Steve,
> ...
> I am not a syntactician, so I would value advice on where I should be
> looking for a plausible syntactic theory that is consistent with RT.
> Cognitive Grammar is obviously at odds with RT over the scope of
> grammar, as are various other functional approaches. LFG at one time
> looked promising, at least with respect to Bantu languages, but I have
> seen a couple of convincing accounts recently of topics in Bantu
> morpho-syntax where GB is clearly superior to LFG. OT seems to be at
> an early stage and I am unsure whether it even constitutes a coherent
> program yet. I'd be interested to know what readers of the list think
> of some other less well-known approaches such as Robert Van Valin's
> Role and reference Grammar (he has worked with Randy LaPolla, who I
> think was once a member of the RT list).
RT is non-committent to any particular syntactic theory. However, it does
constrain approaches to syntax in the following way:
1. By showing that verbal communication is inference-based and the coding
aspect of utterances is basically subserviant to the inferential phase, RT
requires an adequate syntactic theory to be one that doesn't try to put
"pragmatic functions" into the syntax. I don't know exactly where Van
Valin's Role and Reference Grammar stands, but from the little I have read
about this theory I fear that it does attempt putting "pragmatic functions"
into the syntax.
2. RT shares much of Fodor's modularity of mind hypothesis (with good
reason, I believe). This broader framework requires that the syntactic
theory be one that can characterize a mental modules in Fodor's sense. That
is a weak constraint: many instantiations of generative grammar theories
(i.e. Explicit grammars) fulfill this role: P&P/Minimalist Program, Brody's
"Perfect Syntax", LFG, HPSG, Relational Grammar, to mention a view. Maybe
some dependency-based theories can also fulfill this condition. It leaves
out only "cognitive grammar" which is based on a holistic-cognitive (rather
than modular) paradigm of cognitive theories.
But I am not sure that the choice of syntactic theory within these bounds
matters much to relevance-theoretic pragmatics. I would be interested in
hearing what others think about this.
>
>
> Turning to pragmatics, the field is a lot smaller, with the main
> players being RT and the neo-Gricean approach. Although I disagree
> with much of the philosophical underpinning of the neo-Gricean
> approach and believe that it does not pay adequate attention to issues
> of cognition in language use, I have seen a few neat analyses where
> the interplay of the Q-, I-, and M-principles seems to make specific
> predictions which a RT analysis would not be able to make (as far as I
> can see).
Can you be more specific on this and give a few references?
> ...
> The combined strengths and weaknesses of the neo-Gricean approach
> vis-a-vis RT are apparent in the following ecxtract from a review of
> Yan Huang's "Anaphora" which I wrote for Notes on Translation:
>
> "... Unfortunately, I doubt whether
> relevance theory as it currently stands is capable of providing an
> empirically falsifiable account of anaphora resolution, (although
> Matsui 2000 provides a start in her account of bridging reference).
> This is a challenge that needs to be met."
I am quite surprised by what you say in this last sentence. Surely Matsui
2000 is more than a start. Also, reference resolution has received much
relevance-theory-informed attention in the literature (see e.g. The volume
edited by Fretheim & Gundel 1996: Reference and referent accessibility.
Amsterdam: Benjamin's).
>
> What I am wondering is whether RT researchers have avoided adopting
> and adapting relevant insights from our biggest rival simply because
> we want to be seen to be different. There is no doubt in my mind that
> RT is on more secure theoretical ground than neo-Gricean pragmatics,
> but it does lack specificity of the Q-, I-, and M-principles.
Again, I am not sure what you mean: in which way do think are the Q-, I-,
and M-principles more specific than the RT comprehension procedure (which -
I suppose - is what you compare the neo-Gricean principles to)? There is one
sense of course in which they are undoubtedly more "specific": they are
concerned only with Generalized Conversational Implicatures in Levinson's
(2000: Presumptive Meanings. MIT Press.) sense. But is this "specificity"
desirable? Not in my opinion.
Christoph
----------------------
Christoph Unger
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From 01. June 2002:
In den Gaerten 62
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