A "confusing conflation"? From the banal to the bizarre (& back)
Module and central processor. Or is it -- Module _or_ central processor?
A "confusing conflation" (Levinson)? Don't think so. Rather, divergent
philosophies of mind...
In "PS: autonomous syntax", R. A. Hudson writes:
>Generative Autonomy [...] is the claim that
>(autonomous) syntactic structures are generated
>by an autonomous grammar - i.e. by one which is
>separate in some important respects from the rest of
>cognition, i.e. a module. [...]
>I don't really see what it has to do
>with relevance theory as such, but I know it's
>historically linked to RT.
Levinson seems to further, with caveats, this historical link, as per the
following three quotes from his _Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of
Generalised Conversatinal Implicature_:
"Those who hope that a theory of linguistics
will be a theory of a closed mental module
(a la Fodor) will have to yield up semantic
interpretation to another module or mental
process. These conclusions have already been
reached and stoically accepted by Sperber
and Wilson (1986, 1995:257-8) and their
followers on the grounds of partially diferent
but parallel arguments." (p. 186).
"The London School (Sperber and Wilson, Kempson,
Carston, and colleagues [...]) couple this claim
about two distinct kinds of pragmatic inference
to a logically independent claim of Fodorean
modularity: a semantics (or more generally
linguistics) module is by definition a closed
processing system. It follows that semantics
stops before any pragmatic processing begins. [...]
Semantic representations are syntactical objects;
their _interpretation_ belongs to the Fodorean
central processor, where a theory of communication
belongs. Let us call this move _semantic retreat_."
(p. 190).
"I [...] argue that pragmatics should be considered
a component in a theory of meaning, not of course
in the Fodorean sense (Fodor [The Modularity of
Mind] 1983) of a specialised, encapuslated module,
but in the sense (more normal in linguistics) of a
set of distinct principles. [...] Wilson and Sperber
(1986) argue explicitly against this (although
there may be some
*confusing conflation*
here between the explicit notion of a linguistic level
or component and a Fodorean module proper). [...] However,
even if pragmatic principles belong to no specialised
linguistic component, but are free-floating in a
Fodorean central processor, none of the arguments
[...] about the interrelation of semantics and
pragmatics seem to be weakened [...]" (p. 404).
I guess I like the alliteration, "confusing conflation" (at least it's not
'confused' -- how's that for syntactic ambiguity). Of course I rather think
it's all a matter of different underlying philosophies of mind.
Readers of Fodor's early _LOT_ will recall his "Griceian" [sic] manifesto
-- in taking, as Levine puts it, with R. Cummins, "a Gricean approach to
meaning", by intending to build, "theory of communication" which is, a la
Grice 1948/1957,
"Griceian in spirit"
(Fodor, LOT, p. 104).
(Fodor's take on Grice's _conversational maxims_ to be found, rather, in
his _Psychosemantics_: "Paul Grice has made us aware
how complex these sorts of pragmatic determinants
[...] can become".
(_Psychosemantics_, p. 100). Never too determinant to become monotonic
(Levinsoneans read: _undefeasible_) though, methinks.
It all may remind Grice's subtitle of his presidential address at the
American Philsophical Association on the philosophy of mind ("philosophical
psychology"): from the banal to the bizarre (and back).
Cheers,
JL
Refs.
Cummins R. Meaning and mental representation. MIT.
Fodor JA. The language of thought. Sussex: Harvester Press.
The modularity of mind. MIT
Psychosemantics. MIT
Grice HP. 1948. Meaning. Repr. in WOW
1967. Logic and Conversation. In WOW.
1976. Method in Philosophical Psychology: from the
Banal to the Bizarre. Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Association, vol. 48. Repr in _Conception_
Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard.
The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon.
Levine J. Philosophical Review 87
Levinson SC. Presumptive meanings: the theory of generalised
conversational implicature. MIT
Sperber D & D Wilson. Relevance: communication
and cognition. Blackwell
==
J L Speranza, Esq
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