is his contrast between what is said and
what is conventionally implicated. He writes: "I would wish to maintain
that the semantic function of the word ‘therefore’ is to enable a speaker
to indicate, though not to say, that a certain consequence holds.
Mutatis mutandis, I would adopt the same position with regard to "but" [...].
(1989: 121)" Grice does not explain how we are supposed to generalize from
his very small set of examples ("therefore", "but", and "moreover"), and he
does he not say what the theoretical utility is of his sense of ‘say’".
Bach refers to Grice's Causal Theory of Perception where -- in a section
which Grice did not reprint in _Studies_ -- deals at large with 'but': --
Grice's table in 1961 symposium being:
Four Catalysts
for Three Types
of Implication-Carrying Utterances.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| type of |I.truth- |II. utterer-|III. non- | IV. |
| utterance |conditional?| based? | detachable?|cancellable?|
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |
|1.presupposition| yes | yes | no | no |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |
|2. conventional | no | yes | no | no |
| implicatum | | | | |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |
|3.conversational| no | yes | yes | yes |
|implicatum | | | | |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |
One of the four examples that Grice considers is:
Gmaj C
(10) She was poor, and she was honest
(other versions has "but" she was honest)
D7 G
Victim of the squire's whim.
C
First he loved her, then he left her,
D7 G
& she lost her 'onest nime.
(This supposedly rhymes when uttered by English tommies).
(My favourite printed version of this is in Field-Marshall A. P. Wavell's
rendition by heart while he was posted in India, in _'Other Men's
Flowers'_, London: Jonathan Cape. Titled 'Poor But Honest', pp.366ff.
(the other three examples he considers are: "He has stopped beating his
wife" -- the worn-out joke, he says --; "He has beautiful handwriting", and
"My wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom"). Re the "but" case, he writes:
"In this case [as opposed to the "beating your wife" example and contra
"she was poor _AND_ she was honest") "the question whether the implication
(11) There is a contrast between her poverty
and her honesty.
is "slightly more complex." He notes: "There is a sense in which we may
like to say that it _not_ cancellable. If someone were to say
(12) She is poor, but she is honest,
though of course I do not mean to imply
that there is any contrast between
her poverty and her honesty.
"this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said; but though we
should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do _not_ think we should go so
far as to say that his utterance was _unintelligible_" (L Horn in his essay
on 'Pragmatic Theory' for F Newmayer has this as not cancellable, though...
-- thus he writes on p.120: "In [She was poor but she was honest] the
inference is that there is some contrast between her poverty and her
honesty. As in the presupposition of [Smith has left off beating his wife]
the inference is noncancellable."). Grice adds: "We should suppose that the
speaker had adopted a MOST PECULIAR WAY of
expressing the news that she was poor AND honest".
Incidentally, S., have you done "but" in the OED. I guess it has some nice
quotes... And don't forget the etymology: "by-out".
Refs.
Bach K. The myth of conventional implicature.
Boer S/W Lycan. The Myth of Semantic Presupposition, Indiana Linguistics
Club, Bloomington, Ind.
Dummett MAE. In Kasher reviewed in this forum.
Dummett MAE. The Seas of Language.
Fraser B. Pragmatic Markers. Pragmatics 6
Frege G 1892/1994, ‘On Sense and Reference’, in RM Harnish (ed.), Basic
Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., pp. 142-160.
Frege G. 1918/1994, ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, in RM Harnish (ed.),
Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., pp. 517-535.
Green MS. On Frege's |-. His homesite.
Grice HP. 1961, ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 35, pp. 121-52.
Grice HP. 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Harnish RM. Notes on Frege. His homesite. ['Highly' interesting]
Horn LR. Pragmatic theory. In FJ Newmeyer, Linguistics, the Cambridge Survey.
Karttunen L/S Peters. Conventional Implicature. In Syntax and Semantics,
vol. 11: Presupposition, C-K Oh and D. Dineen (eds.), Academic Press, New
York.
Rieber S. Conventional Implicature' Linguistics and Philosophy 20, 51-72.
Speranza JL. This and That.
Speranza JL. Join the Grice Circle!
Speranza JL. Say it with flowers: comments on Wharton.
Sperber D/D Wilson: 1986, Relevance, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 2nd edn. 1995.
Wavell A P. Other men's flowers. Cape.
Wilson D/D Sperber: 1993, ‘Linguistic Form and Relevance’, Lingua 90, 1-25.
==
J L Speranza, Esq
Country Town
St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
Telefax 00542214259205
http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
jls@netverk.com.ar
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Jan 23 2002 - 02:49:43 GMT