Philosophy is footnotes to Plato.
A. N. Whitehead.
Pragmatics is feetnotes to
[Amazing] Grice.
J. L.
J. Fantin writes:
>When do Relevance Theorists generally date the beginning
>of RT as a formal theory? Is it with the publication of
>Sperber and Wilson (1986) or with an earlier article.work?
>Is anyone aware of anything published on this the history
>of RT?
R. Daniliuc comments:
>You may find the following link helpful for your
>question or as a general reference:
>http://www.ua.es/dfing/rt.htm
The (main) relevant "#" (sub-site) in that nice site maintained by
list-member F. Yus being
http://www.ua.es/dfing/rt.htm#Pre-
-- viz., what Yus calls 'Pre-1986 research on relevance', implicating (that
is, is it) that it's (as Fantin notes) 1986 indeed the year that marks the
birth of RT as a T. (For Grice's remarks on the use of the word 'theory' by
people like Mrs Julie M. Jack [of Somerville], see WOW, p. 358: "The
application of _theoretical concepts_ is _not_ generally thought of as
reachable by intuition or observation. But some of those like Mrs Jack who
object to [my] analysis of meaning are also anxious that meanings should be
_intuitively_ recognisable. How this result is to be achieved I do not
know." And cfr. Avramides on 'theory' vs. 'analysis').
In that section, http://www.ua.es/dfing/rt.htm#Pre- mentions two essays by
Wilson & Sperber which have relevant 'historical' bearing (if that's the
word) viz:
i. 'On Grice's theory of conversation'
(Pragmatics Microfiche 3.5, F1-G14.
Issued by the Linguistics Dept at Cambridge
as ed. by S. C. Levinson)
-- repr. in Kasher, _Implicature_ --
and
ii. 'On defining relevance',
as appeared in P. G. R. I. C. E.,
ed. R. Grandy & R. Warner (aka as
'Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends').
(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
It is in footnotes (feetnotes?) 2-4 of (ii) that Wilson/Sperber address
'historical' matters as they expand on Grice's very introduction of the
'maxim' of the category of 'RELATION'.
Under the category of RELATION, I place a single
maxim, namely 'Be relevant'. Though the maxim
itself is terse, its formulation conceals a
number of problems that exercise me a good deal ...
I find the treatment of such questions
exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert
to them in a later work.
[Grice, Logic and Conversation, 1967. repr. WOW]
Wilson/Sperber write:
"In these cautious terms Grice [...]
introduced a maxim of relevance [...]."
[cfr. comments on Wilson/Sperber on Dascal
below]. [...] In the years since then,
[...] NO EXPLICIT _ACCOUNT_ OF RELEVANCE
**SUITABLE FOR USE IN PRAGMATIC THEORY** has
emerged [Footnote citing Thomason 1973:12,
Gazdar 1979:45, and Werth 1981:130]. Indeed,
there has been considerable scepticism
over whether any such account is in principle
possible [Footnote citing Berlin 1938:21, Haack
1978:16, Suppes 1957:8, and Anderson/Belnap
1975:xxi]. Where definitions _have_ been attempted,
they have been approached in rhetorical, emotional,
or aesthetic rather than logical terms [Footnote citing
Dijk 1979, Dascal 1977, and Werth 1981. ...
Dascal relates [relevance] to SATISFACTION OF A
CONVERSATIONAL DEMAND]. Yet since utterance
comprehension involves a substantial _INFERENTIAL_
element, it is not unreasonable to expect the
drawing of INFERENCES to contribute, in some way,
to judgements of relevance."
As the Grice of _Aspects of Reason_ would I think thoroughly agree.
Besides a ref. to the work of Nowell-Smith (on relevance, in his _Ethics_,
as noted by Harnish and Horn inter alii -- passage in refs. below --), I
would point to the contrast, implicated in the passage above by Wilson and
Sperber, between seeing ('accounting for') relevance as
i. "related" to "satisfaction of
a conversational demand"
and
ii. "in logical terms" (rather).
Dascal's approach may indeed place (like Nowell-Smith, or Gardiner -- see
below) too much emphasis on the (perhaps ultimately _un_Gricean?) idea that
the 'demand' has to be _real_ [sic] 'conversational' to be 'true': i.e. as
generated by your co-conversant. Whereas for Grice, who is feeling in 1967,
"enough of a rationalist",
"[O]ne feels that the the talker who is
irrelevant [...] has primarily let
down not his audience but himself."
[or 'herself' as RT would prefer.] (WOW,
-- Studies in the Way of Words, p. 29).
This is what Blakemore calls the 'psychological' side, as it were, to the
matters that pertain us.
"It will be remembered that in his discussion
of the rationale for the conversational maxims
Grice toyed between
[i.] a social explanation
and
[ii.] a cognitive [explanation]
[Cfr. social cognition? JLS]. He ended up *dismissing*
the idea that the maxims [including 'Be relevant!' if
maxim it -- _pace RT_ -- be. JLS] had their origin in the
nature of SOCIETY or culture ON THE GROUNDS that this
did not provide a sufficiently GENERAL explanation."
(Blakemore, in Hall, p. 364)]
The issues here are tricky (I don't mean (to imply that) Blakemore's
discussion is). But if 'demand' is intepreted a la _fiat_ (as in the logic
of A. Kenny, 'Practical Inferences', _Analysis_), then it's not evident
that an approach like Dascal will _not_ ultimately "fit" the 'logical
terms' which Wilson/Sperber refer to.
Blakemore's consideration, which immediately follows the passage quoted
above -- "[Grice] warned us that the key to a general, *psychological*
explanation [of the maxims] lay in the notion of relevance" -- enhances,
again, the ''psychological' ('cognitive')/'social' contrast.
Assessing this balance between the psychological and the social is indeed a
delicate matter (and one empathises with Grice telling his Harvard audience
that he finds the treatment of the questions [concealed] behind the
direction of 'relation' "exceedingly difficult" and to which he hopes "to
revert in later work" (and cfr. his 'Retrospective Epilogue' to WOW, esp.
pp. 371: "The suggested maxims do not seem to [be mutually independent]
... The force of this consideration seems to be blunted by writers like
Wilson and Sperber who seem to be disposed [but actually ain't? JLS] to
sever the notion of relevance from the specification of some particular
direction of relevance."). This is further explored inter alii by
Taylor/Cameron. They suggest that Grice be seen as a 'psychologist' or the
'rationalist' school, rather than a 'sociologist' of the 'empiricist'
school like Nowell-Smith or, more historically, Sir Alan Henderson Gardiner
(And Gardiner's book gets cited in Sperber/Wilson 1986).
It actually all started with _Aristotle_, right?
Cheers,
JL
Refs.
AVRAMIDES, A. Meaning and mind: an examination of a Gricean account of
language.
BERLIN I. 1938. Verification. Aristotelian Society 38. Cited by
Wilson/Sperber, 'On defining relevance', in PGRICE (Grandy/Warner). The
passage cited by Wilson/Sperber by this Russian-born philosopher who
belonged to what I call Grice's _first_ 'playgroup' -- at All Souls, Oxford
-- see Owen -- is: "Relevance is not a precise logical category ... the
word is used to convey an essentially vague idea". The essay is repr. in
_Concepts and Categories_. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
BLAKEMORE R. Constraints on interpretation. In K. HALL, 363-80.
BURTON-ROBERTS N. 1985. Utterance, relevance & problems with text grammar:
review article of P. Werth's Focus Coherence and Emphasis. Australian
Journal of Linguistics 5 285-296. (Cited by Yus).
DASCAL M 1977. Conversational relevance. Journal of Pragmatics 1 309-328.
As cited by Wilson/Sperber, 'On defining relevance', in PGRICE, this is
repr. in A. Margalit, ed., _Meaning and Use_.
DIJK TAV. 1979. Relevance assignment in discourse comprehension. Discourse
Processes 2. Cited by Wilson/Sperber, 'On defining relevance', in PGRICE.
GARDINER A. E. The theory of speech and language. Oxford: Clarendon. Cited
by Sperber/Wilson, _Relevance_.
GAZDAR GJM & D GOOD. 1982. On a notion of relevance. In NV Smith, Mutual
Knowledge. London: Academic Press, 88-100. Cited by Yus.
GRANDY R/R WARNER. PGRICE Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon.
GRICE H. P. Logic and Conversation.
William James Lecture No. 2.
1967.
Repr in _WOW_ Studies in the Way of Words.
GRICE H. P. Aspects of reason.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
HARNISH R. M. Implicature and logical form. Repr. in Kasher.
HALL, K. Legacy of Grice. Berkeley Linguistics Society 16.
HARE R. M. Practical Inferences.
HORN L. R. Hamburgers and truth. In Hall.
Greek Grice. CLS.
KASHER, _Implicature_. Routledge.
KENNY. AJP. Practical Inferences. Analysis, vol. 26, cited by Hare,
Practical Inferences.
MASON J. 1982. From speech acts to conversation. Journal of Literary
Semantics 11 96-103. Cited by Yus.
MOORE T. 1982. Comments on Sperber and Wilson's paper. In N. V. Smith,
Mutual Knowledge. London: Academic Press, 111-112. Cited by Yus.
MURPHY, J. P. Implicature. Arlington: Virginia: Center for Applied
Linguistics. (Ed). Contains Thomason, 'Where pragmatics fits in'. See
THOMASON 1973, as cited by Wilson/Sperber, 'On defining relevance', in PGRICE.
NOWELL-SMITH P. H. Ethics. Penguin. The relevant passage being: "Rule 3:
What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his
audience. This is the most important of the three rules; unfortunately, it
is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than liars or
careless talkers." (p. 82). [Note that this is consistent with Grice's idea
that _floutings_ to 'relation' are 'rare': A: Mrs X is an old bag. B: The
weather has been delightful this summer' (Grice WOW, p. 35). This rule is
particularly obvious in the case of answers to questions, since it is
assumed that the answer _is_ an answer. Not all statements are answers to
questions; information may be volunteered. Nevertheless the publication of
a text-book on trigonometry IMPLIES that the author believes that there are
people who want to learn about trigonometry, and to give advice implies a
belief that the advice is relevant to the hearer's problem [cfr. Grice on
'varieties' of relevance. WOW, p. 27). This rule is of the greatest
importance to ethics. For the major problem of theoreetical ethics was that
of bridging the gap between decisions, ought-sentences, injunctions, and
sentences used to give advice on the one hand and the statements of fact
that constitute the reasons for these on the other. In was in order to
bridge these gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions had to
be invoked. The third rule of contextual implication may help us to show
that there is no gap to be bridged because the reason-giving sentence must
turn out to be practical from the start and not a statement of fact from
which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is, therefore,
more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters of
ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless
we assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions
between decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support
of them." (p. 82).
OWEN G. Obit of G. Ryle. Aristotelian Society.
SPERBER D & D WILSON. 1980. Pragmatics. Cognition 10 281-286. Cited by Yus.
1982a. Reply to Gazdar & Good. In Mutual Knowledge.
Ed. N.V.
Smith. London: Academic Press, 101-110. Cited by Yus.
1982b. Reply to Wilks. In: Mutual Knowledge. Ed. N.V.
Smith. London: Academic Press, 118-123. Cited by Yus.
1982c. Reply to Clark. In: Mutual Knowledge. Ed.
N.V. Smith. London: Academic Press, 128-131. Cited by Yus.
1984. Pragmatics: An overview. In: From the
Linguistic to the Social Context. Ed. Susan Georges. Bologna: Cooperativa
Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 21-41. Cited by Yus.
WARNOCK. G. J. Morality and language. Oxford: Blackwell. For an account of
Grice's and Nowell-Smith's participation in the [second] 'playgroup' at
Grice's St John's.
WERTH P. 1981 The concept of ‘relevance' in conversational analysis. In:
Conversation and Discourse. Ed. P. Werth. London: Croom Helm, 129-154.
Cited by Yus.
1984. Focus, Coherence and Emphasis. London: Croom Helm. Cited by
Yus.
WILKS Y. 1982 Comments on Sperber and Wilson's paper. In: Mutual Knowledge.
Ed. N.V. Smith. London: Academic Press, 113-117. Cited by Yus.
WILSON D. and D. Sperber 1981. On Grice's theory of conversation." In:
Conversation and Discourse. Ed. P. Werth. London: Croom Helm, 155-178.
Cited by Yus. (o "p" _Pragmatics Microfiche_).
Wilson, D. and D. Sperber 1985. On choosing the context for utterance
interpretation." In: Foregrounding Background. Eds. J. Allwood and E.
Hjelmquist. Doxa, 51-64. Cited by Yus.
WILSON D & D. SPERBER. On defining relevance. In PGRICE See Grandy/Warner.
Cited by Yus.
TAYLOR T. & D. CAMERON. Gricean pragmatics. In Analysing conversation.
Oxford: Pergamon.
THOMASON R. 1973. Semantics, pragmatics, conversation, and presupposition.
Unpublished mimeo. Philosophy Dept. University of Pittsburgh, 1973. Cited
by Wilson/Sperber in 'On defining relevance' in PGRICE. Originally lecture
at conference on 'implicature'. Thomason writes in the proceedings: "The
paper that I read in Austin in the spring of 1973 [...] was tentative and
[...] unsuccessful. Though I'm still willing to distribute it privately,
I'd be embarrassed to see it in print." in MURPHY, p. 161.
==
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