Implicature: Clause, Scale, Rank, & Beyond

From: J L Speranza (jls@netverk.com.ar)
Date: Tue Jun 04 2002 - 23:54:10 GMT

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    In _Pragmatics_, Levinson classifies implicature as being 'scalar' or
    'clausal' -- he never implies the taxonomy is dichotomic though, as his
    opus magnum, _Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalised
    Conversational Implicature_ shows. In _A Theory of Scalar Implicature_
    Hirschberg brings in the context-sensitive 'ranks'... What's more in store?
    Perhaps a discussion of the "m-intended point", to use Levinson's wording,
    a la Strawson in 'Intention & Convention in a Theory of Speech Acts'?
    Issues like these are dealt with by Capone vis a vis a commentary of
    Carston's essay in Carston & Uchida, _Relevance Theory: Applications &
    Implications_.

    In a recent post to this list, M. J. Murphy wrote:

    >Another one [resource other than http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk]
    >worth browsing is the Semantics Preprint Archive.
    [at http://www.semantics.archive.net]
    >More Griceans than RT people there at the moment.

    I tried a 'relevance' search at:
    http://semanticsarchive.net/cgi-bin/browse.pl?search=relevance

    and retrieved 2 items:
      
        * Santos, D.
          The relevance of vagueness for translation.

    and, a more relevant one,
      
    (at http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/JMwNjhiN/Review20%Carston.rtf.)

      viz.

      * Capone, A.
      
      "Some considerations on Carston's paper 'Informativeness,
      relevance and scalar implicature'" (in Carston/Uchida,
      _Relevance Theory: applications and implications_)

    which I'm excerpting below.

    JL

    ===

    Capone writes: "[Carston has] argued that pragmatics contributes to the
    fully truth-evaluable propositional form of an utterance. [Carston's]
    considerations, which extend the original Gricean program, are based on
    important ideas by Sperber & Wilson (1986) and, in particular, on the
    distinction between implicatures and explicatures. Persuaded though I am
    that Carston evinces great intelligence and logical acumen in her critique
    of some neo-Gricean ideas, I hope to be able to redirect some of her
    arguments or at least to show that the debate has to be continued.
    Carston's claims [include]. The revised presumption of optimal relevance
    predicts the 'I am reluctant to say' implicature in connection with a
    Gricean example of a quantity implicature."

    1. Capone first examines the issue of cardinal numbers.

    "[Re: cardinal determiners] Carston favours the underspecification
    hypothesis: the hypothesis that cardinal determiners are associated with a
    rather general (underdetermined) semantics, which is then enriched by means
    of contextual clues."

    Capone contrasts Carston's 1999 view on cardinal numbers -- "cardinal
    numbers can be associated with an underspecified semantics which is then
    enriched through contextual clues" -- with three other views:

       Levinson (1991, 2000):
                Cardinal numbers can be assigned a (lower bounding) at least n
    semantics, which gives rise to the generalized upper bounding
    conversational implicature exactly n.
        Higginbotham (1983):
                Cardinal numbers can be considered ambiguous between an at
    least n and an exactly n reading.
        Jaszczolt (1999):
        Cardinal numbers are interpreted as having the exactly n reading
    through default semantics (this reading can be overridden in particular
    cases).

    "I agree [with Carston] that [in a sentence like "There there will be 20
    people there"] might be an interpretative ambiguity in the sense of
    Jaszczolt (1999), I do not think that we are faced with ambiguity proper,
    with at most n as one linguistic sense of the cardinal determiner."

    "Carston shows that the unitary semantics analysis is confronted with some
    serious problems. [Carston] believes that the unitary [uniguous. JLS]
    semantics analysis cannot deal with expressions such as ["More than 3
    people came". Carston discusses one [...] problem for the proponents of
    unitary semantics. She believes that there are predictions of
    (respectively) redundancy and oddity with explicit modifiers such as "at
    least" and "exactly"."

    Capone then addresses both the issue of 'redundancy' and 'oddity'.
       Re: redundancy: "It has been proposed by Radici Colace (personal
    communication) that a sentence such as "At least 3 students came" evokes a
    context where a minimal threshold questionnaire is being answered or where
    this statement answers a question requiring unspecific information. If
    these contextual conditions are conversationally implicated by the use of
    "at least _n_" phrases, the charge of redundancy is easily answered, as
    redundancy generates M-implicatures (implicatures due to the maxim of
    manner)."
      Re: oddity: "Carston is committed to the view that in case "the at least
    _n_" semantics is advocated, a sentence such as "_Exactly_ 3 students came"
    should be odd. This argument presupposes that a sentence such as "_At
    least_ 3 students came; oh _exactly_ 3 students came" is odd. However, if a
    speaker proffers this sentence, uttering the first part on the basis of a
    logical inference, and utters the second part on the basis of knowledge
    derived from the contents of, say, a record/book, the whole utterance is
    _not_ anomalous".

    "Carston claims (1999: 208) that the semantics of "3" should be conceived
    as follows:

    (1) [X[3]]

    -- where X is a variable which is assigned in context a specific
    interpretation. Carston explains why in the following dialogue B's (ii)
    reply, though fine, involves extra processing (and is thus somewhat marked)."

    (2) A: Does she have 3 children?
        B: i. No, she has 2.
           ii. ?Yes, (in fact) she has 4.
           iii: No, she has 4.

    "Presumably [Carston] would have to say that there is an interpretation
    rule that assigns to cardinal determiners the default interpretation
    "exactly n" in a default context. I agree that [X [three]] is a good way
    out of the problems. Now, _what_ *are* are the truth-conditions of
    Carston's [three]? Intuitively, she would have to look for what sentences
    such as

    (3) At least 3 men arrived.
    (4) Exactly 3 men arrived.
    (5) At most three men arrived.

    have in common. They might have in common the following truth-conditions:

    (6) A quantity of _at least_ 3 men arrived.

    "[Carston's [three]] is _not_ supposed to mean that, if we count the
    objects in question, they are three in number, as this amounts to accepting
    the exact n meaning as basic (thus, there would be no way of enriching the
    semantics further. It cannot mean that, if we count the objects, they will
    not exceed 3, as this does not accommodate the "at least n" reading. I
    could say "At most 3 students will arrive", without wanting to commit
    myself to the prediction that _at least 3_ students will arrive). Carston
    might now retort that what is a problem to her view is a problem for
    Levinson's view. [...] But this is not Levinson's problem. [...] I could
    surely say "At least 3 students came, in fact at most 3 students came".

    2.

    Consider Harnish's example:

    (7) The flag is red.

    "Must it be all red?"

    "Carston cites Harnish (1976: 341) in support of her view that relevance is
    a more fundamental category than informativeness"

    The Harnish quote being:

     "This maxim [relevance [or 'relation'. Let's recall Grice is
     echoing Kant. JLS]] turns out to be so central and important
     in conversational implicature that it is not clear that
     it belongs on equal footing with the rest. I suspect that
     maxims are (at least partially) ordered with respect
     to weight, etc. and that relevance is at the top,
     controlling most of the others".
              
    "Carston takes for granted that an utterance of "The flag is red"
    conversationally implicates (and does not entail) "The flag is all red".
    Carston discusses this kind of example further and shows that the scalar
    implicature, in a particular context, is defeated." -- The quote from
    Carston's essay being:

     "For instance, say X and Y have a box
     of flags all of which are half blue and half
     white but which are distinguished by
     having a small block of some other colour
     in the white half: red, yellow or green.
     X is handling out flags to Y in some order
     or other and at a certain point Y is
     expecting to be given one that has a
     green patch on it. X makes a mistake and
     Y says:

         "This flag is red."

     Arguably it would be more informative and
     equally well evidenced for him to say

         "This flag is blue, white and red",

     but it certainly would not be relevant. There
     are two points here: first, the example does
     not implicate that the flag in question is
     all red (since the totality of colour on
     the flag is irrelevant); second, it does implicate
     that the flag is not green, but it does not
     implicate that the flag is not blue (since the
     only relevant contrast set here is between a
     green patch and a patch of any other colour)
     (Carston 1999:183).

    Capone writes: "Now if my considerations are plausible, I should show,
    contrary to Carston, that the inference is not defeasible. The situation
    she considers, instead, seems to show the opposite, prima facie. In that
    situation, she argues, the sentence "This flag is red" is not used to
    implicate that the flag is _all_ red. However, anyone now must have noticed
    that this is a loose usage of the expression "This flag is red".

    I disagree there. People are sometimes _loose_ speakers but this is not
    such a case, methinks.

    Capone goes on: "Surely one could use the sentence in the way Carston uses
    it, but this is not a legitimate use."

    I'm not so sure, after all she is _using_ it, isn't she.

    Capone writes: "If my considerations are correct, Carston's hypothetical
    situation does not prove that relevance considerations can defeat scalar
    implicatures. I want nevertheless to explore the standard neo-Gricean
    hypothesis to see in what ways Carston's considerations can modify it (if
    they can)." [...] Once the implicature evaporates, it is not unreasonable
    to argue that considerations of relevance will guide one's interpretations."

    Capone quotes from Carston's consideration of Horn's (1989) dual model of
    language. The Carston quote being:

     "Whatever the value of this view of things
     for language change, it strikes me as quite
     wide of the mark when it comes to verbal
     communication. Speakers are often very
     interested in being understood, having their
     message received, and this must, at the very
     least, modify their alleged concern to keep
     their articulatory organs in repose. The assumption
     that hearers would really like to have every
     ounce of intended meaning enshrined in
     linguistic form is equally dubious;
     the psychological evidence indicates that
     our cognitive systems are finely attuned to
     aspects of context, including states of mind of
     speakers, so that explicit encoding, over a
     fairly low threshold, is more likely to impede
     than enhance communication."

    Capone writes: "As Carston's paper is a critique of both Horn's and
    Levinson's systems, she then turns to Levinson's I-principle ("amplify the
    informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding a more
    specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's
    m-intended point").

    "Carston asks,

      "How does one judge what the speaker's m-point is?"

    and answers it with

       "The answer seems to be via considerations of relevance"
       (p. 186).

    As for the "problems with lexical items related by hyponymy", "Carston,
    after summing up some important considerations by Hirschberg (1991) on
    scalar implicatures, deals with two apparent counterexamples to the Gricean
    analysis"

    (8) A: What did you buy for your mother?
        B: I bought her flowers.
    (9) Billy got a dog for Christmas
        
    "Carston considers that the neo-Gricean framework predicts that in (i) B
    should implicate that he did not buy his mother _roses_, and that in (ii)
    the speaker implicates that Billy did not get a _spaniel_. Her reasoning is
     based on the scales below."

       (10) <rose, flower>,
       (11) <spaniel, dog>.

    "In these scales the included items are ordered on the basis of entailment
    ('x is a rose' entails 'x is a flower'; 'x is a spaniel' entails 'x is a
    dog'). Carston disposes of the problem by saying that these undesired
    implicatures are prevented from arising by the principle of relevance, as

      "the informationally weaker statement is sufficiently
      relevant to be worth the hearer's attention and
      so does not give rise to any implicature that
      the stronger proposition is not the case"
      (p. 190).

    "I would like to redirect Carston's considerations, by saying that in case
    the elements of a Horn-scale are related by hyponymy, the implicature
    generated by the use of the weaker item must be of the type 'I do not know
    whether the more informative option obtains'."

    This could, I guess, be rather formalised using a "Gazdar" type of an
    epistemic operator "~K(x is s)" or "K~(x is s)" -- where 'K' stands for 'K'
    and 's' for 'the strong(er) item in a Horn-scale'.

    Capone writes: "In (i), B is asked a question and replies to it by
    providing a statement that is, evidently, weaker than the one he could have
    provided by using "roses". [... The hearer] will [however] exclude that the
    speaker did not utter the more informative item because he had no relevant
    knowledge. Considering that it was him who bought the flowers, unless we
    are faced with an utterly absent-minded person, it is unlikely that he is
    not in a position to know what kind of flowers they were. The hearer thus
    reasons in the following way."

    "It is obvious that it is not the case that B is not in a position to be
    more specific about the flowers he bought; hence he cannot mean that he is
    not in a position to know. He must have a different reason for choosing the
    less informative item. Perhaps he is reluctant to say what kind of flowers
    he bought or he bought a bouquet with mixed flowers (he does not remember
    exactly the kinds of flowers contained therein)."

    "It is interesting to note, however, that in a range of cases, relevance
    considerations seem to (re)shape the implicatures related to scalar items."

    Capone gives the following illustrations:

    (12) A: Where are you going?
         B: Out.
    (13) A: What are you cooking?
         B: Dinner.
    (14) A: What is on the TV this evening?
         B: A film.
    (15) A: What did you buy?
         B: Some presents.

    In these examples, "the speaker will _not_ conversationally implicate that
    he is not in a position to know whether the more informative item of [some]
    relevant scale obtains. This implicature is in fact defeated in (12),
    (13), and (14) because in these cases it is obvious that the speaker must
    know whether some alternative, more informative, assumption obtains."

    "The hearer, thus, rather infers that the speaker is _reluctant_ to
    provide the more informative option or that he believes the hearer has no
    need to know the more informative option."

    "I think that one has to find relevance-independent ways in order to
    prevent scales based on entailments from overgenerating inferences. In
    fact, following Carston's suggestion [of how the neo-Gricean must reckon
    things out, in her view. JLS] we may find further counterexamples as

      "I saw some students"

    "by her reasoning, will implicate
     
       "I did not see any _female_ students",

    as well as

       "I did not see any _male_ students".

    "If we accept that by modifying a noun we obtain a phrase which entails
    that noun and that if we modify a verb we obtain a phrase which entails
    that verb, any use of the structure [[np The N] VP] will conversationally
    implicate It's not the case that [[np The Modifier N]VP] and any use of
    [NP[vpV]] will conversationally implicate It's not the case that
    [NP[vpVMOD]]. This means for example that a use of "The man came"
    implicates "It is not the case that the nice/benevolent/ humane/kind ...
    man came"".

    "Levinson claims that entailment alone is not sufficient to form
    well-formed Horn-scales. Levinson adds a further constraint: the
    alternative items should be equally lexicalised and should be about the
    same semantic relations. This constraint, for example, prevents us from
    having scales of the kind

      <male student, student>,

    as this contrast is not lexicalised."

    "I would like to consider one further counterexample:

       <p, p v q>.

    "It is claimed in the literature that "p" entails "p v q" (but note that
    Strawson qualifies this). If entailment were enough, we could have a scale
    like <p, p or q>. But we could also have a scale like <q, p or q>. On the
    basis of these two scales, one who utters

       "p or q"

    implicates both that it is not the case that p and it is not the case that
    q. The sum of the implicatures is incompatible with the semantics of the
    sentence."

    "I cannot resolve this problem in the context of this paper, but it appears
    that Grice's intuition that one who utters p or q implicates that he does
    not know whether p is true and that he does not know whether q is true
    cannot be based on Horn-scales of the ordinary type."

    Indeed, the relevant scale seems to be, rather, as Capone notes below,

       <and, or>

    -- the "speaker ignorance implication", as Grice called it way back in 'The
    Causal Theory of Perception' (1961, repr. in G. J. Warnock, _The Philosophy
    of Perception_, Oxford Readings in Philosophy) is best explained, rather,
    by way of a Gazdar _clausal_ (rather than a Horn-scale) implicature. And I
    think even Horn would agree...

    (Do not multiply Horn scales beyond necessity. And note that what
    Hirschberg brings in is the idea of a context-sensitive _rank_

       << s, w >>

    -- which is not _yet_ a Horn scale.)

    Capone writes: "Let us turn to

       <rose, flower>.

    "Should we say that there is no Horn-scale (in any sense) between the two
    items? Could we try and say that if two items are related by a hyponymy
    relation they will not enter a Horn-scale? Alternatively, we could say that
    if two lexical items are related by hyponymy, they _do_ enter a Horn-scale,
    but that the scalar implicature thereby generated is of the

       [clausal, epistemically modified Gazdar. JLS]

    type "I am not in a position to know whether the stronger item in the scale
    obtains. It might be argued, alas, that this option is _ad hoc_."

    Which would be a pity, as I thought it rather nice, rather.

    Capone brings in the talk of 'ranks': "However, if one had a general
    constraint that the items arranged in a Horn-scale be of the same _rank_,
    this move will be extendable to all Horn-scales and the treatment would not
    be ad hoc. Items related by hyponymy, obviously, are not of the same
    _rank_, though, and, thus, cannot form a Horn-scale. But they may form a
    special Horn-scale. This notion of "rank", ill-defined as it is, is of some
    use in explaining why we have the Horn-scale

      <&, v>

    but _not_ the Horn-scale

      *<p, p v q>,

    as the items being compared in the latter are not of the same _rank_. A
    simple sentence cannot form a scale with a complex
    (conjunctive/disjunctive) sentence".

    "So, a person who utters "John bought her flowers" might implicate, by an
    ordinary Horn-scale, that John did not buy her tulips, that John did not
    buy her roses, that John did not buy her orchids, (continuing until all the
    types of flowers are exhausted)."

    And more: consider, 'I expect John did not buy her _plastic_ flowers, now
    did he.' (But then a plastic flower is not really a _flower_, is it?)

    Capone writes: "But, as the output of such scales provides few cognitive
    effects and unjustified processing efforts, some general cognitive
    principle will determine, in the case of items related by hyponymy, that
    ordinary scalar mechanisms cannot hold and that the output of the scales in
    question must have some general format, to wit".

      "I am not in a position to be more specific
      about the exact type of thing I referred to in
      my utterance by resorting to a hyponym".

    "On p. 194, Carston claims that Horn's Q- and R-implicatures and Levinson's
    I-implicatures, despite the claims of the neo-Gricean theory, equally
    consist, after all, in inferential enrichments."

    Capone considers two further examples by Carston:

    (16) John was reading a book.
         +> John was not reading a dictionary.
    (17) Some people like eating raw liver
         +> Not all people.

    "Carston, contrary to Atlas & Levinson (1981), who claim that the
    implicature in (16) is an inferential enrichment due to the I-principle,
    claims that the implicature could be generated due to a contrast."

      <dictionary, book>,

    "in which case the Q-implicature would also be, ipso facto, an inferential
    enrichment. Conversely, Carston argues, the ["some" +> "not all"]
    implicature in (ii) could be the outcome of the I-principle. If Carston's
    considerations were correct, her criticism would be turned into a victory
    for the neo-Gricean approaches, as in fact, as I have shown elsewhere, one
    needs a demonstration that the Q-principle and the I-principle do not clash."

    "It is not obvious that one can make a case for a Q-implicature in (i) as,
    although the Horn-scale <dictionary, book> is well-formed, world knowledge
    prevents the Q-implicature from arising, as one normally does not _read_
    dictionaries. One only consults them."

    At best.

    "Concerning (17), it is clear that the Q-implicature is dependent on the
    quantifier; thus, if we replace "like to eat raw liver" with "play tennis",
    it is not obvious that one can obtain the implicature related to the
    quantifier "some" by an inference to stereotype. Quoting Richardson and
    Richardson (1990) [Carston] claims that the example iii below can be
    explained via an I-implicature (while it is normally accounted for via a
    Q-implicature) and that iv can be explained via a Q-implicature (while it
    is normally accounted for via a an I-implicature):

    (18) "p v q"
          +> ~(p & q)
    (19) "p -> q"
         +> ~p -> ~q

    "One might consider that what is conveyed by (18) is". "p or q but not both
    p and q." "Things are not so easy."

    "The explanation Carston has for example (19) is the following":

      "~(~p -> ~q)" _entails_ "p -> q".

    "Consider, however, that if these logical demonstrations were sufficient to
    prove that the items related by logical entailment form a Horn-scale, one
    could derive on the basis of the scale <p, p v q>" the imlicature "not p"
    from an utterance of "p or q". This implicature, in fact, does not arise,
    as we have shown that entailment is not a sufficient condition for a
    Horn-scale."

    "Despite all the logical equivalences Carston mentions, <[not[if(not P),
    (not Q)]], [if P, Q]> is _not_ a well-formed Horn-scale. First, because it
    is not a scale between lexemes. Second, because the items in the scale are
    not about the same semantic relations."

    "Implicating reluctance. Carston expatiates on the advantages of accepting
    Sperber & Wilson's (1995, 270) revised Presumption of optimal relevance.
    This presumption is reported below:

      "The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough
      for it to be worth the addressee's effort to
      process it;

      The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant
      one compatible with the communicator's abilities
      and preferences.

    Capone writes: "Carston discusses an interesting Gricean example".

    (20) A: Where does Pierre live?
         B: Somewhere in the South of France.

    "Grice would say about this example that B conversationally implicates that
    she does not know exactly where Pierre lives. Carston mentions that
    Sperber & Wilson consider a different possible implicature of B's
    utterance: B is _reluctant_ to disclose Pierre's exact whereabouts."

    "Carston believes that Grice cannot predict this implicature ("It can only
    be a case of what Grice calls "opting out", which does not give rise to
    implicatures at all" (p. 216)). Carston believes that the "unwilling to
    say" implicature follows from Sperber & Wilson clause (b) of the
    Presumption of Optimal Relevance (revised) ((b) The ostensive stimulus is
    the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and
    preferences)."

    "I am persuaded that Grice has ways to calculate the "unwilling to say"
    inference, as opting out is ipso facto a way of showing reluctance to say
    (something). Suppose that someone asks my sister "Where does your brother
    work now?", assuming (reasonably) that my sister should know. My sister
    replies: "He works somewhere in the South of France". If the person who
    initially asked the question is persuaded that my sister should know, then
    he will infer that my sister did not want to be sufficiently informative
    and that she was not willing to provide the requested information."

    "But I wonder whether this is a real implicature. Implicatures, in fact,
    are part of the speaker's intended meaning."

    Indeed. The m-intended point mentioned by Levinson in the discussion above.
    This point, as Horn notes is also made by Hirschberg in her treatment of
    scale-based implicature.

    Capone writes: "If one bears in mind Strawson's considerations on speaker's
    meaning, one arrives at a different conclusion. In 'Intention & Convention
    in Speech Acts', discusses an interesting example. S arranges
    convincing-looking evidence that p, knowing that A is looking at him. S
    intends H to recognize his intention to let him believe that p. However,
    this, Strawson argues, does not count as communication. He thus adds one
    further condition to Grice's definition of meaning: it seems a minimum
    further condition of the speaker's trying to communicate that he should not
    only intend A to recognize his intention to get A to think that p, but that
    he should also intend A to recognize his intention to get A to recognize
    his intention to get A to think that p."

    "If one bears what Strawson says in mind, my sister cannot mean that she is
    reluctant, although the speaker infers that she is. Thus the reluctance
    inference is not an implicature."

    "I agree with Carston that the hearer will infer reluctance on the part of
    the speaker in the examples discussed above and that one way to calculate
    this inference is to take into account the fact that the speaker can
    provide the information in question and prefers not to provide it. As the
    ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the
    communicator's abilities and preferences, the hearer will assume that the
    speaker acts as if he was not able to provide the information in question.
    However, as he can provide the information requested, the hearer will
    assume that he is reluctant to provide it."

    "On p. 220, Carston discusses an example by Green (1995, 96-97)."

    (21) B: Are some of your friends Buddhists?
         A: Yes, some are.

    "The context is one in which B might be interested in knowing if _all_ of
    A's friends are Buddhists. A, by replying as she does, may be heard as
    implicating that not all of her friends are Buddhists. However, the scalar
    implicature will not arise, Carston says, because A might have a reason for
    diffidence concerning the stronger point (she might have fear to be
    considered a Buddhist-groupie) and, thus, the scalar implicature might not
    get through." -- The Carston quote being,

      "Green's context makes it plain that while
      the speaker has the ability to make the stronger
      statement, she prefers not to (she is afraid of
      being considered a Buddhist-groupie) and the
      hearer is aware of this. Hence the relevance
      principle correctly predicts that the speaker
      is not implicating that not all of her friends
      are Buddhist and that the hearer recovers no
      such assumption as part of what is communicated."

    "However, I am not sure that this example really shows that the scalar
    implicature is defeated."

    I, for one, if interested to know if B's _all_ friends are buddhists would,
    to start with, ax [sic] "all", -- never "some".

    Capone writes: "If A's preference is not to show that she is
    Buddhist-groupie, the scalar implicature is what would serve her purpose
    best, as she would conversationally implicate that not all of her friends
    are Buddhists."

    Capone sums up: "I believe that Carston's paper discusses many problems and
    offers some interesting solutions. I think the problems she raises are
    serious ones. I have shown some of the ways in which they might be disposed
    of, although I am sure that the discussion does not end here."

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    ==
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