Is Brockway Blackmore?
In 'On defining relevance' (in Grandy P.G.R.I.C.E., Clarendon) DSM Wilson &
D Sperber quote a no. of philosophers who have discussed relevance... May I
add? PH Nowell Smith, of Trinity, Oxford, discusses relevance in _Ethics_
(Penguin). There's a PhD on N-Smith's contextual implication as Gricean by
an Italian philosopher (Nowell-Smith was a member of Grice's playgroup at
Oxford). Then there's D. Holdcroft, Prof of Philosophy at Leeds, --
although nonOxon educ. he did give lectures at Oxford & has a book which
can be regarded as Gricean, _Words & Deeds_ (Oxford) -- anyway, he has
discussed relevance in 'Conversational Relevance', in the APRA proceedings.
Then there's also RM Hare. Hare writes in 'Relevance' (in his _Essays in
Ethical Theory_, Oxford):
In the mouth of many radicals, a piece
[...] is said to be relevant it if lends
support to the utterer's political opinions.
But then can a piece fail to be relevant - in this usage?
But then that's I suppose Sperber's interesting dilemma. It seems that,
if relevancy is postulated a priori of everything, the problem becomes,
"how can something _not_ be relevant?
"I shall not be using the word in that sense" says Hare -- of course,
for any Gricean, it's not a question of _sense_. It's a question of use.
Relevantly, when in last post I wasted my day's energies in listing all
the USES of _relevance_ as recognised by the OED, one lister of this list
wrote offlist to me, and relevantly: "What is the purpose (relevance?) of
the e-mail (below) you circulated to the relevance list?". Answer: to list
all the uses of relevance.
Also relevantly, an Italian speaker better than I noted that I'm not
only irrelevant but impertinent. The offlister writes: "'Relevance theory'
is often translated into Italian by "teoria della pertinenza", so I would
accuse you of 'impertinenza' AND 'irrilevanza'. 'Impertinenza' does not
mean 'non-pertinenza' but only impertinence in the sense of insolence
(Insolents like you are, I regret, usually relevant)".
Anyway, back to Hare. He commonsensically writes: "The claim that a
certain feature is X-ly irrelevant can play a crucial part in a X argument"
Hare being Oxford prof of moral philosophy is naturally concerned with
"moral" and "morally" -- but RT-ists need not. Hare's two examples: "If I
am being blamed for missing an appointment, the fact that there was a
flight at such-and-such a time which would have enabled me to keep the
appointment if I had caught it is irrelevant, if I could NOT have caught
it." His example 2: "It is usually held that it is IR-relevant to a moral
appraisal of my action that it was I, that particular, Devon-born English
individual Richard Mervyn Hare, who did it". No individual constants can
feature in a claim of moral relevance.====
Incidentally, Wilson/Sperber mention in the op.cit above Brockway? Is
that the maiden name of Blackwell published author D. Blackmore? I think I
know that, but I forget what publications by DB are listed as DBrockway?
Another incidentally: I was told offlist that Recanati's "essays" repr.
in Kasher are not individual papers, but excerpts from his book with
Blackwell.
Best,
JL
GC.
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