Dear all of you,
my name is Markus Tendahl and I am a PhD student at the
University of Dortmund, Germany. I am doing research in the fields
of cognitive semantics and pragmatics, in particular Relevance
Theory. Currently, I am trying to combine aspects of Lakoffian
cognitive semantics and Relevance Theory with the intention to see
how this combination could be useful in a refined understanding of
the role of metaphor in political discourse.
As the title of this mail suggests, this is not just an introduction of
myself. During the last few days I have been trying to come to a
clear understanding of what Sperber/Wilson have in mind with
'manifest assumptions' and I would be very glad if someone could
help me along. I will try to make my problems as clear as possible.
Whatexactly is the difference between 'usual' assumptions
and 'manifest' assumptions?
S&W say that assumptions are not inferred non-
demonstratively (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 40), but manifest
assumptions may be. They further say that non-demonstrative
inference includes two processes: a) a process of hypothesis
formation (including deductive rules) and b) a process of
hypothesis confirmation (a non-logical cognitive phenomenon)
(Sperber & Wilson 1995: 40, 69).
If assumptions are only the outcome of deductive reasoning but
manifest assumptions are the outcome of deductive reasoning
plus confirmation, what justifies the claim that manifestness is
a weaker notion than knowledge or 'usual' assumptions?
I am afraid I do not fully understand the examples S&W provide
(Sperber & Wilson 1995: 40-41). Regarding the
Chomsky/Reagan example, S&W say that it was not an
assumption of ours before that these two persons have never
played billiards together. But S&W also say that we entertain
assumptions we have never represented mentally before. So
why would the assumption mentioned before be disqualified
from being classified as a usual assumption? Where do we
have hypothesis formation and where do we have hypothesis
confirmation? The same problems occur in the other example
dealing with the car in the street. How is our hypothesis that
there is a car in the street, according to S&W, formed and
confirmed?
I really do hope that you have got an understanding of where my
problems lie and I would really appreciate any answer.
Thanks in advance.
Best wishes,
Markus
________________________________________________________
Markus Tendahl
Universität Dortmund
Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik
Emil-Figge-Straße 50
44221 Dortmund
Phone:
(0231) 755-5877 (Office)
(0231) 1061041 (Private)
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