W. Davis on Implicature

From: Jlsperanza@aol.com
Date: Fri Jan 17 2003 - 15:17:44 GMT

  • Next message: Jlsperanza@aol.com: "Implicature and Impliciture"

    In a previous set of notes I referred to W. Davis's book on _Implicature_
    (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cf. M Green

       [PDF] Review of W. Davis, Implicature
       File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -- View as HTML
       http://www.people.virginia.edu/~msg6m/davisreview.pdf
    http://216.239.37.100/search?q=cache:7Q3YTaeVxjsC:www.people.virginia.edu/~msg

    6m/davisreview.pdf+Davis+Implicature+Mitchell+Green&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

             "[A]n insightful, meticulously researched
             and challenging work that no student of
             pragmatics can afford not to master. [...]
             Davis has raised the level of discussion of
             conversational pragmatics."

    and J. Saul
    http://www.shef.ac.uk/~phil/staff/saul/davis.html

            "[T]he problems [Davis] raises [...] are
            serious and important problems which should
            give any Gricean pause. This is an extremely
            worthwhile book, even for those who disagree
            with it."

    I here offer for the record a listing of the sections to W. Davis's book --
    with the corresponding numbered examples.

    (The most relevant sections for RT seem to be four: 3.5. Relevance
    implicatures; 3.12. "Relevance" theory; 4.2. The presumption of relevance;
    and 5.8. Relevance implicatures [revisited]).

    Cheers,

    JL
    J L Speranza

    =====

    W. Davis, IMPLICATURE.

    0. Introduction.

    1. Concept and theory.

    1. 1. The concept of implicature.

    Example of what Davis calls "utterer's implicature":

    (1) A: Where can I get gasoline?
         B: There's a station around the corner.
                 +> which is open and has gasoline to sell.
                      (after Grice, WOW)
         It's _U_ (rather than x) that implicates that the station
         is open and has gasoline to sell.

    Two examples of what Davis calls "expression implicature" (as opposed to
    "utterer's implicature"):

    (2) Bill is sick, so he should rest.
         +> Bill's being sick implies that he should rest.

    (3) Some died.
         +> Not all died.

    1.2. Theoretical importance.

    "Implicature" distinguished from "presupposition":

    (4) (a) Your crimes are inexcusable.
    >> You have committed crimes.
          (b) Your crimes are _not_ inexcusable.
    >> You have committed crimes.

    1. 3. Gricean theory.

    1.4. Grice's razor.

    1.5. Sufficiency.

    2. Differentiation.

    2.1. Quantity implicatures.

    (1) (a) Some (many, at least 90% ...) died.
               +> ~ (All died).
         (b) It is possible true.
               +> ~ (It is necessary true).
         (c) The food is warm.
               +> ~ (The food is hot).
         (d) Steve believes the plant is alive.
              +> ~(Steve knows the plant is alive).

    (2) A: Did anyone die?
         B: (a) Some did.
                   +> ~ (All died).
              (b) Yes.
                    ~+> ~(All died).

    (3) (a) Some died.
               ~+> ~(Only some (a few, a minority) died).
         (b) Some died.
               ~+> ~(Some were killed (murdered, assassinated,
                      executed, ...)).
         (c) Some died.
              ~+> ~(35.72% died).
         (d) Over 50% died.
              ~+> ~(Over 51% died).
         (e) Some people died.
              ~+> ~ (Some women (mothers, grandmothers, ...) died).
         (f) The repairs will take some time.
              ~+> ~ (The repairs will take a long time).
         (g) Hummel wrote some fine music.
              ~+>~(Hummel wrote only fine music).
         (h) Some odd numbers are prime.
              +>~(Many (most) are).
         (i) John may win
              +>~(John will win).
         (j) John sees a book on the table.
             ~+>~(John sees all (many, most) books on the table).
         (k) 2 is an even number.
             ~+>~(2 is necessarily an even number).
         (l) 2 is an even number
             ~+>~(S knows that 2 is an even number).
        (m) 2 is a number.
              ~+>~(2 is an even (odd, prime, composite) number).
        (n) The food is not hot.
             ~+>~(The food is nearly hot).
         (o) John is not happy.
               ~+>~(John is unhappy (miserable, depressed, ...)).
         (p) John is in California.
              ~+>~(John is in southern California).
         (q) It is snowing.
              ~+>~(It is snowing and cold (wintry, cloudy, ...)).
         (r) It is snowing or raining.
              ~+>~(It is snowing).
         (s) It is hot and/or humid.
             ~+>~(It is both hot and humid).
         (t) John kicked the dog.
             ~+>~(John kicked the dog intentionally (unintentionally, softly)).
         (u) John lost a book.
              ~+>~(John lost his book (Mary's book, the red book, ...))
        (v) John didn't shop and buy wine.
             ~+>~(John neither stopped nor bought wine).
         (w) I'll pay you $5 if you mow the lawn.
              ~+>~(I'll pay you $5 if and only if you mow the lawn).

    (4) (a) John entered a house.
               +>~(John entered his house).
         (b) John entered a house.
             ~+>~(John entered S's house).
         (c) John lost a book.
              +> John lost his book.
         (d) John drove a car.
             +>~(John drove his car)
         (e) John drove a car.
               ~+>~(John drove his car).

    (5) (a) John could have solved the problem.
               +>~(John did solve it).
         (b) John was able to solve the problem.
              +> John did solve it.

    (6) A: Did anyone get an A?
         B: Some got Bs.

    (7) A: Did you get Hillary Clinton's photograph?
         B: I got Bill Clinton's.

    2.2. Tautology implicatures.

    (8) War is war.
         +> It is the nature of war that terrible things happen.

    (9) A war's a war.
         +> One war is as bad (or as good) as another.

    2.3. Conjunction implicatures.

    (10) (a) John took off his trousers and went to bed.
           (b) John went to bed and took off his trousers.

    (11) John took off his trousers; he went to bed.

    (12) (John took off his trousers) & (John went to bed).

    (13) (a) John both took off his trousers and went to bed.
           (b) It is true both that John took off his trousers and
                 that John went to bed.

    (14) (a) John dropped the glass and it broke.
           (b) John flipped the switch and turned on the light.
           (c) John was in the kitchen and he was baking bread.

    (15) John set a record and cleared 15 feet.

    (16) (a) John dropped the glass; it broke.
           (b) John slipped; the road was icy.

    (17) (a) John dropped the glass and it broke.
           (b) John slipped and the road was icy.

    (18) (a) If John went to bed and took off his trousers, he did
                things the hard way.
           (b) John did not go to bed and took off his trousers.
           (c) I hope that John took off his trousers and went to bed.
          
    (19) (a) Take off your trousers and go to bed!
           (b) Did you take off your trousers and go to bed?

    (20) I will play racquetball, tennis, or squash.

    (21) (a) Jack married Jill, and Ted married Alice.
           (b) Steve and Terry helped move the piano.
          (c) John brought apples, organges, and pears.
          (d) Cats are animals, vertebrates, and mammals.
          (e) It will be rainy and cold today.
          (f) John visited London, and didn't see Big Ben.
          (g) John saw Bill, and met either Charles or Andrew.
          (h) John took the exam, and I'll be amazed if he passed.
          (i) "John got into bed" is true and "John took off his trousers" is
    true.
          (j) Some violinists are pianists, and some pianists are violinists.
          (k) 6 is an even number, and 7 is odd.

    2.4. Idioms.

    (22) (a) NP went to the bathroom.
           (b) NP urinated or defecated.

    2.5. Non-Gricean speech.

    3. Determinacy and calculability.

    3.1. Background constraints.

    3.2. The meaning constraint problem.

    3.3. The rhetorical figure problem.

    3.4. Indeterminate implicatures.

    3.5. Relevance implicatures.

    "Let us consider a variation on dialogue (1) of Chapter 1."

    (1) A: I am sick.
         B: A flying saucer is nearby.

    "A may be dumbfounded by B's response because A believes that it is false,
    and that even if it were true it would not be RELEVANT to his being sick.
    Nevertheless, B may well have been implicating that A could get help from the
    doctors on the flying saucer. Alternatively, B may have been implicating that
    A may have gotten sick because of the flying saucer. B might even have been
    implicating that the flying saucer would take him to a hospital, or that
    either the doctors on the saucer would help him or the aliens would take him
    to the hospital. B might have been implicating many things, because there are
    any number of ways her remark could have been relevant to the accepted
    purpose of the conversation. [...] The determinacy principle fails because
    there are too few constraints for the Cooperative Principle to require, or
    even make probable, any particular beliefs. There are just too many ways of
    being relevant. Calculability fails because conversational principles do not
    enable us to determine which of all the things B might have been implicated B
    actually implicated." (p. 74).

    3.6. Close-but implicatures.

    (2) A: Did anyone get an A?
         B: Some got Bs.

    (3) A: Did you get Hillary Clinton's photograph?
         B: I got Bill Clinton's.

    (4) A: Everyone in my class got an A.
         B: Some in mine got Bs.

    (5) A: I'd love to have Hillary Clinton's photograph.
         B: I have Bill Clinton's.

    3.7. Quantity implicatures: the possibility of ignorance.

    3.8. Quantity implicatures: other possibilities.

    (6) A: Did anyone die?
         B: (a) Some did.
             (b) Yes.

    (7) (a) SOME bottles are cool.
         (b) Some bottles are COOL.

    3.9. Tautology implicatures.

    3.10. Conjunction implicatures.

    3.11. Conflicting principles.

    (8) Some S are P.

    3.12. "Relevance" theory.

    "Sperber and Wilson's principle [of relevance] has the same difficulty [as
    Grice's Cooperative Principle has]. ... "Grice's Maxim of Relation ["be
    relevant"] is implied by [Sperber and Wilson;s] principle of relevance, it
    seems, but doesnot exhaust it." (p. 100).

    3.13. Modal implicatures.

    (9) (a) I must tell you that I love you.
         (b) I may tell you that I love you.
         (c) Must I tell you that I love you?
         (d) May I tell you that I love you?

    (10) (a) I must tell you how much I love you.
                +> I love you a lot.
           (b) I will tell you how much I love you.
                +> I love you a lot.
           (c) I may tell you how much I love you.
                ~+> I love you a lot.
     
    (11) (a) Must I tell you how much I love you?
                +> I love you a lot.
          (b) Will I tell you how much I love you?
               ~+> I love you a lot.
          (c) May I tell you how much I love you?
               +> I love you a lot.

    (12) (a) May I tell you how much I love you?
                -- You might not like what I tell you.
           (b) May I tell you how much I love you?
                It's more than a little but less than a lot.
          (c) May I tell you how much I love you,
               and so so with a fair degree of precision?
          (d) I must tell you how much I love you,
               because the sergeant ordered me to.
          (e) I must tell you how much I love you,
               but I don't want to lie.
          (f) I must tell you how much I love you,
              but I don't really know.

    (13) (a) I have to tell you how much I love you.
                +> I love you a lot.
           (b) I don't have to tell you how much I love you.
                +> I love you a lot.
          (c) I can't tell you how much I love you.
               +> I love you a lot.
         (d) I need to tell you how much I love you.
              +> I love you a lot.

    (14) (a) Given "You have to tell me how much you love me": I agree.
                ~+> I love you a lot.
           (b) Given "You don't have to tell me how much you love me". I know.
                ~+> I love you a lot.
           (c) Given "You can't tell me how much you love me?". No.
                ~+> I love you a lot.

    (15) Given "Tell me how much you love me"
           (a) I must.
                ~+> I love you a lot
          (b) Must I?
               ~+> I love you a lot.
          (c) May I?
               ~+> I love you a lot.

    (16) Must (Do I have to) I tell you how much I love you?
           (a) +> I don't want to tell you; or
           (b) +> I don't need to tell you because you should
                     already know, or
           (c) +> Perhaps you don't know.

    (17) Must I TELL you how much I love you?
          (a) ~+> I don't want to tell you.
          (b) +> I don't need to tell you because you should already know.
          (c) ~+> Perhaps you don't know.

    (18) Do I HAVE to practice?
           (a) +> I don't want to practice.
           (b) ~+> I don't need to practice because I am already
                       good enough
           (c) +> Perhaps I am already good enough?

    4. Presumption and mutual knowledge.

    4.1. The cooperative presumption condition.

    (1) A: I was out drinking with the guys.
         B: Are you lying to me?
         A: I've never lied to my Juliet, and never will.

    (2) B: Were you with Jennifer last night?
         A: I was out drinking with the guys.

    (3) A: Did you eat all the chocolates?
         B: I ate some.

    (4) A: Do you like my new dress?
         B: I like all your dresses.

    (5) A: I demand to know why you marked this problem wrong.
         B: I'm sorry, but I am late for class.

    4.2. The presumption of relevance.

    "Because Sperber and Wilson replace Grice's Cooperative Principle with their
    Principle of Relevance, the analogue of the cooperative presumption in their
    theory is the "presumption of relevance"... This presumption is no more
    necessary than Grice's." (p. 119).

    4.3. Mutual knowledge.

    4.4. Meaning versus communication.

    4.5. Implicature and inference.

    (6) A: Let's stop and get some money for groceries.
         B: The bank was flooded yesterday,
              so it may not be open.

    (7) A: Let's stop and have a picnic by the river.
         B: The bank was flooded yesterday,
              so it may not be open.

    4.6. The recognition of implicature.

    5. The existence of implicature conventions.

    5.1. Conventions.

    5.2. Quantity implicatures.

    5.3. Tautology implicatures

    5.4. Disjunction implicatures.

    5.6. Modal implicatures.

    5.7. Figures of speech.

    5.8. Relevance implicatures.

    5.9. Close-but implicatures.

    5.10. Manner implicatures.

    5.11. Interrogative and imperative implicatures.

    6. The nature of implicature conventions.

    6.1. First-order versus second-order semantic conventions.

    6.2. Idioms.

    6.3. Indirect speech-act conventions.

    (1) (a) I didn't eat some of the cookies. I ate ALL of them
         (b) I didn't travel to France. I DROVE there.

    (2) (a) I didn't break a finger. I broke two.
         (b) I didn't broke a finger. I broke HIS.
         (c) I didn't broke a finger. I broke MINE.

    (3) (a) The restaurant wasn't air conditioned,
               the waiters weren't polite, and the food was warm too.
         (b) The restaurant wasn't air conditioned,
               the waiters weren't polite, and the food was cooked too.

    (4) (a) John skillfully was able to solve the problem.
         (b) John skillfully could have solved the problem.

    6.4. The role of conversational principles.

    (5) (a) I lost an N.
         (b) I lost my N
         (c) I lost someone else's N.
         (d) Nothing
         (e) I lost a red N.
         (f) I lost your N.
         (g) I have Alzheimer's disease.
         (h) I have black hair

    6.5. The principle of antecedent relation.

    6.6. The universality of implicature conventions.

    6.7. Conclusion.



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