I enjoyed M. Hegarty's comments in 'Functionalism & formalism' on
"functional analogues", as it were, for natural language -- the Boeing 747
and the genome.
The topic has associations with two Gricean pet ideas, viz:
i. the idea of a 'convention' as a functional atavism.
ii. the all-pervasiveness of "teleofunctional" explanation.
Re i: the linkage of 'functional explanation' and 'convention' is pursued
by F. Newmeyer in e.g.
http://www.nwcl.salford.ac.uk/anlec.htm.
Discussing the advantages of what he calls a _generalised_ ('holistic')
variety of functionalism over a more atomistic one (which he associates
with 'emergent grammar' and 'optimality theory'), Newmeyer writes:
a given form ["device"] may enter the
system to serve some specific function
_and_ be retained -- by force of
convention[ality] -- even _after_ that
function ceases to be served.
(and cfr. Newmeyer, 'Generative grammar meets Grice: an analysis of
syntactic categories without prototypes' -- 5th IPRA, Mexico City).
(For the record, the analogy brought by Newmeyer is between, say, 'syntax'
and ... lung cancer:
We *can* pinpoint _smoking_ as a cause
of lung cancer *in general*, even [when]
the *complexity* of a specific pathology
prevents us from conclusively attributing
this specific case to smoking. Similarly,
we can pinpoint, say, iconicity as
[the general function for a formal device]
without _having_ to identify iconicity
as the motivator for every specific device.).
While Grice does trade on 'convention' ("conventional implicatures" which
may or may not be some sort of 'fossilised' conversational implicature --
WOW, p. 39, and cfr. p. 280), it is never clear just _what_ his analysis of
'convention' may look like.
(The idea that 'conversational implicature' is the ultimate functional
explanation is expressed e.g. by C Gardent at
www.coli.uni-sb.de/~claire/teaching/ss00/implicature1.
"Conversational implicature -- paradigm of
a pragmatic explanation -- offers a functional
explanation of linguistic facts.").
I would like to think he would endorse something like a Lewisian account --
in terms of _arbitrariness_. (Cfr. Dibrell, 'Intention and convention: a
reconciliation of Austin and Grice').
Re ii: It is in _Aspects of Reason_ that Grice explores the idea of what,
with Sperber, I shall call 'teleofunctionalism' -- see Sperber/Origgi -- at
http://www.dan.sperber.com/evo-lang.htm). --
Alluding to Lewis Carroll's famous stanza ('The Walrus and the Carpenter':
'The time has come', the Walrus said,/'To talk of many things:/Of shoes --
and ships -- and sealing wax --/Of cabbages -- and kings.') Grice proposes
that certain items are best _described_ purely functionally:
It does not require very sharp eyes, but
only our willingness to use the eyes one has,
to see that our speech [...] is permeated
with the notion of purpose; to say what a
certain kind of thing is is only too frequently
partly to say that it is for. This feature
applies to our talk [...] of, for example,
ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and,
possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it
extends even to cabbages".
(Grice, _Aspects of Reason_, p. 35).
Interestingly, Grice extends this proposal to the notion of 'sentence'
('Reply to Richards', p. 83).
In the link by Sperber/Origgi mentioned above, the authors explore some
considerations on 'funtions' in the work of R. Millikan.
Crucially, Millikan distinguishes between a _direct_ function and a
_derived_ one. The former is characterised in _general_ terms; the latter
in 'casuistic' ones. Now, a _second_ qualification made by Millikan is
between a (say, direct) function which is 'proper' and one which is not.
Sperber/Origgi explore on this idea of what the 'proper' direct function of
a system like a natural language may look like.
Sperber/Origgi are concerned with defending a 'Gricean' view which Millikan
rejects on various fronts ('psychological implausibility', derived status
of the implicit/explicit distinction, etc.). And I think Sperber & Origgi
_succeed_.
Sperber/Origgi criticise certain current *evolutionary* functional
explanations of linguistic form:
It is as if the evolution of an organ
of locomotion such as wings were discussed
in terms of the _effects_ of locomotion
such as fleeing a predator, finding food,
or finding a mate, without considering the
proximate [direct proper] function of
the organ, namely locomotion.
Millikan's [teleofunctional] account of a (biological/cultural) device is
in terms of "the proper funtion"] causally responsible for the reproduction
and proliferation of the device." For Millikan a given form [device] has a
*direct* _proper_ function iff the form is such that it originates as a
reproduction" of a [device] which, due to possession of the properties
reproduced, _has_ performed the function." On the other hand, a given form
has a _derived_ proper function iff the form is such that it originates as
the product of some prior device that, given specific circumstances, had
the performance of the function as a proper function AND which, under those
specific circumstances, causes the fucntion to be performed by means of
producing the specific device." (Examples:
(i) "The pigment-arranging device of the chameleon's skin performs the
function of hiding the chameleon by producing a colour pattern which
matches the background on which the chameleon is sitting. Now, a _specific_
pattern in the chameleon's skin, though never produced before, may still be
said to have a function, and a "proper" one, even -- if a _derived_ one.")
(ii) "A gosling's "imprint mechanism" has the *direct* proper function
of allowing the gosling to fix an image of its mother so as to follow her.
A _specific_ imprinting -- unique to a specific gosling -- will have the
*derived* proper function of helping that specific gosling to follow [its
mother]")
As for 'artifacts' ('cultural items'): Consider a hammer [Unger's example]
"The hammer has the direct proper function of driving a nail. It is the
successful -- and repeated -- performance of this driving of nails by
hammers that causes the proliferation and reproduction of hammers, as it
were." Ditto for an expressive device such as language qua vehicle of
utterer's meaning: "Among the effects that may correlate with a given
"expressive device" ["form"], a device's direct proper function is what
keeps communicators using it (the device's *conventional use)." "Now, the
_derived_ ["particularised" in Grice's jargon?] proper function of an
expression device may (but then it may _not_) be a mere token of its direct
proper function -- as when a word is used to convey its conventional
meaning". Sperber/Origgi write:
"By rejecting the Gricean approach
(or confining it to an occasional and
marginal role), Millikan falls
back on some version of the
[code model] of communication."
"For Millikan, the possible contextual meaning of a given expression device
is that which is _conventionally_ associated with this device. Millikan
does not deny the existence of utterer's meaning, but sees it as a
departure from the "normal" form of communication".
The truth in Grice's model is that
we have the ability to interrupt and prevent the
automatic running on of our talking and our
doing-and-believing-what-we-are-told equipment.
We do this when we discover evidence
that the conditions for a normally effective
talking and for a correct believing-on-the-basis-
of-what-we-hear are *not* met".
(Millikan, Language, thought & other biological
categories, p.69).
Rather, Sperber/Origgi propose that "a given device has, as its direct
proper function, to indicate the utterer's meaning. The device performs
this direct proper function through a token of the device which performs
the *derived* proper function of indicating a *contextually relevant*
[utterer's] meaning. [Contra Millikan] A device proliferates -- and
stabilises -- because it causes highly reliable cognitive responses. A
device provides communicators with informationally rich, highly structured,
and reliably decoded evidence for the utterer's meaning."
JL
Refs:
Block N. Troubles with functionalism
http://www.hps.elte.hu/~gk/books/cog/block.htm
(On yet _another_ side to Gricean functionalism
as per Grice's 'Method in in philosophical psychology'
repr. in Conception of Value).
Carston, R. Pragmatics and the Explicit-Implicit Distinction.
University College, London.
(cited by Sperber/Origgi).
Darnell, M, E Moravcsik, F Newmeyer, M Noonan & K. Wheatley, eds
Functionalism & formalism in linguistics. John Benjamins
Info from:
http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/lec/publications.html
Dibbrell WS. Intention & convention: a reconciliation of Austin
& Grice. MS. Available via UMI Int.
Gaines P. Functionalism & formalism
http://www.linguistlist.org/issues/11/11-145.html
Grice HP. Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press.
The conception of value. Clarendon
Aspects of reason. Clarendon.
Reply to Richards.
In PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
intentions, categories, ends, ed. R. Grandy & R. Warner. Clarendon.
Kirby, S. Constraints on constraints, or the limits of functional adaptation.
In J. Darnell et al. Function, selection & innateness:
the emergence of language universals. Oxford UP.
Knight, C, M Studdert-Kennedy & J Hurford, eds,
The evolutionary emergence of language: social function
& the origins of linguistic form. Cambridge University Press.
Info from:
http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/lec/publications.html
Lewis DK. Convention. Harvard UP.
Millikan RG. Language, thought & other biological categories. MIT Press.
White Queen Psychology & other essays for Alice. MIT Press.
Language conventions made simple. JPhilosophy 95
A common structure for concepts of individuals,
stuffs, & real kinds : More mama, more milk, more mouse.
Behavioural/Brain Sciences 9
-- available online.
Newmeyer F. Generative grammar meets Grice:
an analysis of syntactic categories without prototypes. 5th IPRA, Mexico
City.
Language form & language function.
Where is functional explanation?
Abstracted in http://www.nwcl.salford.ac.uk/anlec.htm
Sperber, D & G Origgi,
Evolution, communication, & the proper function of language.
In P Carruthers/A Chamberlain, eds,
_Evolution & the human mind: language, modularity
& social cognition_. Cambridge University Press.
Available at:
http://www.dan.sperber.com/evo-lang.htm
& D. Wilson. Relevance: Communication & cognition. Blackwell.
==
J L Speranza, Esq
Country Town
St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
Telefax 00542214259205
http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
jls@netverk.com.ar
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sun Jun 30 2002 - 23:09:34 GMT