Dear Barbara, Dear All;
There are several versions of the theory-theory and of the simulation
theory of mindreading. They may well converge, in part in content, and in
part by recognizing that not all mindreading follows the same procedure.
For instance, when you see one person chasing another, surely, you
understand their intentions without having to simulate and discover in
yourself what would cause you to behave in the way they do. On the other
hand, much in literature clearly appeals to our ability to identify with
others. The mindreading involved in utterance interpretation may well
involve yet another procedure.
Deirdre and I have just completed an article on the issue,
"Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading" to appear in Mind
and Language. that I have just posted it on my web site
(www.dan.sperber.com)
and its mirror
(http://perso.club-internet.fr/sperber/),
(as well a revised version of our "Truthfulness and Relevance"
article, which we have recently re-submitted). I hope the
"Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading" article will help
answer Barbara's important question.
Dan
At 20:52 30/10/01 +0000, Barbara MacMahon wrote:
Dear All,
I'm interested to know how relevance theorists view the simulation
theory/theory theory debate in accounts of theory of mind. I don't know a
lot about either, but have a feeling (for which the evidence has faded) that
RT goes better with theory theory - perhaps because of the focus on
inferencing in theory theory. However, I've recently read the simulationist
Goldman's 'The Mentalizing Folk' in Sperber ed.'s Metarepresentations, and
find it convincing, particularly in my own context of working on an
explanation of the literary reading process. In fact Goldman says that
versions of the two theories are not incompatible anyway. Does anyone have
any thoughts on this?
With best wishes,
Barbara
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