RT list: Re: Concept-Procedural

2.2 Paraphraseability/Accessibility to consciousness
   
  Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Blakemore (2002) suggest that in contrast to concepts which can be brought to consciousness procedures cannot. This is drawn from their intuitive observation that native speakers can give a more or less satisfactory paraphrase of conceptual expressions such as tree, freedom, or because, and that they are generally able to tell if two related conceptual expressions are synonymous or not without having to think about it for any length of time and in particular without having to test whether they are intersubstitutable in all contexts. It is an opposite story with procedural expressions, they claim: these expressions are difficult to paraphrase, and native speakers tend to resort to intersubstitutability test to see if they are synonymous. Blakemore (2002, 2006) even suggests that this explains why the translation of procedural expressions is notoriously difficult and why they are challenging for second language learners. Other relevance
 theorists have made similar claims. For example, Rouchota (1998: 114) claims that it is ‘extremely difficult for non-native speakers to learn to used connectives in a foreign language correctly, especially the semantically related ones’, and Iten (2004) says that procedural expressions such as well, even, just of English, or doch and ja of German are much harder for non-native speakers to learn than conceptual expressions. They cite no research to support their claims.
   
  I think this is interesting enough to take issues with. First, accessibility to consciousness is the intuitive argument which, on its own, would not be compelling as Iten (2004) concedes. It is true that intuition is a popular (yet potentially vicious/double-edged) tool for many linguists, but it is also true that people’s intuition is neither sufficient nor reliable enough to confirm any hypotheses. And that is where empirical tests come in.
   
  Second, the claim that procedural expressions are more difficult to paraphrase than conceptual expressions is not convincing. Native speakers of English can give a more or less satisfactory paraphrase of procedural expressions such as but or however as well as with conceptual expressions such as tree or freedom. When asked what but or however means, they tend to resort to the concept of contrast or contradiction or even say that but means however, or they mean the same when asked if there are any differences. And indeed, that is what textbooks of English say (a group of linking words or expressions to express contrast/contradiction to be inserted, ref. to be inserted). Moreover, if it is true that native speakers struggle to tell the differences between related procedural expressions such as but and however, it is also true that they also do struggle to tell the differences between related conceptual expressions, perhaps as much as with procedural expressions. Examples
 are district from borough; road from street from way from avenue from way from drive, or freedom from liberty. In many cases, the differences between two related expression such as the last pair freedom vs liberty can be brought out only when one resorts to telling how or when it is used, just like what one typically does with but and however. Another example, perhaps more convincing example is cigarette vs fag. Certainly, the difference between these two linguistic forms lies in how they are used, the latter being the one to be used colloquially. Thus, struggling to tell meaning of and to differentiate related items is not confined only to procedural expressions; it seems it does happen with conceptual expressions as well.
   
  Third, the claimed ‘notorious difficulty’ in the translation of procedural expressions does not seem to be supported by sufficient evidence, intuitive or empirical. Intuitively (but this can be easily tested empirically), it seems more plausible that interpreters and translators have more problems with conceptual expressions such as deconstruction, utopia, nothingness, internet, etc. than with procedural expressions such as but, however, after all. Just think of translating Relevance into another language and see which sort of expressions one would struggle with. I would certainly have more problems putting concepts such as assumption, relevance, contextual effects, manifestness, explicature, etc. into Vietnamese. In addition, in some cases the translation of some concepts is so difficult that the translator resorts to borrowing wholesale from the source language. If the translation of procedural expressions are really difficult for translators as RT claim, it is not
 clear why translators do not borrow as they sometimes do with conceptual expressions, or do not do so as often as with conceptual expressions. I strongly believe that this alleged notorious difficulty in translating procedural expressions will continue as long as linguists continue to use contrived examples considering them out of context, but I will not offer a full explanation here. Also, a quick look at dictionaries (good or bad) would reveal that they include almost all (if not all) procedural expressions but not all conceptual expressions, which shows that procedures are not as difficult to translate as relevance-theoretically claimed. Finally, even if we concede that the meaning of procedural expressions are difficult to bring to consciousness and that translating and learning them is notoriously difficult, there is a another class of procedural expressions which do not seem to behave the same way. They are pronouns such as I, he, she, they. If pronouns are claimed
 to be procedural thus belonging to the realm of subsconciousness thus cannot be brought to consciousness, it seems reasonable to expect them to be difficult to translate or to learn. I am not sure if there are any good and daring translators/interpreters or language learners who report the translation or learning of these expressions is notoriously difficult. Thus, even within the procedural basket, there seems to be apparently obvious evidence against the ‘cannot-be-brought-to-consciousness’or the ‘notoriously-difficult-to-translate/learn’ argument.
   
  In short, this criterion does not seem to be reliable enough, to me at least. If there are real differences between these two classes of expressions, they may lie somewhere else, not in the evidence offered by relevance theorists.
  
  
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Borsley R D <rborsley@essex.ac.uk> wrote: Minh

I'm not very well today and I won't be coming in. I could see you
tomorrow at 11.30.

Bob

Prof. Robert D. Borsley
Department of Language and Linguistics
University of Essex
Wivenhoe Park
COLCHESTER CO4 3SQ, UK

rborsley@essex.ac.uk
tel: +44 1206 873762
fax: +44 1206 872198
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~rborsley

Published October 2007:

Borsley, R.D., M. Tallerman and D. Willis, The Syntax of Welsh, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521836302

       
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Received on Fri Jan 4 13:11:34 2008