>>Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 20:00:12 +0100
>>To: Marot@t-online.de (Matthias Rothe)
>>From: Jos=E9 Luis Guijarro Morales <joseluis.guijarro@uca.es>
>>Subject: Re: sorry: RT and literature again
>>
>>
>>At 16:49 21/02/00 +0100, Mathias wrote:
>>
>>>dear all, I've just read through the old `literature debate` again and
>there are=20
>>>still a lot of arguments which are far from being clear to me. I very much
>hope=20
>>>that some of you are interested in going through a couple of points anew.
>>
>>>For example:=20
>>
>>>I'm referring to Dan Sperber answering Ian MacKenzie. Dan Sperber writes:
>>>
>>>"Comprehending of any text, in the most down-to-earth sense of
>comprehension, is=20
>>>comprehension of the speaker's communicative intention. Without such=20
>>>comprehension, a literary text would not be worth interpreting in any=
> grander=20
>>>sense of interpretation (or would not be more worth such grand=
> interpretation=20
>>>than unintended texts such as cadavres exquis are)."
>>>
>>>1.=20
>>>As far as I understand, Dan Sperber's claim here is not, that we will only=
> be=20
>>>able to comprehend a literary text if we can infer the author's=
> informative=20
>>>intention but that wanting to infer it, that is, developing hypotheses
>about it,=20
>>>is a nessecary and sufficient condition for comprehending.
>>=20
>>>Furthermore we `can only want to infer it=B4, if we do recognise a=
> literary
>text=20
>>>as ostensive behaviour, that is if we recognise the communicative=
> intention.
>>>Am I right so far?
>>
>>>2.
>>>Dan Sperber additionally seems to claim that there is a correct and an
>incorrect=20
>>>comprehension, the correct one is the one the author intended, for=
> instance a=20
>>>certain reference of a pronoun, the incorrect one is the one the author
>did not=20
>>>intend. Wether it is easy to distinguish them is another question.
>>>
>>>I'd like to raise two objections:
>>
>>>1.=20
>>>As far as I see it, the author's communicative intention does only
>function as=20
>>>an incentive for interpreting and does not touch the interpretive
>possibilities=20
>>>as such at all. The interpretive possibilities are determined by the way
>we have=20
>>>learned to use our language. It is perfectly possible that we
>comprehend/interpret a >text and only after that get to know that this text
>was generated by a machine. >Would this touch any of the interpretive
>possibilities?=20
>>
>>>The question is, if we would want to comprehend a text, if we knew that it
>was=20
>>>generated by a machine (or a cadavres exquis). But this in turn depends on
>the=20
>>>way we have been trained to deal with (literary) texts. For quite a long
>time we=20
>>>have been trained, I think, to ask for authors and not, for instance, for=
> the=20
>>>potential of language as a material. With a shift of focus it would of
>course be=20
>>>worth to comprehend/interpret a text without identifying it as ostensive=
>=20
>>>behaviour.=20
>>
>>>2.
>>>As soon as you cease to consider authorial intention, you can give up the
>idea=20
>>>of `correct=B4 or `incorrect=B4 comprehension. Even within a hermeneutic
>framework=20
>>>`correct=B4 or `incorrect=B4 with reference to author's intention is=
> nothing
>you can=20
>>>verify or falsify. So why entertain these ideas? This does not mean that
>there=20
>>>are no criteria for `correct=B4 or `incorrect=B4=
> comprehension/interpretation.
>These=20
>>>criteria are supplied by text structure/rules of language use etc. rather
>than=20
>>>by author's intention. =20
>>>
>>>I'd appreciate comments!
>>>cheers, Matthias
>>
>>Hi!
>>
>>If I am right, the idea behind Dan Sperber's commentary has more to do with
>adopting the intentional stance (the way Dan Dennet describes it). This move
>produces (normally!) the situation Dan Sperber was thinking of, i.e, a
>sender who would be trying to communicate that she would like to inform us
>that something is the case. Only in that way, I think, can one, as a
>recipient, assign references, sort out ambiguities and give precise meaning
>to a great variety of words which happen to be used in her text. Now, as you
>say, the sender might well be a machine and, as such, it does not have any
>intention, communicative, informative or otherwise. So what?
>>
>>Let me come back to Dennett's idea: in dealing with aspects (i.e.,
>"systems") of the world, human beings can adopt three fundamental stances:
>(1) the physical stance, which one (normally!) uses to interact with the
>non-living world, (2) the design stance, which we (normally!) use for
>artifacts (such as trying to set a new video when we don't have the
>indications of use handy) and (3) the intentional stance that we apply
>(normally!) to beings which we consider to alive and, therefore, with
>intentions monitoring their behaviour. You have remarqued that I bracketted
>"normally" all the time, didn't you? Why would I do that?
>>
>>Because, sometimes, it is easier for human beings to try the intentional
>"shortcut" to deal with complicated systems. After all, when you play chess
>with a computer, you need not know how ith works phisycally, nor do you need
>to know how it was designed. The only thing you need in order to play is to
>(make as if you) believe that IT WANTS to win the game. And you play
>accordingly. No problem, there, eh?
>>
>>Maybe if you think of COMMUNICATION (literary or otherwise) as another type
>of game, you might (make as if you) believe that there is somebody WANTING
>to play the game with you and act accordingly, even if the sender is a
>machine. In this case, we would say that the machine passed the Turing test.
>But that's another story!
>>
>>The problem here, I think, is to distinguish between, say, that the grass
>will be damp if the rain is falling (i.e., the rain "informs you" that the
>grass will be wet) and that "I am fed up" refers to the producer of the
>utterance BECAUSE he intended to communicate it by uttering it the way
>he/she/it did. I do not understand how one can insist that it is the
>structure (or the text itself) that communicates (and thereby informs) us of
>something. Try finding out what the next sentence means (and you know that I
>intend it as an example, of course, which helps a lot!):
>> =20
>> e.1. He then put it on top of the other one
>>
>>[In ancient times, as you know, even the rain, or other phenomena were
>interpreted along the lines of the intentional stance. They were thought to
>be intentional spirits, gods or whatnot].
>>
>>Cheers!
>>
>Jos=E9 Luis GUIJARRO MORALES
>Universidad de C=E1diz
>Facultad de Filosof=EDa y Letras
>Departamento de Filolog=EDa Francesa e Inglesa
>G=F3mez Ulla, 1
>11003 C=E1diz, Espa=F1a (Spain)=20
>Tlf. (34) 956.015.526
>Fax. (34) 956.015.501=20
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