Re: RT list: Degrees of inference?

Hi,

Being in a similar line of business to Ian and Ernst August (translation,
specifically), perhaps also Ronnie, and working in Chinese-Western
exchanges among others, I also find this topic very interesting, and would
like to zero in on some of these concepts more closely.

I agree that the (alleged) 'low/high context' distinction is probably not
in the language; (this might be part of the illusion which Ernst August
seems to hint the Western observers in question may be under), and that a
Western observer's judgment of the processing cost demanded by the Japanese
speech is likely to be skewed by the effort it seems to demand of him/her
(the outside observer).

So I share Ernst-August (at least provisional) scepticism, but since he
tantalisingly ends on an upbeat note, saying that this should be a testable
hypothesis, I'm intrigued about two things:

1.Methodology: 'studying the content of the cognitive environments' would
seem necessary (though not easy), and it seems one would also have to take
a corpus of (e.g.) Japanese addressing Japanese and compare it to corpora
of say, Americans talking to Americans, Maltese talking to Maltese, etc.
(In interpreter training we avoid using speeches aimed only at local
audiences in the same language community, for obvious reasons; it's hard
enough already).

2. The implications of the 1995 proviso about 'the communicator's abilities
and preferences". Leaving aside varying expressive abilities (another bane
for interpreters), surely the more 'sophisticated' operators in all
(surviving, successful) cultures would have evolved different ways of
keeping valuable information to themselves, while 'keeping things going'?

Might the generalisation turn out to be that *linguistic* communication is
given a more ritual/social, less informative role in some cultures, in the
shared understanding (generating appropriate expectations in participants
of that culture) that whatever *information* one prefers to make accessible
is derived and conveyed by other means (perhaps encoded in some other
dimension of the event - aesthetic, visual, choreographic, etc. [cf. as
suspected by Barthes]).

With apologies for seeming to delve into ostensibly non-RT frameworks like
functions of language or semiotics - but as Ernst August says, none of this
would contradict RT or the POR. Only a culturally-determined 'default
setting for processing effort' doesn't seem plausible, if as we believe, RT
is universal.

Cheers,

Robin

Robin Setton
Interprète de conférence
Conference Interpreter (AIIC), OECD

On 28 November 2013 17:40, <ernst-august_gutt@sil.org> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> This discussion is interesting but I think Ronnie Sims' observation
> that somehow "it doesn't hit the spot" is very pertinent here. It seems
> that too little attention is paid to a couple of important points of RT. .
>
> 1) Optimal relevance is not universally defined, but always context
> dependent - which means, in effect, dependent on the mutual cognitive
> environment of the communication partners. The point from which this
> discussion started, however, seem to be cross-cultural judgments: in this
> case, scholars from one culture comparing the processing effort, esp. that
> incurred by inference, in acts of communication in another culture. This
> means, however, comparing two most likely non-commensurate things if the
> cognitive environments of both acts of communication are not the same,
> which in these cases they hardly will be. So what seems to be happening in
> these evaluations is something like the following: one is trying to compare
> the processing cost [e.g. steps of inference] that would one would have to
> spend in one's own cognitive environment to obtain an utterance considered
> satisfactory in one's own cognitive environment with the effort it takes
> one to process, in one's own cognitive environment, the utterance actually
> offered in quite a different cognitive environment. For example, a Western
> person considers the processing cost he/she would need to invest in
> processing the utterance of an East-African person to obtain the
> information a Western person would expect to be told, and comes to the
> conclusion that this information is either only very weakly implied or
> requires a lot of inferencing, which could have been avoided by a more
> direct answer, of the kind expected in a Western cognitive environment. From
> an RT point of view, this does not make sense. Optimal relevance, with both
> processing cost and cognitive effects involved, have to evaluated relative
> to the cognitive environment in which they take place.
>
> 2) Also, t
> he 1995 version of optimal relevance includes a very significant modificationin its second part, bringing in the preferences of the communicator: "b)
> The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant compatible with the
> communicator's abilities and preferences" (Sperber, D., and D. Wilson.
> 1995:270). This means, among other things, that the communicative POR
> does not oblige the communicator to supply, without unnecessary processing
> effort, the information the addressees might like to get but a) only
> information that is in line with the abilities of the communicator - e.g.
> the communicator can't supply info she does not have or can only come up
> with as good a stimulus as her particular skills allow - and b)
> information that the communicator is prepared to supply (preferences).
>
> This has far-reaching implications for the topic under discussion here.
> Suppose the mutual cognitive environment of a group contains the belief
> that information is a very valuable, and potentially also risky, commodity:
> one never knows what others might do with that information. When a person
> with that cognitive environment is asked by a stranger how far it is to a
> certain place or where such and such a person lives, then that person
> would, if indeed he felt he had to answer, tend to keep the information
> quite vague: "Oh, it's over there, quite far" - even if he was in a
> position to give a much clearer answer. While the vagueness of the answer
> probably would not surprise a person sharing a similar cognitive
> environment - it's only what any stranger could expect to be told - an
> outsider to the culture might conclude that either these people don't know
> how to be precise - how to formulate an optimal stimulus - or that they
> expected the addressee to work hard to figure out from that answer where
> they'd have to go. In the latter case, in the spirit of the discussion
> going on here, one might conclude that this is a culture that generally
> demands higher processing efforts from the audience than some other
> cultures. Similarly with business negotations, perhaps in an Asian context:
> if it is customary to reveal only as little of one's own interests to the
> other party as possible in order to get the best deal for oneself and to
> keep open as many options as possible, then, again, one will naturally tend
> to be rather vague, saying only as much as one feels one has to say to
> remain polite and to keep things moving. The other party, if they share the
> same cognitive environment, will interpret the answers given along these
> lines - probably also trying to figure out what the first party is trying
> to hide. Such interaction obviously involves a lot of mental work. This
> would not be needed in another group with less sophisticated conventions
> where one is quite ready to reveal information.
>
> The important point is that, in all these cases, people are actually
> guided by the communicative POR (adequate cogn. effects with minimal
> processing effort) - keeping in mind the preferences of the communicator,
> and the mutual cognitive environment in which the communication takes
> place. To take the observable difference in processing cost as evidence for
> cultural parameters that somehow - arbitrarily? - determine a sort of
> "default level" of processing effort or inference for that group that is
> e.g. higher than the "default level" of some other group would be missing
> the point entirely. It would be much more useful to study the "contents" of
> the cognitive environment concerned and find out what cultural assumptions
> there are in that cognitive environment that would make the information and
> the stimulus used to convey it optimally relevant. That would actually help
> outsiders to better understand those communications - and the culture in
> which they take place.
>
> Personally I believe there is no reason to assume that there are groups
> that set "minimal processing cost" as such at a higher level than perhaps
> some other groups, or put more "responsibility" on the audience than other
> groups do. I would expect that in all and every case it will turn out that
> such differences arise not from culturally set default values for these two
> parameters but are natural consequences of beliefs and values of the
> cognitive environments concerned - whether this concerns just two
> individuals or large cultural or ethnic groups. (So this should actually be
> a testable hypothesis.)
>
> Well, this is my two cents' worth.
> Ernst-August Gutt
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* owner-relevance@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk [mailto:
> owner-relevance@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk] *On Behalf Of *Ronnie Sim
> *Sent:* 28 November 2013 10:20
> *To:* ian mackenzie
> *Cc:* relevance@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk
>
> *Subject:* Re: RT list: Degrees of inference?
>
> Now you speak of
> "the SIL linguists with knowledge of Africa, and the various Japanese
> linguists working in RT. Then again, they tend to analyse specific
> particles, connectors, discourse markers, etc., i.e. do *real* work,
> rather than trade in airy generalisations like I do!"
>
> I'd add three points:
> 1. Procedural meaning came out of RT work, and a number of us are applying
> it in analysing those particles &c ... I think with useful results,
> particularly in turning up particles in Greek, Hebrew and African languages
> that mark a string as metarepresentational.
>
> 2. "Trading in airy generalisations" is in fact where the new insights
> come, that the detail work can pick up. don't deprecate the theoretical
> developments you guys uncover; I don't-- and a reason for speaking to the
> issue you raise is the hope for some new thinking.
>
> 3. "Ranking languages according to levels of inference, or the use of
> implicatures" doesn't hit the spot, though, does it? It would presumably
> not be IN the language, but in how it is used for communicating in
> different interpersonal contexts, some of which would rely more on shared
> assumptions, or if Yoshikawa goes further, some of which pay less attention
> to shared assumptions and require audiences to spend more processing effort
> than RT suggests. I assume that all communities have situations in which
> speaking is deliberately less plain, and, if you are correct, that some
> communities spread this across many contexts, and make the assumption that
> the audience will make effort to understand. If that roughly represents
> the kind of societal contexts you have in mind, I then want to ask two
> further questions.
>
> a. How would RT be affected if the "minimal processing effort" side is
> weakened? I guess the affect can be tolerated, since all societies do
> communicate in situations where more effort is required [by some in the
> audience]. It presumably links up with the three strategies in Dan
> Sperber's paper *Understanding Verbal Understanding*, which also accepts
> audiencescan jack up the effort side.
>
> b. What kind of evidence would be required to show that community A
> typically uses language in ways that lay more responsibility on
> hearers/readers? Not from less benevolence or to obfuscate communication,
> but for some other reason.
>
> Coming back to eastern Africa, yes, I "see" communities that apparently
> lay more responsibility on audiences, and do not utter to minimise
> processing costs. And, yes, I see literature that requires more processing.
> Isn't it the case that much modern English literature is more open-ended
> than RT has allowed for?
>
> I'd really like to hear discussion from those in RT who are in a good
> position to speak to these questions.
>
> Ronnie
>
>
>
>
>
> On 27/11/2013 18:08, ian mackenzie wrote:
>
> Thank you, Ronnie Sim.
>
>
> It’s not only the Horn of Africa. John Hinds (1987) quotes Yoshikawa(1978)
> (I can give the refs. to anyone who wants them) saying “the basic principle
> of communication in Japan, the fact that what is verbally expressed and
> what is actually intended are two different things, is something that
> Japanese people are supposed to be aware of.”
>
>
> S&W do of course argue that language use (in any natural language) is
> almost never literal, and that inference is almost always involved, but I’m
> still surprised that no-one seems to have tried to rank languages according
> to levels of inference, or the use of implicatures. Especially with all the
> SIL linguists with knowledge of Africa, and the various Japanese linguists
> working in RT. Then again, they tend to analyse specific particles,
> connectors, discourse markers, etc., i.e. do *real* work, rather than
> trade in airy generalisations like I do!
>
>
> Ian MacKenzie
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Ronnie Sim <ronnie_sim@sil.org> wrote:
>
>> Ian, you asked
>> "Can anyone tell me whether any work has been done on RT and *degrees of
>> inference* considered to be necessary in different languages/cultures?"
>> The short answer from me is a nagative ... but I hope others on the RT
>> list will have something more positive.
>>
>> What I can do is agree on the basis of anecdotal evidence.
>> I'd say in Africa generally -- so, at least in the societies I am most
>> familiar with, in eastern Africa and the Horn, speaking directly is not the
>> norm. People tend to talk indirectly about issues, and rely on the audience
>> doing a lot of inferencing to keep track of what is intended. The more
>> serious the issue is, the more care there is in not speaking to it
>> directly. So the western "value" of being up front with what is on our mind
>> is not appreciated, not valued, and may be read as insensitive. Put like
>> that, I can also see indirectness, and consequent reliance on inferencing,
>> at work in western societies in at least some aspects of life.
>>
>> Secondly, especially in the Horn of Africa, it seems to me that
>> explanation [whenever called for] is achieved via the presentation of
>> analogies -- 'parables' if you like. A asks a question about something that
>> is not clear, and B responds by offering an analogy. A has to inference in
>> what way the analogy fits. Again, the west does this, and some tropes
>> depend on analogy, but in the Horn, in some societies at least, it is an
>> art form--a genre, almost. Sometimes the analogy might be fairly 'narrow'
>> and be interpretable in terms of one [or two] quite strong implicatures. At
>> other times, it seems to depend on a range of weak implicatures, no one of
>> which is consciously 'intended'. Again certain [traditional?] negotiations
>> in the west may show similar signs. I think of negotiations that used to
>> involve two families arranging a marriage between one of 'our sons' and one
>> of 'their daughters'. And analogy and indirectness is the means of carrying
>> it out. some time ago now, I heard this done in terms of a young man
>> wishing to harbour his boat, so it can be quite raucous and baudy.
>>
>> Is indirectness something that surfaces in all societies, in some
>> communication, and then, along the lines of your question, do some
>> societies prefer indirectness, and a consequent greater dependence on
>> inferencing?
>>
>> Anthropologist Mary Douglas set up two parameters for understanding
>> societal behaviour -- Group and Grid. The Group parameter involves the
>> bondedness among members of the group; the grid parameter involves
>> stratification of tasks/roles among group members. Low Group/Low Grid would
>> be individualist; High group/High grid is hierarchical societies; High
>> group/Low grid is egalitarian; Low group/High grid is fatalist. The
>> epitomising terms are extremes; most societies presumably show trends not
>> extremes.
>>
>> Communication in different Group/Grid societies might reasonably be
>> predicted to show differences brought about by such cultural factors.
>>
>> There is a correlation between the Group/Grid concept and the concept of
>> high/low Context. Plausibly, communication in high shared context
>> situations relies more heavily on inferencing.
>>
>> I would like to hear from others who have explored more systematically
>> these cultural aspects in which communication takes place. Which is my main
>> reason for saying anything at all, no matter how little! I assume that the
>> work of Helen Spencer-Oatey, Stells Ting-Toomey and those who are
>> associated with the same interests could give us much more.
>>
>> Ronnie [Sim]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26/11/2013 17:07, ian mackenzie wrote:
>>
>> In the 1980s, John Hinds distinguished between speaker/writer and
>> listener/reader responsible languages. In the former (e.g. English and
>> French), the speaker/writer is primarily responsible for effective
>> communication; in the latter (e.g. Japanese and perhaps Korean) it is the
>> listener/reader. It is often said that in Japanese what is expressed and
>> what is intended tend to be two different things; there is no obligation to
>> give full explanations and clarifications, to be linear and direct, or to
>> use explicit coherence markers and transitional statements. Consequently
>> listeners/readers need to rely heavily on inference.
>>
>> In the 1970s, Edward Hall distinguished between high- and low-context
>> cultures, giving Japan as an example of a high-context culture in which
>> people tend to have similar experiences and expectations, allowing many
>> things to be left unsaid, and inferences to be drawn from implicit shared
>> cultural knowledge.
>>
>> The authors of RT come from speaker/writer responsible cultures (the
>> French even have the deluded saying *ce qui n’est pas clair n’est pas
>> français*!). Can anyone tell me whether any work has been done on RT and *degrees
>> of inference* considered to be necessary in different languages/cultures?
>>
>> Many thanks,
>>
>> Ian MacKenzie
>>
>> Faculté de traduction et d’interprétation, Université de Genève
>>
>> ian.mackenzie@unige.ch
>>
>>
>> Recently published:* English as a Lingua Franca: Theorizing and Teaching
>> English*, Routledge, 2013.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
Received on Thu Nov 28 17:29:08 2013