EXPLICATURE AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE*

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Abstract

Attitudinal phrases such as *I suppose* and *probably* are often considered to fall outside of the truth-conditional content of the utterances that contain them. But as yet no satisfactory account has been given of the role of these expressions in communication. The Gricean distinction between *what is said* and *what is implicated* proves inadequate in explaining the use of such expressions. I claim that the distinctions made within Relevance Theory do enable a convincing account of these expressions. The distinction between the propositional form of an utterance and its explicatures gives us the necessary concepts for an analysis of these phrases in both their parenthetical and their non-parenthetical uses.

1 Introduction

First, I will present Urmson's (1966) argument that attitudinal phrases or adverbs such as *I suppose/guess* and *probably/supposedly/unfortunately* do not always function descriptively, i.e. do not always describe the psychological state of the speaker (Urmson 1966: 194-5). Urmson (1966) calls these uses *parenthetical*, which I will explain in the next section.

Secondly, I will show that the Gricean notions of *what is said* and *what is implicated* cannot explain Urmson's (1966) *parenthetical use* by pointing out some problems found in Prince et al's (1983) implicature analysis of hedging devices such as *I think* and *probably*. I will then present the Relevance notions of *the propositional form of an utterance* and *explicature*. The former notion can capture descriptively used attitudinal verbs while the sub-notion of the latter which is a *higher-level explicature* (discussed in Section 7) can capture attitudinal sentence adverbs and non-descriptively used attitudinal verbs. The notion of *explicature* can be used to explain the role these attitudinal expressions play in the hearer's utterance interpretation processes.

2 Parenthetical Uses

Let us consider the following examples:

(1) *I suppose* that your house is very old.
(2) Your house is, I suppose, very old.
(3) Your house is very old, I suppose.   (Urmson 1966: 193)

Urmson (1966: 193) argues that 'in some contexts it will be virtually indifferent, on all but stylistic grounds, whether the verb occurs at the beginning, middle, or end of the indicative clause with which it is conjoined'. He argues that in all of the cases, *I suppose* does not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance (its truth-conditional content). Rather, he argues that *I suppose* in (1) - (3) signals the way the proposition (=indicative clause) should be interpreted: the signal concerns what degree of belief in the proposition is being claimed by the speaker: i.e. the degree being, naturally, a weak one(Urmson 1966: 199).

I would like to mainly analyze *I suppose* in (1) whose use Urmson (1966: 193) technically calls *parenthetical use*. He does not use this term only to mean the grammatical feature we observe in the use of *I suppose* in (2) and (3): i.e. a piece of information *I suppose* being slipped into another. By this term he means that *I suppose* does not have a descriptive sense and does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Urmson (1966) would argue that (1) and the following (4) convey the same truth-conditional content.

(4) Your house is very old.

When (4) is uttered with an uncertain tone of voice, the effect of the utterance may be very similar to that of (1). That is, in (4) the speaker's uncertainty is expressed by means of intonation and it does not affect the truth-conditional content of (4). In (1) the speaker's uncertainty does not affect the truth-conditional content of (1) either, according to Urmson (1966), even though *I suppose* is explicitly given.

Urmson (1966: 212) claims that 'they (parenthetical verbs) help the understanding and assessment of what is said rather than being a part of what is said'. As for attitudinal adverbs, Greenbaum (1969: 202) also claims that attitudinal adverbs such as *probably* and *supposedly* 'express an opinion on the notion of the truth-value of what is being said' and suggests that these adverbs fall outside of *what is said*.

Now Urmson (1966) and Greenbaum (1969) made their claims before Grice (1975) established his technical notion of *what is said*. Urmson (1966) and Greenbaum (1969) are concerned with the propositional content expressed by an utterance, where the point of an utterance lies, and for this they seem to use the term *what is said*.

Grice (1975: 44), on closer examination, gives two characterisations of *what is said*. On the one, it is the truth-conditional content of an utterance. On the other, it is the outcome of linguistic decoding, reference assignment and disambiguation. For Grice the former characterisation is identical to the latter and he does not seem to have cases such as (1)-(3) in his mind.

In order to avoid confusion, I will use the term *proposition expressed* for Urmson's (1966) and Greenbaum's (1969) sense of *what is said* which concerns the point of an utterance, and which can be an embedded clause of the linguistically encoded content as seen in (1). And I will use *what is said* in Grice's sense which is the linguistically encoded content with reference assigned, indexicals fixed and ambiguity resolved.

The parenthetical use of *I suppose* can be contrasted with (5)B where the explicitly given attitude of the speaker seems to contribute to the proposition expressed. Urmson (1966) might analyze (1) and (5)B as describing different

states of affairs.

(5)   A: I suppose that this house is quite new.
       B: Well, *I suppose* that it is very old.

                                    (adapted from Urmson 1966: 194)

Although Urmson (1966) does not explicitly say that *I suppose* in (5)B constitutes a part of the proposition expressed, he points out the difference between it and (1) and indicates that they should be given distinct analyses. There seems to be good reason to assume that B's attitude *I suppose* is not used parenthetically, that is, it describes the state of B's supposing that the house is very old. *I suppose* in (5)B is uttered in clear contrast with what A supposes, and the point of the utterance lies with this contrast between what A supposes and what B supposes.

Now, what kind of explanation can the Gricean notion of *what is said* offer regarding the difference between (1) and (5)B? In the next section, I will examine some Gricean analyses of explicitly given attitudes.

3 Gricean Analyses

Let us assume that the Gricean *what is said* is the linguistically encoded content with reference assigned, indexicals fixed and ambiguity resolved. Then it should include the explicitly given *I suppose* in (1) and (5)B which are both linguistically encoded. That is, parenthetical and non-parenthetical *I suppose* are a part of what is *said* but there are no sub-notions of *what is said* which can distinguish the former use from the latter. So we can argue that the Gricean notion of what is said cannot really explain parenthetically used *I suppose* and cannot capture the difference between (1) and (5)B.

Let us now assume that the Gricean *what is said* is the truth-conditional content of an utterance which amounts to the notion of *proposition expressed*. Then it includes *I suppose* in (5)B but it does not include *I suppose* in (1). That is, what is said by (1) is (4) and it captures the difference between (1) and (5)B. However, in (1) the speaker conveys to the hearer that she has limited commitment to the truth of the embedded clause, even though the point of the utterance does not lie with this limited conviction of the speaker. Now if this attitude is not a part of *what is said*, what is it?

The only alternative for a Gricean analysis would be to say that (1) *implicates* that the speaker is not totally committed to the truth of the house being old. This is obviously counter-intuitive since *I suppose* is uttered in (1) and there is nothing implicit about it. Let us nevertheless pursue this implicature analysis a little. In fact, this is how Prince et al (1982) analyze explicitly given attitudes such as *I think* and *probably*. Prince et al (1982) have analyzed the use of hedging devices in physicians' discourse, including a group of devices for expressing limited commitment to a proposition. One of their examples is given in (6):

(6) *I think* his feet were blue.
(7) His feet were blue.   (Prince et al 1982: 85)

They argue that (6) conveys the same proposition as (7) and that *I think* in (6) does not affect the propositional content but *implicates* that the speaker is less than fully committed to its truth.

Prince et al(1982) do not say what kind of implicature the use of *I think* in (6) gives rise to. So let me consider the kinds of implicature Grice (1975) discusses. Since the implicature of the speaker's limited conviction in the proposition expressed is not confined to a particular situation of utterance, we may safely say that this implicature is not a particularized conversational implicature. Then it is either a generalized conversational implicature or a conventional implicature.

The crucial difference between conversational and conventional implicatures is that the former are calculated on the basis of Gricean maxims. Now, which maxim is involved in giving rise to the implicature of the speaker being less than fully committed to the proposition? Regardless of which maxim is being observed or flouted, we still get the same implicature, so we can safely assume it is not a conversational implicature of any sort. There simply is no process of calculation or inference involved. This leaves us with only one option: that the implicature is a conventional implicature.

According to Grice (1975: 44), 'in some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said'. Conventional implicatures are not derived inferentially via maxims but are merely attached by convention to particular words or expressions.

However, *conventional implicature* seems to be a problematic category. Grice (1961, 1975) gives only two examples, *but* and *therefore,* though various people have given other examples for this category: e.g. *even, too, yet,* discourse connectives such as *so* and *moreover,* certain syntactic structures like clefting and intonational effects. Levinson (1983: 128-9) even includes socially deictic items such as *tu* and *vous* in French and argues that *vous* used to a singular addressee conventionally implicates that he is socially distant from, or socially superior to, the speaker.

All that this range of cases have in common is that they do not seem to be part of what is said, nor to be derived via Gricean maxims. That is, *conventional implicature* is simply a label for aspects of utterance meaning that do not fit into the positively defined theoretical classes. Any such negatively defined category is highly unlikely to form a natural class.

Blakemore (1987) has given an alternative analysis of one group of classes, the so-called discourse connectives including the examples given by Grice(1961, 1975), i.e. *but* and *therefore.* She argues that these words do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance but their main function is to indicate how the proposition they introduce is to be interpreted as relevant by constraining the hearer's choice of context for its interpretation. She argues that connectives such as *but* and *therefore* do not map onto concepts but have the function of prescribing how the propositional form they introduce is to be processed: i.e. their semantics is procedural rather than conceptual (Blakemore 1987: 144).

However, phrases like *I think* and *I suppose* do encode conceptual content. Two distinct properties i.e. procedural and conceptual are associated with *but/therefore* and *I think/suppose* which are supposed to give rise to conventional implicatures. Again, the ragbag nature of the category of conventional implicature is evident.

Without any developed explanation of what it means to say that *I think/suppose* gives a conventional implicature of low speaker conviction, it amounts to no more than saying that it does not fall into the two better understood categories of *what is said* and *what is conversationally implicated*. We must try to give a more positive explanation of the role of these explicitly given attitudes. My general conclusion then is that Prince et al's implicature analysis of the speaker's expression of limited conviction in (6) is inadequate.

Thus, whichever Gricean notion we resort to, the parenthetical use of *I suppose* and *probably* cannot be properly explained. Now I shall introduce the Relevance-based notions of *the propositional form of an utterance* and *explicature* which will give us the distinctions necessary for an explanation of parenthetical uses of attitudinal expressions and explain the role of these expressions in the hearer's comprehension.

4 The Propositional Form of an Utterance

Sperber & Wilson (1986: 86) claim that linguistic decoding assigns a logical form to a linguistic stimulus. The logical form assigned by linguistic decoding is semantically incomplete, i.e. not fully propositional, since reference, the time of utterance etc. are not identified. A semantically complete logical form is fully propositional i.e. is capable of being true or false, and it is called a *propositional form*.

An incomplete logical form encoded by an utterance is enriched so as to be semantically complete, i.e. to be fully propositional, and this fully propositional form, Relevance Theory assumes, is the truth-conditional content of an utterance. For example, it is only after reference assignment and disambiguation, etc. that the incomplete logical form encoded by (1) can be developed into a fully propositional form something like (8) which is the truth-conditional content of (1):

(1) *I suppose* that your house is very old.
(8) The speaker supposes at t that the hearer's house is
   very old at t.
       (t = some identifiable time span)

The linguistic decoding can only recover an incomplete logical form and it is the job of pragmatic processes to develop it inferentially into a propositional form (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 65-7). So pragmatic processes are necessary so as to identify the truth-conditional content of an utterance.

Urmson (1966) might not be happy with (8) as the propositional form of (1), since he might identify the propositional form with the notion of *proposition expressed*. However, the latter notion concerns the point of an utterance but the former does not: e.g. the propositions expressed by (1) and (5)B would be different since the point of each utterance is not the same, while the propositional forms given by (1) and (5)B are the same since they are developed from the same logical form.

Contrary to Urmson (1966) who claims that *I suppose* in (1) functions parenthetically i.e. non-descriptively, Relevance Theory predicts that *I suppose* in (1) functions descriptively i.e. contributes to the truth-conditional content as it is a part of the propositional form. Then, (1) and (5)B have the same truth-

conditional content and it might appear that Relevance Theory cannot capture the difference between (1) and (5)B.

However, the difference between (1) and (5)B is not in fact attributed to their propositional contents which, I have argued, are identical. What we have to consider here is where the point of an utterance lies, or in relevance-theoretic terms, where the main relevance lies. A propositional form is relevant if and only if it has contextual effects. The propositional form with *main relevance* is the one from which the main bulk of the contextual effects of the utterance is derived. For example, the point of the utterance (1) lies with (9):

(9) The hearer's house is very old at t.

This is because (9) can interact with contextual assumptions such that if the hearer's house is very old, he will have to work a lot on it, and can yield a range of implicatures including that the hearer will have to work a lot on it. In deriving an implicature such as above (i.e. contextual effect), attitudinal phrases such as *I suppose* and *probably* are irrelevant. The most relevant information is (9) and I argued that this is where the main relevance lies.

On the other hand, when *I suppose* is not a pure parenthetical use as in (5)B, the main relevance lies as much with the expression of attitude as with the embedded proposition. In such a case the propositional form (8) that includes this relevant piece of information would give rise to contextual effects.

Thus, the non-technical notion of *the proposition expressed* is unnecessary in Relevance-based analyses. That is, without resorting to this non-technical notion, Relevance Theory captures the difference between (1) and (5)B via considerations of where the main relevance lies. The speaker's limited conviction in (1) and (5)B is communicated to the hearer as part of the propositional form, and this way, *I suppose* plays a role in the hearer's comprehension.

The Gricean notion of *what is said* seems to be identified with the Relevance notion of *the propositional form of an utterance* and seems to exhaust what is explicitly communicated in the Gricean framework. In Relevance theory, however, the propositional form of an utterance is not the only assumption which is explicitly communicated to the hearer (I am confining myself to literal cases; in non-literal cases such as metaphor, the propositional form of an utterance is not communicated to the hearer). For example, Sperber & Wilson (1986: 82) argue that 'the logical form of an uttered sentence can be integrated into an assumption about what the speaker has said'. That is, the propositional form (8) can be integrated into the following description (10):

(10) The speaker has said that the speaker supposes at t
     that the hearer's house is very old at t.

(10) is not the propositional form of the utterance but it is communicated to the hearer at the explicit level. In the next Section, I will introduce the Relevance-based notion of explicature and in Section 6, I will discuss more fully the role the propositional sub-part of (8) (= (9)) plays in the hearer's comprehension.

5 Explicature

An utterance is considered to have only one identifiable propositional form (=the truth-conditional content), but it can have many explicatures. For example, the following utterance (11) has one identifiable propositional form (12) and can communicate explicatures such as (13) and (14). That is, we are assuming that it is manifest to the speaker and the hearer that the speaker really believes the truth of (12) and the explicature (14) is communicated to the hearer.

(11) She went shopping.
(12) Mary1 went shopping at t.
(13) The speaker has said that Mary1 went shopping at t.
(14) The speaker believes that Mary1 went shopping at t.
    (1 = identified as a particular individual)

Sperber & Wilson (1986: 181) point out that the speaker who communicates (14) does not automatically communicate (12). For example, suppose it is mutually manifest that the hearer believes that Mary never goes shopping and has no reason to believe the speaker's utterance (11) more than his own opinion. Then the speaker could not have intended her utterance to be a relevant one by making manifest to the hearer that Mary went shopping, but only by making manifest that she believes that Mary went shopping.

Let us, however, suppose that the hearer has decided that the speaker intended to communicate both that the speaker believes that Mary went shopping and that Mary went shopping. In other words it is mutually manifest that the speaker intended the hearer to infer (12) from (14). Then the utterance (11) is an ordinary assertion and the propositional form (12) is communicated to the hearer as an explicature.

Sperber & Wilson (1986: 182) define explicatures as communicated assumptions which are developments from a logical form encoded by an utterance. For example, explicatures such as (12), (13) and (14) are developed from the logical form encoded by the utterance (11).

Now let me go back to (1). The propositional form given by (1) is (8) and the assumption which has main relevance is (9):

(1) *I suppose* that your house is very old.
(8) The speaker supposes at t that the hearer's house is very old at t.
(9) The hearer's house is very old at t.

Let us assume that (1) is an ordinary assertion and (8) is communicated to the hearer. Then (8) is an explicature though the main relevance does not lie there. So the speaker's limited conviction is communicated to the hearer as a part of an explicature which happens to be the propositional form of (1). I have said that the main relevance lies with (9) and (9) gives rise to the main bulk of the contextual effects. Now the inferential process of deriving (9) is clearly not deductive since *suppose* is a non-factive verb (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971: 374) and the truth of (9) does not deductively follow from (8). In the next section I will discuss how (9) can be derived.

6 General Detachment Procedure

The utterance (1) encodes a full logical form, something like (15) which embeds a logical form (16):

(15) [X supposes [Y's house is very old]].
(16) [Y's house is very old]

(16) can be developed so as to be a fully propositional form, something like [The hearer's house is very old at t] (=(9)). (9) can interact with contextual assumptions and would doubtless give rise to contextual effects. Now the question is how to infer the logical form of the embedded clause from the full logical form encoded by (1), i.e. how to infer (16) from (15). One possibility is *general detachment procedure* which allows the detachment of all those subparts of a logical form which themselves are logical forms. This might function quite generally allowing hearers to assess a much wider range of assumptions and assess their relevance (following a suggestion of Robyn Carston).

Obviously this procedure is not deductive and is not carried out by any elimination rule which, Relevance Theory (1986) assumes, is the only kind of logical rules available to human mind. At the moment, I can only say that the detachment procedure is not a deductive operation but a formal one which can operate on well-formed logical forms.

However, this general detachment procedure is highly plausible in our mind and I will show that this is not an ad-hoc operation suggested just to explain the case of inferring (9). For example, suppose the hearer and the speaker entertain a contextual assumption such as (17):

(17) If Mary is in the kitchen, she is cooking.

Now the hearer asks 'Where is Mary?' and the reply he gets is (18) from which he might derive (19):

(18) Mary is either in the kitchen or in the living room.
(19) Mary1 is cooking at t [weak assumption].
   (1 = identified as a particular individual)

Clearly the following assumption (20) is used to interact with the contextual assumption (17) so as to derive (19).

(20) Mary1 is in the kitchen at t [weak assumption].

So a logical form [P] is separated off from [P or Q] by some detachment procedure although it cannot be done deductively. [P] is a weak assumption since detachment procedure does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion even if the premise is true. So (20) is a weak assumption and this weakness of (20) is carried over to the contextual implication (19) in the deductive process of Modus Ponens. The disjunctive logical form [Mary is in the kitchen] is detached from the full logical form, developed to be fully propositional, and used to derive implicatures including (19) i.e. to achieve contextual effects.

Let us now consider the following (21) which communicates (22):

(21) John denied he was a thief. (suggested by Neil Smith)
(22) John denied he took money.

Now (22) cannot be communicated to a hearer if there was not any detachment procedure of inferring the logical form (23) from the full logical form encoded by (21).

(23) [he was a thief] w (w = a weak assumption)

Though (23) is a non-deductively inferred weak assumption, it can be developed to a propositional form such as (24) which can then interact with contextual assumptions such as (25) and give rise to implicatures including (26). (26) can be put into an assumption schema (27) given by the utterance (21) and can be communicated to the hearer:

(24) John1 was a thief at t [weak assumption].
(25) If John1 was a thief, he took money.
(26) John1 took money at t [weak assumption]
(27) John1 denied _____

Thus the suggested detachment procedure seems to operate quite generally and is not confined to cases such as (1).

Let us now turn to attitudinal adverbs such as *probably* which, I claim, contribute to *higher-level explicature.*

7 Higher-Level Explicature

Let us consider the following.

(28) *Probably* your house is very old.

Does *probably* in (28) contribute to the propositional form of the utterance as *I suppose* in (1) does? My claim is that it does not and this seems to be supported by the fact that it does not fall within the scope of logical operators such as negation.

(29) It is not the case that *probably** your house is very
    old.

(28) can be contrasted with (30) in which *It is probable* does contribute to the propositional form of the utterance; *It is probable* falls within the scope of negation as (31) shows.

(30) *It is probable* that your house is very old.
(31) It is not the case that *it is probable* that the hearer's house is very old.

So (28) and (30) have different propositional forms. The propositional form of (30) is that it is probable that the hearer's house is very old. However, the propositional form of (28) seems to be (32) and as Urmson (1966: 200) argues, *probably* is used parenthetically, i.e. non-descriptively.

(32) The hearer's house is very old at t.

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The adverb *probably* maps onto a concept [probably]. This can be shown by the fact that the speaker of (28) can be challenged by a hearer as regard to her truthfulness in her use of *probably*: i.e. (28) can be followed by a reply such as (33):

(33) That's not true. You KNOW that the house is very old.

Such a reply is possible because *probably* encodes conceptual content which can be true or false in its own right (Wilson & Sperber: this volume). I argue that wherever *probably* is uttered, in the beginning as in (28), in the middle, or at the end, it does not contribute to the propositional form of an utterance. This can be confirmed by (34) and (35), i.e. *probably* does not fall within the scope of negation:

(34) It is not the case that your house is, *probably** is very old.
(35) It is not the case that your house is very old, *probably**.

The same argument goes for parenthetically used *I suppose* in (2) and (3). It falls outside of the scope of negation as (36) and (37) show:

(36) It is not the case that your house is, *I suppose**, very old.
(37) It is not the case that your house is very old, *I suppose**.

Also, (2) and (3) can be followed by (33). This shows that *I suppose* in (2) and (3) encodes conceptual content but does not contribute to the propositional form of the utterances. *I suppose* in (1), on the other hand, does fall inside of the scope of negation as seen in (38):

(38) It is not the case that *I suppose* that your house is very old.

Relevance Theory predicts that the conceptually encoded content of an utterance can contribute to the explicitly communicated content in the following two ways: it can contribute to the propositional form of an utterance , and it can contribute to *higher-level* explicatures (Wilson & Sperber: this volume). Examples of the latter are sentence adverbs such as *unfortunately*. In (28) *probably* does not contribute to the propositional form of the utterance but it does contribute to a *higher-level* explicature such as (39):

(39) It is probable that the hearer's house is very old.

(39) is developed from the propositional form (32) and the speaker's uncertainty in (28) is communicated as part of the higher-level explicature (39).

Unlike *I suppose* in (1), the general detachment procedure is not necessary

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for (28) since its full logical form (=(32)) can interact with contextual assumptions and give rise to a range of contextual effects. As for (30), on the other hand, the general detachment procedure is likely to be in operation since (32) which would doubtless give rise to contextual effects, would have to be derived from (30). The main relevance may not lie with the speaker's attitude of uncertainty in (30), yet the speaker's limited commitment to the truth of (32) is communicated as part of an explicature which is the propositional form of the utterance.

Sentence adverbs which contribute to higher-level explicatures seem to be those of this attitudinal type. For example, *artistically* and *architecturally* in the following utterances (40) and (41) are sentence adverbs but they do make a contribution to the propositional forms of the utterances. It is counter-intuitive to argue that these utterances have the identical propositional form (42).

(40) *Artistically* your house is interesting.
(41) *Architecturally* your house is interesting.
(42) The hearer's house is interesting at t.

I argue that sentence adverbs and parenthetically used verbs (as in (2) and (3)) do not contribute to the propositional form of an utterance when they are attitudinal expressions. For example, *certainly* in (43) is a relevant piece of information which is uttered in clear contrast with *probably* in (28).

(43) (uttered in reply to (28))
    Oh, *certainly* the house is very old.

However, *certainly* is an attitudinal sentence adverb and falls outside of the scope of negation as (44) shows, and I argue that it does not contribute to the propositional form of the utterance:

(44) It is not the case that *certainly** the house is very old.

Certainly in (43) is in clear contrast with the speaker's low commitment in (28) and the main relevance lies as much with this attitude of the speaker as with the embedded clause. However, the contrast is in fact being made between the higher-level explicature (39) and the following higher-level explicature (45), not between the propositional forms given by (28) and (43) which are identical i.e. (32).

(45) It is certain that the house is very old.

I have argued that unlike *I suppose* in (1), attitudinal sentence adverbs such as *probably* and *certainly* do not contribute to the propositional form of an utterance but they do contribute to higher-level explicatures. This way the speaker's low or high conviction can be communicated to the hearer. I argue that attitudinal sentence adverbs are always, what Urmson (1966) calls, *parenthetically used* and fall under the Relevance-based notion of higher-level explicatures.

All higher-level explicatures are all those that embed the propositional form. Higher-level explicatures exclude explicatures such as (8) which is a completion of the full logical form encoded by an utterance. That is, higher-level

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explicatures always subsume the propositional form of an utterance and at the same time they are not identified with the propositional form of the utterance.

8 Conclusion

In this paper I argued that *I suppose* in (1) and (5)B is communicated as part of an explicature. In both of the uses, it contributes to the propositional form of the utterance. However, the main relevance does not lie with the same explicature: in (5)B *I suppose* constitutes a part of an explicature where the main relevance lies while in (1) it constitutes a part of an explicature where the main relevance does NOT lie. That is, in (1) the embedded propositional form which is separated off from (8) via general detachment procedure gives rise to the main bulk of the contextual effects, while in (5)B the full propositional form does. This shows that we do not need the non-technical notion of *proposition expressed* in order to capture the difference between (1) and (5)B. The Relevance-based notion of *explicature*, via considerations of where the main relevance lies, explains the role of, what Urmson (1966) calls, *parenthetical* and *non-parenthetical* use of *I suppose* in the hearer's interpretation and captures the difference between (1) and (5)B.

Contrary to Urmson (1966), I have argued that *I suppose* in (1) functions descriptively, i.e. non-parenthetically and contributes to the truth-conditional i.e. propositional form of the utterance. As for attitudinal sentence adverbs such as *probably* and *certainly*, I share the intuition with Urmson (1966: 200) that they always function non-descriptively, i.e. parenthetically and do not contribute to the truth-conditional, i.e. propositional form of an utterance. I argue that they contribute to higher-level explicatures, and a speaker's low or high conviction expressed by these adverbs is communicated to the hearer as part of higher-level explicatures.

As Urmson (1966) argues, parenthetically used *I suppose* in (2) and (3) does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance, i.e. falls outside of the propositional form of the utterance. Like attitudinal sentence adverbs, I argue that *I suppose* in (2) and (3) does not contribute to the propositional form but to a higher-level explicature.

Thus, Relevance Theory explained what Urmson (1966) and Greenbaum (1969) did not try to explain and what the Gricean analysis failed to explain: i.e. the role explicit expressions of attitudes such as *I suppose* and *probably* play in the hearer's comprehension. The latter is always communicated as part of a higher-level explicature. And the former is communicated either as part of an explicature which is the propositional form of the utterance (e.g. (1)), or as part of a higher-level explicature (e.g. (2) and (3)).

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