R. Stephenson writes re his essay in applied linguistics: "I am having
trouble with a few details. I am trying to understand what form thoughts
have based on RT. Specifically, I am trying to match Lakoff's and Reddy's
idea that not all metaphors are propositionally based because metaphors are
so inherent to our understanding of life that do not need a propositional
counterpart to be understood."
You might find of interest to know (if you don't know it already) that Z.
Todd & B. Nerlich (of U.Leicester and Nottingham, respectively) hold a
public "FLN" -- Figurative Language Network. The network was founded by
Nerlich, Todd and D.D.Clarke and is currently being operated by Todd, who
also maintains at Leicester an useful site with bibliographical and other
info.
Stephenson: "I know that S&W say that not all thoughts can be represented
semantically (contra Katz et al and principle of effability), which may or
may agree with Lakoff. In another place they write:
The search for optimal relevance leads the
speaker to adopt, on different occasions,
a more or a less faithful interpretation
of her thoughts. The result in some cases is
literalness, in other metaphor (p. 237)
"If I understand it correctly, it seems that both literalness
(propositional statements?) and metaphors are a
function of semantic representation."
Literalness = proposional statement? What would a _non_-propositional
statement be, pray? (:)). I think "literalness" is what _standard_
philosophers (and linguists) :) refer to as truth-conditions, mainly
(Davidson, Grice, Gazdar, Levinson)?
"So again, what is the form of a thought?"
Now, _that's_ a general question, if ever I heard one. :). Sounds almost
Wittgensteinian. You may like to consult the (rather obscure, but could be
worst. :)) work by Gricean author C.A.B.Peacocke, whose inaugural lecture
at Oxford was precisely on questions of thought and content.
Sperber recently circulated with this list biblio details on his book
on _meta-representations_. This suggests that a metarepresentation, ala
1. Utterer Intends Addresse Believes Utterer Believes It is Raining.
is a representation of a representation (a la metalanguage is language on
language). Therefore,
2. Utterer Believes It is Raining
would be a representation proper (cfr. Recanati?). Orthodox Griceans (like
Peacocke) would, I believe, oppose the view that mental representations
(_so-called_) are representations proper. It's a linguistic utterance which
represent MENTAL CONTENT (see A. Avramides's book on Grice for MIT). But to
assume that a mental representation itself represents leads to either some
sort of a regressus ad infinitum or a naive homuncular theory of
psychological/propositional attitudes (see R. Cummings, _Meaning & Mental
Representation_).
H. P. Grice himself develops a (promising, in my view) sketch of a
general theory of representation in his _Studies in the Way of Words_,
Retrospective Epilogue, pp.358-9.
Also of relevance here may be JR Searle's contribution to the PGRICE
festchrift (*P*hilosophical *G*rounds of *R*ationality: *I*ntentions,
*C*ategories, *E*nds, ed. R. Grandy, Clarendon -- to which S/W also
contributed), viz. "Meaning, Communication, and Representation".
Best,
JL
Grice Circle
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