Sorry, I made a mistake in mailing this item; it was meant to go to the
list. - Christoph
>Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2000 15:55:57 +0200
>To: joerch.f@t-online.de (joerch)
>From: Christoph Unger <ChristophU@t-online.de>
>Subject: Re: Relation of Grice's maxims and RT
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Dear Joerch and all,
>
>let me respond just briefly to some aspects of your question:
>
>>
>>I have been pretty much concerned with the following question: the
>>relation of RT and Grice's co-operative principle and all its
>>conclusions.
>>
>
>>The trouble is: on the one hand RT's claims are pretty convincing; on
>>the other hand Grice's maxims seem to play an eminent role in
>>inferential processes. And from my (admittedly narrow) knowledge of the
>>current pragmatic discussion, there are either "pro-gricecean" or
>>"contra-gricean" contributions. This, as I said, has puzzled me for a
>>considerable time.
>>
>
>Sperber & Wilson (1986/95 _Relevance_) and Wilson & Sperber (1981 'On
>Grice's theory of conversation') have not just put forward claims about
>RT, but also argued - in my opinion quite compelling and convincingly -
>that Grice's maxims can not explain inferential communication, i.e. that
>they do not play an eminent role in inferential processes. When you say
>that 'on the one hand, RT's claims are pretty convincing; on the other
>hand Girce's maxims seem to play an eminent role in inferential
>processes,' are you thereby saying or implying that RT's claims about
>communication are more convincing than its arguments against Grice's
>maxim-based account? If so, that would need a separate discussion.
>
>When you say that in pragmatics there are 'either "pro-gricean" or
>"contra-gricean" contributions,' which side do you take RT to come down?
>Probably not as "pro-gricean," because RT does take issue with maxim-based
>accounts of pragmatics. Is it "contra-gricean"? Certainly not, because RT
>owes a good deal of inspiration to Grice. The most important inspirations
>are these:
>
>1. That (ostensive) communication is basically inferential.
>
>2. That whatever principles (or maxims) account for the inferential
>processes in communication, they are based on whatever makes communication
>rational.
>
>While Grice was trying to seek a rational basis for why people should
>abide by the Cooperative Principle and the maxims, Sperber & Wilson argue
>that cooperation is not crucial for ostensive communication; however, it
>is rational for all speakers to form their contributions so that the
>audience will not only attend to them, but that they will be able to infer
>the intended meaning without unjustifiable processing effort (i.e. aiming
>at optimal relevance, c.f. the communicative principle of relevance). Why
>is this rational? Because of the cognitive principle of relevance which
>says that human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of
>relevance. In other words: RT cashes in on the vision which Grice had: to
>account for inferential communication by finding a rational basis for
>communication. It does so in a slightly different way: there is no
>assumption of cooperation (no Cooperative Principle) and no maxims, and
>the communicative principle of relevance is squarely rooted in cognition.
>So, in a way one can say that RT is neither a "pro-gricean" nor a
>"contra-gricean" contribution to pragmatics, but rather a "third way"
>built on the central insights of Grice's contribution but advancing over
>him in significant ways.
>
>
>
>>
>>My "solution" is comparatively simple, perhaps too simple. If so, pls.
>>provide me with some new input to my forthcoming thought processes!
>>
>>
>>Why not seeing Grice's maxims as firmly entrenched in the encyclopaedia
>>of certain culturally determined groups. (Well, enter sociolinguistics!
>>Culturally determined groups is such a loose term. However, I don't see
>>the need of going into further details here. Still, I presume that
>>Grice's maxims vary in pretty much the same way as other "features" of
>>language.) So, the maxims seem to be a result of certain conventions that
>>individual's need stick to in order to facilitate certain human
>>interaction processes (and thus to improve the degree of relevance!).
>>Communication is one of these interaction processes which most of the
>>time needs to be facilitated (I guess). Now, if I imagine a new member
>>of (my western) society, he is likely to observe certain phenomena of
>>communicational conventions over an over again. These observable
>>phenomena can be seen as inputs to inferential processes. So once these
>>experiences get processed, their status for interactional processes is
>>likely to be reflected in the encyclopaedia of the individual as well.
>>
>>My "idea" now is, that the gricecean maxims may serve as premises in
>>inferential processes. Once an individual is processing an utterance, he
>>is at the same time in an interaction process. This offers the
>>possibility that the initial context Sperber and Wilson describe in
>>Relevance: Communication and Cognition could reasonably contain premises
>>such as:
>>
>>if someone addresses me, it's a standard that he/she "is making his/her
>>contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of
>>the exchange)" and so forth...(Mind the first maxim of quantity embedded
>>in this premise)
>>
>>
>
>Why and how should anybody arrive at such a conclusion, and if so, what
>contribution will this make to comprehension or cognition? On the basis of
>the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure the audience arrives at an
>interpretation of the utterance(s). No maxim of Quantity (nor any other of
>the maxims) is needed to arrive at this interpretation. What could be a
>reason that the audience engage in a post-comprehension inference process
>to arrive at a maxim as a generalistion of verbal behaviour? That these
>generalisations about verbal behaviour contribute some time to the
>inference process? Why should this be needed when all one needs is to look
>for relevance? I am really puzzled by this suggestion.
>
>The point is that the communicative principle of relevance is enough on
>its own to explain the inferential processes in communication - this is
>the soul of RT, and Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) argue for it in minute
>detail. If this is convincing, there is no reason why should one try to
>let conversational maxims slide in through the back door.
>
>Best,
>
>Christoph
>
>
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