No like is the same; Similitude and Identity
are different things.
T. Adams,
Exegesis of 2 Peter iii 10
1633. OED under 'like'.
>To: relevance@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk
>From: robyn carston <robyn@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk>
>Subject: Non-member submission from [David J Weber <david_weber@sil.org>]
>>Subject: metaphor and simile
>>Friends,
>>Has anyone looked into the cognitive difference
>>between a metaphor and a simile? I just read a literary
>>scholar's statement that a metaphor was just an
>>abbreviated simile, abbreviated in that it lacks an
>>explicit comparator, that otherwise the two are the
>>same. However, my gut feeling is that they are quite
>>different, that generally a simile invites a more
>>superficial comparison than a metaphor, that generally
>>a metaphor provokes a more profound search for
>>relevance than a simile. But I can't recall this issue
>>being discussed.
>>Best, --David
Well, metaphor does pose a few problems to relevance theory, and I'm hereby
taking the liberty of appending R. Carston's post to the list on "Metaphor
and effort" distributed some time ago. It may pay to contrast her thoughts
as they may apply to 'simile' (vs. metaphor). As if [sic] confirming David
Weber's 'gut feeling', a simile looks _like_ [sic] a more processable thing
to process, but this is just what it _looks_ *like*. Some interspersed
comments on R. Carston's comments below, with a few refs. to Grice (WOW)
and Webster, and the entry for 'like' in the OED.
Cheers,
JL
Refs.
Cartwright, N. Fitting facts to equations. In PGRICE, see Grandy.
Davidson, D. What metaphors mean. In Inquiries into truth and
intepretation. Oxford.
(cited in Sperber/Wilson, _Relevance_).
Grandy, Richard, and Richard Warner, PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Clarendon (Includes contribution
by Wilson and Sperber, 'On defining relevance').
Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard.
Oxford English Dictionary.
Webster's Dictionary of English Usage.
====
X-Sender: robyn@crow.phon.ucl.ac.uk
To: relevance@linguistics.UCL.ac.uk
From: robyn carston <robyn@linguistics.UCL.ac.uk>
Subject: metaphor and effort
Sender: owner-relevance@linguistics.UCL.ac.uk
Dear all
The following thoughts were prompted (or reactivated) by reading the recent
interesting paper by Ira Noveck, Maryse Bianco and Alain Castry describing
some experimental work on metaphor processing (the paper was publicised
on this list). I was going to address the authors specifically but then
thought
the issue might be of wider interest to people involved in relevance theory.
However, be warned that this is not a short message, but more like a short
essay. I would very much appreciate corrections/comments if anyone makes
it through to the end.
Ira Noveck et al.'s basic position is that metaphorical utterances take more
processing effort and have more cognitive effects than 'non-figurative
equivalents'.
=====
[Here the issue (as per D. Weber's post) is to contrast the processing
effort of "the A is B" (when understood both non-metaphorically and
_metaphorically_) with "The A is like B".
I will have Grice's example in mind throughout,
"You are the cream in my coffee",
in _WOW_ (Studies in the Way of Words_, p.34. JLS]
=======
Building on some work by Ray Gibbs (1990), they ran some experiments to test
this hypothesis and found that the results supported it. Their claim is
that this is precisely what the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor
predicts.
Gibbs (1994) also takes the 'extra processing effort' prediction to follow
from
RT and finds it to be at fault on these very grounds: '... the psychological
research clearly shows that listeners do not ordinarily devote extra
processing
resources to understanding metaphors compared with more literal utterances.
The metaphor-as-loose-talk view, ... may not see metaphors as violations of
communication norms but still incorrectly assumes that metaphors, and other
tropes ... obligatorily demand additional cognitive effort to be
understood' (p.232). It is this psychological evidence that Noveck et al.
are calling into question.
======
[I wonder if R. Gibbs has addressed the issue of the extra processing
effort of similes versus 'equitives' like "The A _is_ B". JLS]
=====
However, the opposite view of what RT predicts about metaphor processing is
also to be found, espoused by another staunch relevance theorist. In his
excellent
book on relevance and poetic effects, Pilkington (2000) discusses
psycholinguistic
work by Gibbs and by Gerrig (1989) which seems to show that 'utterances
used metaphorically do not necessarily take longer to process than the same
utterances
used literally' (p.89).
======
[So the question is _tricky_ for we have at least, as I say above, 3
different types of scenarios involving the processing effort of
1. "The A is B" when uttered _literally_.
2. "The A is like B" which cannot be _but_ literal
(since, a la Davidson's neo-Gricean theory in
'What metaphors mean'
all similes are trivially _true_).
((unlike metaphors which, of the type we are
considering -- unlike "You are a butcher" said
of a bad surgeon, or proverbs like "Too many
cooks spoil the broth" or special cases such as
Donne's "No man is an island" --
are categorially _false_)).
3. "The A is B" when used _metaphorically_
JLS]
===
According to Pilkington 'the relevance theory account of
metaphor interpretation is quite consistent with [these] psycholinguistic
results' (p.90).
So what's going on here? On the face of it, it looks as if someone has to
be wrong
about what the RT prediction is. Before I check back on what the founding
father
and mother have to say, note that talk of extra or more processing effort
raises the
question of 'more than what?'. What is the metaphorical utterance being
compared
with? I think there are two different comparisons at work and that this
may be the
source of the apparently contradictory positions.
=====
[Right. And if D. Weber is right, there may be a _third_ comparison at
work, viz. the simile proper: "The A is LIKE B".
D. Weber refers to the view of metaphor as implicit (abbreviated)
simile, which is indeed Grice's (traceable back to Aristotle's views on
analogical reasoning) when Grice refers to 'You are the cream in my
coffee'. Literally, it is a categorial falsity, and so the addressee is
promted to look for, as Grice puts it, if not some loose talk, at least a
'more or less fanciful resemblance':
"Examples in which the first maxim of Quality is
flouted.
...
METAPHOR.
Examples like 'You are the cream in my coffee'
characteristically involve categorial falsity,
so the contradictory of what the speaker has
made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a
truism; so it cannot be _that_ that such a speaker
is trying to get across. The most likely supposition
is that the speaker is attributing to his audience
some feature or features in respect of which the
audience RESEMBLES (MORE OR LESS FANCIFULLY) the
mentioned substance" (Grice, op. cit., p. 34.
emphasis mine. JLS).
JLS]
====
Sperber & Wilson (1985/86), discussing such highly conventional metaphors as
'Jeremy is a lion', which communicates the strong implicature that Jeremy is
brave, say that such metaphors 'must suggest some further line of thought if
their relative indirectness and its extra processing cost is to be
justified ...'
(p.167) and, of course, this point holds all the more for more creative
metaphors.
The processing effort comparison here is between uttering 'Jeremy is a
lion' and
uttering 'Jeremy is brave', or between 'You are a piglet' and 'You are a
grubby kid'. It is this sort of comparison that Noveck et al. have in mind.
======
The sort of comparison that D. Weber now invites
us to consider is rather between
1. Jeremy is a lion
and
2. Jeremy is like a lion.
with the distinction, for (1), between (1a) and (1b):
1a. Jeremy is a lion. The new lion at the zoo, actually.
It was christened 'Jeremy' by the Guardian,
after "Jeremy Taylor"
(non-metaphoric)
1b. Jeremy [Taylor] is a lion. He's so brave, and human.
(metaphoric).
JLS]
====
However, consider now an example in Sperber (2000, p.132): 'John is a
soldier'.
In a particular context (A), a hearer might access an interpretation along
the lines
that John is very dutiful, loyal, obedient, a team-player,
self-sacrificing, but not
including that John is a member of the military, has weapons, etc. This
would be a
case of a loose or metaphorical use of 'soldier'. In a different context
(B), the 'literal' properties of being a member of the military, being
trained to kill, etc. might be accessed instead. In both cases, as ever,
the hearer follows a path of least effort in accessing the interpretation
and stops when his expectation of relevance is satisfied. The issue of
different degrees of processing effort is not Sperber's concern here, so is
not discussed, but it seems clear that there is no prediction that there
will be any significant processing effort difference between the
loose/metaphorical use in context A and the literal use in context B. It
also seems pretty clear that in certain contexts the loose/metaphorical
reading is going to be easier to access than the literal one. I think
these are the sorts of comparison that Gerrig and Pilkington are making,
and they are quite different from that discussed in the previous paragraph.
So is that it? - problem solved? Probably not entirely. I'm not deeply
enough steeped in the full weighty mass of psycholinguistic experiments in
this area to be sure of my ground here, but I assume that not only cases
such as the 'soldier' one, but also cases like the 'piglet/dirty kid' one
have been tested and have given a result of no significant difference in
processing effort/time (a word of confirmation from Ray Gibbs and/or Sam
Glucksberg would be most welcome at this point). If so, this would still
seem to be at odds with the RT account, unless, of course, the measures
(reading times, etc) used in the experiments simply cannot tap the sort of
effort differences at issue.
=====
In experimenting the processing effort of similes, a trick may arise as
to what counts as a 'simile' proper (cfr. Grice's remarks on 'as if'
thinking in Cartwright's contribution to PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality, p. 442) plus some _loose_ usages (if that's the word) people
tend to make of things like 'like'.
Consider Grice's very examination of metaphor:
"Examples like 'You are the cream in my coffee'
charcteristically involve categorial falsity"
(WOW, p. 34)
And note his use of 'like': "examples like...", and appendix I below on
'like' in the Webster's Dictionary of English Usage, sp. the separate entry
for "like, such as". The Cartwright ref. being:
"My view is that equations do not govern objects
in reality. This grew out of a Grice seminar on
metaphysics [where] we talked about pretences,
fictions, surrogates, and the like; and Grice
asked about various cliams, where whould we put
the 'as if' operator: helium gas behaves AS IF
it is a collection of molecules which interact
only on collision, or helium gas is composed of
molecules which behave AS IF they interact only
on collision, or...?"
(op. cit., p. 442).
====
Furthermore, there seems to be a striking difference in the psycho results
that
I'm aware of between metaphorical predications and metaphorical referring
expressions. While the predications (which all the examples so far discussed
are) apparently take no more effort than literal paraphrases, metaphorical
reference (e.g. 'The princess' used to refer to a cat, 'That junkyard' used to
refer to someone's office) does take significantly longer than literal
reference.
======
This distinction reference/predication multiples the scenarios for
metaphor only, for, luckily, you cannot seem to use a simile
_referentially_... but cfr. below "Something like a tiger was seen in the
neighbourhood" and such. JLS]
======
This was pointed out by Gibbs himself (1990) and reinforced by Onishi &
Murphy (1993), who tried everything they could to ease the way for
metaphorical
references, but had to conclude that there just is a heavier processing
load for
metaphorical referring expressions than for corresponding literal ones.
Of course, there are plenty of possible explanations for this
reference/predication
difference, some of which are discussed by Gibbs and O&M.
Now, Noveck et al.'s experiments in which a metaphorical/literal processing
difference was found were all cases of referring expressions. So their
results further reinforce those of Gibbs and O&M, but they could therefore
be subject to an
explanation for the extra effort in terms of special properties of
reference that
make metaphor difficult when used in this way.
====
Now that I think of it, 'like' CAN occur in referring expressions, as in,
"Something like a tiger was seen in the neighbourhood." It's odd to think
of this as giving way to a metaphor, though. [JLS]
====
It might be of greater
interest for
the RT prediction about 'piglet/dirty child', etc. if there were
experiments which
revealed effort differences when these are used in predicating properties
of an
already determined referent. I wonder if these are planned ...
Best wishes, Robyn
------------------
References:
Gerrig, R. 1989. Empirical constraints on computational theories of
metaphor. Cognitive Science 13, 235-241.
Gibbs, R. 1990. Comprehending figurative referential descriptions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 16, 56-66.
Gibbs, R. 1994. The Poetics of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Noveck, I. et al. 2001. The costs and benefits of metaphor. Metaphor
and Symbol 16, 109-121.
Onishi, K. & Murphy, G. 1993. Metaphoric reference: When metaphors are
not understood as easily as literal expressions. Memory & Cognition 21,
763-772.
Pilkington, A. 2000. Poetic Effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective.
John Benjamins.
Sperber, D. 2000. Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective.
In D. Sperber (ed.) Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective,
117-137. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. 1985/86. Loose talk. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 86, 153-171.
--------------------
=====
Appendix I. "Like/as." (To which I'd add "SUCH AS" ("Examples such as 'You
are the cream in my coffee' involve categorial falsity"-- which the Webster
dictionary has as a separate entry. The Webster Dictionary quotes:
1. Winston tastes good, like a cigarette should.
(1950s ad) as being "a line [which] provoked a considerably controversy in
the popular press -- which is probably what the advertising agency hoped to
achieve."
That pesky 'like' is a problem for us
Americans to solve. New Yorker, May 26 1956.
Webster notes: ""Like" for "as" is never used in England, but is universal
in the South and West. Brander Matthews 1901 described 'like' as a
Briticism "very prevant" among both the educated and the uneducated. A
British writer in the New York Times (7 May 1978) thought that 'like' and
'as' were hopelessly muddled in the minds of most Americans."
What is this pesky "like"? Is it "a solecism typical of the uneducated"?
Not necessarily. Though indeed originating with the uneducated, Webster
claims, 'like' has been "taken up by the knowing and the well-informed who
find it catchy, or liberating, and who use it as though they were
slumming." (Strunk & White, 1959).
The "sneakiest" construction, Webster claims, is the one in which "like"
"introduces a clause from which the verb -- and sometimes even more -- has
been omitted. The verb is usually to be understood from the preceding
clause. This "like" is often to be a preposition because there is no
following verb. The classic example of this construction is (2)".
2. He takes it like a duck to water.
Webster further quotes:
3. As if it followed like the night the day
that language is a living thing. Simon 1980.
4. They let him die like a cat up an alley.
Mencken, Evergreen 1967.
5. I've had my share of criticism but for the
most part it has rolled off me like water
off a duck. W Novak.
6. Such wits as he are, to a company of
reasonable men, like rooks to the gamesters.
W. Whycherly, The Country Wife, 1675.
7. About 9 o'clock, the fog began to rise
and seemed to be lifted up from the water like
the curtain at a playhouse.
B. Franklin, Autobiography, 1788.
Webster has a separate entry for "like, such as", as the distinction
carries its own problems: "Sellers 1975 make a distinction reserving 'such
as' for examples and 'like' for resemblances. Kilkpatrick 1984 does not
want 'like' used in the place of 'such as' Winners & Sinners 27 April 1987
on the other hand does not want 'such as' used before a single example;
'like' is to be used there. Bernstein 1971 think that the
example-resemblance distinction is too fine to worry about. Kilkpatrick
says Bernstein is wrong. In some passages, you cannot be sure whether
examples or resemblances are intended."
===
Appendix II. As to balance the rather prescriptivist take of the Webster,
allow me to edit the rather more descriptive approach as per the entry for
'like' in the OED.
"From the late OE. "lic", shortened form of OE. "gelic" = OFris. gelick,
OS. gilick (Dutch gelijk), OHG. gilih (MHG. gelih, mod.G. "gleich"), ONor.
glikr, Goth. galeiks: -OTeut. galiko- f. pref. ga- (corresponding in
meaning to L. com-) + liko- body, form"."
The word is thus etymologically analogous to L. "con-formis". The OE.
"gelic" survived into early mod.Eng. as "y-like": "alike". The OE. "lic"
yields normally "lich" in Southern and "lik" in Northern ME. The former
type did not survive after the 14th c.; the prevalence of the b form may be
partly due to the analogy of the comparative, where the k is normal in all
dialects, though the forms with ch were not uncommon. The inflected
comparative and superlative are now rare in educated use exc. poet. or
rhetorical."
USAGES: 1. Having the same characteristics or qualities as some other
person or thing; of approximately identical shape, size, colour, character,
etc., with something else; similar; resembling; analogous. (In the negative
phrases, there is none or nothing like --, the adj. assumes a pregnant
sense = `so good or wonderful as'.)
Cites:
1600 Ballad, Mary Ambree 32 (Percy MS.)
There was never none like to Mary Aumbree.
1604 E. G[rimstone] D'Acosta's Hist. Indies iv. xxxviii. 314
It is in face like to a monkie.
1859 Masson Brit. Novelists ii. 94
Swift is the likest author we have to Rabelais.
1340 Hampole Pr. Consc. 830-1
Whiles a man lyves he is lyke a man; When he es dede what es he lyke than?
1548 Hall Chron., Hen. VI, 84
The Parisians like the Wethercocke be variable and inconstaunt.
1601 Shaks. Twel. N. iii. i. 39
Fooles are as like husbands, as Pilchers are to Herrings.
1854 Brewster More Worlds xv. 226
The fixed stars are like our sun in every point in which it is possible to
compare them.
"Usage II: Some phrasal uses of the adj. in this construction have a
special idiomatic force. The question What is he (or it) like? means `What
sort of a man is he?', `What sort of a thing is it?', the expected answer
being a description, and not at all the mention of a resembling person or
thing."
[Good point. JLS]
"(Cf. what-like.) to look like (occas. to be like) sometimes means `to have
the appearance of being' so and so; e.g. in `He looks like a clever man'."
Cites:
1684 tr. Bonet's Merc. Compit. xviii. 647
The unskilfulness of the Dissector, who was liker a Butcher than an
Anatomist.
1692 R. L'Estrange Fables clxxxi. (1708) 194
The Hypocrite is never so far from being a Good Christian, as when he looks
Likest One.
1835 Marryat Three Cutters i,
It is Lord B--; he looks like a sailor, and he does not much belie his looks.
1966 I. Murdoch Time of Angels xviii. 193,
I suppose it's a skill like another.
1641 Bp. Mountagu Acts & Mon. (1642) 355
The two letters of b and m being in manuscripts very like.
"Usage III: In proverbial formuloae"
Cites:
1611 Bible Hosea iv. 9 And there shall be like people, like priest
1632 Massinger City Madam i. i,
Like hen, like chicken.
1632 Massinger City Madam ii. ii,
Like bitch, like whelps.
1590 Shaks. Com. Err. iii. ii. 105
Anti. What complexion is she of?
Dro. Swart like my shoo, but her face nothing like so cleane kept.
1968 P. Durst Badge of Infamy vii. 61
`Would you like some coffee?' `Now that's more like it. Sure why not?'
"Characteristic of; such as one might expect from."
Cites:
1703 Rules of Civility 98 That would be liker a Drunkard than a Gentleman.
1850 Carlyle Latter-d. Pamph. III. 2
The Forty Colonies..are all pretty like rebelling just now.
1592 Shaks. Rom. & Jul. i. v. 187
My grave is like to be my wedding bed.
1896 A. E. Housman Shropsh. Lad xxii,
Such leagues apart the world's ends are, We're like to meet no more.
1930 G. B. Johnson in B. A. Botkin Treas. S. Folklore (1949) iv. iii. 608
`I like to have got killed' means `I almost got killed'. It is surprising
how many phrases used by Negroes are exactly the phrases used by English
folk.
1969 Observer (Colour Suppl.) 23 Mar. 23/2
They look at me like I'm dirt.
"Usage IV: Used parenthetically to qualify a preceding statement: = `as it
were', `so to speak'. Also, colloq. (orig. U.S.), as a meaningless
interjection or expletive."
Cites:
1778 F. Burney Evelina II. xxiii. 222
Father grew quite uneasy, like, for fear of his Lordship's taking offence.
1961 New Statesman 22 Sept. 382/2
`You're a chauvinist,' Danny said. `Oh, yeah. Is that bad like?'
1966 Lancet 17 Sept. 635/2
As we say pragmatically in Huddersfield, `C'est la vie, like!'
1973 Black Panther 17 Nov. 9/4
What will be the contradictions that produce further change? Like, it seems
to me that it would be virtually impossible to avoid some contradictions.
"Usage V: Something considered in respect of its likeness to something
else; an instance of similarity; chiefly in proverbial expressions, as:
like (will) to like, like for like.
Cites:
1601 Shaks. Jul. C. ii. ii. 128
Euery like is not the same.
1607 W. Sclater Funeral Serm. (1629) 2
Illustrated by a comparison of likes.
1633 T. Adams Exp. 2 Peter iii. 10. 1304
No like is the same; Similitude and Identitie are different things.
1696 Tryon Misc. i. 4
Every Like works upon its Likeness.
==
==
J L Speranza, Esq
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