Re: RT list: Cognitive effects and processing effort

Dear all,

This is indeed a huge subject and one I cannot commit to solving in my
thesis altogether. I just want to clarify a couple of points here. My
earlier response did not have so much to do with quantifying effort and
effect as such, but rather with how RT should be able to create
interesting hyporheses about language production; and I think that the
way to address this is by going back to the idea of maximal relevance
and addressing production on its basis as Sperber and Wilson did for
interpretation. So far as I understand Jan's response, I have one
objection.

"one might still want to say that competent speaking and hearing
presupposes some naive reflection on relevance over and above regular
ground-level maximising"

Again, I am not sure I got the point here right, but my understanding
of relevance is that it is not a result of reflection. It is an
automatic process, a generalisation about the way in which human
cognition (a tendency towards maximal relevance) and ostensive
communication (an incremental search for satisfactory cognitive effects
for no unnecessary effort - optimal relevance) work. It is in this
sense, that RT provides a useful account of processing input, premises
and conclusions, without suggesting that we think about what is
"relevant" or not. So, what I suggested was that it should provide
interesting insights on the intrinsic ways in which we select contexts
and interpretation hypotheses. It is not in itself a naive conception
available to the hearer/speaker, but, for me, a way to account for how
naive mental devices (if you want to follow the modularity thesis)
successfully feed the inferential device(s) without spending more
effort than necessary (in some sense resolving to some extent the Frame
Problem - but see the exchange between Chiappe & Kukla and Sperber &
Wilson in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1996).

Apart from that, I am pretty convinced that the original conception of
effort and effect is on the right track (as Sperber noted). There is no
need to measure them in absolute numerical ways and no known way to do
so as of yet. That is why for the time being it is safe to assume that
they exist and that the mind assesses them on its own. And the basic
problem I find with attempts to measure them, is one that has been
evident in the argumentation of Sperber & Wilson, and which I
understand as a difference in the situation someone is in during
processing: The more you carry a heavy suitcase the heavier it feels,
so when one is tired or stressed or deep in thinking about losing a
loved one, you should get different measurements of his effort and
effects, even if you find a way to quantify them. And again,
quantifying them can only be pursued indirectly (neurological
activation patterns being a very good starting point as Sperber said)...

However, the basic thing here is that 'expectations of relevance' are
not not conscious means to get to the interpretation of an utterance,
but rather the cognitive motivation behind processing, a cognitive
motivation that is not mentally available, but a useful criterion for
science to address how the mind works. In this sense, no one is
expected to be a relevance theorist (as Bach argues) in order to
communicate, BUT relevance theorists can address through the use of
their generalisations how everyone communicates.

I am sensing that this has started to get out of proportion for the
purposes of the relevance list, so I am happy (and more than willing)
to discuss things in private e-mail if needed any further. After all, I
can only hope I have gotten the relevance-theoretic argument correctly,
so here should be the place for more hardcore relevance theorists to
deal with these issues for now.

Best wishes,

Stavros

Quoting Stefan Malmberg <stefan.malmberg@aland.net>:

> Thank you all for an interesting discussion. I am very interested in
> your prospective thesis, Stavros, though I am inclined to agree with
> Jan that 'this problem, if it is one, cannot be solved in terms of
> neurology or a
> quantification of relevance, at least not in a straightforward or easy way.'
>
> Best Stefan
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Jan Straßheim
> To: relevance list
> Sent: Monday, October 16, 2006 2:39 PM
> Subject: Re: RT list: Cognitive effects and processing effort
>
>
> Dear Stavros,
>
> Thank you loads for your comment!
> Since I'm quite interested in the current discussion (thank you,
> Stefan!), I address this to the list. Somebody please shut me up if
> necessary.
>
> As you (and Robyn Carston) say, the (Pseudo-)Bach problem is not
> that RT somehow rules out consideration of the production side - it
> certainly doesn't. I guess we agree on the rest, too, but to make
> sure, I'll try to say what I think the real problem is.
>
> Your mention of optimal relevance highlights the fact that normally
> the question is just as acute for hearers: they have to find out (as
> "sophisticated understanders") what the speaker (sometimes
> erroneuosly) thought might have been most relevant to them, i.e.,
> they, too, have to think about relevance expectations on the other's
> part which are different from their own. Again RT clearly includes
> this, just as it allows for, say, cultural biases, slave-master
> relationships, anonymous readers, fictional speakers, degrees of
> intellectual alertness etc. (cf. Relevance, pp. 158ff.).
> So the theory allows us to ask a great variety of questions about
> what people have to take into account when presuming what is how
> strongly manifest to individual others. And it stresses that answers
> to these questions are essential to understanding communication. The
> pursuit of maximal relevance is offered as the key (cf. Relevance, p.
> 46).
> But if this is the explanatory goal, then rightly pointing out that
> expectations of relevance ("prospective intuitions") shut out nearly
> everything in advance of the local comparison (though this is
> crucial, and possibly a solution to Kent Bach's "uniqueness
> problem"), is not enough. Observing others as it is required for
> competent communication should involve sometimes quite precise
> reference to how these expectations arise in the first place. In this
> sense, one might still want to say that competent speaking and
> hearing presupposes some naive reflection on relevance over and above
> regular ground-level maximising - although, as you say, if RT is
> right, then this reflection is itself driven by the pursuit of
> maximal relevance, so I'm very much looking forward to your thesis!
>
> As far as can see, this problem, if it is one, cannot be solved in
> terms of neurology or a quantification of relevance, at least not in
> a straightforward or easy way. Help wanted!
>
> All the best
> Jan

-- 
Stavros Assimakopoulos
PhD candidate
Department of Linguistics and English Language
University of Edinburgh