Excellent. One thing leads to the other, as they say. Here I will provide
running commentary on this _brilliant_ essay by J. S., J. of Pr.
J. Strassheim writes in the abstract:
"Two seminal but unconnected relevance theories of communication are
compared:"
I love the word 'seminal'. Consider: "Two seminal but unconnected theories
on the category of 'relation' are compared: Aristotle and Porphyry" :)
J. S. continues:
"one found in Alfred Schutz's philosophy,"
I see that one of his publications _is_ problematic. The word 'problem'
Schutz possibly learned from Witters (as Grice calls Wittgenstein). For
Witters, there are problems and pseudo-problems. One of Schutz's books bears the
title: "The _problem_ of relevance". Odd.
"and one developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in a cognitive-science
framework."
I would refer here too to J. Strassheim's use of _pace_: "pace Greenall",
J. S. writes. I have analysed this phrase, and have to think that it is a
_trick_. Peace exists only when WAR pre-dated. So, the use of 'pace' -- in
the ablative -- indicates that J. Strassheim finds ARGUMENT-IS-WAR (recall
Lakoff) with Greenall, but that, in spite of the war, now _peace_ has been
reached. THIS use I find very logical, and I assume it's the one J.
Strassheim is abiding by. Other (to me, sloppy) writers, use "pace" to mean _other_
things, 'flouting' the very etymological root of the word _pax_.
J. Strassheim continues:
"The comparison is meant to strengthen both sides by integrating their
advantages, and to prompt further discussion between these and other relevance
accounts."
Well, I'll see if I can combine it with good old paleo-Gricean approach to
"Relation" ('be relevant').
J. S.:
"Both theories, it is argued, aim to grasp and explain the fact,
unaccounted for by code-like rules (e.g. of language), that people interact in
context in a routine yet flexible way."
In this, with Grice. I never met a code theorist, though! Note that Schutz
comes from Weber, Husserl, and 'sociology' -- as per that horrible hybrid
by Compte. So the idea of _agents_ interacting, zwaek-rationalitaet, and the
rest of it, provides a framework in which 'code-like rules of language'
seem totally inexistent.
J. S. continues:
"Both investigate a dynamics of selectivity in experience making certain
selections ‘relevant’ to an individual, which interactants exploit for
coordination."
This above sounds Gricean enough. 'exploit' is a good one, for it _is_
related to 'flout'. We see here what seems to be Schutz's basic collocation:
'relevance to an idividual'. I wouldn't think this is the primary sense for
Grice -- 'relevance to a topic', possibly is. Whereas for Sperber and
Wilson, relevance has been turned from a category of a maxim ('be relevant') to
the status of a 'cognitive principle': individuals cannot really flout the
principle of relevance as they cannot flout the codes of genetics -- S&W,
first edition, ch. 1). In S/W, an individual (or interactant) cannot _fail_
from being relevant --. The subtleties of the 'dynamics' of the S/W approach
vs. the paleo-Gricean one where 'relation' is subsumed under 'cooperation'
are well known.
J. S. continues::
"Three differences between the theories are examined, and specific
integrations encouraged: (a) The central problematic of inter-individual
ascriptions\\
f relevance remains underdeveloped with Sperber/Wilson. Schutz's idea of
ongoing ‘typification’ is proposed as an amendment."
And what about Grice? I provided his only example of a 'flout' (for surely
we can use 'flout' as noun, to avoid Greenall's mouthful, 'flouting' --
it's "conversational flouts" we are interested in:
Example in which a conversational implicature is achieved by REAL, as
distinct from APPARENT, 'violation' of the maxim of Relation [the 'terse' "Be
relevant"] are perhaps rare:
At a genteel tea party
A: Mrs X is an old bag. (METAPHOR)
[moment of appalled silence]
B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?
+> I would think someone here may not agree with the _tenor_ of your meta
phor, darling.
------
I do not know about underdeveloped S/W (call them 'developing' cfr.
'developing countries' the ultimate pc) but Grice, as discussed by Blakemore and
others is pretty basic and explicit in the WJL in at least two points:
"[Be relevant] conceals a number of [issues] that exercise me a good deal
[Odd he use 'exercise', since he was a professional cricket and football
player] ... about ... different KINDS and FOCUSES of relevance there may be,
... how to allow for the fact that subjects [topics] of conversations are
LEGITIMATELY changed, and so on." (WoW, 27)
Two pages later, after formulating the 'fundamental question' re: the
cooperative principle he adds as a rejoinder:
"I am fairly sure that I cannot reach [such conclusion regarding the
goal-oriented, rationally-strategically foundation of the Cooperative Principle]
until I am A GOOD DEAL clearer about the nature of relevance and of the
circumstances in which it is required."
I was saying that the theory of implicature (an A-philosophical thesis, in
the words of Grice in "Prolegomena") should best be illustrated with
philosophical examples. But which philosophical examples come to mind here?
Well, for one, Quine's 'changing the subject'. This is an ILLEGITIMATE fallacy
-- usually generating no 'conversational' implicature per se.
Bilgrami: I will discuss the social narrow content of
an ascription of analyticity
Hintikka: The weather has been delightful this summer.
Bilgrami: ??
----
Rawls: I will discuss the veil of ignorance and the political
base of liberty rights.
Habermas: The weather has been delightful this summer, and
I propose you discuss rather what is WORTH discussing:
the morality/legality interface.
---- The 'changing the topic' fallacy is famous in Quine's work -- but I
find that Quine tended to stick to a topic for quite a bit too long; so he
thought 'changing the topic' was always bad, whereas, as Grice notes, topics
[kinds and focuses] are LEGITIMATELY allowed to 'change' or 'shift in the
course of a talk exchange'. Pehaps one should stick to what Grice calls
"Athenian dialectic" of Socrates ('Valedictory Essay') but I, for one, find
Socrates's too rambling -- especially in his exchanges with Protagoras.
In "Metaphysics and Eschatology", Grice discusses the topic change in the
conversation between Socrates and Thrasymacus vis a vis 'fair' understood
'positivistically' (by Thrasymacus) and thus 'externalist' way, and 'morally'
by Socrates himself. Grice is not clear how to assess the shifts of topics
in this case.
J. S. continues:
"(b) Schutz lacks a concise notion of relevance."
I guess that Relevanz. The idiom is Latin in origin (of sorts). I wonder if
there is a Germanic equivalent. In the case of Grice it's clear that he
chose 'relevant' as it relates to 'Relation' which Is one of the Four
Categories in Kant's Table of Categories -- and which derives directly from
Aristotle's Categoriae (qualitas, quantitas, modus, relatio). It's not clear what
the SOURCE of Shutz's notion is. As I have said elsewhere, 'relevance' or
'relevancy' as I prefer, is a technical term in Scots law. Seeing that
Shutz was a lawyer, he may have been aware of this.
J. S. goes on:
"Sperber/Wilson's two-sided concept paves the way for a different concept
meeting requirements identified in the article and captures the interlocking
of routine and flexibility in interaction"
I like that! Indeed, that's what Searle accepted as being a no-no for an
Austinian theory of conversation. Austin was 'rutinary', but there's
creativeness in the conversation of _most_ people (recall Grice, on the laxity of
conversations 'over the garden fence'). Only a very literalist reader of
Grice would assume that it's through merely following (and never flouting) the
maxims that we do converse. To echo Strawson on Austin's limitations: "to
suggest otherwise would parallel the suggestion that we cannot make love
unless abiding by the 'code' of the Roman of the Rose" (Logico-Linguistic
Papers).
J. S. continues:
"(c) Sperber/Wilson overly restrict the range of experience powering their
theory. This is shown for individual goals, whose inclusion via the
recommended concepts of typification and relevance is suggested."
Good for you!
Having reached Schutz via Husserl (via Presas) it did strike me that Grice,
qua analytic philosopher, really never bothered with the constitution of
the 'other' which IS at the core of the phenomenological foundation of
'sociology' (cf. Buber). Phenomenology _simpliciter_ started as a
metaphysics-cum-epistemology, and a sequel of Neo-Kantianism. Gricean theories of
communication, on the other hand, McGinn has reminded us (in Woodfield, "Thought
and object") remain essentialy 'solipsistic' --. Many of the social
constraints of Grice's theory have to be postulated as "Given" -- Recall that,
after all, he was into providing a justification for the Modernism of Russell
against the neo-traditionalist attacks of Strawson. If the whole thing
developed into a rational account of human behaviour, the better for Grice --
but hardly the initial motivation. Etc.
Cheers, and thanks to J. S. for sharing the reference with us.
JL Speranza
Received on Wed Dec 2 18:58:57 2009
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