The form of thoughts

From: Robert Stephenson (RobertS@twu.ca)
Date: Fri Aug 31 2001 - 20:44:16 GMT

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    Hello all,
            I am nearly finished my MA in applied linguistics, but am having
    trouble with a few details necessary for my thesis. I am trying to
    understand what form thoughts have based on RT. Specifically, I am trying
    to match Lakoff's (1993) and Reddy's (1993) idea that not all metaphors are
    propositionally based because metaphors are so inherent to our understanding
    of life that do not need a propositional counterpart to be understood. I
    know that S&W say that not all thoughts can be represented semantically
    (contra Katz et al and principle of effability), which may or may agree with
    Lakoff. In another place they write: "The search for optimal relevance
    leads the speaker to adopt, on different occasions, a more or a less
    faithful interpretation of her thoughts. The result in some cases is
    literalness, in other metaphor." (p. 237) If I understand it correctly, it
    seems that both literalness (propositional statements?) and metaphors are a
    function of semantic representation. So again, what is the form of a
    thought? I am sorry if my question is elementary, but I am not sure what
    the RT position is. Thanks.

    Bob



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