Re. Purpose of communication (Tim Wharton):
It seems to me that both the evolutionary argument (one of the main
underpinnings of RT) and
the observations of pragmaticists and others over the last 50 years
converge on the following assumptions:
A that the ability to communicate enhances fitness enormously by allowing
socialisation,
B that language further increases this advantage hugely by allowing (1) far
greater specification in the
communication of assumptions and the object of intentions (2) communication
of recursive conceptual and intentional
structures like hypotheticals, conditionals, attributed intentions etc.,
which both allow, at least, in favourable conditions, the negotiation of
jointly constructed or compatible mental models as a basis for social
planning, etc.
I assume that most people working in pragmatics and verbal communication
would agree that
the idea that the primary purpose of communication is the transfer of
information about the world
is a pre-pragmatic fallacy dating back to a time (pre-Austin, Grice, Searle
etc.) when only the propositional
content of utterances was recognised. In other words, taking the Prague
'functions of language' as a rough starting point, the 'persuasive' or
'manipulative' (in the absence of a more neutral term) function - modifying
the hearer's cognitive environment, i.e. the assumptions-under-beliefs they
entertain - seems from the evidence to be primary in verbal communication,
with information and 'social-ritual' functions subserving it (most
obviously, adducing statistics and examples in an argument, or using
stylised, marked or socially/historically loaded language and symbols).
Orality and spontaneity correlate with persuasiveness (use of prosody),
i.e, speech seems more obviously adapted to the goal of modifying the
hearer's assumptions by acting on real-time, psychophysiological processes
(viz the key role of prosody, word order choices, the position of discourse
markers and connectors) whereas information proper is much more efficiently
and usefully conveyed on media which also allow storage and reference
(writing, tables, diagrams, formulas...). This seems clear to anyone
working constantly on actual communicative acts like conference speeches
(to rfer selfishly to personal experience, in simultaneous interpreting,
for example, the core challenge lies in reencoding and rexpressing
ostension/intentionality online in another language, i.e. complex
propositions embedded in complex attitudes, not just complex facts;
political discourse is much more difficult than purely 'technical'
discourse).
In that light all the definitions of the purpose of communication, or of
making utterances, which Tim cites
(Grice, Neale, Hauser) seem to address only part of the range of
possibilities generated by B (1) and (2) above.
So as regards Timéàs final question, it seems that 'information 'about the
world' must _always_ be 'filtered' through cognitive states inasmuch as
communication is always between at least two 'cognitive devices'. But this
sounds again as if the primary purpose of human communication is to convey
accurate information, almost deploring that it must be 'filtered' through
cognitive devices.
Rather, we cannot but communicate assumptions-under-attitudes/(='cognitive
states'?), assumptions irrevocably tagged with belief values, the
communication of a 'fact' would simplz be the limiting case of successful
communication of an assumption tagged with a high degree of evidentiality.
Hoping this seems relevant,
Robin (Setton)
At 07:32 13.12.02 +0000, you wrote:
>Dear all,
>
>Why do humans communicate? I've been thinking about this question recently
>and, although I realise it may be a little tangential to the concerns of
>some fellow-listers (to whom I apologise in advance), I was wondering if
>anyone could shed any light on it for me.
>
>Neale (1992) raises the issue of the 'purpose' of communication when
>discussing Grice's (1969) revision of Clause (1) of his original 3-clause
>characterisation of non-natural meaning. Grice makes a change from "U
>intends... (1) A to produce some particular response r" to "U intends... (1)
>A to think that U thinks that p". This leads Grice to distinguish between
>utterances in which the speaker's intention is to get the hearer to think
>that the speaker holds a particular belief (or some other propositional
>attitude), and utterances uttered with the _further_ intention of getting
>the hearer to come to hold that belief or propositional attitude (on the
>strength of their thinking that the speaker holds that belief or
>propositional attitude).
>
>Neale goes on (p. 545): "One worry about the suggested revision is that it
>does not comport well with the commonly held view that the primary purpose
>of communication is the transfer of information about the world: on the
>revised account, the primary purpose seems to be the transfer of information
>about one's mental states." Neale is referring back to a point originally
>made in McDowell (1980) "The primary point of making assertions is not to
>instill into others beliefs about one's assertions, but to inform others ...
>about the subject matter of one's assertions (which need not be, though of
>course it may be, the asserter's beliefs)."
>
>In the literature on nonhuman animal communciation, the 'function' of a
>trait is looked at in terms of its effects on survival and reproduction -
>basically, its consequences for the species' fitness. Starting from the
>presumption that we might adopt the same strategy when we try to give an
>account for human communciation (which - I realise - may not be to
>everyone's taste) can anyone tell me why informing others about "the subject
>matter of one's assertions" - i.e. transferring information about the
>world - should be regarded as more fitness-enhancing than instilling into
>others "beliefs about one's assertions" - i.e. transferring information
>about one's mental states?
>
>Hauser (1998) discusses many of the functions of the individual
>communication systems of nonhuman animals, but essentially all of these boil
>down to the observation that "communication provides for conveying
>information _and_ for expressing to others what has been perceived" (my
>emphasis). As far as I can see, Hauser gives equal weight to both conjuncts.
>Johnson-Laird (1990 - quote taken from Hauser) writes: "communication is a
>matter of causal influence... the communicator [must] construct an internal
>representation of the external world, and then... carry out some symbolic
>behaviour that conveys the content of that representation. The recipient
>must first perceive the symbolic behaviour, i.e. construct its internal
>representation, and then from it construct a further internal representation
>of the state that it signifies". The information being transmitted in this
>view is only indirectly 'about' the world. The 'primary purpose' seems to be
>the transfer of mental states.
>
>I tend toward this latter view (with reservations about others of
>Johnson-Laird's claims), since in acts of communication by both human and
>nonhuman animals, information 'about the world' is generally (always?)
>'filtered' through cognitive states.
>
>And Grice can't have been _wrong_, for God's sake...
>
>Best wishes (and Happy Christmas) to all,
>
>Tim
>
>
>Refs:
>Grice (1969) Utterers meaning and intentions. Philosophical Review 78.
>Hauser (1996) The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
>McDowell (1980) Meaning, communication and knowledge, in Z van Staaten,
>Philosophical Subjects, Oxford.
>Neale (1992) Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and
>Philosophy 15.5.
>
>---------------------------------------
>Tim Wharton
>twharton@clara.co.uk
>t.wharton@ucl.ac.uk
>tel. +44 (0)1273 477281
>---------------------------------------
>
>---------------------------------------
>Tim Wharton
>twharton@clara.co.uk
>t.wharton@ucl.ac.uk
>tel. +44 (0)1273 477281
>---------------------------------------
>
>
Prof. Robin Setton
Professeur à l'unité d'interprétation
Ecole de traduction et d'interprétation
Université de Genève
Boulevard du Pont d'Arve 40
CH-1211 Genève 4
Tél. +41 22 705 87 53
FAX +41 22 705 87 59
E-mail Robin.Setton@eti.unige.ch
http://www.unige.ch/eti/interpretation
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