In _Pragmatics_, Levinson classifies implicature as being 'scalar' or
'clausal' -- he never implies the taxonomy is dichotomic though, as his
opus magnum, _Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalised
Conversational Implicature_ shows. In _A Theory of Scalar Implicature_
Hirschberg brings in the context-sensitive 'ranks'... What's more in store?
Perhaps a discussion of the "m-intended point", to use Levinson's wording,
a la Strawson in 'Intention & Convention in a Theory of Speech Acts'?
Issues like these are dealt with by Capone vis a vis a commentary of
Carston's essay in Carston & Uchida, _Relevance Theory: Applications &
Implications_.
In a recent post to this list, M. J. Murphy wrote:
>Another one [resource other than http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk]
>worth browsing is the Semantics Preprint Archive.
[at http://www.semantics.archive.net]
>More Griceans than RT people there at the moment.
I tried a 'relevance' search at:
http://semanticsarchive.net/cgi-bin/browse.pl?search=relevance
and retrieved 2 items:
* Santos, D.
The relevance of vagueness for translation.
and, a more relevant one,
(at http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/JMwNjhiN/Review20%Carston.rtf.)
viz.
* Capone, A.
"Some considerations on Carston's paper 'Informativeness,
relevance and scalar implicature'" (in Carston/Uchida,
_Relevance Theory: applications and implications_)
which I'm excerpting below.
JL
===
Capone writes: "[Carston has] argued that pragmatics contributes to the
fully truth-evaluable propositional form of an utterance. [Carston's]
considerations, which extend the original Gricean program, are based on
important ideas by Sperber & Wilson (1986) and, in particular, on the
distinction between implicatures and explicatures. Persuaded though I am
that Carston evinces great intelligence and logical acumen in her critique
of some neo-Gricean ideas, I hope to be able to redirect some of her
arguments or at least to show that the debate has to be continued.
Carston's claims [include]. The revised presumption of optimal relevance
predicts the 'I am reluctant to say' implicature in connection with a
Gricean example of a quantity implicature."
1. Capone first examines the issue of cardinal numbers.
"[Re: cardinal determiners] Carston favours the underspecification
hypothesis: the hypothesis that cardinal determiners are associated with a
rather general (underdetermined) semantics, which is then enriched by means
of contextual clues."
Capone contrasts Carston's 1999 view on cardinal numbers -- "cardinal
numbers can be associated with an underspecified semantics which is then
enriched through contextual clues" -- with three other views:
Levinson (1991, 2000):
Cardinal numbers can be assigned a (lower bounding) at least n
semantics, which gives rise to the generalized upper bounding
conversational implicature exactly n.
Higginbotham (1983):
Cardinal numbers can be considered ambiguous between an at
least n and an exactly n reading.
Jaszczolt (1999):
Cardinal numbers are interpreted as having the exactly n reading
through default semantics (this reading can be overridden in particular
cases).
"I agree [with Carston] that [in a sentence like "There there will be 20
people there"] might be an interpretative ambiguity in the sense of
Jaszczolt (1999), I do not think that we are faced with ambiguity proper,
with at most n as one linguistic sense of the cardinal determiner."
"Carston shows that the unitary semantics analysis is confronted with some
serious problems. [Carston] believes that the unitary [uniguous. JLS]
semantics analysis cannot deal with expressions such as ["More than 3
people came". Carston discusses one [...] problem for the proponents of
unitary semantics. She believes that there are predictions of
(respectively) redundancy and oddity with explicit modifiers such as "at
least" and "exactly"."
Capone then addresses both the issue of 'redundancy' and 'oddity'.
Re: redundancy: "It has been proposed by Radici Colace (personal
communication) that a sentence such as "At least 3 students came" evokes a
context where a minimal threshold questionnaire is being answered or where
this statement answers a question requiring unspecific information. If
these contextual conditions are conversationally implicated by the use of
"at least _n_" phrases, the charge of redundancy is easily answered, as
redundancy generates M-implicatures (implicatures due to the maxim of
manner)."
Re: oddity: "Carston is committed to the view that in case "the at least
_n_" semantics is advocated, a sentence such as "_Exactly_ 3 students came"
should be odd. This argument presupposes that a sentence such as "_At
least_ 3 students came; oh _exactly_ 3 students came" is odd. However, if a
speaker proffers this sentence, uttering the first part on the basis of a
logical inference, and utters the second part on the basis of knowledge
derived from the contents of, say, a record/book, the whole utterance is
_not_ anomalous".
"Carston claims (1999: 208) that the semantics of "3" should be conceived
as follows:
(1) [X[3]]
-- where X is a variable which is assigned in context a specific
interpretation. Carston explains why in the following dialogue B's (ii)
reply, though fine, involves extra processing (and is thus somewhat marked)."
(2) A: Does she have 3 children?
B: i. No, she has 2.
ii. ?Yes, (in fact) she has 4.
iii: No, she has 4.
"Presumably [Carston] would have to say that there is an interpretation
rule that assigns to cardinal determiners the default interpretation
"exactly n" in a default context. I agree that [X [three]] is a good way
out of the problems. Now, _what_ *are* are the truth-conditions of
Carston's [three]? Intuitively, she would have to look for what sentences
such as
(3) At least 3 men arrived.
(4) Exactly 3 men arrived.
(5) At most three men arrived.
have in common. They might have in common the following truth-conditions:
(6) A quantity of _at least_ 3 men arrived.
"[Carston's [three]] is _not_ supposed to mean that, if we count the
objects in question, they are three in number, as this amounts to accepting
the exact n meaning as basic (thus, there would be no way of enriching the
semantics further. It cannot mean that, if we count the objects, they will
not exceed 3, as this does not accommodate the "at least n" reading. I
could say "At most 3 students will arrive", without wanting to commit
myself to the prediction that _at least 3_ students will arrive). Carston
might now retort that what is a problem to her view is a problem for
Levinson's view. [...] But this is not Levinson's problem. [...] I could
surely say "At least 3 students came, in fact at most 3 students came".
2.
Consider Harnish's example:
(7) The flag is red.
"Must it be all red?"
"Carston cites Harnish (1976: 341) in support of her view that relevance is
a more fundamental category than informativeness"
The Harnish quote being:
"This maxim [relevance [or 'relation'. Let's recall Grice is
echoing Kant. JLS]] turns out to be so central and important
in conversational implicature that it is not clear that
it belongs on equal footing with the rest. I suspect that
maxims are (at least partially) ordered with respect
to weight, etc. and that relevance is at the top,
controlling most of the others".
"Carston takes for granted that an utterance of "The flag is red"
conversationally implicates (and does not entail) "The flag is all red".
Carston discusses this kind of example further and shows that the scalar
implicature, in a particular context, is defeated." -- The quote from
Carston's essay being:
"For instance, say X and Y have a box
of flags all of which are half blue and half
white but which are distinguished by
having a small block of some other colour
in the white half: red, yellow or green.
X is handling out flags to Y in some order
or other and at a certain point Y is
expecting to be given one that has a
green patch on it. X makes a mistake and
Y says:
"This flag is red."
Arguably it would be more informative and
equally well evidenced for him to say
"This flag is blue, white and red",
but it certainly would not be relevant. There
are two points here: first, the example does
not implicate that the flag in question is
all red (since the totality of colour on
the flag is irrelevant); second, it does implicate
that the flag is not green, but it does not
implicate that the flag is not blue (since the
only relevant contrast set here is between a
green patch and a patch of any other colour)
(Carston 1999:183).
Capone writes: "Now if my considerations are plausible, I should show,
contrary to Carston, that the inference is not defeasible. The situation
she considers, instead, seems to show the opposite, prima facie. In that
situation, she argues, the sentence "This flag is red" is not used to
implicate that the flag is _all_ red. However, anyone now must have noticed
that this is a loose usage of the expression "This flag is red".
I disagree there. People are sometimes _loose_ speakers but this is not
such a case, methinks.
Capone goes on: "Surely one could use the sentence in the way Carston uses
it, but this is not a legitimate use."
I'm not so sure, after all she is _using_ it, isn't she.
Capone writes: "If my considerations are correct, Carston's hypothetical
situation does not prove that relevance considerations can defeat scalar
implicatures. I want nevertheless to explore the standard neo-Gricean
hypothesis to see in what ways Carston's considerations can modify it (if
they can)." [...] Once the implicature evaporates, it is not unreasonable
to argue that considerations of relevance will guide one's interpretations."
Capone quotes from Carston's consideration of Horn's (1989) dual model of
language. The Carston quote being:
"Whatever the value of this view of things
for language change, it strikes me as quite
wide of the mark when it comes to verbal
communication. Speakers are often very
interested in being understood, having their
message received, and this must, at the very
least, modify their alleged concern to keep
their articulatory organs in repose. The assumption
that hearers would really like to have every
ounce of intended meaning enshrined in
linguistic form is equally dubious;
the psychological evidence indicates that
our cognitive systems are finely attuned to
aspects of context, including states of mind of
speakers, so that explicit encoding, over a
fairly low threshold, is more likely to impede
than enhance communication."
Capone writes: "As Carston's paper is a critique of both Horn's and
Levinson's systems, she then turns to Levinson's I-principle ("amplify the
informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding a more
specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's
m-intended point").
"Carston asks,
"How does one judge what the speaker's m-point is?"
and answers it with
"The answer seems to be via considerations of relevance"
(p. 186).
As for the "problems with lexical items related by hyponymy", "Carston,
after summing up some important considerations by Hirschberg (1991) on
scalar implicatures, deals with two apparent counterexamples to the Gricean
analysis"
(8) A: What did you buy for your mother?
B: I bought her flowers.
(9) Billy got a dog for Christmas
"Carston considers that the neo-Gricean framework predicts that in (i) B
should implicate that he did not buy his mother _roses_, and that in (ii)
the speaker implicates that Billy did not get a _spaniel_. Her reasoning is
based on the scales below."
(10) <rose, flower>,
(11) <spaniel, dog>.
"In these scales the included items are ordered on the basis of entailment
('x is a rose' entails 'x is a flower'; 'x is a spaniel' entails 'x is a
dog'). Carston disposes of the problem by saying that these undesired
implicatures are prevented from arising by the principle of relevance, as
"the informationally weaker statement is sufficiently
relevant to be worth the hearer's attention and
so does not give rise to any implicature that
the stronger proposition is not the case"
(p. 190).
"I would like to redirect Carston's considerations, by saying that in case
the elements of a Horn-scale are related by hyponymy, the implicature
generated by the use of the weaker item must be of the type 'I do not know
whether the more informative option obtains'."
This could, I guess, be rather formalised using a "Gazdar" type of an
epistemic operator "~K(x is s)" or "K~(x is s)" -- where 'K' stands for 'K'
and 's' for 'the strong(er) item in a Horn-scale'.
Capone writes: "In (i), B is asked a question and replies to it by
providing a statement that is, evidently, weaker than the one he could have
provided by using "roses". [... The hearer] will [however] exclude that the
speaker did not utter the more informative item because he had no relevant
knowledge. Considering that it was him who bought the flowers, unless we
are faced with an utterly absent-minded person, it is unlikely that he is
not in a position to know what kind of flowers they were. The hearer thus
reasons in the following way."
"It is obvious that it is not the case that B is not in a position to be
more specific about the flowers he bought; hence he cannot mean that he is
not in a position to know. He must have a different reason for choosing the
less informative item. Perhaps he is reluctant to say what kind of flowers
he bought or he bought a bouquet with mixed flowers (he does not remember
exactly the kinds of flowers contained therein)."
"It is interesting to note, however, that in a range of cases, relevance
considerations seem to (re)shape the implicatures related to scalar items."
Capone gives the following illustrations:
(12) A: Where are you going?
B: Out.
(13) A: What are you cooking?
B: Dinner.
(14) A: What is on the TV this evening?
B: A film.
(15) A: What did you buy?
B: Some presents.
In these examples, "the speaker will _not_ conversationally implicate that
he is not in a position to know whether the more informative item of [some]
relevant scale obtains. This implicature is in fact defeated in (12),
(13), and (14) because in these cases it is obvious that the speaker must
know whether some alternative, more informative, assumption obtains."
"The hearer, thus, rather infers that the speaker is _reluctant_ to
provide the more informative option or that he believes the hearer has no
need to know the more informative option."
"I think that one has to find relevance-independent ways in order to
prevent scales based on entailments from overgenerating inferences. In
fact, following Carston's suggestion [of how the neo-Gricean must reckon
things out, in her view. JLS] we may find further counterexamples as
"I saw some students"
"by her reasoning, will implicate
"I did not see any _female_ students",
as well as
"I did not see any _male_ students".
"If we accept that by modifying a noun we obtain a phrase which entails
that noun and that if we modify a verb we obtain a phrase which entails
that verb, any use of the structure [[np The N] VP] will conversationally
implicate It's not the case that [[np The Modifier N]VP] and any use of
[NP[vpV]] will conversationally implicate It's not the case that
[NP[vpVMOD]]. This means for example that a use of "The man came"
implicates "It is not the case that the nice/benevolent/ humane/kind ...
man came"".
"Levinson claims that entailment alone is not sufficient to form
well-formed Horn-scales. Levinson adds a further constraint: the
alternative items should be equally lexicalised and should be about the
same semantic relations. This constraint, for example, prevents us from
having scales of the kind
<male student, student>,
as this contrast is not lexicalised."
"I would like to consider one further counterexample:
<p, p v q>.
"It is claimed in the literature that "p" entails "p v q" (but note that
Strawson qualifies this). If entailment were enough, we could have a scale
like <p, p or q>. But we could also have a scale like <q, p or q>. On the
basis of these two scales, one who utters
"p or q"
implicates both that it is not the case that p and it is not the case that
q. The sum of the implicatures is incompatible with the semantics of the
sentence."
"I cannot resolve this problem in the context of this paper, but it appears
that Grice's intuition that one who utters p or q implicates that he does
not know whether p is true and that he does not know whether q is true
cannot be based on Horn-scales of the ordinary type."
Indeed, the relevant scale seems to be, rather, as Capone notes below,
<and, or>
-- the "speaker ignorance implication", as Grice called it way back in 'The
Causal Theory of Perception' (1961, repr. in G. J. Warnock, _The Philosophy
of Perception_, Oxford Readings in Philosophy) is best explained, rather,
by way of a Gazdar _clausal_ (rather than a Horn-scale) implicature. And I
think even Horn would agree...
(Do not multiply Horn scales beyond necessity. And note that what
Hirschberg brings in is the idea of a context-sensitive _rank_
<< s, w >>
-- which is not _yet_ a Horn scale.)
Capone writes: "Let us turn to
<rose, flower>.
"Should we say that there is no Horn-scale (in any sense) between the two
items? Could we try and say that if two items are related by a hyponymy
relation they will not enter a Horn-scale? Alternatively, we could say that
if two lexical items are related by hyponymy, they _do_ enter a Horn-scale,
but that the scalar implicature thereby generated is of the
[clausal, epistemically modified Gazdar. JLS]
type "I am not in a position to know whether the stronger item in the scale
obtains. It might be argued, alas, that this option is _ad hoc_."
Which would be a pity, as I thought it rather nice, rather.
Capone brings in the talk of 'ranks': "However, if one had a general
constraint that the items arranged in a Horn-scale be of the same _rank_,
this move will be extendable to all Horn-scales and the treatment would not
be ad hoc. Items related by hyponymy, obviously, are not of the same
_rank_, though, and, thus, cannot form a Horn-scale. But they may form a
special Horn-scale. This notion of "rank", ill-defined as it is, is of some
use in explaining why we have the Horn-scale
<&, v>
but _not_ the Horn-scale
*<p, p v q>,
as the items being compared in the latter are not of the same _rank_. A
simple sentence cannot form a scale with a complex
(conjunctive/disjunctive) sentence".
"So, a person who utters "John bought her flowers" might implicate, by an
ordinary Horn-scale, that John did not buy her tulips, that John did not
buy her roses, that John did not buy her orchids, (continuing until all the
types of flowers are exhausted)."
And more: consider, 'I expect John did not buy her _plastic_ flowers, now
did he.' (But then a plastic flower is not really a _flower_, is it?)
Capone writes: "But, as the output of such scales provides few cognitive
effects and unjustified processing efforts, some general cognitive
principle will determine, in the case of items related by hyponymy, that
ordinary scalar mechanisms cannot hold and that the output of the scales in
question must have some general format, to wit".
"I am not in a position to be more specific
about the exact type of thing I referred to in
my utterance by resorting to a hyponym".
"On p. 194, Carston claims that Horn's Q- and R-implicatures and Levinson's
I-implicatures, despite the claims of the neo-Gricean theory, equally
consist, after all, in inferential enrichments."
Capone considers two further examples by Carston:
(16) John was reading a book.
+> John was not reading a dictionary.
(17) Some people like eating raw liver
+> Not all people.
"Carston, contrary to Atlas & Levinson (1981), who claim that the
implicature in (16) is an inferential enrichment due to the I-principle,
claims that the implicature could be generated due to a contrast."
<dictionary, book>,
"in which case the Q-implicature would also be, ipso facto, an inferential
enrichment. Conversely, Carston argues, the ["some" +> "not all"]
implicature in (ii) could be the outcome of the I-principle. If Carston's
considerations were correct, her criticism would be turned into a victory
for the neo-Gricean approaches, as in fact, as I have shown elsewhere, one
needs a demonstration that the Q-principle and the I-principle do not clash."
"It is not obvious that one can make a case for a Q-implicature in (i) as,
although the Horn-scale <dictionary, book> is well-formed, world knowledge
prevents the Q-implicature from arising, as one normally does not _read_
dictionaries. One only consults them."
At best.
"Concerning (17), it is clear that the Q-implicature is dependent on the
quantifier; thus, if we replace "like to eat raw liver" with "play tennis",
it is not obvious that one can obtain the implicature related to the
quantifier "some" by an inference to stereotype. Quoting Richardson and
Richardson (1990) [Carston] claims that the example iii below can be
explained via an I-implicature (while it is normally accounted for via a
Q-implicature) and that iv can be explained via a Q-implicature (while it
is normally accounted for via a an I-implicature):
(18) "p v q"
+> ~(p & q)
(19) "p -> q"
+> ~p -> ~q
"One might consider that what is conveyed by (18) is". "p or q but not both
p and q." "Things are not so easy."
"The explanation Carston has for example (19) is the following":
"~(~p -> ~q)" _entails_ "p -> q".
"Consider, however, that if these logical demonstrations were sufficient to
prove that the items related by logical entailment form a Horn-scale, one
could derive on the basis of the scale <p, p v q>" the imlicature "not p"
from an utterance of "p or q". This implicature, in fact, does not arise,
as we have shown that entailment is not a sufficient condition for a
Horn-scale."
"Despite all the logical equivalences Carston mentions, <[not[if(not P),
(not Q)]], [if P, Q]> is _not_ a well-formed Horn-scale. First, because it
is not a scale between lexemes. Second, because the items in the scale are
not about the same semantic relations."
"Implicating reluctance. Carston expatiates on the advantages of accepting
Sperber & Wilson's (1995, 270) revised Presumption of optimal relevance.
This presumption is reported below:
"The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough
for it to be worth the addressee's effort to
process it;
The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant
one compatible with the communicator's abilities
and preferences.
Capone writes: "Carston discusses an interesting Gricean example".
(20) A: Where does Pierre live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
"Grice would say about this example that B conversationally implicates that
she does not know exactly where Pierre lives. Carston mentions that
Sperber & Wilson consider a different possible implicature of B's
utterance: B is _reluctant_ to disclose Pierre's exact whereabouts."
"Carston believes that Grice cannot predict this implicature ("It can only
be a case of what Grice calls "opting out", which does not give rise to
implicatures at all" (p. 216)). Carston believes that the "unwilling to
say" implicature follows from Sperber & Wilson clause (b) of the
Presumption of Optimal Relevance (revised) ((b) The ostensive stimulus is
the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and
preferences)."
"I am persuaded that Grice has ways to calculate the "unwilling to say"
inference, as opting out is ipso facto a way of showing reluctance to say
(something). Suppose that someone asks my sister "Where does your brother
work now?", assuming (reasonably) that my sister should know. My sister
replies: "He works somewhere in the South of France". If the person who
initially asked the question is persuaded that my sister should know, then
he will infer that my sister did not want to be sufficiently informative
and that she was not willing to provide the requested information."
"But I wonder whether this is a real implicature. Implicatures, in fact,
are part of the speaker's intended meaning."
Indeed. The m-intended point mentioned by Levinson in the discussion above.
This point, as Horn notes is also made by Hirschberg in her treatment of
scale-based implicature.
Capone writes: "If one bears in mind Strawson's considerations on speaker's
meaning, one arrives at a different conclusion. In 'Intention & Convention
in Speech Acts', discusses an interesting example. S arranges
convincing-looking evidence that p, knowing that A is looking at him. S
intends H to recognize his intention to let him believe that p. However,
this, Strawson argues, does not count as communication. He thus adds one
further condition to Grice's definition of meaning: it seems a minimum
further condition of the speaker's trying to communicate that he should not
only intend A to recognize his intention to get A to think that p, but that
he should also intend A to recognize his intention to get A to recognize
his intention to get A to think that p."
"If one bears what Strawson says in mind, my sister cannot mean that she is
reluctant, although the speaker infers that she is. Thus the reluctance
inference is not an implicature."
"I agree with Carston that the hearer will infer reluctance on the part of
the speaker in the examples discussed above and that one way to calculate
this inference is to take into account the fact that the speaker can
provide the information in question and prefers not to provide it. As the
ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the
communicator's abilities and preferences, the hearer will assume that the
speaker acts as if he was not able to provide the information in question.
However, as he can provide the information requested, the hearer will
assume that he is reluctant to provide it."
"On p. 220, Carston discusses an example by Green (1995, 96-97)."
(21) B: Are some of your friends Buddhists?
A: Yes, some are.
"The context is one in which B might be interested in knowing if _all_ of
A's friends are Buddhists. A, by replying as she does, may be heard as
implicating that not all of her friends are Buddhists. However, the scalar
implicature will not arise, Carston says, because A might have a reason for
diffidence concerning the stronger point (she might have fear to be
considered a Buddhist-groupie) and, thus, the scalar implicature might not
get through." -- The Carston quote being,
"Green's context makes it plain that while
the speaker has the ability to make the stronger
statement, she prefers not to (she is afraid of
being considered a Buddhist-groupie) and the
hearer is aware of this. Hence the relevance
principle correctly predicts that the speaker
is not implicating that not all of her friends
are Buddhist and that the hearer recovers no
such assumption as part of what is communicated."
"However, I am not sure that this example really shows that the scalar
implicature is defeated."
I, for one, if interested to know if B's _all_ friends are buddhists would,
to start with, ax [sic] "all", -- never "some".
Capone writes: "If A's preference is not to show that she is
Buddhist-groupie, the scalar implicature is what would serve her purpose
best, as she would conversationally implicate that not all of her friends
are Buddhists."
Capone sums up: "I believe that Carston's paper discusses many problems and
offers some interesting solutions. I think the problems she raises are
serious ones. I have shown some of the ways in which they might be disposed
of, although I am sure that the discussion does not end here."
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==
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