Why do humans communicate?

From: Tim Wharton (twharton@clara.co.uk)
Date: Mon Dec 09 2002 - 07:46:23 GMT

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    Dear all,

    Why do humans communicate? I've been thinking about this question recently
    and, although I realise it may be a little tangential to the concerns of
    some fellow-listers (to whom I apologise in advance), I was wondering if
    anyone could shed any light on it for me.

    Neale (1992) raises the issue of the 'purpose' of communication when
    discussing Grice's (1969) revision of Clause (1) of his original 3-clause
    characterisation of non-natural meaning. Grice makes a change from "U
    intends... (1) A to produce some particular response r" to "U intends... (1)
    A to think that U thinks that p". This leads Grice to distinguish between
    utterances in which the speaker's intention is to get the hearer to think
    that the speaker holds a particular belief (or some other propositional
    attitude), and utterances uttered with the _further_ intention of getting
    the hearer to come to hold that belief or propositional attitude (on the
    strength of their thinking that the speaker holds that belief or
    propositional attitude).

    Neale goes on (p. 545): "One worry about the suggested revision is that it
    does not comport well with the commonly held view that the primary purpose
    of communication is the transfer of information about the world: on the
    revised account, the primary purpose seems to be the transfer of information
    about one's mental states." Neale is referring back to a point originally
    made in McDowell (1980) "The primary point of making assertions is not to
    instill into others beliefs about one's assertions, but to inform others ...
    about the subject matter of one's assertions (which need not be, though of
    course it may be, the asserter's beliefs)."

    In the literature on nonhuman animal communciation, the 'function' of a
    trait is looked at in terms of its effects on survival and reproduction -
    basically, its consequences for the species' fitness. Starting from the
    presumption that we might adopt the same strategy when we try to give an
    account for human communciation (which - I realise - may not be to
    everyone's taste) can anyone tell me why informing others about "the subject
    matter of one's assertions" - i.e. transferring information about the
    world - should be regarded as more fitness-enhancing than instilling into
    others "beliefs about one's assertions" - i.e. transferring information
    about one's mental states?

    Hauser (1998) discusses many of the functions of the individual
    communication systems of nonhuman animals, but essentially all of these boil
    down to the observation that "communication provides for conveying
    information _and_ for expressing to others what has been perceived" (my
    emphasis). As far as I can see, Hauser gives equal weight to both conjuncts.
    Johnson-Laird (1990 - quote taken from Hauser) writes: "communication is a
    matter of causal influence... the communicator [must] construct an internal
    representation of the external world, and then... carry out some symbolic
    behaviour that conveys the content of that representation. The recipient
    must first perceive the symbolic behaviour, i.e. construct its internal
    representation, and then from it construct a further internal representation
    of the state that it signifies". The information being transmitted in this
    view is only indirectly 'about' the world. The 'primary purpose' seems to be
    the transfer of mental states.

    I tend toward this latter view, since in acts of communication by both human
    and nonhuman animals, information 'about the world' is generally (always?)
    'filtered' through cognitive states.

    And Grice can't have been _wrong_, for God's sake...

    Best wishes (and Happy Christmas) to all,

    Tim

    Refs:
    Grice (1969) Utterers meaning and intentions. Philosophical Review 78.
    Hauser (1996) The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    McDowell (1980) Meaning, communication and knowledge, in Z van Staaten,
    Philosophical Subjects, Oxford.
    Neale (1992) Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and
    Philosophy 15.5.

    ---------------------------------------
    Tim Wharton
    twharton@clara.co.uk
    t.wharton@ucl.ac.uk
    tel. +44 (0)1273 477281
    ---------------------------------------



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