(1)"The Melvin Hall dormitory is on fire."
(2)"The dean wishes to speak with you."
A question:
If it is mutually manifest to interlocutors that the utterer of
(1)/(2) is lying, can we say that the only possible interpretation of
either (1) or (2) will be that the addresser is being phatic (is not
really informing the addressee about anything, but is resorting to
contact/interpersonal relationship-maintenance)?
And based on this, is it possible to make a generalization that phatic interpretations
will inevitably arise if (pathological) dishonesty of the sender is mutually manifest
to both interlocutors?
Respect,
Andre
HTB> If I think that the utterer is an idiot, and has just drunk a lot of
HTB> alcohol, and only tentatively put forward an utterance, and I'm sleepy, then
HTB> we know, do we not, that I am going to spend a lot less processing effort on
HTB> the utterance than if the utterer were my leader, is giving expert testimony
HTB> in front of an important committee, and is speaking with firm conviction,
HTB> and I'm wide awake.
HTB> To capture this intuition, we would want to say that these factors are taken
HTB> into account by the hearer, either as a cognitive "preprocess" in deciding
HTB> how much processing effort to invest, or during the processing itself, as
HTB> some kind of filter or "colorer" of the results being obtaied as P proceeds.
HTB> I wonder if there is evidence, or even theory, of how this operates, how
HTB> these factors are taken into account.
HTB> Hanno Beck
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