RE: RT list: VS: Ray Gibbs on logical form

Dear Kristin and All,

This is just to say that I agree with Kristin's points; we reached a
similar conclusion at our seminar in Cambridge. The suggestion would take
us to what Recanati calls 'meaning eliminativism' I think? A tempting but
difficult position to defend.

All the best,
Kasia

On Feb 18 2011, boerjess@rz.uni-leipzig.de wrote:

>Dear All,
>
>before I start saying what I want to say, I'll briefly state my
>understanding of the concept 'logical form', as I -- as well as others
>of you who expressed as much in their posts -- have the feeling that
>since Ernst August Gutt's original post which started this discussion,
>quite different notions of logical form have been elaborated on.
>
>My understanding of logical form with respect to a linguistic
>utterance is that it is the semantic representation of that utterance,
>built up according to the Principle of Compositionality and as such
>not necessarily constituting a proposition. Derivatively, I also use
>the term (interchangeably with 'semantic form') to refer to the
>semantic representation (i.e. the lexical meaning) of individual
>linguistic expressions. (Having said this, I also agree with Billy
>Clark's suggestion that the term may also be used `...without any
>reference to linguistic meaning or utterance interpretation.')
>
>So much for clarification.
>
>In reply to what Billy Clark stated in his post, I have a question
>(though this might turn out to not be relevant). Also, I'd like to
>bring in another aspect concerning the notion of underspecification of
>semantic meaning and the consequences this has for the concept of
>logical form.
>
>Beginning with my question, Billy Clark wrote
>
>> In another sense, 'logical form' has been used as a synonym (or near
>> synonym) > for 'semantic representation', i.e. as a representation
>> of the linguistically > encoded meanings of linguistic expressions.
>> I don't think it follows from Relevance Theory that we entertain
>> logical forms in this latter sense as part > of the interpretation
>> process, even though we might want to represent them as > part of
>> our theory to account for linguistic meaning and utterance
>> interpretation.
>
>I'm wondering whether the characterisation in RT of the process of
>ad-hoc concept formation does not actually presuppose that an
>expression's encoded meaning is entertained during processing (but
>maybe I have a faulty understanding of what `to entertain' *means* in
>this connection)?
>
>As I understand it, ad-hoc concept formation is a process that starts
>from an expression's encoded meaning and adjusts this with respect to
>the actual utterance context. So, the encoded meaning is accessed
>initially during processing, but subsequently worked on and
>adjusted/changed.
>
>And this brings me to my second point. Generally, I think that the way
>ad-hoc concept formation is characterised (referring to adjustment of
>encoded meaning) and the idea of the semantic meaning of an expression
>being no more than a pointer to conceptual structures from which the
>actual meaning of the expression in question is build (as proposed
>e.g. by Carston 2002), are in conflict (I should mention that this has
>also already been observed by N. Burton-Roberts in his (2005) paper
>Varieties of semantics and encoding). If a pointer constitutes no more
>than a concept schema, i.e. a maximally semantically underspecified
>'logical form', the question arises whether it makes sense to assume
>that it is this highly abstract meaning representation that is being
>'adjusted'.
>
>Turning to the idea of semantic underspecification and the pointer
>metaphor as such: the main appeal of the idea of (linguistic) semantic
>underspecification seems to be that it allows the formal semanticist
>to uphold the principle of compositionality in the face of the
>abounding variability/flexibility of meaning a particular phonological
>form may be used to express in different utterance contexts. So, if
>one assumes that lexical meanings are pointers (i.e. semantically
>underspecified), then this constitutes a further reason why the
>logical form build up within the language faculty for a particular
>utterance could not be a proposition: it does not even include
>determinate readings for (most of the?) expressions used. In a sense,
>what are called the lexical meanings of expressions are no more than
>place-holders for actual 'values' that are retrieved or constructed
>from the conceptual space the lexical meaning is taken to point to.
>
>However, if this is how logical forms of utterances are characterised,
>I share the apprehension that it's a hopeless enterprise trying to
>device some empirical test that could validate its psychological
>reality.
>
>And also, although from a formal perspective it is convenient to model
>the lexical meaning of an expression as involving a parameter or
>variable that has to get fixed during interpretation (namely, by
>replacing it with the actual reading appropriate in the context), the
>question arises whether this really is anything more than just a
>formal tool.
>
>In other words, I'm not sure whether anything crucial would be lost,
>if one were to take the pointing metaphor seriously and assumed that
>understanding the particular phonological forms a speaker used,
>involves the (partial?) activation of the conceptual regions -- from
>which the actual meaning (logical form/proposition) that is expressed
>on the occasion is determined -- associated with those phonological
>forms and that, in a sense, it is the phonological forms themselves
>that 'point' and so no lexical semantic form, highly underspecified
>and no more than a variable, or place-holder would be necessary.
>
>Best Wishes
>Kristin Börjesson
>
>Linguistics Institute
>University of Leipzig
>Beethovenstrasse 15
>04107 Leipzig
>
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-- K. M. Jaszczolt, Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy of Language,
Head of Department of Linguistics, MML, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick
Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA, and Newnham College, Cambridge CB3 9DA, United
Kingdom, tel. +44 1223 335744; http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/~kmj21

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Received on Fri Feb 18 17:09:51 2011