Some below references, indexed & other, to Grice in R. Carston, _Thoughts &
utterances: the pragmatics of explicit communication_. ("*" indicates
unindexed). Cheers,
JL
J L Speranza.
----3-4. Grice described as an 'ordinary-language philosopher' who concentrated [the] analytical efforts on [...] meaning [...] * 6-7. The 'Gricean schema' for the figuring out of a conversational implicature (Grice 1975:70), *12 n2 Pragmatics as an 'adjunct' to semantics'. "Grice's principles", "inference guided by the Gricean maxims"; [Grice's] maxims"; relevance theory as having "the strongest cognitive processing orientation of all the various post-Gricean strands." *20. Grice on the indeterminacy of _implicature_. 21-2. Grice [1989:25] on reference assignment and disambiguation. ("Peter [Smith, Jones] plays [tennis, the piano] well") Conversational maxims not playing a role (for Grice). 49. Grice, 'the outstanding exception', [keeps] 'what is [explicitly conveyed]' as close as possible to truth-conditions." *84n3. Grice 1989:25 *85-6n11. 'Gricean gambit': "an _utterer_'s reference does not need affect the proposition; it comes as an implicature. Ex. Linda (who happens to believe that the Prime Minister is Mandelson) utters, "The prime minister is in the next room". Problem with opaque context: "Lucinda will be delighted to find that the prime minister is in the next room." -- "the Gricean gambit runs counter to [the] intuition that what the utterer of the [opaque construction] above explicitly conveys is that Lucinda will be delighted to find out that the person _whom she believes_ to be the prime minister is in the next room. If the utterer were to add, "Of course, the prime minister is not, in fact, the prime minister", the utterer would NOT be self-contradicting, but expressing the proposition that whoever Lucinda believes is the prime minister is _not_ the prime minister." *86n13. A 'Gricean' view on "France is hexagonal": "the utterer does not mean that France has 6 equal sides. While the proposition expressed contains an encoded concept; what is _meant_ by uttering it is something 'looser' (an implicature). *86n15. Research in "the broadly Gricean inferential pragmatic tradition." *88n23. Context-sensitivity as a 'Gricean gambit' -- ""by uttering 'The flag is blue' the utterer expresses a false proposition if the flag has some other colours on it, though the utterer may implicate [via informativeness] the true proposition that the flag is _partly_ blue." 94 Grice's work as "pivotal". *96-100. Grice on 'say' vs. 'implicate'. 'Grice's circle', as defined by Levinson: "Grice's account makes implicature dependent on a prior determination of 'the said'. The said in turn depends on implicature. Let us call this 'Grice's circle'" (2000:186). *98-101. The gap between encoded meaning and the proposition expressed [is] far greater than Grice envisaged [...]. [The Gricean circle] does NOT entail an interdependency between meaning and [inference]: a circle between [the explicit & the implicit] is inescapable once 'pragmatic intrusion' on truth-conditions is accepted. [Grice's] assumptions do not seem compatible with there being pragmatic maxim-driven input to what is explicitly conveyed. Therefore, [Grice's] assumptions must be revisited [or altogether dropped]". 101-16. On Grice's 'classical' theory. Section: 'Grice: saying & implicating'. First subsection, 'Odd statements but true', quotes from Grice's 'Prolegomena' on 'meaning'-'use' (1989:4). Grice's concern: to blocking some applications of a pattern of a maneovure by the "A-philosophers" ('a' as in 'asymmetry' and 'amoral'? (p. 207n2). A as in 'appropriateness'? Cf. "contexts of appropriate use" these philosophers are into identifying). Grice's 'own bid' to defend the causal theory of percep tion ("That pillar box seems red to me" +> I doubt or deny that it is). Travis on the failure of the Grice's programme. The second subsection, 'Contextual contributions to what is said', the role of Grice's conversational maxims in determining what is explicitly conveyed. Grice's ex.: ("fire pump" vs. "bicycle pump" -- 1989:222): "niece piece of textual excavation [by Neale]" -- possibly best left unexcavated. "While the importance of Grice in initiating an inferential approach cannot be denied], when it came to what is explicitly communicated, he was pretty much of a code theorist". Third subsection, 'Implicature: conventional & conversational': 5 cases of the former cited by Grice ("moreover", "but", "therefore", "so", "on the other hand" (1989:120, 361)). Grice on 'ground floor' speech acts. (1989:362). Grice's ex. in 'Vacuous Names': "Jones's butler mixed up the hats & coats." Problem with scope: ref. to Grice's 'Retrospective Epilogue' "allow[ing] an implicature to fall within the scope of an operator". 3 examples by Grice of a _generalised_ implicature (1989:37, 1981:185): "X is meeting a woman this evening" (+> not X's wife, mother, sister, or close Platonic friend); "I broke a finger yesterday" (+> the finger was my own); "He took off his trousers & got into bed" (+> in that order). Grice's overall scheme for meaning. ['conventionally' on p. 112 should read 'conversationally']. Grice as "ruling out the possibility of an entailment being implicated". "Very interesting" example by Grice in 'Retrospective Epilogue': "Heigh ho" (+> Well, that's the way the world goes). The fourth subsection, 'Saying, meaning, & making as if to say': the problem of tropes. "Jane is a raging inferno today." *102-4. The "Gricean gambit" revisited. *119. An important question arises [re enrichment] that did not arise for [Grice], according to [whom] the bracketed material would be part of what is conveyed explicitly." *126-7. Grice on conventional implicature: "My brother in law lives on a peak in Darien; his great aunt, on the other hand, was a nurse in the Great War." *134. Grice's conventional implicature best seen as a procedural constraint on the derivation of a common-or-garden _conversational_ implicature. 134-7. "Difference between Grice and relevance theory" the latter gives a more explicit account of how an implicature is [deductively] derived", granting it's the implicated PREMISE (rather than the conclusion) which oftem seems to have a special 'feel' to it.. *138. Failure of Grice's cancellability test. "Theorists with strong Gricean leanings ... maintain that it is [im]possible to cancel elements in Grice's narrow conception of the expressed proposition." *141. Grice on implicature indeterminacy. *142. "Aspects" of Grice's implicature [best seen] as contributions to EXplicature. *148-9. The Gricean Circle, a "matter of satisfying simultaneous constraints with no requirement on the order in which elements of the solution are recovered." 150. Grice on implicature as lying outside the expressed truth-conditions *151. Grice's second maxim of Quantity. 153. "It's not clear what Grice would have said about fragmentary subsentential utterances -- e.g. "Jill won't"" 156. "For Grice, the communicated proposition cannot be an implicature; that would leave the utterer without having conveyed anything -- and thus no way of calculating the implicature." *159-60. Grice on 'making as if to say', and 'conventional implicature'. *164. 'The Gricean concept of 'what is said'". 165. Grice's manoeuvre [as misfiring]." We should not however conclude that "Grice's cause [...] is lost". *166-70. Grice's "insistence" on implicature calculability. implicature is calculable". U utters "Smith's murderer is insane", when the item referred to is not Smith's murderer & is not insane, while Smith's actual murderer is indeed. Grice would say that the utterance is TRUE. The true proposition, however, would not be the one the utterer means". 172-3. Grice on reference assignment. "Harold Wilson is a great man" vs. "The British prime minister is a great man." "If Grice did believe that this was essential to the concept of 'what is [explicitly conveyed]', he would not hesitate over "Harold is a great man" and "The British prime minister is a great man". It would follow that something different is [explicitly conveyed] in the two cases." (p.175). *177. Grice on reference assignment and disambiguation. 179. Grice on encoded meaning. *181. The 'Gricean notion' of what is said. 182. "The Gricean notion of what is said should be laid to rest." *183-4. A 'Gricean gambit': "[There's] no place for a concept of what is said (in Grice's sense) within a cognitive processing-oriented account." *185. Grice's Modified Occam's Razor 187. Grice on "truth value". *188. Grice on what is [explicitly conveyed] is *meant*". *189. 'Gricean minimalism'. *190-2. "Unlike Grice, entailment and implicature are not necessarily mutually exclusive." 193. Grice on "embedded implicature" *197. [Grice] on 'what is [explicitly conveyed]' (always fully propositional) as being "very close (if not identical) to the truth-conditional logical form." 205. Grice on rationality. *207n2. Grice's maxims. N3 Adapted. N4: 'neo-Gricean pragmatics'. N5 Grice's [manoeuvre]. N6 Grice on 'imply' vs. 'state'. *208n7. Grice on 'say'. N8 Grice's 'theory-laden' view of 'say' [explicitly convey]. N9 "the Gricean tradition" *209n10. Grice's conventional implicature -- "the least satisfactory aspects of Grice's framework." N13: Grice on utterer's meaning: the "the reflexivity of intention." *210n6. Grice on 'say' generic for 'state', 'ask', & 'enjoin'. N17 Grice on Moore's paradox: where does the _expressing_ of a psychological attitude (such as belief) fit in? *213-4n27. Alternatives to "the Gricean view": a general proposition may be the one expressed by an utterance, while a singular proposition may come out as an implicature. N29 Grice on 'cancelability'. *216n40 'What is said [explicitly conveyed]' in the Gricean sense." *217n42. The Gricean notion of 'what is said [explicitly conveyed]'. N43. The Gricean 'what is said [explicitly conveyed]'. N44 "the minimal Gricean notion" (of 'what is said [explicitly conveyed]'). *219n52. The Gricean 'what is said [explicitly conveyed]. "Tom has had breafast. I don't mean to imply that he has had breakfast TODAY. Just that the rumour that he *never* has breakfast is somewhat ungrounded". *220n56. Grice on inference. 222-3. Grice vs. Strawson on "and" vs. "&" *227. "The Gricean treatment": "and" +> 'and then': the temporal connection as a generalised conversational implicature. *229-30. Grice's Modified Occam Razor. *230. Grice's maxim "be orderly". *233. Grice on cancellability *235. "In Grice's terms, the utterer 'makes as if to SAY' in order to IMPLICATE." *254. "Grice's account" *257. "I am at one with Grice and neo-Griceans ... that this [and +> and then] involves "pragmatic inference". *258-9n1. "Grice's view on 'and'". *260n7. Grice on reference assignment *265. "The Gricean approach" *271. Grice on scope ambiguity. *277. Grice's Modified Occam's Razor/ *278. [Analysis ...] 'in the Gricean spirit' 281-4. Grice on scope ambiguity. "Neo-Griceans" vs. "the [actual] work [by] Grice". *287. 'Grice's circle'. *289-92. The 'Gricean' conversational implicature of "~". *302-3. "Grice's truth-functional account" *311. "Grice's Occamite account" *312-15. "Grice's approach". N1: Grice on the iota operator. N2: Grice on what is [explicitly conveyed]. N6: "Grice's analysis". n7. "Grice's account and recourse". N8: "Gricean" explanation. n10: "Grice's inferential apparatus". n12: "Grice's approach". *317n19 "neo-Gricean generalised-particularised implicature distinction". *319n24. "Grice and the Griceans" 320. Grice on: "He's just an evangelist (+> He's a sanctimonoius, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber." *329. Grice's Modified Occam's razor. 330-1. Grice on "loose" lvs. "unfettered" as applied to "life" 333: Grice on "You're the cream in my coffee". *334. "Grice's concept of 'what is said [explicitly conveyed]'". *336. "Retreat to Grice". 341. Grice on the maxims of Quality. *344-5. "The Gricean story [re: metaphor] as involving a flout of the first maxim of Quality. *362. Grice on monosemy and univocality. *368n3: Cohen vs. Grice. N4 "Gricean" 'accessibility'? N5. Grice on "unfettered life" -- a trivially true or a metaphorical predication? *370n8. A counterpart to "Grice's s utterer-oriented first maxim (& supermaxim) of quality". N9 Grice on demonstrative reference. *382-3. Grice's 'Conversational Principles'. *393. Grice, H. P. Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 repr in WOW; The causal theory of perception. Aristotelian Society vol. 35 repr. [minus Section II on 'Implication'. JLS] in WOW. Logic & conversation. William James Lectures. Utterer's meaning, sentence meaning, & word meaning. Foundations of Language 4 repr. WOW. Vacuous names. in Davidson/Hintikka. Utterer's meaning & intentions. Philosophical Review 78. repr. WOW. Logic & converation. In Cole & Morgan, repr. WOW. Further notes on logic & conversation. In Cole, repr. WOW.1981. Presupposition & conversational implicature. In Cole, repr. WOW. Reply to Richards. In Grandy/Warner. Retrospective epilogue to WOW. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard.
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