Re: RT list: Re: C-P (logical properties of procedural expressions)

I will now turn to logical properties of ... procedural expressions. The test of semantic compositionality will follow (this is assumed to be the strongest evidence for the distinction and I suppose I need to give it more thoughts)

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  2.4 Logical properties of ... procedural expressions
   
  Though not standardly listed as one of the criteria for the conceptual-procedural distinction, it is often claimed that logical properties are distinctive features of conceptual expressions as opposed to procedural expressions. Generally, it is argued that while conceptual expressions have logical properties (can enter entailment or contradiction relationships), procedural expressions do not enjoy these privileges (Wilson 200 .. unpublished lectures on concepts, Borsley p.c). Let’s first look at some procedural expressions and see whether they have no logical or enyclopaedic properties as claimed by RT.
   
  The first set of procedural expressions are pronouns such as I and he which relevance theorists would certainly treat as having no logical properties. However, suppose that the procedure encoded in he is something like ‘look for a male’. If he instructs the hearer to look for a male, it simultaneously tells him not to look for a female which is a contradiction[1]. Similarly, if the procedure encoded in I is something like ‘look for the speaker’, it tells the hearer to look for the real speaker or someone assumed to be the speaker though not necessarily the real one[2], not someone else who has nothing to do with the concept of the speaker. Thus the logical properties of pronouns are there to be seen.
   
  The second set of procedural expressions are discourse connectives such as so and but which are also claimed to have no logical properties. Recall that the procedure encoded in so is process what follows as a logical conclusion from the premise expressed by the first segment. Now if the hearer follows this instruction/guide, in other words, if he is constrained by the procedure encoded in so, he is not to process the second segment as premise from which to draw the conclusion expressed by the first clause – this line of inference would fit after all. Or consider the procedure encoded in but: process what follows as contradicting a manifest assumption. If the hearer is indeed constrained by this procedure/instruction, he is not to process what follows as strengthening a manifest assumption or he is not to process both segments as true at the same time. Again, the logical properties of discourse connectives are there to be seen.
   
  In general, it seems the claim that only conceptual expressions have logical properties whereas procedural expressions cannot be maintained. A procedure, an instruction, a guide must have its contents. It would be very odd to assume that this content have no logical properties yet still fulfilling its guiding or constraining function. To claim that procedures do not have logical properties is in effect to allow that a procedure can be something like ‘do A and don’t do A’. It is not clear how such a non-logical procedure/constraint can do the guiding/constraining job it is supposed to do. In other words, a procedure which have no logical properties would give contradictory instructions which confuse rather than guide the hearer’s interpretation. In addition, if we accept that a procedure/instruction must have some sort of content, this content must be conceptual by nature. It would be a fantastic miracle if a conceptually empty linguistic form could do the guiding or
 constraining job. With reference to but, so, after all, what relevance theorists are doing when they formulate the ‘procedural’ meaning of these expressions? They are fleshing out the conceptual properties of these expressions expressed by conceptual expressions like contradiction, conclusion etc.
   
  The next part is just speculation. Plse read with due care.
   
  There may indeed be no such a thing as a ‘procedural meaning’. It could be just conceptual meaning in disguise (perhaps due to the loss or blurring of the encyclopaedic entry). Perhaps, a more plausible possibility is that all linguistic forms are conceptual though one may be conceptually richer than another. Thus, the continuum may be something like:
   
   
  less conceptual more conceptual
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  Tom but he somebody because Cuba book
   
  I think a conceptual account (treating all linguistic forms as encoding conceptual information) may be more promising since it is generally agreed that concepts can be loosely used. A procedural account seems to be in conflict with loose use. I would be surprised if a procedure can be argued to be used loosely. A procedure should apply consistently. If a linguistic form encodes one constraint (but), that constraint should operate fully whenever the expression is used; if it encodes two constraints (nevertheless, however), the two constraints must operate fully whenever used. It would be very odd to assume that although an expression encodes two constraints, sometimes the two constraints operate, sometimes only one does – loose use of procedures. It is often suggested that procedural expressions are extremely context-sensitive (Unger 2005). If this is right, it suggests that procedures can be used loosely just like concepts! It may even suggest that expressions often
 claimed to encode procedures in fact encode concepts. Thus no real distinction.
   
  I am asking myself: Can we afford the distinction? Sperber in his reply to one of my previous posts seems to suggest that it is possible for a unitary procedual account of all expressions, thus treating all as encoding procedural information. Then I would say a unitary conceptual account of all expressions cannot be too remote.
  
  
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      [1] Also notice that he or she can be used as a general noun. Consider the question: Is it a he or a she? often asked about newly-born babies. And this question can be perfectly paraphrased as: Is it a male or female? Borsley (p.c) suggests that the above example shows that pronouns can be used as common nouns, but they can be used as common nouns, it also suggests that they encode conceptual information.
   

    [2] Consider ‘I need one-to-one support with every aspect of my daily life.’ – written in a care plan of a austistic service user (having no language at all) by the manager of a care home. The real speaker/writer is the manager who obviously does not need that kind of support. Clearly the manager must intend that utterance to be interpreted with the assumption that it is the service user who is speaking/writing, not the manager.

       
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Received on Fri Jan 4 14:14:45 2008