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>Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2000 15:52:18 +0200
>To: relevance@linguistics.ucl.ac.uk
>From: Dan Sperber <dan@sperber.com>
>Subject: New book on metarepresentations
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>Just out:
>
>Dan Sperber (ed.)
>METAREPRESENTATIONS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
>(Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science 10)
>Oxford University Press USA, July 2000 (cloth 0195141148, paper 0195141156)
>
>Cognitive systems are characterized by their ability to construct and=20
>process mental representations. Cognitive systems capable of communicating=
>=20
>also produce and interpret public representations. Representations, whether=
>=20
>mental or public, are themselves objects in the world; they are found=20
>inside cognizers and in the vicinity of communicators; they are potential=20
>objects of second order representations or "metarepresentations". While the=
>=20
>term "metarepresentation" gained currency only in the late 80's, the=20
>general idea is much older. Under a variety of other names, philosophers,=20
>psychologists, linguists, logicians, semioticians, literary theorists,=20
>theologians, and anthropologists have been interested in different types of=
>=20
>metarepresentations. Notwithstanding historical antecedents, much recent=20
>work on metarepresentations is truly novel as a result of being pursued=20
>within the framework of evolutionary and cognitive psychology, and of=20
>modern philosophy of language and mind. This collection of essays reflects=
>=20
>these new developments. It is organized in three parts:
>
>PART I: The evolution of metarepresentation
>PART II: Metarepresentations in mind
>PART III: Metarepresentations, language, and meaning
>
>Here is a brief guide to the contents of the volume:
>
>PART I: The evolution of metarepresentation
>
>In "Making Tools for Thinking," DANIEL DENNETT raises fundamental=20
>challenges. The notion of a metarepresentation cannot be clearer than that=
>=20
>of a representation. The notion of a representation can be understood in a=
>=20
>variety of senses, some shallower and wider, such that we would be willing=
>=20
>to attribute representations to simpler animals and devices. Others senses=
>=20
>are narrower and richer, such that we might be tempted to think of=20
>representation as specifically humans. Do these richer senses of=20
>"representation" somehow presuppose that representations are being (or are=
>=20
>capable of being) metarepresented? Can we conceive of the emergence in=20
>evolution and in cognitive development of metarepresentations - and of the=
>=20
>type of representations that requires metarepresentation - in a purely=20
>mind-internal way or should we see this emergence as linked to the=20
>availability in the environment of representational tools - linguistic=20
>symbols for instance - there to be metarepresented? These issues are well=20
>worth keeping in mind when reading the rest of the book
>
>In "The Mind beyond itself," ROBERT WILSON speculates on issues similar to=
>=20
>those raised by Dennett. He criticizes the individualistic approach to=20
>cognition and develops the idea that that many higher cognitive functions,=
>=20
>and in particular metarepresentational capacities, are essentially=20
>world-involving. He discusses the cases of memory, theory-of-mind, and=20
>cultural evolution, and argues that, in each case, external symbols and=20
>their metarepresentations play an essential role.
>
>In "Consider the source: The evolution of adaptations for decoupling and=20
>metarepresentations," LEDA COSMIDES AND JOHN TOOBY outline a novel and=20
>wide-ranging approach to the evolution of metarepresentational abilities.=20
>They start from the observation that human evolution is characterized by a=
>=20
>dramatic increase in the use of contingent information for the regulation=20
>of improvised behavior tailored to local conditions. They argue that=20
>adaptations evolved to solve the problems posed by using local and=20
>contingent information include a specialized "scope syntax," decoupling=20
>systems, and a variety of metarepresentational devices. These adaptations=20
>are essential to planning, communication, mindreading, pretence, deception,=
>=20
>inference about past or hidden causal relations, mental simulation, and=20
>much else. Thus Cosmides and Tooby view mindreading as only one of the=20
>functions that has driven the evolution of metarepresentational abilities=20
>and of human intelligence in general. One may note that the=20
>representational powers they see as having evolved in the human mind are=20
>interestingly similar to those Fran=E7ois Recanati analyzes from a semantic=
>=20
>point of view in his chapter.
>
>In "Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective," DAN SPERBER=20
>envisage the possibility that humans might be endowed, not with one, but=20
>with several evolved metarepresentational abilities. He argues that, beside=
>=20
>the standard metapsychological mindreading ability, humans might have a=20
>comprehension module aimed at the online interpretation of utterances, and=
>=20
>a logico-argumentative module, aimed at persuading others and avoiding=20
>deception.
>
>In "Chimpanzee cognition and the question of mental re-representation",=20
>ANDREW WHITEN examines the state of the evidence regarding the ability of=20
>chimpanzees to engage in imitation, mindreading, and pretence. He argues=20
>that chimpanzees have a capacity for a most basic form of=20
>metarepresentation, which he calls "re-representation" and which are mental=
>=20
>representations whose content derives from other mental representations=20
>either in oneself or in others. He discusses how these abilities in apes=20
>relate to the different "grades" of metarepresentation envisaged in the=20
>theory-of-mind literature, in particular by Leslie and Perner. This chapter=
>=20
>provides a welcome transition to the second part.
>
>PART II: Metarepresentations in mind
>
>In "The mentalizing folk," ALVIN GOLDMAN raises central questions regarding=
>=20
>people's abilities to metarepresent mental representations. What concepts=20
>of mental states do people possess? How do they attribute specific=20
>instances of mental states to themselves and to others? How do these=20
>abilities develop? He reviews the main competing answers to these=20
>questions, criticizes various forms of the theory-theory approach and=20
>defends a version of the simulation theory approach where particular=20
>attention is paid to introspection.
>
>In "How to acquire a 'representational theory of mind'," ALAN LESLIE=20
>discusses several versions of the theory-theory of cognitive development in=
>=20
>its application to the acquisition a representational theory-of-mind.=20
>Theory-theories associate the possession of a concept, in particular the=20
>concept of belief, to some descriptive knowledge of the referents, in this=
>=20
>case, of beliefs. Leslie argues against this view and for a "conceptual=20
>psycho-physical" approach where a concept such as that of belief might be=20
>causally correlated with, or "locked to," beliefs in the world, and be that=
>=20
>concept just because of this locking mechanism. The concept of belief,=20
>then, is not acquired as part of a proper 'theory' of mind. Rather the=20
>acquisition of a theory is made possible by the possession and deployment=20
>of the previously available concept. What makes this concept of belief=20
>available - as well as the basic metarepresentational abilities where it=20
>gets deployed -may well be an innate disposition rather than a learning=20
>process.
>
>In "Metarepresentation and Conceptual Change: Evidence from Williams=20
>Syndrome," SUSAN CAREY AND SUSAN JOHNSON present a case study of abnormal=20
>cognitive development, specifically, the acquisition of a intuitive but=20
>non-core theory of biology, by a population of retarded people with=20
>Williams Syndrome. They argue that the bootstrapping devices that underlie=
>=20
>conceptual change require metarepresentational cognitive architecture.=20
>Metarepresentational capacities that are part of the theory-of-mind module=
>=20
>support for instance noticing of contradictions and distinguishing=20
>appearance from reality, thus permitting conceptual change. However, in=20
>the case of retarded individuals, the lack of sufficient computational=20
>capacity serves as a bottleneck, both in the construction of metaconceptual=
>=20
>knowledge that goes beyond the core, and in the construction of the first=20
>theories that likewise transcend the core. This study also throws light on=
>=20
>the status of the 4-year-old's theory-of-mind as core knowledge or=20
>constructed knowledge.
>
>DAVID ROSENTHAL's HOT (i.e. higher-order thought) theory of consciousness=20
>is a particularly clear and crisp case of metarepresentational thinking. In=
>=20
>"Consciousness and Metacognition,", he defends this theory and discusses=20
>relevant evidence from current research on metacognition and in particular=
>=20
>on feeling-of-knowing experiences. He argues that this evidence sheds light=
>=20
>on what it is to be conscious of a mental state and on what it is,=20
>therefore, for a mental state to be conscious. He discusses important=20
>issues having to do with the development of metacognitive abilities and=20
>with their fallibility.
>
>PART III: Metarepresentations, language, and meaning
>
>In "Meaning, exemplarization and metarepresentation", KEITH LEHRER argues=20
>that the human mind is essentially a "metamind" (see Lehrer 1990),=20
>involving first level representational states that are metarepresented and=
>=20
>evaluated at a metalevel thus becoming states of the metamind. This permits=
>=20
>mental plasticity and the resolution of conflicts that at the lower level=20
>that are unavoidable for a complex representational system. Such a=20
>metarepresentational view seems, however, threatened by a regress (as=20
>suggested by Wilfrid Sellars) or by circularity (as suggested by Jerry=20
>Fodor) in accounting for language learning. Drawing on Sellars theory of=20
>meaning, and on Nelson Goodman notion of exemplarization, Lehrer argues=20
>that the problem of understanding meaning and of achieving representational=
>=20
>transparency is resolved through a harmless referential loop of ascent to=20
>quotation and desent to disquotation.
>
>In "The iconicity of metarepresentations," FRAN=C7OIS RECANATI develops an=
>=20
>extensive and original formal treatment of the semantics of=20
>metarepresentations. He discusses the relevant philosophical literature on=
>=20
>quotations and indirect reports of speech or thought, and argues, against=20
>standard views, for a Principle of Iconicity according to which true=20
>metarepresentations essentially resemble the representations they are=20
>about. They are fundamentally "transparent," in that they represent what=20
>the metarepresented representation represents and not just, "opaquely" that=
>=20
>representation itself. He contrast his approach to the simulation view of=20
>metarepresentations, and speculates about the relationship between=20
>conditionals and metarepresentations.
>
>In a series of influential papers, Tyler Burge has argued for the view that=
>=20
>the intentional states of a subject are in part determined by the social=20
>practices of the members of his community. The disposition to defer to=20
>experts plays an important role in this externalist view. In "Social=20
>externalism and deference," STEVEN DAVIS discusses and refines Burge's=20
>account. He argues that a conditional disposition to defer is essential to=
>=20
>concept possession. He analyzes this disposition to defer as involving=20
>epistemic norms and a metarepresentational ability. This chapter thus=20
>relates the metarepresentational framework to some of the most interesting=
>=20
>recent developments in the philosophy of language and mind.
>
>In "Metarepresentations in staged communicative acts," RAYMOND GIBBS=20
>demonstrates, with linguistic and experimental evidence, how=20
>speaker's/listener's recognition of specific metarepresentations affects=20
>their joint production and understanding of nonserious speech, and in=20
>particular or irony. The evidence tends to show that irony, because of its=
>=20
>complex metarepresentational character, requires more processing effort to=
>=20
>understand than tropes like metaphor. Gibbs concludes that the most general=
>=20
>challenge that studying metarepresentations in language poses is=20
>to recognize how the coordination of mutual beliefs in ordinary speech=20
>reflects essential connections between the ways people think and the ways=20
>they produce and understand language.
>
>In "Metarepresentation in linguistic communication," DEIRDRE WILSON=20
>examines the different types of metarepresentational ability involved in=20
>linguistic comprehension. She discusses Grice's metarepresentational view=20
>of speaker's meaning and of comprehension processes. Focusing on the use of=
>=20
>utterances to represent attributed utterances and thoughts, she surveys a=20
>range of linguistic metarepresentational devices, and argues that their=20
>analysis can both benefit from and provide useful evidence for the study of=
>=20
>more general metarepresentational abilities. From a historical point of=20
>view, current approaches to metarepresentations derive from semiotic and=20
>philosophical interest in metalinguistic devices. Deirdre Wilson's chapter,=
>=20
>showing how this traditional interest is now being reframed in a cognitive=
>=20
>perspective, provides a fitting conclusion for the whole volume.
>
>-----------------------------
>Dan Sperber
>Directeur de Recherche au CNRS (Paris)
>
>email: dan@sperber.com
>web page: http://www.dan.sperber.com
>-----------------------------
>
>
>
-------------------------------------------------
Robyn Carston
Department of Phonetics & Linguistics, UCL
Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
Tel 020 7679 3174
Fax 020 7383 4108
URL http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/robyn/home.htm
-------------------------------------------------
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