RT list: Cognitive effects and processing effort

At 20:36 13/10/2006, Stefan Malmberg wrote:
>...
>In a recent article (Implicature vs.Explicature: What's the
>difference?) (2006) Kent Bach writes :' The most obvious problem is
>of how to quantify and measure degrees of cognitive effects and
>processing effort. The formulations I've seen of relevance-theoretic
>concepts and principles are too vague to be of much help in this regard'.
>
>I too still find this a problem. Does anyone have any fresh insights
>into the matter?

My question is, why is this a problem, or if you prefer, what problem is it?

Since Relevance (1986), we have argued that relevance, effort and
effect pay a role in comparing actually competing cognitive inputs or
interpretations. The possibility of such local comparisons does not
depend on an ability to quantify or measure these variable in the
abstract. Then and since, numerous examples have been given comparing
inputs and interpretations in terms of effort and effect, and
experiments have shown how these could be used to derive and test
predictions. In a more recent paper ("Modularity and relevance" in
The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. Edited by Peter Carruthers,
Stephen Laurence, & Stephen Stich, available at
http://www.dan.sperber.com/relevance%20and%20modularity.htm) I have
suggested how the mind cound indeed be geared towards the
maximisation of relevance (i.e. the "Cognitive principle of
relevance") on the sole basis of these local comparisons. In fact
even "comparison" might be more than is needed, if by this we were to
mean a cognitive operation of ranking alternatives. A non-cognitive
sensitivity to gradients of effort and effect might be all that is required.

So, you might say, maybe our minds, in their ordinary workings, just
locally compare and don't quantify effect and effort, but we
scientists still would like to be able to do so. If you are moved by
this crave for measurement, then let me point out that what you
should be after are neurological variables. Effort is just
consumption of energy and should be measured in joules (how in
practice, this is another matter). The measure of effect is more
tricky and may have to do with spread of activation, which itself may
have neurochemical correlates. What I don't see is why the fact that
we don't know how to measure such variables should worry pragmatists,
and particularly relevance theorists. If "how to quantify and measure
degrees of cognitive effects and processing effort" is, as Bach
claims, "the most obvious problem" with relevance theory, then let's
cheerfully keep working on less obvious and more challenging problems
in the field.

Cheers, Dan

-----------------------------
Dan Sperber
Institut Jean Nicod
http://www.institutnicod.org
1bis avenue de Lowendal
75007 Paris, France

email: dan@sperber.com
web site: http://www.dan.sperber.com
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Received on Sat Oct 14 16:49:41 2006