In the analysis of Performatives and Speech Acts.
From:
LINGUIST List: Vol-13-51. Thu Jan 10 2002. ISSN: 1068-4875.
Home Page: http://linguistlist.org/
Review of:
Kasher, Asa, ed. (1998) Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Volume II: Speech act
theory and particular speech acts. Routledge, vi+490pp, hardback ISBN
0-415-16938-0, Routledge Critical Concepts series.
By: B. Bultinck.
Essay 5: D Wilson & D Sperber,
<< Mood & non-declarative sentences >>
"The authors concentrate on the distinction between mood and force in the
traditional analyses of imperatives and interrogatives. They conclude that
the traditional descriptions are not _empirically_ adequate. Their proposal
consists of a two-layered schema: the syntactic pattern (e.g.,
"indicative", "imperative", "interrogative") must be assigned some
intrinsic _semantic_ content, which can then be used as a foundation for an
explanatory account of "force". This content can _not_ be
truth-conditional. It's, rather, semantically indeterminate and has to be
enriched pragmatically. It encodes a rather abstract property of the
intended interpretation: a suggestion as to the direction in which the
relevance of the utterance is to be sought."
I was pleased to see some interesting remarks on "mood" in H. P. Grice's
new _Aspects of Reason_ (Clarendon Press, 2001). He notes the distinction
between "mood" and "mode". Apparently, Grice was using "mood" regardless,
till, in Harvard, J. Moravscik pointed out to him the discordance what the
use of "mood" in (some) linguistic theory. Grice changed that to "mode",
then: "[... I'll talk] about 'modes' rather than 'moods' to make it clear
that I am _not_ trying to characterise what linguists would call 'moods'
(though I would expect there to be important links between their 'moods'
and my 'modes'). I would justify (or explain) my use of the term 'mode' by
reference to my views about meaning". (p.68). The scheme proposed on p.52
makes that clear:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| mood | sub- | | |
| operator | mood | differential | complement |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| |exhibitive| | |
| | !1 | none | |
|imperative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| wills that p |
| ! |protreptic| | |
| | !2 | wills addreseee | |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| |exhibitive| | |
| | .1 | none | |
|indicative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| judges that p |
| . |protreptic| | |
| | .2 | wills addressee | |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
Grice's theory, like Wilson/Sperber on this, is _context-sensitive_, as it
were. There's nothing, usually, in the form itself which indicates a
particular mood, or, strictly, sub-mood. He writes: "The recognition of the
sub-mood has to come from context" (p.54). This "context" plays the same
role as it does in, e.g. his type of "contextual" cancellation of a
conversational implicature. Sometimes, the indication is made _explicit_,
though.
Bultinck writes: "The authors concentrate on the distinction between mood
and force in the traditional analyses of imperatives and interrogatives."
Grice concentrates on some, it seems, philosophical pre-conceptions,
especially concerned with special requirements for the _phrastics_ (or
radicals) in, say, "intentional" and "imperative proper" -- the two
sub-modes of "imperative". Grice will not restrict the phrastic of an
imperative, for example, to be represented in the truth-condition with a
reference to the _second_ person. Thus, (1) constitutes for Grice a
perfectly legitimate imperative ("if uttered by a captain to a
lieutenant"). Similarly, a phrastic of an intentional need not concern the
_first_ person: (2) is equally perfectly legitimate:
(1) The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn.
(2) They shall not pass.
Bultinck: "The syntactic pattern (e.g., "indicative", "imperative",
"interrogative") must be assigned some intrinsic _semantic_ content, which
can then be used as a foundation for an explanatory account of "force"."
Re: this ref. to "force", I was wondering -- vis a vis this collection by
Kasher - if there are specific RT-treatment of _specific_ speech acts, or
as I prefer, explicit performatives (qua English lexemes). I note that
Austin lists 184 such verbs in English. As for theoretical treatment, it
seems J.R.Searle's account (based on truth-conditional semantics) though,
seems most akin to RT. His paradigm (a la Gricean working-out pattern for
the truth-value of an explicit performative) making explicit use of
"manifest" intention (in 'How Performatives Work', Linguistics &
Philosophy, vol. 12, now repr. in Kasher):
(3) 1. U utterered the sentence, "I hereby warn you that the ice is thin".
2. The literal meaning of the utterance is such that by that very utterance
U _intends_ to make it the case that he warns me that the ice is thin. 3.
Therefore, in making the utterance, U manifested an intention to make it
the case by that utterance that he warned me that the ice is thin. 4.
Therefore, in making the utterance U manifested an
intention to _warn_ me that the ice is thin. 5. Warnings are a class of
actions where the manifestation
of the intention to perform the action is sufficient for its performance,
given that certain other
conditions are satisfied. 6. I assume those other conditions _are_
satisfied. 7. U warned me that the ice is thin, by that utterance. 8. Ergo:
U both said that he warned me that the ice is thin, and made it the case
that he warned me that the ice is thin. Therefore, he made a true statement.
Bultinck writes: "This content -- Wilson/Sperber argue -- can _not_ be
truth-conditional. It's, rather, semantically indeterminate and has to be
enriched pragmatically." Or contextually. See above, quote from Grice
2001. "It encodes a rather abstract property of the intended
interpretation: a suggestion as to the direction in which the _relevance_
of the utterance is to be sought." I note that the term "protreptic", used
by Grice (_Studies in the Way of Words_, p.111) is recognised by the O.E.D
and has a rather distinguished career:
"protreptic (pr@U'trEptIk), a. and sb. [as adj. ad. Gr. protreptikos fitted
to urge on, hortative, instructive, f. pro, pro-2 + trepein to turn, direct
the course of; as sb. ad. late L. protrepticon (-um) = Gr. protreptikon,
neuter of the adj.]. A adj. Directive, instructive, didactic. 1658
Phillips, Protreptick, doctrinal, or giving instructions. 1850 Maurice Mor.
& Met. Philos. (1854) I. 47 The discipline of the habit or character he
[Clement] would call protreptic.
========
To which I'll add: 1968. H P Grice. Philosophical Review. Let us draw a
distinction between what I might call "purely exhibitive utterances and
utterances which are not only exhibitive but also what I might call
"protreptic" (that is, utterances by which U intends, via imparting the
belief that he [U] has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a
corresponding attitude in the hearer.
=========
B sb. A book, writing, or speech intended to exhort or instruct; an
exhortation, instruction.
1656 Blount Glossogr., Protreptick, a book of instruction, a doctrinal.
1678 Cudworth Intell. Syst. 125 To rank Anaximander amongst the Divine
Philosophers, as he [Clement] doth in his Protreptick to the Greeks. 1678
Cudworth Intell. Syst. 371 That this Pythagorick Prayer was directed to the
Supreme Numen and King of Gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his
Protrepticks. 1899 A. B. Cook in Classical Rev. Nov. 418/1 In the mind of
Ischomachus' wife the bear-dance..bulked larger than the protreptics of her
husband. So pro'treptical a., of protreptic nature. 1667-8 Bp. Ward Serm.
Infidelity (1670) 3 The means used..are partly Didactical, and partly
Protreptical. 1895 R. G. Moulton Proverbs p. x, Early proverbs are
philosophical, not protreptical."
Finally, the list (in Appendix) of 184 verbs in Austin's _How to do Things
With Words_. Perhaps work has been done in RT regarding specimens or
classes from this list.
Cheers,
JL
====
Appendix. The 184 explicit performative (illocutionary) verbs listed (in
the tables) by Austin in his final lecture to _How to do things with
Words_: 1. accept. 2. acquit. 3. adhere (to). 4. adopt. 5. advise. 6.
affirm. 7. agree. 8. analyse. 9. announce. 10. annul. 11. answer. 12. am
determined to. 13. apologise
14. applaud. 15. appoint. 16. apprise. 17. approve. 18. argue. 19. ask. 20.
assess. 21. beg. 22. begin with
23. ?believe. 24. bequeath. 25. bet. 26. bid you farewell. 27. bind myself.
28. blame. 29. bless. 30. calculate. 31. call. 32. challenge. 33.
characterise. 34. champion. 35. choose. 36. claim. 37. class. 38. command.
39. commend. 40. commiserate. 41. complain of. 42. compliment. 43. concede.
44. conclude by
45. condole. 46. congratulate. 47. conjecture. 48. consent. 49. convict.
50. contemplate. 51. contract
52. correct. 53. countermand. 54. covenant. 55. criticise. 56. curse. 57.
dare. 58. date. 59. declare closed
60. declare for. 61. declare my intention. 62. declare open. 63. dedicate.
64. dedicate myself to. 65. deduce. 66. define. 67. defy. 68. degrade. 69.
demote. 70. demur to. 71. deny. 72. deplore. 73. deprecate
74. describe. 75. diagnose. 76. direct. 77. dismiss. 78. distinguish. 79.
don't mind. 80. ?doubt. 81. drink to. 82. embrace. 83. ?emphasise. 84.
enact. 85. engage. 87. entreat. 88. envisage. 89. espouse. 90. estimate
91. excommunicate. 92. explain. 93. favour. 94. felicitate. 95. find as a
matter of fact. 96. fine. 97. formulate. 98. grade. 99. grant. 100. give.
101. give my word. 102. grumble about. 103. guarantee. 104. hold as a
matter of law. 105. identify. 106. illustrate. 107. inform. 108. intend.
109. ?interpose. 110. interpret. 111. ?know. 112. levy. 113. locate. 114.
make it. 115. mean. 116. mean to. 117. measure. 118. mention. 119. name.
120. neglect. 121. nominate. 122. object to. 123. oppose. 124. overlook.
125. order
126. overlook. 127. pardon. 128. pay tribute. 129. place. 130. plan. 131.
plead. 132. pledge myself
133. postulate. 134. pray. 135. press. 136. proclaim. 137. promise. 138.
propose to. 139. protest. 140. purpose. 141. put it at. 142. quash. 143.
rank. 144. rate. 145. read it as. 147. reckon. 148. recognise
149. recommend. 150. refer. 151. regard as. 152. rejoin. 153. remark. 154.
repeal. 155. report. 156. reprieve. 157. repudiate. 158. resent. 159.
resign. 160. revise. 161. rule. 162. sentence. 163. shall
164. side with. 165. state. 166. swear. 167. sympathise. 168. take it. 169.
tell. 170. testify. 171. thank
172. toast. 173. turn to. 174. understand. 175. undertake. 176. urge. 177.
value. 178. veto. 179. vow. 180. vote for. 181. warn. 182. welcome. 183.
wish. 184. withdraw.
==
J L Speranza, Esq
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