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## Direct Reference, Meaning and Thought

ORIGINAL

### §13.1 Enriching the Gricean picture: two sorts of pragmatic explanation

Most contemporary philosophers of language accept something which I call the "Gricean picture". In this section I will present the picture and show that it embodies a dubious assumption - an assumption which must be brought to light and criticized before we can confidently use the pragmatic apparatus set up by Grice and his followers.

#### *The Gricean picture*

The meaning of a sentence conventionally determines what is literally said by uttering the sentence - the literal truth-conditions of the utterance; for example, the meaning of the sentence "I have not had breakfast today" determines that, if S utters the sentence on a certain day, what he thereby says is that he has had no breakfast on that day. The meaning of the sentence also determines other, non-truth-conditional aspects of utterance meaning, like those responsible for the difference between "and" and "but." Grice calls them "conventional implicatures". Conventional implicatures are to be distinguished from the "conversational" implicatures of the utterance, which are also distinct from, and external to, what is said. Conversational implicatures are part of what the utterance communicates, but they are not *conventionally* determined by the meaning of the sentence; they are pragmatically rather than semantically determined. For example, in saying that he has had no breakfast, S may convey to his audience that he is hungry and wishes to be fed. As Grice pointed out, the generation of these "conversational implicatures" can be accounted for by connecting them with certain general principles or "maxims" of conversation that participants in a talk-exchange are mutually expected to observe. In the Gricean framework, conversational implicatures are contextual implications of the utterance act - they are the assumptions that follow from the speaker's saying what he says together with the presumption that he is observing the maxims of conversation.

Since what is communicated includes a pragmatic, nonconventional element, viz. the conversational implicatures, the fact that a given expression receives different interpretations in different contexts does not imply that it is semantically ambiguous. The intuitive difference in meaning can be accounted for at the semantic level, by

positing two different literal meanings, but it can also be accounted for at the pragmatic level, by positing a conversational implicature which in some contexts combines with what is literally said. Take, for example, the sentence 'P or Q'. It can receive an inclusive or an exclusive interpretation. Instead of saying that "or" is ambiguous in English, we may consider it as unambiguously inclusive and account for the exclusive reading by saying that in some contexts the utterance conversationally implicates that 'P' and 'Q' are not both true. When there is such a conversational implicature, the overall meaning of the utterance is clearly exclusive.

When an intuitive "ambiguity" can be accounted for either at the semantic level, by positing two different literal meanings, or at the pragmatic level, by positing a conversational implicature, the pragmatic account is to be preferred, according to Grice. This is the substance of the methodological principle he called "Modified Occam's Razor": *Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity* (Grice 1989:47). This is a principle of theoretical parsimony, like Occam's Razor. Pragmatic explanations, when available, are to be preferred because they are economical, in the sense that the principles and assumptions they appeal to are very general and independently motivated. By contrast, positing a semantic ambiguity is an ad hoc, costly move - a move which the possibility of a pragmatic analysis makes entirely superfluous.

The Gricean picture which I have just presented has been enormously influential, and rightly so; but it raises a problem which has been recognized only recently. The problem is connected with the notion that sentence meaning conventionally determines what is said. Grice is aware that what is said depends not only on the conventional meaning of the words but also on the context of utterance. What is said by uttering "I have not had breakfast today" depends on who is speaking and when. That is why there is a difference between the conventional meaning of words and what is said by uttering the words. The conventional meaning of the words only determines, or helps to determine, what is said, according to Grice. But what does this mean? A common answer is that sentence meaning is a "function" from context onto propositions; it is a rule that determines, for every context, what is said by uttering the sentence in that context. Similarly, the meaning of a word like "I" is a function that takes us from a context of utterance to the semantic value of the word in that context, which semantic value (the reference of "I") is what the word contributes to the proposition expressed by the utterance. On this view, made popular by Kaplan's work on the logic of demonstratives, what is said by an utterance depends not only on the conventional meaning of the words but also on the context of utterance; however, recourse to the context of utterance is guided and controlled by the conventional meaning of the words. The meaning of "I" tells

us what to look for in the context of utterance for a full identification of what is said; once the context is given, what is said can be automatically decoded.

Neat and attractive though it is, this view of the matter is quite unrealistic. In general, even if we know who is speaking, when, to whom, and so forth, the conventional meaning of the words falls short of supplying enough information to exploit this knowledge of the context so as to secure understanding of what is said. Consider a simple example, "He has bought John's book". To understand what is said, one must identify the intended referent of "he". At most, the conventional meaning of "he" imposes that the referent be male, but this allegedly necessary condition is certainly not sufficient and does not uniquely identify the referent in the context of utterance. The meaning of the word "he" provides no "rule," no criterion enabling one to identify the reference. The meaning of the sentence, in this case as in many others, seriously underdetermines what is said. (More on this in §18.3.) Nor is this underdetermination limited to the reference of referring expressions. To understand what is said by "He has bought John's book," one must identify the referent of "he," of "John" and (perhaps) of "John's book". But one must also identify the relation that is supposed to hold between John and the book. According to Kay & Zimmer (1976:29), "genitive locutions present the hearer with two nouns and a metalinguistic instruction that there is a relation between these two nouns that the hearer must supply". "John's book" therefore means something like "the book that bears relation x to John". To understand what is said by means of a sentence in which the expression "John's book" occurs, this meaning must be contextually enriched by instantiating the variable "x". In other words, not only the reference but the descriptive sense of the expression "John's book" is context-dependent. Moreover, as in the case of "he," there is no rule or function taking us from the context to the relevant semantic value. The only constraint linguistically imposed on the relation between John and the book is that it be a relation between John and the book.

The purpose of this chapter not being to review the literature on context-dependence, I will not proceed with further examples. I will simply assume (1) that context-dependence extends far beyond reference assignment, and (2) that it is generally "free" rather than "controlled," in the sense that the linguistic meaning of a context-sensitive expression constrains its possible semantic values but does not consist in a "rule" or "function" taking us from context to semantic value.)

Up to this point we need not depart from the Gricean picture, but simply enrich it. We have three levels of meaning: sentence meaning, what is said, and what is communicated. What is communicated includes not only what is said but also the conversational implicatures of the utterance.<sup>1</sup> The mechanism of implicature generation suggested by Grice is intended to account for the step from what is said to what is communicated. But how are we to account for the step from sentence meaning to what is

said? What bridges the gap instituted by there being a "free" type of context-dependence pervasive in natural language? Grice does not address this issue. However, as many people have suggested (e.g. Katz 1972:449, Walker 1975:157, Atlas 1979:276-8, Wilson & Sperber 1981:156), the pragmatic apparatus by means of which Grice accounts for conversational implicatures can also be used to account for the determination of what is said on the basis of sentence meaning. In the interpretation process, the referent of "he" and the relation between John and the book in "He has bought John's book" are selected so as to make what the speaker says consistent with the presumption that he is observing the maxims of conversation. The speaker might have meant that Jim has bought the book written by John or that Bob has bought the book sought by John. The hearer will select the interpretation that makes the speaker's utterance consistent with the presumption that he is trying to say something true and relevant.<sup>2</sup>

Once the Gricean picture is enriched in the manner indicated, a problem arises. Implicit in the Gricean picture is the assumption that there are two, *and only two*, ways of accounting for *prima facie* ambiguities: the semantic approach, which posits a multiplicity of literal meanings, and the pragmatic approach, which posits a conversational implicature.<sup>3</sup> Modified Occam's Razor provides a reason to prefer the latter approach, when it can be implemented, to the former. These two approaches correspond to the two basic levels of meaning that are distinguished in the Gricean picture: sentence meaning, which determines what is literally said, and the utterance's overall meaning, which comprises not only what is said but everything that happens to be communicated, including the conversational implicatures. The semantic approach locates the ambiguity at the level of sentence meaning, while the pragmatic approach considers that it is generated only at the level of what is communicated. But in the enriched Gricean picture, there are three basic levels of meaning rather than two: sentence meaning, what is said, and what is communicated. A pragmatic process is involved not only to get from what is said to what is communicated but also to get from sentence meaning to what is said. It follows that there are three ways of accounting for *prima facie* ambiguities rather than only two. Besides the semantic approach, which locates the ambiguity at the first level, that of sentence meaning, there are two pragmatic approaches, corresponding to the second and third levels of meaning (what is said and what is communicated). The classical Gricean approach considers that what is said is the same on all readings of the "ambiguous" utterance, the difference between the readings being due to a conversational implicature which, in some contexts, combines with what is literally said. The other pragmatic approach considers that the difference is a difference in what is said, even though the sentence itself is not ambiguous; this is possible owing to the semantic underdetermination of what is said.<sup>4</sup>

The important point is that Modified Occam's Razor does not support the approach in terms of conversational implicature as against the other pragmatic approach; it only says that a pragmatic approach is to be preferred, *ceteris paribus*, to a semantic approach. Hence, enriching the Gricean picture in the manner indicated has the result that the classical Gricean approach to multiple readings in terms of conversational implicature can no longer be justified by appealing to Modified Occam's Razor, as it could when it was assumed to be the only pragmatic alternative to a semantic approach. The classical Gricean approach is threatened by the appearance of a pragmatic rival.

Consider, as an example, Donnellan's distinction between two uses of definite descriptions. Donnellan held that what is said by an utterance of "Smith's murderer is insane" is different according to whether the description "Smith's murderer" is used attributively or referentially. On the attributive interpretation, what is said is true if and only if there is one and only one person who murdered Smith and he or she is insane. But if the description "Smith's murderer" is used to refer to a certain person, Jones, who is known to have murdered Smith, rather than in general to whomever murdered Smith, then the utterance is true if and only if Jones is insane: Jones's being the murderer of Smith is no more part of the truth-condition of what is said, on this "referential" interpretation, than my being the speaker is part of the truth-condition of what I say when I utter the sentence "I am insane". This was Donnellan's view. (In Chapter 15, I shall refer to this view as "the Naive Theory" - a theory which I will set out to defend.) Now a large number of competent philosophers have used the Gricean picture to argue against this view. In doing so, they have taken for granted that there are only two possible approaches to Donnellan's distinction: a semantic approach, according to which the literal meaning of the sentence and, therefore, what is said, is different on the referential and the attributive reading, and a pragmatic approach, according to which what is said on both readings is the same thing (viz., that there is a unique murderer of Smith and that he or she is insane), the referential reading being only distinguished at the level of what is communicated. Using Modified Occam's Razor as an argument for the pragmatic approach, they concluded that Donnellan was wrong to locate the difference between the two readings at the level of what is said. This argument against Donnellan's view will be criticized in Chapter 15; it relies on the mistaken assumption that there are only two possible accounts, a semantic account and a pragmatic account in terms of conversational implicature. But this is not so: another type of pragmatic account is possible, which incorporates Donnellan's view, according to which the difference between the referential and the attributive reading is a difference in what is said. On this approach, to be developed in Chapter 15, the sentence "Smith's murderer is insane" is not ambiguous, yet it can be used to express either a general or a singular proposition, depending on the context of utterance. Modified Occam's Razor provides no reason to prefer to this

account an account in terms of conversational implicature; on the contrary, as I tried to show elsewhere (Recanati 1989b:§8), considerations of theoretical economy tend to favor the pragmatic account that incorporates Donnellan's view.

Another example is provided by Carston's pragmatic analysis of conjoined utterances (Carston 1988). In some contexts, a conjunctive utterance 'P and Q' conveys the notion that the event described in the second conjunct occurred after the event described in the first conjunct; thus "They got married and had many children" is not intuitively synonymous with "They had many children and got married". In Grice's framework this intuition can be accounted for along the following lines:

What is *strictly and literally said* is in both cases the same thing. The temporal ordering, which is responsible for the intuitive difference between the two examples, is *con conversationally implicated* rather than part of what is said. This sort of implicature is easy to account for: since the speaker is presumed to observe the maxim "Be orderly," it is implicated that the event which is described first occurred first, and that the event which is described last occurred last. Modified Occam's Razor dictates that this approach be preferred to a semantic approach ascribing to "and" a temporal sense to account for this type of example and a non-temporal sense to account for other examples in which the implicature is not generated (e.g. "Jane had three children and Mary two," in which no temporal ordering is suggested).

However, as Robyn Carston has shown (Carston 1988), another pragmatic account is possible, according to which the temporal ordering *is* part of what is said by means of "They got married and had many children," even though "and" is ascribed a single, non-temporal sense at the semantic level.<sup>5</sup> Modified Occam's Razor provides no reason to prefer to this account the classical Gricean account in terms of conversational implicature.<sup>6</sup>

To sum up: Enriching the Gricean picture to take the semantic underdetermination of what is said into account implies rejecting an assumption implicit in the Gricean picture, namely the assumption that there are two, and only two, possible approaches to *prima facie* ambiguities, the semantic approach and the pragmatic approach in terms of implicature. Once this assumption is abandoned, the classical Gricean treatment of *prima facie* ambiguities in terms of implicature is considerably weakened; instead of enjoying the privileges of monopoly, it has to compete with another pragmatic approach. This raises a central issue: that of the criteria that can be used in adjudicating between the different pragmatic approaches. When should a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning be considered as a conversational implicature, and when should it be considered as constitutive of what is said? In what follows, I shall consider various

possible answers to this question, i.e. various criteria that could be used to decide whether a given aspect of meaning is a conversational implicature or a pragmatic constituent of what is said.<sup>7</sup>

### §13.2 Three minimalist principles

The first criteria that come to mind deserve to be called "minimalist" because they work by minimizing the aspects under which what is said can go beyond the meaning of the sentence. Following Carston (Carston 1988:163-4), I shall make a distinction between two minimalist criteria: the Linguistic direction principle and the Minimal truth-evaluability principle. I shall also mention a third criterion, which is a mixture of the other two. Let us start, then, with the Linguistic direction principle:

**Linguistic direction principle:** A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if its contextual determination is triggered by the grammar, that is, if the sentence itself sets up a slot to be contextually filled.<sup>8</sup>

Context-sensitive expressions, such as "he" or the genitive, set up such slots, which in some cases at least can be represented as variables in need of contextual instantiation. It follows, by the Linguistic direction principle, that the pragmatic determination of the referent of "he" and of the relation between John and the book contributes to determining what is said by uttering the sentence "He has bought John's book".<sup>9</sup>

There is a problem with this version of the principle. According to some accounts (Jakobson 1957 §1.5, Ducrot 1973, 1980), a word such as "but" is like an indexical in that it sets up a slot to be contextually filled. In Ducrot's argumentation-theoretic framework, a sentence 'P but Q' indicates that there is a conclusion *r*, to be contextually identified, such that (i) 'P' supports (or "is an argument for") *r*, (ii) 'Q' supports *not-r*, and (iii) 'Q' is stronger than 'P' so that 'P but Q' also supports *not-r*. Yet the contextual value of the variable "*r*" cannot be considered as part of what is said, for the notion of "what is said" is essentially tied to that of truth-conditional content, and 'P but Q' is true merely iff 'P' and 'Q' are both true. Non-truth-conditional aspects of utterance meaning, such as the conventional implicature associated with "but," are not part of what is said, as Grice insisted. It follows that being the contextual value of a variable set up at the level of sentence meaning is not a sufficient condition for being part of what is said; the truth-conditional nature of what is said has to be taken into consideration.

The next criterion takes the close link between what is said and the truth-conditions of the utterance into account:

¶ *Mixed minimalist principle:* A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if: (i) its contextual determination is triggered by the grammar, that is, the sentence itself sets up a slot to be contextually filled, and (ii) the slot in question needs to be filled for the utterance to be truth-evaluable and express a complete proposition.¶

In the case of conventional implicatures, the second necessary condition is not satisfied: contextually determining the value of "*r*" is not necessary for the utterance 'P but Q' to be truth-evaluable. (To be sure, it is necessary for understanding the utterance, but that is another matter.) This version of the principle captures Grice's intuition that conventional implicatures are external to the propositional (truth-conditional) content of the utterance, even though they are an aspect of utterance meaning.¶

¶ But there is a problem with this second version of the principle too. Perry has shown that, in some cases, a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is necessary for truth-evaluation, and therefore constitutes an integral part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance, *without* being grammatically triggered by an "indicator" or a variable set up at the level of sentence meaning. When this happens, Perry claims that what is said involves an "unarticulated constituent". ¶

It is a rainy Saturday morning in Palo Alto. I have plans for tennis. But my younger son looks out the window and says, "It is raining." I go back to sleep.

What my son said was true, because it was raining in Palo Alto. There were all sorts of places where it wasn't raining: it doesn't just rain or not, it rains in some places while not raining in others. In order to assign a truth-value to my son's statement, as I just did, I needed a place. But no component of his statement stood for a place. The verb 'raining' supplied the relation *rains* (*t, p*) - a dyadic relation between times and places, as we have just noted. The tensed auxiliary 'is' supplies a time, the time at which the statement was made. 'It' doesn't supply anything, but is just syntactic filler. So Palo Alto is a constituent of the content of my son's remark, which no component of his statement designate; it is an *unarticulated* constituent. [Perry 1986:138] ¶

¶ Perry's notion of unarticulated constituent enables one to capture the difference between "It is raining" and "It is raining here". In both cases the second argument of the relation *rains* (*t, p*) is supplied by the context, but this pragmatic constituent of meaning is "articulated" in the latter case (it is grammatically represented by a device that sets up a slot to be contextually filled) and "unarticulated" in the former. Yet, in both cases, it seems to be part of the proposition expressed by the utterance.¶ It follows that the first

necessary condition in the mixed principle is not necessary after all.<sup>1</sup> This suggests that we turn to a third (and last) minimalist criterion, the Minimal truth-evaluability principle.¶

¶ *Minimal truth-evaluability principle:* A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if its contextual determination is necessary for the utterance to be truth-evaluable and express a complete proposition. ¶

By this principle, conversational implicatures are clearly *not* part of what is said, because the utterance expresses a complete proposition without them. (Since conversational implicatures follow from the speaker's saying what he says, the generation of a conversational implicature presupposes that something has been said.)

¶ What are we to think of this last minimalist criterion? Some authors have argued that it should be rejected (Sperber & Wilson 1986, Carston 1988). The case against the Minimal truth-evaluability principle rests on examples such as (1) and (2):

(1) It will take us some time to get there.

(2) I have had breakfast. ¶

Once the identity of the speaker and hearer, the time of utterance and the reference of "there" is determined, then, arguably, no further slot needs to be filled for an utterance of (1) to express a complete proposition. The proposition we get at this point is the proposition that there is a lapse of time (of some length or other) between our departure, or some other point of reference, and our arrival at a certain place.¶ But, according to Carston, who borrows this example from Sperber & Wilson (1986:189-90), this is not the proposition actually expressed; to get the latter, we need to go *beyond* the minimal proposition expressible by the sentence and enrich it by pragmatically specifying the relevant lapse of time as rather long (longer than expected, perhaps).¶ This contextual specification is constitutive of what is said, yet it is not necessary for the sentence to express a definite proposition.¶ It follows that the Minimal truth-evaluability principle must be rejected.¶ In the same way, according to Sperber & Wilson, once the identity of the speaker and the time of utterance has been fixed, (2) expresses a proposition, viz. the proposition that the speaker has had breakfast at least once before the time of utterance. This proposition, which would be true if the speaker had had breakfast twenty years earlier and never since, does not correspond to what the speaker means to say when he utters "I have had breakfast". What the speaker says goes beyond the minimal proposition expressible, contrary to what the Minimal truth-evaluability principle predicts. ¶

In the framework laid down by Sperber & Wilson and Carston (henceforth "SWC"), two sorts of pragmatic processes are involved in getting from sentence meaning to what is said. The first type of process, which I call "saturation" (Recanati 1989a), is involved whenever a slot must be contextually filled for the utterance to express a complete proposition. The second type of process is non-minimalist; I call it "(free) enrichment". According to SWC, free enrichment is involved in e.g. the determination of the length of the lapse of time mentioned in "It will take us some time to get there". The enrichment of "some time" into something more specific is not needed for the utterance to express a complete proposition, but for the proposition expressed to correspond to what the speaker means. The input to this second type of process is a complete proposition (that which results from the first type of process), and the output is a richer proposition, i.e. one that entails the input proposition. SWC's claim that the proposition expressed is obtained from the disambiguated meaning of the sentence not only by saturation but also by free enrichment is inconsistent with the doctrine I call Minimalism, according to which the proposition expressed - what is said - is the "minimal" proposition expressible by the utterance, i.e. what results from simply saturating the disambiguated meaning of the sentence.

If Sperber-Wilson and Carston are right, we must reject Minimalism altogether; for none of the three minimalist criteria can be maintained. In Chapter 14 I shall argue that the rejection of Minimalism is indeed justified. However, it must be realized that examples (1) and (2) *per se* are not sufficient to dispose of the Minimal truth-evaluability principle. Additional assumptions are needed to get rid of this principle, and of Minimalism in general. To see that, let us consider a possible defence of the Minimal truth-evaluability principle.

### §13.3 The Implicature Analysis

Examples (1) and (2) do not, in and by themselves, require giving up the Minimal truth-evaluability principle. One obvious way to handle them consistently with the latter would be to adopt an analysis in terms of conversational implicature, according to which the person who utters (2) "says" that he has had breakfast (at least) once, and "implicates" that this - his having breakfast - happened on the very day of utterance. In the same way, it might be claimed that the person who utters (1) "says" that there is a lapse of time (of some length or other) between departure and arrival, and "implicates" that the lapse of time in question is rather long. On this analysis (henceforth the "Implicature Analysis"), the pragmatically determined constituents of meaning which are *not* necessary for truth-evaluability are ipso facto *not* part of what is said, but are only implicated.

The Implicature Analysis enables one to salvage the Minimal truth-evaluability principle in the face of *prima facie* counterexamples such as (1) and (2). (Note that the same strategy would also permit to salvage the Linguistic direction principle in the face of Perry's counterexample. For we might analyze "It is raining" in such a way that the unarticulated constituent (i.e. the *place* concerned by the rain) is not a constituent of *what is said*, but merely an "implicated" aspect of utterance meaning.) On such an analysis, the speaker who utters "It is raining" says that it is raining in some place (left undeterminate at the level of what is said), and "implicates" that this is happening *here, in Palo Alto* (Perry's example). Such an analysis supports the Linguistic direction principle: the pragmatically determined constituents of meaning which are *not* grammatically "articulated" are considered as *not* part of what is said, but as mere conversational implicatures.

The Implicature Analysis, then, can be used to defend Minimalism in its various forms. But I do not think this defence is acceptable, for the following reason. There is no intuitive basis for saying that the speaker of "It's raining" expresses the proposition that it's raining somewhere (indeterminate), or that the speaker of "I've had breakfast" expresses the proposition that his life was not entirely breakfastless: neither the speaker nor the hearer is aware that *this* is the proposition expressed. To be sure, most implicature theorists are unlikely to be moved by such an objection, for they think the proposition expressed ("what is said") need not be consciously accessible. What is consciously accessible, according to them, is only "what is communicated," i.e. the result of combining the proposition literally expressed with various extra elements such as the conversational implicatures. But this is precisely something which I deny. In Recanati (1989a) I made the opposite claim: that we are conscious of what is said. More precisely, I claimed that we have *distinct conscious representations* for "what is said" and for "what is implicated" by a given utterance: both are consciously accessible, and are consciously accessible *as distinct*. Note that the inferential connection between these representations is as consciously accessible as the representations themselves. Let us consider a typical example: the utterance "I have not had breakfast this morning," which (in some easily accessible context) implicates that the speaker is hungry and wishes to be fed. Both the speaker and the hearer are aware that the speaker says that he has had no breakfast this morning and *implies* that he is hungry; and both are aware of the inferential connection between what is said and what is implied. This was one of the constraints on implicatures raised by Grice himself. Grice said that "the presence of an implicature must be capable of being worked out" (Grice 1989:31). For an implicature to be worked out, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) both what is said and what is implied must be grasped, and (ii) the inferential connection between them must also be grasped. Many followers of Grice have (wrongly) interpreted this as requiring that *the theorist* be capable of working

out whatever conversational implicature is posited to explain a given semantic phenomenon; but Grice clearly had in mind the participants in the talk-exchange themselves: it is the speaker and hearer who must be capable of working out the implicatures, and this entails that they have conscious access both to what is said and to what is implicated. As we shall now see, this provides us with a criterion for distinguishing genuine implicatures from pragmatic constituents of what is said - a criterion which enables us to dispose of the Implicature Analysis.

### §13.4 The Availability Principle

Let's try to make more explicit the claim concerning the accessibility of what is said (the "availability hypothesis," as I called it in my first article on the subject). Consider Figure 1. Starting at the top, this figure shows the various steps that lead, by analytical abstraction, from what is communicated to the meaning of the sentence. The analysis thus displayed is intended to mirror the actual process of understanding the utterance, this corresponding to a bottom-up reading of the diagram.




Figure 1

At the top (i.e., the root) of the inverted tree, "what is communicated" is the intuitive datum we, as analysts, start from; it is also the consciously accessible output of the process of pragmatic understanding. At the bottom of the tree, we find sentence meaning, a theoretical construct representing both the output of the process of semantic decoding and the input to the process of pragmatic understanding. Of sentence meaning we can assume only tacit (unconscious) knowledge on the part of the speaker who utters the sentence. To be sure, users of the language claim to have intuitions concerning what the sentences in their language mean; but these intuitions are not directly about their purported objects - linguistic meanings. They do not bear on the linguistic meanings of sentences, which are very abstract and inaccessible to consciousness, but on what would

be said or communicated by the sentence were it uttered in a standard or easily accessible context.

Being located at an intermediate level in the diagram, distinct from the top level where the consciously accessible output of pragmatic processing is located, "what is said" is generally considered as no less sub-doxastic and unconscious than sentence meaning. We are supposed to be conscious only of "what is communicated," which is distinct from what is said. But this is the picture which I reject. I claim that we are conscious of what is said (and, also, of what is implicated). To make sense of this hypothesis, I suggest a slight modification of Figure 1. As it is, it implies that what is communicated - the object of our intuitions - is something over and above what is said and what is conversationally implicated: what is communicated is seen as the output of a specific cognitive process (the last step in the general process of pragmatic understanding) whose inputs are what is said and what is implicated. One way of understanding the claim concerning the availability of what is said is by rejecting this view altogether, considering that what is communicated *consists of* what is said and what is implicated, instead of being something *over and above* what is said and what is implicated. Instead of locating what is communicated at one level and what is said (as well as the implicatures) at another, I suggest that we consider "what is communicated" as simply a name for the level at which we find both what is said and what is implicated - the top level, characterized by conscious accessibility (Figure 2). On this view, the conscious availability of what is said no longer is a mystery: if what is communicated, which is consciously accessible, consists of what is said and what is implicated, then what is said cannot but be consciously accessible.




Figure 2

In the new diagram, it is no longer suggested that there is a specific process merging what is said and what is implicated. They constitute the final output of the general process of pragmatic understanding, not an intermediate output, as Figure 1 suggests. What is

said and what is implicated thus remain distinct, and are consciously available as distinct.<sup>8</sup>

From the Availability hypothesis, according to which what is said and what is implicated are consciously accessible (and accessible as distinct), we can easily derive a criterion for telling when a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said and when it is not. This criterion I call the Availability Principle:

*Availability Principle:* In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter. |

This principle can be appealed to in a number of cases to show that a tentative analysis is misguided. Consider the utterance "Everybody went to Paris". Under ordinary circumstances, what a speaker would mean by this is not that everybody in the absolute sense, i.e. every person in the world, went to Paris, but that everybody in some (contextually identifiable) group went to Paris. Suppose, for example, it is established that what the speaker means is that every member of the Johnson & Johnson staff went to Paris. Still, the utterance can be analyzed in two ways. The first analysis is quite straightforward: it identifies what the speaker says with what he means, i.e. with the proposition that every member of the Johnson and Johnson staff went to Paris.<sup>9</sup> But there is another possible analysis. We may consider that what is literally said is that everybody in the world went to Paris, even though this is clearly not what the speaker means. A proponent of this analysis has only to assume that what the speaker says is different from what he means, i.e. that he speaks nonliterally, as in metaphor. Such an analysis has been put forward in Bach (1987) and extended to many examples, including the whole class of utterances in which an incomplete definite description occurs. Thus, Bach identifies the proposition literally expressed by the utterance "The door is closed" with the Russellian proposition that the only one door there is in the world is closed, this proposition not being what the speaker means to communicate when he utters the sentence. The Availability Principle militates against this type of analysis, which assumes a counter-intuitive identification of what is said. When the speaker says "Everybody went to Paris," or "The door is closed," it is counter-intuitive to identify what he says with the propositions that every person in the world went to Paris, or that the only door in the universe is closed. The speaker himself would not recognize those propositions as being what he said. The "nonliteral" analysis must therefore be rejected, by virtue of the Availability Principle.<sup>10</sup>

One important consequence of the Availability Principle is that some of the most often cited examples of conversational implicatures turn out not to be conversational

implicatures after all. So-called "scalar implicatures" - or, perhaps, a subgroup of them - are a case in point. Suppose the speaker utters "John has three children," thereby communicating that John has exactly three children. It is customary to say that the proposition literally expressed by "John has three children" is the proposition that John has at least three children, even if what the speaker means to communicate by this utterance is that John has exactly three children. What is communicated (viz., that John has exactly three children) is classically accounted for by positing a conversational implicature that combines with the proposition allegedly expressed (viz., that John has at least three children). This proposal has great merits; it accounts for the "ambiguity" of "John has three children" (which may sometimes mean: at least three and sometimes: exactly three) without positing several distinct lexical senses. The proposal, however, does not pass the availability test, for the speaker himself would not recognize the proposition that he has *at least* three children as being what he has said in the cases in which the intended reading is "exactly three". Not being consciously available, the proposition which the classical account takes to be literally expressed cannot be identified with what is said, if we accept the Availability Principle. The latter dictates that we consider the aspect of meaning which Griceans (rightly) take to be pragmatically determined (viz. the implicit restriction: no more than three children) as part of what is said rather than as a conversational implicature external to what is said.<sup>11</sup>

| Another important consequence of the Availability Principle is that the counterexamples to the Linguistic direction principle and to the Minimal truth-evaluability principle *cannot* be disposed of by treating the relevant pragmatic constituents of meaning as "implicatures" external of what is said. The spatial location of the rain in Perry's example ("It is raining") and the temporal location of the relevant breakfast in Sperber & Wilson's example ("I've had breakfast") must be treated as (pragmatic) constituents of *what is said*, if the Availability hypothesis is correct. For it would be counter-intuitive to identify what is said by these utterances with the proposition that it's raining somewhere and the proposition that the speaker has had breakfast once, respectively. I conclude that Minimalism cannot be defended by appealing to the Implicature Analysis. (I shall return to the issue of Minimalism in Chapter 14.)

### §13.5 Conclusion

Not many people have observed that Grice's theory departs from our intuitions when it is applied to examples such as "John has three children," which Griceans take to express the proposition that John has at least three children and to implicate that he has no more than three children. However, there is an important difference between this example and e.g. "I've had no breakfast today", which implicates that the speaker is hungry and

wishes to be fed. In the latter example, the implicature is intuitively felt to be external to what is said; it corresponds to something that we would ordinarily take to be "implied". In the former case, we are not pre-theoretically able to distinguish between the alleged two components of the meaning of the utterance - the proposition expressed (that John has at least three children) and the implicature (that he has at most three children). We are conscious only of the result of their combination, i.e., of the proposition that John has exactly three children. In this case as opposed to the other one, the theoretical distinction between the proposition expressed and the implicature does not correspond to the intuitive distinction between what is said and what is implied.<sup>12</sup> If I am right, this intuitive difference between the two types of example points to an important theoretical distinction, between genuine implicatures and pragmatic constituents of the proposition expressed.<sup>13</sup>

As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, one only has to realize that sentence meaning largely underdetermines what is said, to be forced to the conclusion that such a distinction must be made. But where must the boundary be drawn? Grice's "tests" for conversational implicature (cancellability, nondetachability, and so forth) test the presence of a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning, but they do not tell us whether it is a genuine implicature or a constituent of what is said. New criteria have to be devised to make this decision possible. In my view, the Availability Principle is the fundamental criterion we must use in this connection. Other criteria have been put forward in the literature, but they are either inadequate (like Carston's Independence Principle, criticized in Recanati 1989a) or presuppose the Availability Principle (like the Scope Principle, discussed in the appendix pp. 000-00)

<sup>1</sup> The opposition between what is said and the conversational implicatures survives the claim that what is said is conventionally determined by the meaning of the sentence. *Quia* assumptions following from the speaker's saying what he says, conversational implicatures are, by definition, external to what is said.

<sup>2</sup> Larry Horn once made the fairly surprising claim that if "pragmatic principles - including the familiar Gricean implicata - may (contra Grice) influence propositional content and hence help determine truth-conditions..., no straightforward distinction between what is implicated and what is said... will survive" (Horn 1989:433). But as I said in footnote 1, conversational implicatures are, by definition, external to what is said: their being assumptions following from the speaker's saying what he says is sufficient to make them distinct from what is said, even if what is said is, to a large extent, pragmatically determined. On Horn's current position, see footnote 11 below.

<sup>3</sup> This is the "dubious assumption" which I mentioned at the beginning of this section.

<sup>4</sup> It may be argued that there are not only different pragmatic approaches to *prima facie* ambiguities, but also different semantic approaches. Thus Cohen opposes to the standard "insulationist" semantics an "interactionist" semantics in terms of which, he says, those *prima facie* ambiguities which Grice handles

within the implicature framework can be accounted for in a way that is immune to Modified Occam's Razor (Cohen 1971:56; for a recent statement of the interactionist point of view, see Cohen 1986). I shall not address this issue in this chapter; the Gricean picture will be questioned only as far as the pragmatic approach is concerned.

→ <sup>5</sup> Carston's pragmatic account is, roughly, the following. To determine what is said by means of the sentence "They got married and had many children", the hearer must assign a reference to each of the referring expressions, including the past tense "got married" and "had". Just as pragmatic principles are employed in ascertaining the referent of "they", so, Carston says, they are used in assigning temporal reference. The hearer goes beyond the strict semantic content of the sentence uttered, and on the basis of contextual assumptions and pragmatic principles recovers from "They got married and had many children" a representation such as "John and Mary got married at *t* and had many children at *t+n*". "*t* is some more or less specific time prior to the time of utterance and *t+n* is some more or less specific time, later than *t*. The temporal ordering of the events described in the conjuncts is thus treated as a by-product of the reference assignment process involved in determining [what is said]" (Carston 1988:161). This analysis raises some problems when the past tense is replaced by the present perfect, as in example (1) in the Appendix, because the present perfect can hardly be considered as referring to a specific time. (In familiar terms, the present perfect is used to express general propositions of the type: "There is a time *t*, prior to the time of utterance, such that blah blah", while it makes sense to say that the past tense is "singular" and refers to a specific time *t* which must be contextually identified - with more or less precision - for the utterance to express a complete proposition.) I shall not discuss this issue in this chapter; I am concerned only with the type of analysis Carston puts forward - a pragmatic analysis at the level of what is said. Whether or not the details of her analysis are correct is another matter.

→ <sup>6</sup> In the light of Carston's suggestion concerning "and" we may reconsider Grice's use of Modified Occam's Razor against ordinary language philosophers, to whom he ascribed the semantic view, i.e. the notion that "and", "or", etc., are multiply ambiguous in English. The main reason why this view was ascribed to ordinary language philosophers like Strawson is the following: they held that what is said by uttering a sentence such as 'P or Q' or 'P and Q' varies according to the context of utterance; they considered that the truth conditions of an utterance of one of these sentences were not invariant under contextual change. Thus, 'P and Q' is sometimes true if the event described in the second conjunct occurred before (or simultaneously with) that described in the first conjunct, and sometimes not; 'P or Q' is sometimes true if 'P' and 'Q' are both true, and sometimes not. This way of putting the matter is certainly inconsistent with the classical Gricean approach, which assumes that what is said is the same on all readings, the difference being located at the level of implicatures. It was therefore natural to ascribe to ordinary philosophers the semantic approach, on the assumption that there are only two possible approaches, the semantic approach and the approach in terms of conversational implicature. However, this assumption must be abandoned, and the possibility of a pragmatic approach in terms of what is said acknowledged. Once this is done, Modified Occam's Razor no longer provides any reason to reject the

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claim that sentences such as 'P and Q' can be used to say different things in different contexts; for this claim no longer implies that sentences such as 'P and Q' are semantically ambiguous, and that 'and' has a range of different senses in English. (For a fuller defence of ordinary language philosophers along these lines, see Travis 1985.)

7 As Richard says in an eloquent passage (on behalf of Salmon), "we do not come equipped with a meter that reliably distinguishes between semantic and pragmatic implications. Examples like that concerning 'and' and temporal order help make the point that what seems for all the world like a truth-conditional implication may turn out not to be one" (Richard 1990:123). Unfortunately for those who hold this position, most pragmatists nowadays seem to accept the view that the temporal order associated with 'and' is a truth-conditional implication, albeit a pragmatically based one, and they do so on essentially intuitive grounds. (Even Horn holds this view, despite his earlier assertion quoted in footnote 2. See below, fn 11.) More on this in Chapter 17.

8 For simplicity's sake, the fact that the derivation of implicatures presupposes the identification of what is said (and other things as well) has not been represented in the diagram. It could have been represented by distinguishing two sub-levels within "what is communicated," what is said being input at the first sub-level and the implicatures output at the second one.

9 Such an analysis is supported by the view that, in a quantified sentence like "Everybody went to Paris," the relevant domain of quantification has to be contextually specified for a definite proposition to be expressed. See below, §14.2.

10 Bach (1987: chapter 4) points out that the nonliteral use of sentences such as "The door is closed" is their *standard* use; he speaks of "standardized nonliterality". He might therefore try to avoid the objection I have just raised by arguing as follows: The speaker is not conscious of having said something different from what he communicates because the sentence he uses is *standardly* used to communicate something different from the proposition literally expressed. After all, the same phenomenon occurs in cases of "standardized indirection" (Bach & Hamish 1979:192ff): when an indirect speech act is standardly performed by means of a certain type of sentence, the participants in the talk-exchange may not be conscious of the speech act directly performed (e.g., of the question in "Can you pass me the salt?"). I shall briefly discuss this type of account in footnote 13 below.

11 As he made clear during a workshop held in Paris in May 1991, Larry Horn, one of the main theorist of scalar implicatures (Horn 1972, 1989), now accepts this point with respect to cardinality implicatures (e.g. the implicature from "eight" to "exactly eight") or the temporal and consequential implicatures of conjoined sentences, but not with respect to other cases such as the inference from "some" to "not all". He agrees that our intuitions are to be accounted for, this entailing the necessity of a distinction between implicatures which are and implicatures which are not part of what is said. The account he favours is that in terms of *conventionalized* implicatures: conventionalized implicatures get incorporated into what is said. This type of account is similar to Bach's account in terms of standardized nonliterality; see footnote 13 below.

12 At this point, one might protest that it is a *good* thing from a scientific point of view when a theory's domain of application is extended beyond its intuitive basis. (As far as Grice's theory is concerned, the intuitive basis was the everyday distinction between what is said and what is implied.) This I do not wish to deny; I agree that scientific theorizing is to be freed from, rather than impeded by, intuitions and common sense, which provide only a starting point. Thus there is a sense in which it was a good thing to go beyond our intuitions and to show, as Grice and the Griceans did, that in many cases the meaning of an utterance results from an unconscious process of "meaning construction". Still, I believe there was something to worry about when the theory of implicatures was extended to examples which we would not ordinarily consider as cases of implied meaning. This does not mean that I reject the "scientific" attitude toward common sense. We may at the same time accept this attitude and recognize that human cognition is a very special field: in this field, our intuitions are not just a first shot at a theory - something like Wittgenstein's ladder, which may be thrown away after it has been climbed up - but also *part of what the theory is about*, and as such they cannot be neglected. In the case at hand, it was a mistake to ignore our intuitions, which tell us that there is a difference between standard cases of implied meaning and the other type of alleged implicatures.

13 My account of the difference between conscious and unconscious "implicatures" relies on the claim that the latter are *not* implicatures. Now there is another type of account, which uses Grice's notion of "generalized" implicature, or a related notion of "short-circuited," "standardized," or even "conventionalized" implicature. Using these notions, one may argue that when an implicature is generalized (or standardized, or conventionalized), one is no longer conscious of its being external to what is said. This type of position I earlier ascribed to Bach (footnote 10) and to Horn (footnote 11).

The problem, with this (otherwise plausible) type of account is that it is not general enough. To get an implicature in the first place, we need a proposition expressed; but in Chapter 14 I will argue, following Searle, that no proposition *could* be expressed without the context supplying unarticulated constituents. It follows that at least some of the pragmatic constituents of what is said cannot be treated as (generalized, standardized or conventionalized) implicatures. We need pragmatic constituents of what is said over and beyond those implicatures which arguably get incorporated into what is said.

## PRIMARY PRAGMATIC PROCESSES

### §14.1 Introduction

Minimalism is the doctrine according to which a pragmatic, contextual aspect of meaning should not be considered part of what is said *praeter necessitatem*. In other words, it is only in case of necessity that we must incorporate something contextual into what is said. Two minimalist principles were discussed in Chapter 13, the Linguistic direction principle and the Minimal truth-evaluability principle.

*Linguistic direction principle:* A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if its contextual determination is triggered by the grammar, that is, if the sentence itself sets up a slot to be contextually filled.

*Minimal truth-evaluability principle:* A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if its contextual determination is necessary for the utterance to be truth-evaluable and express a complete proposition.

As I pointed out, both principles have counterexamples. Perry's example, "It is raining," is a case in which a pragmatic constituent of what is said (the place where it is raining) is not grammatically "articulated"; and (1) and (2) below are examples in which a pragmatic constituent of what is said (the temporal location of the breakfast I had, or the length of the time it will take to get there) is not necessary for truth-evaluability.

(1) It will take us some time to get there.

(2) I have had breakfast.

At the end of Chapter 13, I used the Availability Principle to show that these counterexamples to the Linguistic direction principle and to the Minimal truth-evaluability principle cannot be disposed of by treating the relevant pragmatic constituents of meaning as "implicatures" external of what is said. Does this mean, as I suggested, that Minimalism must be given up? I think so, but the issue is fairly delicate and deserves a fuller treatment than I have been able to provide so far. |

## §14.2 Can Minimalism be defended?

Since the Implicature Analysis of "It's raining" fails (§§13.3-4), I think we cannot avoid the conclusion that the Linguistic direction principle has to be given up. In other words, Perry's point has to be granted: there are unarticulated constituents of what is said. That the spatial location of the rain is an *unarticulated* constituent is shown by the contrast between "It's raining" and "It's raining here"; that it is a constituent of *what is said* is a consequence of the Availability Principle, which precludes construing it as an implicature external to what is said (for then what is said would be the proposition that it's raining somewhere, contrary to our intuitions).

What about (1) and (2), the counterexamples to the Minimal truth-evaluability principle? The Implicature Analysis fails in this case also. It would be counter-intuitive to identify "what is said" by these utterances with the proposition that it will take some time or other to get there or with the proposition that the speaker's life was not entirely breakfastless. Yet I do not think the failure of the Implicature Analysis commits us to giving up the Minimal truth-evaluability principle, for the Implicature Analysis of (1) and (2) is not the only way to dispose of these counterexamples to the Minimal truth-evaluability principle.

Carston and Sperber & Wilson reject the Minimal truth-evaluability principle because they believe that a pragmatically determined aspect of the meaning of (1) and (2) possesses the two following properties:

- [a] it is constitutive of what is said, yet
- [b] its contextual determination is *not* necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition.

This conjunction of [a] and [b] is inconsistent with the Minimal truth-evaluability principle, which says that a pragmatically determined aspect of the meaning of an utterance is part of what is said if and only if its contextual determination is necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition. However, the Minimal truth-evaluability principle is not inconsistent with [a] or [b] taken separately. Defenders of the Implicature Analysis accept [b] but reject [a]; they are thus able to maintain the Minimal truth-evaluability principle. We have seen that the Implicature Analysis of (1) and (2) cannot be accepted, because the rejection of [a] conflicts with the Availability Principle. But there is another treatment of these examples, consistent with the Minimal truth-evaluability principle: one may accept [a] but reject [b], i.e. consider that the relevant aspect of the meaning of (1) and (2) is constitutive of what is said (and therefore not a conversational implicature), while insisting that its contextual determination is necessary for the utterance

to express a complete proposition. Let me briefly sketch this minimalist treatment of examples (1) and (2).

Both (1) and (2) can be analysed in terms of quantification. (1) quantifies over durations (it says that there is a duration  $t$  such that it will take us  $t$  to get there) and (2) quantifies over events (it says that there is a past event which is the speaker's having breakfast). Now, quantification involves a certain amount of context-dependence, because, in general, the domain of quantification has to be contextually specified. For example, it can be argued that the sentence "Everybody went to Paris," by itself, does not express a complete proposition - not even the proposition that everybody in the world went to Paris: what it says is that everybody in some domain  $x$  went to Paris, and the context helps to instantiate the variable "x". (On this view, the variable "x" may be contextually instantiated so as to make "everybody in the world" the right interpretation, but this interpretation is no less contextual than any other interpretation.) Suppose we accept this view. Then, in the case of (1), (2) and other utterances involving quantification, there is a slot to be filled for the utterance to be truth-evaluable, corresponding to the domain of quantification. It follows that the specific interpretations of (1) and (2), which SWC present as counterexamples to the Minimal truth-evaluability principle, are consistent with the latter - one merely has to define the domain of quantification in an appropriate way. In the case of (1), we might say that the domain of quantification is a set of durations, *contextually restricted to those that are long enough to be worth mentioning in connection with the process of our going there*. (In this framework, the proposition that it will take us "some time or other" to get there corresponds to the unlikely interpretation in which the domain of quantification is contextually identified with the set of all possible durations, including milliseconds.) In the case of (2), we might say that the domain of quantification is a time interval, or rather a collection of events defined by a time interval. This allows us to account for the intuitive difference between "I've had breakfast" and "I've been to Tibet" (Sperber & Wilson 1986:189-90). In both cases, what is conveyed by virtue of linguistic meaning alone is that, in some temporal domain  $d$  prior to the time of utterance, there is a certain event, viz. the speaker's having breakfast or his going to Tibet; but in the first case, the time interval is contextually restricted to the day of utterance, while in the second case the relevant interval is more extended and covers the speaker's life (up to the time of utterance).

According to the view I have just outlined, it is a mistake to hold that (1) and (2) express complete propositions once the obvious indexical variables (identity of the speaker and hearer, time of utterance, reference of "there") have been instantiated; a slot remains to be filled, which corresponds to the domain of quantification. It follows that the Minimal truth-evaluability principle can be retained even though one accepts thesis [a]

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above, i.e., even though one considers that what is said by means of (1) and (2) is that it will take us a *long* time to get there or that the speaker has had breakfast *on the day of utterance*. Far from being added to an already complete proposition, the pragmatic specifications I have just italicized result from filling a slot, a slot that must be filled in some way or other for the utterance to express a complete proposition.

### §14.3 Giving up Minimalism

Even though I think the Minimal truth-evaluability principle could be retained in the face of examples such as (1) and (2) above, still there are other examples which are much harder to handle without giving up the principle and having recourse to free enrichment. Carston mentions the following examples (for which she gives credit to Diane Blakemore):

- (3) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped
- (4) I went to the exhibition and ran into John
- (5) She took the gun, walked into the garden and killed her mother
- (6) I had a holiday in Austria and did some cross-country skiing.

As Carston says, "the interpretation of (3) in most contexts of utterances will include the understanding that he jumped over the cliff although there's no linguistic expression there telling us this or requiring us to fill in a prepositional phrase... Similarly, in (4) we would most likely assume that the place where I ran into John was the exhibition, in (5) that the killing of the mother was with the gun and took place in the garden, and in (6) that the skiing referred to took place in Austria, although, again, the linguistic content of the utterances does not supply this information or direct its retrieval" (Carston 1988:165).

The important point is that the unarticulated constituent, in each example (3)-(6), is *optional* from the standpoint of truth-valuation. Thus (4) would still be truth-evaluable if the location of the unexpected meeting with John was left undeterminate. In other words, if we extract (or subtract) the unarticulated constituent from what is said, what remains is a less specific proposition, to the effect that the following two facts obtain: I went to the exhibition, and I met John (i.e., I met him in some place or other). This is still a proposition, and it might have been the proposition expressed by (4).<sup>2</sup> Had it been the proposition expressed, no specific place would have been mentioned as that in which I ran into John. It would be fairly artificial to hold that on that interpretation also an unarticulated constituent would be involved, albeit a "general" one standing for an undeterminate location. It is much more natural to hold that on that reading no unarticulated constituent corresponding to a place would be provided. This shows that the

unarticulated constituent which is actually provided is optional,<sup>3</sup> hence that the Minimal truth-evaluability principle must be given up: something like free enrichment is involved in getting from sentence meaning to what is said.

It must be realized that non-minimalist pragmatic processes such as free enrichment are not contingent but essential to the constitution of what is said: although optional, unarticulated constituents of the sort I have just mentioned are *ineliminable* in some sense. When I say "He went to the cliff and jumped," the situation I describe or refer to is a situation in which he jumped *over the cliff* even though nothing in my utterance indicates this particular feature of the situation referred to. This unarticulated feature is part of the truth-conditions of the utterance, part of the described situation. Now there are many other features which, although unarticulated, are part of the situation which the utterance purports to describe; too many, arguably, for all of them to be articulated at the same time. For example, it's part of the situation I intend to describe, that gravitation is not suspended during the jumping. Or consider SWC's example, "I have had breakfast". SWC consider that an unarticulated constituent corresponding to a time (or a time interval) is contextually provided. But, as John Searle pointed out to me, there are many more unarticulated constituents at play in that example:

we take an utterance of that as saying that I have *eaten* breakfast, but of course that is not included in the literal meaning of the sentence. Furthermore, even if I had said I had eaten breakfast, we take that as meaning that I have eaten it by putting it in my mouth, chewing it, etc., as opposed to, say, stuffing it in my left ear or digesting it through the soles of my shoes. But there is nothing whatever in the semantic content of "eat" that precludes these interpretations. I could easily tell you a story where they would be the natural interpretation. [John Searle, personal communication]

Given that such "default" features concerning gravitation or the way eating normally proceeds are part of the described situation, on an ordinary understanding of "I have eaten breakfast" or "He jumped over the cliff" it is clear (I hope) that we could not provide a wholly *explicit* description of the situation in question, that is, a description without unarticulated constituents. That this is so has been quite convincingly suggested by Searle in various articles (Searle 1978, 1980) and in his book *Intentionality* (Searle 1983), with examples more or less like the above. I fully agree with Searle and other "contextualists" on this issue and conclude that "what is said" - the situation our utterance intends to describe - necessarily involves unarticulated constituents. No proposition could be expressed without *some* unarticulated constituent being contextually provided.

So what are the unarticulated constituents?  
... what are the unarticulated constituents?  
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#### §14.4 Primary and secondary pragmatic processes

The abandonment of Minimalism under its various guises has important consequences. It enables us to introduce a number of "primary" pragmatic processes, that is, of pragmatic processes which play a role in the very constitution of what is said. Primary pragmatic processes<sup>6</sup> are to be contrasted with secondary pragmatic processes, which presuppose that something has been said (some proposition expressed). From the point of view of Minimalism, only one type of primary pragmatic process is allowed: *saturation*, which is involved in the contextual determination of the proposition expressed by indexical utterances. I already mentioned another, non-minimalist type of primary pragmatic process, namely *free enrichment*, and a third type of process will be introduced later in this section.

The notion of a primary pragmatic process is closely tied to that of "pragmatic ambiguity," often used but seldom defined in the pragmatic literature. I suggest the following definition: There is *pragmatic ambiguity* whenever a sentence which is not semantically (i.e. linguistically) ambiguous can nevertheless express different propositions in different contexts, owing to some primary pragmatic process involved in the contextual determination of what is said. One particular form of pragmatic ambiguity - that which characterizes indexical utterances - is recognized by all theorists. This particular pragmatic ambiguity is generated by a particular primary pragmatic process, namely *saturation*. But there are other primary pragmatic processes, and other forms of pragmatic ambiguity, as we shall see.

To begin with, it must be noted that two sorts of free enrichment have been mentioned in the pragmatic literature, only one of which corresponds to the description I have given. *Strengthening*, or logical enrichment, takes a proposition as input and yields as output another proposition which entails it. Thus according to SWC "It will take us some time" is enriched into "It will take us a long time," "I have had breakfast" is enriched into "I have had breakfast this morning," and so forth. In all such cases, the enriched proposition entails the input proposition: if I have had breakfast this morning, then I've had breakfast, and if something takes a long time, then it takes some time. But another type of enrichment is sometimes evoked in the literature, namely *expansion* (Bach 1987). It takes a proposition as input, but the proposition it yields as output does not necessarily entail the input proposition. It is a "syntactic" rather than a "logical" sort of enrichment. Bach gives the following examples: "I have nothing to wear" is expanded into "I have nothing suitable to wear to tonight's party," "The door is open" is expanded into "The door in this room is open". The notion of expansion is less restrictive than that of strengthening; every case of strengthening (such as "I have eaten," an example also discussed in Bach 1987) can be treated as a case of expansion, but not the other way

round. That I have nothing suitable to wear to tonight's party does not entail that I have nothing at all to wear; hence the enrichment of "I have nothing to wear" into "I have nothing to wear to tonight's party" cannot be treated as a case of strengthening.

The notion of strengthening has one advantage over that of expansion: it is well-defined, while expansion is not (or so it seems to me).<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, it is clear that the notion of expansion has a much wider range of application than strengthening. One major problem with explanations in terms of the latter notion is that they seem to lack generality. Consider, for example, the sentence "One boy came". It can be used to say something quite specific, namely that *one of the boys in the class* came. This seems to be a typical case of strengthening: "One boy came" might be said to express the "minimal" proposition that at least one boy came, which minimal proposition is entailed by the richer proposition "At least one of the boys in the class came" (if one of the boys in the class came, then one boy came); the notion of strengthening therefore applies in a straightforward manner. But this account is not general enough, as can be seen by considering other cases, which look very similar but are far more difficult to handle in terms of strengthening. Thus, the sentence "Every boy came" can be used to say that every boy in the class came; the problem here is that the output proposition, i.e. the proposition that every boy in the class came, does not entail the input proposition, viz. the "minimal" proposition that every boy (i.e., every boy in the world!) came. Because of this problem, the account in terms of strengthening seems less attractive than an account in terms of expansion (or than a minimalist account in terms of a contextually variable domain of quantification: see §14.2).

We observe the same sort of limitation with respect to negation. We can explain the ordinary understanding of "I have had breakfast" using the notion of strengthening, for "I have had breakfast this morning" entails that I have had breakfast; but we cannot explain the ordinary understanding of "I have not had breakfast" in terms of strengthening, for "I have not had breakfast this morning" (the enriched proposition) does not entail that I have not had breakfast *simpliciter* (the input proposition); I may well have had breakfast on some other occasion, even if I had no breakfast this morning.

I shall not try to adjudicate between the two notions of enrichment here. Let me simply note a possible defence of the notion of strengthening against the above criticism. Strengthening, it may be argued, can be understood as operating *locally*. For example, in the case of "Every boy came," we might say that it is the predicate "boy" that is strengthened into "boy in the class," rather than the proposition "Every boy came" into "Every boy in the class came". This seems to work because the predicate "boy in the class" somehow "entails" the predicate "boy". In the same way, we might say that the strengthening in "I have not had breakfast" applies not to the global proposition but,

within the latter, to the proposition that is negated: "I have had breakfast" is strengthened into "I have had breakfast this morning," and *this* is negated.

This remark is important because, it seems to me, primary pragmatic processes in general must be conceived of as operating locally: they come into play at the sub-propositional level. This is what distinguishes primary from secondary pragmatic processes. The latter cannot operate unless a primary proposition - what is said - has been identified, but primary pragmatic processes, whether minimalist or non-minimalist, do not presuppose the prior computation of some basic propositional value. If I am right, then what I earlier called the "minimal" proposition expressible by an utterance (§13.2), i.e. that which results *simply* from saturation, is a theoretical artefact, in the sense that it *need not be computed* and has no psychological reality.<sup>8</sup>

By way of illustration, let us consider a third type of primary pragmatic process which I have not mentioned so far, and which it is time to introduce. I have in mind the (non-minimalist) process of *transfer*. In saturation and enrichment, a propositional constituent is contextually provided either to fill a slot in semantic structure or for purely pragmatic reasons; in transfer an already available constituent is mapped into another one which replaces it. Although transfer comes in two main varieties, analogical transfer and metonymical transfer, here I shall consider only the latter sort, extensively studied by Nunberg (1978, 1979) and Fauconnier (1985). They give examples like the following:

(M) The ham sandwich is getting restless

As Nunberg and Fauconnier point out, (M) can be used in certain contexts to say of the person who ordered the ham sandwich that he is getting restless. In this particular case there is *metonymical transfer* from the primary semantic value of the linguistic expression "the ham sandwich," namely the ham sandwich, to a secondary or derived semantic value, namely the orderer of the ham sandwich. This looks like a standard example of divergence between what Kripke (1977) and Donnellan (1978) call "semantic reference" and "speaker reference"; however, as Ivan Sag (1981) noticed, this sort of phenomenon can hardly be handled within a classical Gricean framework contrasting the proposition literally expressed, which includes the semantic reference, and what is communicated, which includes the speaker's reference. Such a treatment would be counterintuitive, as Sag pointed out in the following passage:

What is the role of context in examples such as (M)? Is this a case of an absurd literal meaning (an attribution of restlessness to a culinary object) rescued from pragmatic absurdity by the Cooperative Principle augmented by some ancillary principle which guides Gricean inferencing? Or is the shift from ham sandwich to ham sandwich

orderer somehow more directly involved in the semantics of such utterances. Perhaps the shift from ham sandwich to individual who is in some relation to a ham sandwich (possibly different from context to context) is like the shift in denotation that accompanies indexical expressions as they are uttered in various contexts. (...) This approach, rather than one of the first kind, where all examples like (M) are pushed off to pragmatic theory and are abstracted away from in semantic analysis, is intuitive on the grounds that these transfers seem very different in kind from the kind of inferential operations that lead one from *It's hot in here* to the sense of "Please open the window," which clearly deserve treatment of the first type. [Sag 1981:275-6]

The Gricean treatment would be counterintuitive, because it does not seem that the sandwich itself is (absurdly) said to be restless. Whether or not we trust our intuitions on this matter, we must account for them and especially for the intuitive difference between this type of example and other examples to which the Gricean treatment obviously and intuitively applies. Sag mentions a standard example of implicature ("It's hot in here"), but it would have been more relevant to mention examples of irony in which the speaker actually says something absurd to convey something else. As Sag emphasizes, this does not seem to be what happens in the Nunberg-Fauconnier type of example; it does not seem that the speaker says something absurd in order to convey something different.

Treating metonymical transfer as a primary pragmatic process both satisfies our intuitions with respect to examples such as (M) and accounts for the difference between this sort of case (in which a primary pragmatic process is involved) and standard cases of Gricean inferencing (in which a secondary pragmatic process is involved.)

There is an obvious sense in which transfer operates locally. At no point in the interpretation process need we entertain the absurd proposition that the sandwich itself is getting restless. We do not go from that absurd proposition to the communicated proposition that the person who ordered it is getting restless; we go from the primary semantic value (sandwich) to the secondary semantic value (sandwich orderer)<sup>9</sup> and it is the latter which goes into the global interpretation of the utterance. In other words, there is no need to compute the global interpretation of the utterance at an intermediate stage before transfer and other non-minimalist processes occur. That is another way of saying that transfer is a primary pragmatic process, rather than a secondary one presupposing the identification of a proposition at some prior level.

One might object (indeed, Kent Bach has objected to me) that the absurdity of the "literal" interpretation is what triggers the transfer from ham sandwich to ham sandwich orderer. So the literal interpretation has to be somehow computed, Bach suggests. I deny that this is so. Consider another example: "John was arrested by a policeman yesterday. He had just stolen a wallet". The pronoun "he" is interpreted as referring to John, not as

referring to the policeman. Why? Because the former interpretation is far more plausible than the latter. Does this mean that one must first consider the less plausible interpretation ("the policeman had just stolen a wallet"), realize that it is not plausible, and turn to the other interpretation? Obviously not. One need not even *consider* the less plausible interpretation. In the same way, the description "the ham sandwich" is interpreted as referring to the ham sandwich orderer in (M) because that interpretation - accessible through a process of metonymical transfer - is much more plausible than the so-called literal interpretation of the description as referring to the ham sandwich itself. This does not mean that one must first consider the less plausible interpretation (the attribution of restlessness to a culinary object, as Sag puts it), realize that it is not plausible, and turn to the other interpretation. In this case as in the other one, the context constrains the interpretation of the referring expression (pronoun or description) so as to eliminate irrelevant interpretations, but this does not mean that the latter must be considered in order to be rejected. Irrelevant interpretations are simply not selected.

*literal meaning*  
*vs*  
*literal interpretation*

To be sure, the literal interpretation of "the ham sandwich" has to come first since it provides the input to the process of transfer. But that literal interpretation is not selected as a possible interpretation in that context; it serves only as input to a transfer process which yields a satisfactory interpretation ("the ham sandwich orderer"), and it is the latter which goes into the interpretation of the utterance and undergoes a composition process with other semantic values associated with other sub-expressions in the utterance. In other words, we do not have a "global" transfer from the absurd proposition that the sandwich itself is getting restless to the more plausible proposition that the ham sandwich orderer is getting restless, as Bach and many others claim, but a local transfer from the literal interpretation of the description to a non-literal interpretation, only the latter going into the interpretation of the utterance in that context and undergoing the composition process which yields the semantic value of the whole on the basis of the semantic values of its parts. On the picture I am advocating, the composition process takes place "after" various primary pragmatic processes, including transfer, have applied locally. The latter do not presuppose the prior computation of some basic propositional value for the utterance; on the contrary, it is the process of propositional composition which presupposes the prior operation of primary pragmatic processes, since they provide the (relevant) semantic values of the parts on which the composition process operates to yield the semantic value of the whole.<sup>10</sup>

That transfer operates on a "primary" semantic value means that we have a number of levels to distinguish. The primary value on which transfer operates may itself result from the operation of another primary pragmatic process, e.g. saturation, at a prior level. This shows that primary pragmatic processes are primary only in a relative, not in an absolute sense. They are primary in the sense that they do not presuppose the

identification of a proposition at some prior level, contrary to secondary pragmatic processes. They are constitutive of what is said and do not presuppose that something has been said. But they are not, or not necessarily, "primary" in the sense of being first to operate. A primary pragmatic process which takes as input the output of another primary pragmatic process is clearly not "primary" in this second sense, in contrast to a primary pragmatic processes whose input is provided directly by the meaning of the expression type.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Implicature Analysis is not only counterintuitive, it also suffers from a further defect, namely its lack of generality. For it does not (or not easily) apply to examples such as "I have not had breakfast", which could hardly be analysed into the proposition that the speaker has never had breakfast plus some implicature. The only possibility for someone who does not consider the feature "today" as a pragmatic constituent of what is said is to consider this example as a case of nonliterality, in which there is a contradiction between what is said and what is meant. This commits one to giving to different sorts of analysis for "I've had breakfast" and for "I have not had breakfast".

<sup>2</sup> By this I mean that we can imagine a context in which the sentence in (4) would be used to express the proposition in question.

<sup>3</sup> It might be argued - contrary to what was suggested earlier - that every unarticulated constituent (including the location of the rain in Perry's example) is optional from the truth-valuation point of view. With respect to a context in which the location of the rain is irrelevant, "It is raining" might express the proposition that it's raining somewhere, in the same way as "John is eating," in many contexts, expresses the proposition that John is eating something. Here too it would be artificial to hold that an unarticulated "location" constituent is involved, of a "general" or "undeterminate" nature. It seems to me much better to hold that no unarticulated constituent corresponding to a place would be provided on this interpretation. (In examples such as (1) and (2) above, the unlikely "general" interpretation presumably results from contextually providing an unarticulated constituent corresponding to the domain of quantification. The situation is therefore different.) In any case, this is a difficult issue, one that I can only mention *en passant*.

<sup>4</sup> Charles Travis holds similar views: see his 1975, 1981, 1985 and 1989. See also Waismann's classical paper on "Verifiability" (Waismann 1951) - not to mention Austin and Wittgenstein.

"Contextualism" is my name for the doctrine that no proposition could be expressed independent of context. I am aware that contextualism must be argued for rather than merely assumed, as I do here. But this is a very large issue, whose discussion must be postponed to a later work.

<sup>6</sup> In later chapters primary pragmatic processes will be called "p-processes" for ease of expression.

<sup>7</sup> The problem with expansion is this. What is enriched is not a natural language sentence but a semantic representation. Since expansion is a syntactic operation, the expansion theorist must treat semantic representations as syntactic entities - as mental "sentences". This is OK, but to make the proposal precise

(and to apply it to particular examples) we would need to know much more than we do about the "language of thought".

<sup>8</sup> Although it has no psychological reality, it has a role to play in the theory: it corresponds to what in Chapter 16 I will call "the proposition Normally expressed" (§16.6).

<sup>9</sup> Nunberg (1991) offers a different analysis in which transfer operates from the *property* "being a ham sandwich" to the *property* "being the orderer of a ham sandwich," rather than from the sandwich itself to the person who ordered it, as in Fauconnier's or Sag's framework. This issue will not be addressed here.

<sup>10</sup> Among the primary pragmatic processes which play a role in the determination of what is said is the providing of "unarticulated constituents" (a particular form of free enrichment). Now unarticulated constituents are semantic values which correspond to no "part" in the sentence. It follows that the Compositionality Principle must be rejected: the semantic value of the whole is not determined solely by the semantic values of the parts and the way they are put together. (See Crimmins & Perry 1989.)

<sup>11</sup> There are also primary pragmatic processes whose input is neither the meaning of the expression nor a semantic value obtained from the latter through the prior application of another primary pragmatic process. I have in mind the phenomenon of *autonymy*. When an expression is understood as "mentioned," as in "Car is a three-letter word", a primary pragmatic process is at work, whose input is the expression itself (not its meaning). I cannot elaborate here.

## Appendix

### AVAILABILITY AND THE SCOPE PRINCIPLE

Two sorts of criteria for distinguishing implicatures from pragmatic aspects of what is said were considered in chapter 13: various versions of the Minimalist principle, and the Availability Principle. I used the latter to argue against the former, which relies on the counterintuitive Implicature Analysis. In this appendix, I want to consider the relation between the Availability Principle and another principle which has been put forward in the literature, the Scope Principle (Carston 1988, Recanati 1989a, Wilson 1991). The latter is based on observations that various people have made on the behaviour of conversational implicatures in connection with logical operators. These observations tend to provide evidence for a distinction between two types of alleged implicatures: those that do and those that do not fall within the scope of logical operators.

Consider the following pair of examples (from Cohen 1971):

- (1) The old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared.
- (2) A republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack.

In (1), it is implied that the first event described (the death of the old king) occurred before the second one (the declaration of a republic). In (2) the same events are reported in a different order, and the implication is reversed; it is suggested that the death of the old king occurred after - and, perhaps, because of - the declaration of a republic. Cohen ascribes to Grice the view that in both cases the temporal suggestion is a conversational implicature stemming from the presumption that the speaker is observing the maxim of manner: "Be perspicuous". In general, a narrative is more perspicuous if the events are reported in the order in which they occurred. The speaker's reporting a series of events in a certain order therefore implies that they occurred in that order, by virtue of the presumption that he is observing the maxim of manner. *Quia* conversational implicature, the temporal suggestion is not part of what is said and makes no contribution to the truth-condition of the utterance. Thus, according to Grice, what is strictly and literally said by means of (1) and (2) is the same thing, even though there is an important difference in (conveyed) meaning between these two utterances. The truth-functionality of "and" can therefore be maintained.

Cohen (1971) raises a serious objection to the view he ascribes to Grice. If (1) and (2) really have the same truth-conditions and differ only at the level of conversational implicatures, then, in Grice's framework, (3) and (4) also should have the same truth-conditions (given the truth-functionality of "if," in Grice's theory):

(3) If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared, then Tom will be quite content.

(4) If a republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack, then Tom will be quite content.

But (3) and (4) do not seem to have the same truth-conditions. What (3) and (4) say is that Tom will be content if the following conditions obtain: the old king has died, a republic has been declared, *and there is a certain temporal relation between these two events*. The temporal relation allegedly implicated by (1) and (2) is an integral part of the antecedent of the conditional in (3) and (4); it falls within the scope of the conditional. If we suppose that the antecedent of the conditional and the proposition expressed by the simple utterance (1) are identical, this entails that the alleged implicature of (1) is not really an implicature, but a constituent of the proposition expressed (Carston 1988). In the same way, when (1) is negated, the alleged implicature falls within the scope of the negation. The negation of (1) is made true if one of the following conditions fails to be satisfied: the old king has died, a republic has been declared, *and the first event occurred before the second*. Thus, one can deny (1) and thereby mean, as in (5), that the suggested order of events does not correspond to the facts:

(5) It is not the case that the old king has died and a republic has been declared; what is true is that a republic has been declared first and then the old king died of a heart attack.

Deirdre Wilson gives other examples of alleged implicatures falling in the scope of logical operators (Wilson 1991):

(6) It's always the same thing at parties: either I get drunk and no one will talk to me, or no one will talk to me and I get drunk.

(7) If a manhole is left uncovered and you break a leg, sue.

In all of these examples, the fact that the alleged implicature of the simple utterance falls within the scope of the operator in the complex utterance shows that it was not a genuine implicature, but a constituent of what is said. Or at least it shows this if one accepts the crucial premiss which I call Identity: that the proposition expressed by the simple utterance is identical to that which is dominated by the logical operator. (We shall see below that this premiss can be rejected.)

These considerations suggest the following criterion for telling implicatures from pragmatic constituents of what is said:

*Scope Principle:* A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said (and, therefore, not a conversational implicature) if - and, perhaps, only if - it falls within the scope of logical operators such as negation and conditionals.

By virtue of the Scope Principle, (3) and (4) provide evidence that the alleged implicatures conveyed by (1) and (2) are not really implicatures, but pragmatic constituents of what is said. And so forth for the other examples.

As I understand it the Scope Principle relies on two premisses. The first premiss is (e), the conclusion of the following argument (see Anscombe & Ducrot 1978):

- (a) Conversational implicatures are pragmatic consequences of an act of saying something.
- (b) An act of saying something can be performed only by means of a complete utterance, not by means of an unasserted clause such as the antecedent of a conditional.
- (c) Hence, no implicature can be generated at the sub-locutionary level, i.e. at the level of an unasserted clause such as the antecedent of a conditional.
- (d) To say that an implicature falls within the scope of a logical operator is to say that it is generated at the sub-locutionary level, viz. at the level of the clause on which the logical operator operates.
- (e) Hence, *no implicature can fall within the scope of a logical operator.*

I fully accept this argument and its conclusion (e). However it is important to realize that (e) by itself does not justify the Scope Principle. (e) can be paraphrased as follows:

For every complex utterance *u* including a logical operator *D* (i.e. for every utterance such as (3)-(7)), if some aspect *m* of the meaning of *u* falls within the scope of *D*, then *m* cannot be an implicature of *u*.

In other words, the fact that some meaning-constituent *m* falls within the scope of a logical operator in a complex utterance shows that *m* is not an implicature of that complex utterance, for it is in the complex utterance that the alleged implicature would occur at the sub-locutionary level (contrary to premiss (c)). But this does not entail anything concerning the status of *m* in what we may call the *simple* utterance, that is, the utterance (in isolation) of the clause which, in the complex utterance, is dominated by the logical operator. Thus the suggestion concerning the temporal order of the two events (the

declaration of a republic and the death of the old king) cannot be considered as an implicature of the complex utterance (5), by virtue of (c); but it may well be considered as an implicature of the *simple* utterance (1). It is perfectly conceivable that something which is an implicature at the level of the simple utterance acquires a different status when the utterance is embedded into a larger structure. To rule out its being an implicature of the simple utterance, one must have recourse to a second premiss, namely Identity:

*Identity*: the proposition expressed by the simple utterance is identical to that which is dominated by the logical operator in the complex utterance.

If the proposition expressed by (1) is the same as that which is negated in (5), then the proposition expressed by (1), like that which is negated in (5), must include the temporal suggestion that the declaration of a republic occurred before the death of the old king; and if this "suggestion" is part of the proposition expressed by (1), then it is no more an implicature of (1) than it is of (5).

The problem is that Identity does not necessarily hold. Thus Horn (1989, Ch.6), after Ducrot (1972, 1973), talks of a "metalinguistic" use of logical operators, characterized by the fact that the proposition expressed by the simple utterance is not identical to that which falls within the scope of the operator. As Wilson pointed out in her first work on the topic (Wilson 1975:151-2), it is possible to negate aspects of an utterance other than its propositional content, as in (8):

(8) I'm not Mary's father; she's *my* daughter.

Here what is rejected (what falls within the scope of the negation) is not the proposition expressed by the simple utterance "I am Mary's father" but rather the way that proposition is expressed. A similar example, mentioned by Larry Horn (in an oral presentation), is (9):

(9) Their victory was not an historic event; it was *a* historic event.

As Horn makes clear, "metalinguistic" negation may hinge on grammar, speech level, phonetics, or implicatures. When I say "She is not tall - she is very tall," I do not deny that she is tall, for this is entailed by what I assert, namely that she is very tall ("very tall" entails "tall"); what I deny an *implicature* of the utterance "She is tall," namely the "scalar" implicature that she is just tall or no more than tall. As Horn also points out, the same sort of metalinguistic usage can be found in connection with other operators. In all

such uses, what falls within the scope of the logical operator is *not* identical to the proposition expressed by the simple utterance.

For the Scope Principle to work, we have to assume that the logical operators are not used metalinguistically. We have to assume Identity. But how do we know when Identity holds and when it does not? We have to compare what is said by the simple utterance and what is said by the complex utterance, to see whether the proposition which falls within the scope of the operator in the complex utterance (e.g. the proposition which is negated) coincides with the proposition expressed by the simple utterance. Now this supposes that we know what is said by both the simple and the complex utterance. Since our intuitions concerning the content of these utterances must be exploited in order to put the Scope Principle to use, the latter presupposes the Availability hypothesis - the conscious availability of semantic content. I conclude that the Availability Principle is a more fundamental criterion than the Scope Principle.

ORIGINAL