RT list: Grice on 'pragmatic'

Thanks to R. Carston for the link.

In the Horn essay that inaugurates the I. R. P. I read:

"While never actually employing the term 'pragmatics', Grice laid out the
map for modern pragmatic theory [...]"

I think I have discussed this elsewhere -- and indeed one is surprised
that, as I recall, the first or one of the first cites in the OED for
'pragmatics' is by the other Yaleite, H. Bloom.

In any case, a minority: while Grice does not seem to have used
'pragmatics' (publicly?) -- while publicly displaying his affection for 'semantics'
(Part II of WoW is titled, "Explorations in semantics and metaphysics")
there seem to be, in WoW even -- a few mentions of

'pragmatic'

qua adjective.

As I recall, in "Retrospective Epilogue", when he uses the logic vs.
pragmatic distinction. Some inferences may be a matter of 'pragmatic' rather
than 'logical' import. -- This in connection with Grice's seminal:

The pillar box seems/is red (to me).

_contra_ Wittgenstein (who would argue that it would be very _otiose_ to
say that the red pillar box looks red to Wittgenstein (* -- this quote by
Richards below I find magnificent).

Strawson, and Galen Strawson should _explain_ this to me -- (?) -- writes
in 1952 that one "Mr. H. P. Grice" taught him to draw 'pragmatic'
inferences (that famous footnote). Yet Strawson has the interesting caveat: Grice
saw this first in connection with 'another area of philosophy'. My guess is
that this would not be the logical/vernacular account of connectives (e.g.
'and' versus "&") but philosophy-of-perception (alla 'red pillar box')
proper.

--- When J. Constable queried this list about Grice/Richards interface, I
provided the R. Dale reference, and I'm glad that it now shines in the C.
U. P. reprint of _Meaning of Meaning_ --. R. Hall, who I correspond with,
and who has worked hard with OED, may be responsible for having found _this_
other jewel by Richards buried in Princ. Lit. Crit.:

"Sometimes it is held that whatever is redundant or otiose,
         whatever is not required, although not obstructive or disruptive,
is also false."
 
         (1925, 269)
 
-- and I'm pleased that Horn's essay carries the subtitle, 'truth', for
surely it all seems to be (in truth-conditional pragmatics, to echo Recanati)
about the taming of the true (if not the otiose!).
 
 Cheers,
 
J. L. Speranza
   The Grice Club, etc.
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Received on Thu Jul 2 21:23:45 2009