Re: RT list: Relevant experimental evidence from Yi Ting Huang & Jesse Snedeker

Hi Dan,

I have three comments:

1. Huang & Snedeker's conclusion is that a semantic representation is
constructed in context and then pragmatic inference takes place. This seems
to contrast strongly with the idea that pragmatic inference is involved at
all levels of processing (e.g. reference assignment and implicatures). So
their (interpretation of their) results tends to stand in contrast to the
Relevance Theory view.

2. Fortunately, the effect they get is due to a confound (the presence items
containing numerals in the same study). When one removes the offending items
one gets no difference in bias formation between the 'some' and 'all'
 items. Grodner and colleagues paper in Cognition 2010 uses the same kind of
paradigm as H&S and get the no-difference result. Our group have a paper
forthcoming in Language and Cognitive Processes that uses a different
paradigm that also shows no difference.

3. Only Levinson's neo-Gricean theory can be tested experimentally (It has
and it's wrong). Horn's (and other) version(s) only commit to default
availability (rather than generation) and generally refuse to be committed
to any model that would implement their theory. Fortunately, what can't be
tested can safely be ignored.

best,

Richard

On 18 October 2011 11:15, Dan Sperber <dan.sperber@gmail.com> wrote:

> Another nail in the coffin of the neo-Gricean view of 'scalar
> implicatures':
>
>
> Language and Cognitive Processes
>
> Volume 26, Issue 8, 2011
>
> Logic and conversation revisited: Evidence for a division between
> semantic and pragmatic content in real-time language comprehension
>
> Preview
> Buy now
> DOI:10.1080/01690965.2010.508641
> Yi Ting Huang & Jesse Snedeker
> pages 1161-1172
>
> Available online: 17 Oct 2011
> Abstract
> The distinction between semantics (linguistically encoded meaning) and
> pragmatics (inferences about communicative intentions) can often be
> unclear and counterintuitive. For example, linguistic theories argue
> that the meaning of some encompasses the meaning of all while the
> intuition that some implies not all results from an inference. We
> explored how online interpretation of some evolves using an
> eye-tracking while listening paradigm. Early eye-movements indicated
> that while some was initially interpreted as compatible with all,
> participants began excluding referents compatible with all
> approximately 800 ms later. These results contrast with recent
> evidence of immediate inferencing and highlight the presence of
> bottom-up semantic–pragmatic interactions which necessarily rely on
> initial access to lexical meanings to trigger inferences.
>
>
> (also - and freely available at:
>
> http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/pdfs/Huang%20%20Snedeker%20logic%20and%20con.pdf
> )
>
>
>
>

-- 
Richard Breheny
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences
University College London
Chandler House
2 Wakefield Street
London  WC1N 1PF
United Kingdom
ph 44 (0)20 76794039 (xtn 24039)
fax 44 (0)20 7679 4010
http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/richardb/index.html