The Conjunction of Conjunction

From: J L Speranza (jls@netverk.com.ar)
Date: Fri Apr 05 2002 - 09:36:54 GMT

  • Next message: J L Speranza: "J. L. Austin Revisited"

    What's conjointed?

    "And" and conjunction. "And" and relevance.

    Well, there's L. R. Horn's _Natural History of Negation_ (his 'expansion'
    on a seminar given by Haj Ross way back in MIT in 1972) and R. E. Jenning's
    _The Genealogy of Disjunction_ (Oxford, 1994). Why, with S. Schwenter's new
    book for Garland, _Pragmatics of Conditional Marking: Implicature,
    Scalarity, and Exclusivity_, it seems it's only the particle "and" -- of
    the four 'structural devices' mentioned by Grice in 'Logic and
    Conversation' (in this order: 'not', 'and', 'or', 'if' -- WOW, p.22).

    Here are some notes from The LINGUIST List: Vol-13-933. Thu Apr 4 2002.
    ISSN: 1068-4875. (Home Page: http://linguistlist.org/) in the form of a
    REVIEW of Sanders, T., J. Schilperoord, & W. Spooren, ed. (2001), Text
    Representation: Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Aspects. Benjamins, 363pp,
    ISBN 1-58811-077-X. Human Cognitive Processing 8 (By L A Alemany & I
    Castellon).

    "In Chapter 8, H Maat claims that the conjunction 'and' does not link two
    segments directly, but makes them jointly relevant to the surrounding
    context. "Matt's starting point is the relevance theoretic work of D. L.
    Blakemore (_Semantic constraints on relevance_. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987),
    and R. Carston ('Conjunction, explanation and relevance'. Lingua, 90,
    27-48, 1993) who were the first to propose joint relevance as the adequate
    account for 'and'. Maat strengthens this notion by considering 'and' as a
    topic continuity marker. Taking topic to be the explicit or implicit
    question that is being answered by a segment of discourse (J. Van Kuppevelt
    (1995). Discourse structure, topicality and questioning. Journal of
    Linguistics, 31, 109-147), 'and' combines two segments of discourse as a
    single topic. A corpus study of inter-clausal conjunctions shows that the
    majority do present joint relevance. Two kinds of joint relevance
    environments are distinguished: supporting or elaborating an assumption or
    answering a single question, this being the most frequent. Some theoretical
    implications of his account of the conjunction are discussed. First, the
    meaning of 'and' is claimed to be procedural, because it constrains the
    possible implicatures between the joined elements. Second, joint relevance
    relations are placed in an expansion of the coherence relation
    classification of T J M Sanders, WPM Spooren, and LGM Noordman, (1992).
    Towards a taxonomy of coherence relations. Discourse Processes, 15, 1-35),
    as a _subtype_ of *non-causal* relations, namely additive and comparative.
    Finally, this account is related to recent work on the role of connectives
    in the construction of discourse representations, suggesting that the
    differences between juxtaposed and coordinated sentences should be
    investigated."

    May I add a couple (literally by one) 'historical' references in the ps?

    Cheers,

    JL
    Grice Circle.

    ===

    * The first reference is yet another of Grice's editorial policies. When
    compiling his _WOW_ (I like T. Wharton's way of calling Grice's book, "Way
    of Words", don't I), Grice supressed a rather tidy account of "and" in his
    Cole essay, which I append below.

    * Then there's A. N. Chomsky. As someone pointed out to me, Chomsky seems
    to be working on the assumption that authors with double initials who are
    best known for their _second_ initial have "A." as their first initial.
    Thus, he credits "A. P. Grice" in _Aspects of the Theory of Syntax_ in the
    famous endnote in which (A)NC first mentions the idea that "the order of
    'quantifiers' in surface structure sometimes plays a role in semantic
    interpretation", with the celebrated example of "Everyone in this room
    knows at least two languages" and its passive paraphrase. Chomsky writes
    (echoing Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see ref.):

       "[A. P. -- sic] Grice suggested that the temoral
       order implied in conjunction may be regarded as
       a feature of discourse rather than as part of the
       meaning of 'and'."
             Chomsky, 1965, p. 224.

    The fact that Grice was predating the William James Lectures by two years
    is yet another result of Chomskyan Revolution, almost.

    * The other ref. is to J. O. Urmson, Grice's colleague (see e.g. 'Logic &
    Conversation V', WOW, p. 93). In his history of English philosophy 1919-39
    he goes more general than Grice. It's not that he _took off his trousers_
    and went to bed, but the whole clothes. Thus Urmson (of "Parenthetical
    Verbs" fame) writes:

      "In formal logic, the connectives "and" and
       "or" are always given a minimum meaning, as we
       have done above, such that any complex formed
       by the use of them alone is a truth-function
       of its constituents. In ordinary discourse
       the connectives often have a RICHER MEANING;
       thus 'he took off his clothes and went to bed'
       implies temporal succession and has a different
       meaning from 'he went to bed and took off his
       trousers'. Logicians would justify their use of
       the minimum meaning by pointing out that it is the
       COMMON ELEMENT in all our uses of "and". (p. 9).

    * Of course my favourite example remains _Ryle's_ in _Dilemmas_: "he felt
    bad and had some arsenic."

    REFERENCES

    Blakemore, D. (1987). Semantic constraints on relevance. London: Basil
    Blackwell.

    Carston, R. (1993). Conjunction, explanation and relevance. Lingua, 90,
    27-48.

    DIONYSIUS. Peri syntheseos onomaton. Cited in C.C. de Jonge, "Natura artis
    magistra: Ancient rhetoricians, grammarians, and philosophers on natural
    word order," Linguistics in the Netherlands 2001, 159-66. ("Events earlier
    in time are mentioned earlier in the order of words than those which
    occurred later." -one of the eight "natural principles" that influence word
    order). (I owe the ref. to R. H.).

    Grice, H. P. (1981). Presupposition and conversational implicature. In P.
    Cole, ed. Radical Pragmatics. London: Academic Press, pp.113-27

    Urmson J. O. _Philosophical Analysis: its development between the two world
    wars. Oxford: Clarendon, 1956.

    ====

    Appendix: Grice on 'and' in the passage in 'Presupposition and
    Conversational Implicature' suppressed in _WOW_:

    Grice writes:

    "Plausible examples are perhaps not impossible to find. It was suggested by
    Strawson"

    Grice's "friend", and "pupil" and knight and "collaborator", and therefore
    someone Grice couldn't be spared to catch in yet another inconsistency --
    see my 'Robbing Peter to pay Paul'.

    "in _An introduction to logical theory_"

    A book which Strawson credits -- in the 'Preface' -- as being in part the
    result of his tutorials with Grice, even if Grice did not manage to 'save'
    him from 'all' the mistakes.

    "that there is a divergence between the ordinary meaning of the word "and"
    and the conjunction sign of propositional or predicate calculus, because
    "He took off his trousers and went to bed"
    does not seem to have the same meaning as "He went to bed and took off his
    trousers"".

    The example _is_ quoted in WOW, p.8, as "He _got into_ bed and took off his
    trousers". Note all the editorial policies ranging from Urmson's "clothes"
    to Grice's "get into" beds.

    "The suggestion here is, of course, that, in order propertly to represent
    the ordinary use of the word "and", one would have to allow a special sense
    (or sub-sense)"

    I like "subsense" for surely it's "and THEN".

    "for the word "and" which contained some reference to the idea that what
    was mentioned before the word "and""

    As Dionysius of Hallicarnassus would have it. See the ref. section above. I
    owe the ref. to Dionisius to R. H. and note that Dionysius does not mention
    "and", though (or "kai").

    "was temporally prior to what was mentioned after it, and that, on that
    supposition, one could deal with this case. I want to suggest in reply that
    it is not necessary, if one operates on some general principle of keeping
    down, as far as possible, the number of special sense"

    Sic. Not 'senses'

    "of words that one"

    Or Ockham.

    "has to invoke, to give countenance to the alleged divergence of meaning.
    It is just that there is a general supposition which would be subsidary to
    the general maxim of Manner ("be perspicuous") that one presents one's
    material in AN ORDERLY MANNER"

    Emphasis mine to show connection with "Be orderly", Manner's conversational
    maxim No. 4.

    "and, if what one is engaged upon is a narration (if one is talking about
    events), then the most orderly manner for a narration of events is an order
    that corresponds to the order in which they took place.

    Unless one is telling a joke. As S. Attardo notes in K. Hall, _The Legacy
    of Grice_, the important obvious, structural, thing about a a "punchline"
    is that it comes, by definition, almost, at the end of a joke. Surely for
    comical purposes you can narrate the events in any non-temporal order you
    wish.

    "So, the meaning of the expression "He took off his trousers and he got
    into bed" and the corresponding expression with a logician's constant "&"
    (i.e. "he took off his trousers & he got into bed") would be exactly the
    same."

    I.e. no more no less.

    "And, indeed, if anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a
    piece of vocabulary"

    Grice means ordinary _written_ language, as when I write letters in
    English. I (and neither did Edward, the Prince of Wales -- see _A King's
    Story_ -- _never_ use "and". I.e. Grice is using 'speech' _broadly_ and
    notably _not_ suggesting that we go about saying things like "Land of hope
    ampersand glory".

    "instead of as a formal device, and used it to connect together sentences
    of this type, they would collect just the same implicata as the ordinary
    English sentences have without any extra explanation of the meaning of the
    word "and"."

    Grice goes on to prove the 'cancellability', producing the typical Gricean
    idiom, "He took off his trousers and got into bed. But I don't mean to
    suggest that he did those things in that order", of which he writes:

    "If that is not a linguistic offense, or does not _seem_ to be, then, so
    far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has here is a
    conversational implicature, and that the original suggestion of temporal
    succession was not part of the conventional meaning of the sentence."
    (Grice, in Cole, Radical Pragmatics, p. 186).

    ==
                            J L Speranza, Esq
    Country Town
    St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
    Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
    La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
    Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
                          BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
                          Telefax 00542214259205
                       http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
                            jls@netverk.com.ar



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Apr 05 2002 - 15:49:14 GMT