Re: RT list: 'conceptually encoded information that contributes to implicatur...

Thanks to Gutt for the link. I see the referred source cares to quotes
Grice vis a vis Gundel's having conceived her 'thing' 'in terms, originally,
of the Gricean 'maxims', and cfr. her contribution to "Legacy of Grice (ed.
K. Hall, Berkeley). One may add for good measure a _philosophically_ and
historically relevant ref. here: Urmson, Criteria of intensionality (PAS), an
impressive piece seldom quoted by someone of more or less of Grice's
generation. His account of apposite, as he calls them, choices to refer to 'the
postman', "Jenny's husband", etc. are charming and a nod to Grice's idea of
'dossier' in 'Vacuous Names' and as discussed by Evans in Varieties of
Reference. I did enjoy Gundel’s analysis, which I don’t think K. Scott cares
to mention, on ‘medial’ demonstratives, too (Loving English dialects as I
do, I treasure the Trudgill ref. in Dialects of England (Blackwell) as
maintaining the original Indo-European trichotomy -- for everyone who feels
that “this or that” simplifies things relevantly (when it is, rather, this,
that, or yonder. And of course Grice’s lovely iota-operator (WoW:ii), ‘the’
, IS a demonstrative (Davidson, On Saying That, Synthese -- and recall
Grice granting a “phi” “quasi-demonstrative” feature in WoW:xvii). I note
Scott expands on Strawson's and Grice's ‘therefore’ (and the latter's ‘on the
other hand’ as in the Darien-example in WoW:RE) while she bringing ‘so’
into the picture as yet another realisation of this philosophically important
 ஃ. But back to the 'dossier' thing, in a nod to Strawson against Russell
("Mr. Strawson on referring", Mind) Grice closes his relevant essay
(WoW:xvii) with the important caveat that echoes the final section of his
"Vacuous Names": “I have not [here -- but cfr. "Vacuous Names". JLS] given ANY
consideration at all to what might _well_ [but then might not. JLS] turn out
to be the _best_ treatment of definite descriptions, namely to the idea
that they are, in the first place at least, to be regarded as being,
_semantically_ [and vide Grice’s irreverence in avoiding ‘pragmatic’. JLS] a
special subclass of referential expressions” (282), which is what K. Scott is all
about. Then there's also Schiffer as an expansion on Grice’s cursory
comments in the 'referential' basic/resultant procedures in his "shaggy-dog"
story (WoW:vi). Schiffer let me have his important Synthese paper on this,
which alas, only confirmed Kemmerling's wise advise: why schiffer when one can
safely grice? Grice's narrow conception of ‘what is said’ to include “
sense and reference” -- vide his account of 'he' in ‘He is caught in the grip
of the vice’ (WoW:ii) may well be Austinian in nature. These philosophers
were, after all, wedded to this Fregean idea, made popular in England via
Geach’s translation (and recall Austin was Frege's translator, too). It was
their bill of fare and it did work for the philosophical goals they were
trying to pursue. Finally, as an Oxonian, should I say that Scott’s referring
to Hedley’s thing as a PhD was appropriately decoded by yours truly as
DPhil? And her parochial, if prestigious, ref. to Magdalen turned to "Merton"
in my more hierarchical view of how things work at The Place? -- Cheers.
J. L. Speranza
 
Received on Wed Feb 3 13:29:49 2010