T. Wharton quotes from Grice (1969), Neale -- a criticism --, and Mcdowell:
>"The primary point of making assertions
>is not to instill into others beliefs about
>one's assertions, but to inform others ... about
>the subject matter of one's assertions (which need
>not be, though of course it may be, the asserter's
>beliefs)."
A reply on behalf of the Gricean is given by Colin McGinn (in the ps. --
McGinn studied in Oxford with Grice, and reviews some of Grice's findings in
http://accweb.itr.maryville.edu/schwartz/course%20freshman%20sem%2002%20maki
ng%20philosopher.htm).
Cheers,
JL
McGinn writes:
"One issue concerns the conception of
communication suggested by Gricean
theories. At a superficial glance it
might look as if the point of communication,
for a Gricean as for Locke, is to convey
to the audience the state of MIND of the
speaker as opposed to the condition of
the world, since the speaker is said to
intend the audience to believe that he
(the speaker) has certain propositional
attitudes. But in fact this implies the
MIND-CENTERED view of communication
only if the attitudes in question
are themselves taken SOLIPSISTICALLY.
If, on the other hand, we view their CONTENT
as implicating a reference to things IN THE WORLD,
then it is not so clear that the Gricean
has no room for the world-directed purport
of acts of communication."
We might say that the condition of the world
gets conveyed BY conveying the speaker's
world-directed attitudes.
What is perhaps more just is to accuse
the Gricean of mislocating the _EMPHASIS_ in
his implied picture of communication; he should
acknowledge that the primary intention of a
communicator is to let the audience know that
the world is thus and so.
My own view is that the content of an act of
communication must be seen as comprising TWO
elements, corresponding to the meaning of the
sentence uttererd: there is the information
conveyed about the world, but there is also
information about how the speaker represents
the world, where this latter enables the audience
to take what is communciated as usable in the
explanation of the speaker's behaviour. The
speaker's primary intention is indeed to
discourse on the world, but he cannot do this
except by revealing his own conception of it.
Any adequate account of communication must
make a place for both of these respects.
C. Mcginn, 'The structure of content', in
A. Woodfield, Thought and object: essays
in intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon.
(p. 245).
==
J L Speranza, Esq
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St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
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La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
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http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
jls@netverk.com.ar
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