From LINGUIST List: Vol-13-365. Feb 11 2002. ISSN: 1068-4875.
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John Benjamins Publishing presents a new work in Semantics/Pragmatics:
Evidentials and Relevance. E. Ifantidou (Athens University of Economics &
Business). Pragmatics & Beyond NS, 86 2001. xii, 225 pp.
This book uses Sperber and Wilson's "Relevance Theory" to show how
evidential expressions can be analysed in a unified semantic/pragmatic
framework. Part I surveys general linguistic work on evidentials, presents
speech-act theory and examines Grice's theory of meaning and communication
with emphasis on three main issues:
(i) for linguistically encoded evidentials,
are they truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional, and
(ii) do they contribute to explicit or implicit
communication?
For pragmatically inferred evidentials,
(iii) is there a pragmatic framework in which they
can be adequately accounted for?
Part II examines those assumptions of Relevance theory that bear on the
study of evidentials, offers an account of pragmatically inferred
evidentials and introduces three distinctions relevant to the issues
discussed in this book: between explicit and implicit communication,
truth-conditional and non-truth conditional meaning, and conceptual and
procedural meaning. These distinctions are applied to a variety of
linguistically encoded evidentials, including sentence adverbials,
parenthetical constructions and hearsay particles.
The book offers convincing evidence that not all evidentials behave
similarly with respect to the above distinctions and offers an explanation
for why this is so.
Contents
1. Introduction:
Evidentials: their nature and functions.
2. Speech-act theory.
3. Grice and communication.
4. Relevance Theory.
5. Sentence adverbials
6. Parentheticals
7. Evidential particles.
8. Conclusions.
=====
"I never read a book before reviewing it".
Rvd. S. Smith.
"Ch.1 Introduction: Evidentials: their nature and functions". I hope it
answers the question as to whether we're gonna posit one linguistic
criterion or a philosophical criterion or a semantic criterion or a
functional criterion or what haveyou. E.g. take J. O. Urmson's
'parentheticals'. He writes (p.239 of the Caton reprint):
"We may now sum up. It must be admitted that there are verbs which may be
said to describe a mental process... There is _another_ class of verbs ...
whose peculiarty is that they can be used EITHER PARENTHETICALLY in the
normal grammatical sense, OR ELSE FOLLOWED by 'that', in either case with
an indicative clause. ... These verbs are the ones for which I have
invented the technical name of parenthetical verbs."
(edition cited by D. Wilson in online essay. The essay first published in
_Mind_, vol. 61, and also repr. in A. G. N. Flew, ed., _Logic & Language_,
Blackwell. (Urmson, of Corpus, being 'colleague' (qua tutor) of Hare and
Grice and Austin at Oxford).
I find that definition by Urmson rather 'tricky': he is using one single
word, 'parenthetical', to cover two _widely_ different syntatical patterns.
He is (terminologically) honest enough to note that only the _first_
pattern deserves the title of 'parenthetical'. E.g. "The cat is, I know, on
the mat". The fact that he, _surreptitiously_ (to use Grice's favourite
epithet), applies the same rubric to the awfully different pattern "I know
that the cat is on the mat' says a lot about _his_ brand of Oxonian
analysis. Surely Grice would never accept the class of Urmson's
parentheticals as a _natural_ kind...
"Ch.2 Speech-act theory." Well, I guess it's Austin's class of
"expositives", especially his Class No. 4:
testify
report
swear
conjecture
?doubt
?know
?believe
Urmson writes: "The general significance of [Austin's] grouping is
obvious". He forgot to add "to him". I.e. to Urmson (or would Urmson take
"to him" parenthetically to refer to _Austin_?). I _love_ the "?" in front
of 'doubt', 'know' and 'believe'! Surely they are _not_ illocutionary acts
at all! (But then there are probably _no_ illocutionary acts, so to say
that something is not an illocutionary act is not saying an awful lot, is it).
"Ch.3. Grice and communication". Well, _he_ did some pretty good stuff on
this. His category of 'quality' (a joke on Kant) is the one to focus on
here. I especially _love_ the generalisation of quantity by Bach & Harnish:
"Like Grice, we can begin by formulating the presumption for constatives,
-- the speaker has adequate EVIDENCE for what he constates
(or assumes in constating).
(is this the same as Grice's "do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence"? Grice's constraint seems _weaker_). "Analogs of this presumption
exists for other types of speech acts" For "directives"
-- the speaker has _reasons_ for what he directs (or assumes in
directing)
For questions: "this amounts to not asking a question like, 'Have you
stopped beating your wife?' unless you have reason to believe what is
assumed?"
???? -- Surely I can test my addressee's intelligence, in which I may have
_other_ reasons: namely to test his intelligence.
"Ch.4 Relevance Theory". I hope the bibliography is updated.
"Ch.5 Sentence adverbials." Hate them! Surely a sentential adverbial
commits you to that odd theory of Davidson that 'adverbials' presuppose
that the referent of a sentence is an 'event'. I long for the
Wittgensteinian atomism when sentences meant 'facts', not 'events'! Urmson
considers two nice relevant adverbs here, though: "Certainly, the cat is on
the mat". (But what has 'certainty' to do with 'knowledge'? Nought! That's
why Urmson is careful to say that he is only proposing some very bold (i.e.
untrue) equivalence here.
Urmson writes: "_certainly_, _probably_ and _possibly_ show how much
reliability is to be ascribed to the statement. Perhaps it is worth saying
that no importance should be attached to the grouping..."
But surely the implication is:
"certainly" =====> "I know"
"probably" =====> "I believe" (prob: > 0.5)
"possibly" =====> "I believe" (prob: < 0.5).
"Ch.6 Parentheticals". Some natural kind! Mind: I'm not against the use of
'parenthetical' (e.g. in the work of M. S. Green) as restricted to what
Urmson would have as 'true' (i.e. genuine) parentheticals as in "The cat
is, I know, on the mat". This class is difficult enough to deal with to try
to extend Urmson's analysis to things like "I know that the cat is on the
mat" which are better treated truth-conditionally a la Grice (_Studies_,
p.53 -- and note that in Grice's account of 'know' no reference to
'evidential' is required. The man who knows is not the one who has
'adequate evidence' for what he says (as Gettier showed), but the one about
who we can invoke 'some conditions placing restriction on how he came to
think p (cf causal theory)". -- Grice's reference being obviously to A. I.
Goldman.
"Ch.7 Evidential particles". "particle"? Is this some _pars orationis_?
"Ch.8. Conclusions". I hope the author expands on the relevance of
relevance. "The book uses Sperber/Wilson's RT to show how evidential
expressions can be analysed in a unified semantic/pragmatic framework. The
first part surveys general work, presents speech-act theory and examines
Grice's theory with emphasis on
Q: For _encoded_ evidentials, are they truth-conditional or
non-truth-conditional?
A: They _are_ truth conditional. Urmson was wrong and working within a very
artificially schema that he concoted himself to prove Austin's attitude
against the true-false fetish right. He fails.
Q: Do they contribute to explicit or implicit
communication?
A: _encoded_ evidentials surely balance towards the _explicit_ side of the
explicit-implicit barrier. Surely, I wouldn't bother to say "I know" unless
I want to be 'claimed' or 'deemed' to having _said_ it!
Q: For pragmatically inferred evidentials, is there a
pragmatic framework in which they can be adequately accounted for?
A: No.
But keep trying! (We love keep trying!). If there _is_ an adequate account
we better inform Alvin Goldman about it...
"Part II examines those assumptions of RT bearing on evidentials"
Does the author list them?
"offers an account of pragmatically inferred evidentials"
Such as those triggered by tone of voice? Or is G. E. Moore being invoked
here? Moore noted that
"It is raining"
implies that I believe it. So far so good. Is this 'belief' in rain
_pragmatically inferred_? If so, it's surely not an implicature... (On
Grice's account).
Grice writes: "it will not be true that when I say that p, I
conversationally implicate that I believe that p"
Grice thinks that's too harsh (_contra_ Leech or Harnish, who use,
respectively, direct or trivial to qualify the relevant conversational
implicature here), and prefers to use "express" rather than "implicate".
I follow suit!
Austin surely knew this when he mocked those who said that "p" implies not
just "I believe p" but "I _know_ P": Suppose someone says,
"There's a goldfinch in the garden".
Someone asks, "How do you know?" (Incidentally, this is odd, for surely
that question does not _imply_ that the questioner thinks that the
questionee _knows_! That's precisely what he's trying to assess! 'How do
you 'know'?' would be better English, but some speakers are _sloppy_ (cfr.
"How does she cook?" +> she does cook)). One can always answer:
"Hey. Who said anything about 'know'?'
Similarly if one is asked (upon one saying 'there's a goldfinch in the
garden') 'Do you _know_ there is?'.
Austin writes: "We may well reply 'No'. We may say, 'No, but I think there
is', 'No, but I believe [there] is'. FOR THE IMPLICATION THAT I KNOW OR AM
SURE IS NOT STRICT: we are not all (terribly or sufficiently) STRICTLY
BROUGHT UP." (p.77).
This ironic ref. to a strict education made me once think that the true
Sceptic is the one who by abiding to Grice's 'Quality' reaches 'epokhe' and
'ataraxia' (or both)...
The book under review "... introduces three distinctions relevant to the
issues discussed in this book":
i. between explicit and implicit communication
cfr. R. Carston, Pragmatics and the explicit-implicit distinction. UCL.
ii. truth-conditional and non-truth conditional meaning,
iii. and conceptual and procedural meaning.
"These distinctions are applied to a variety of _encoded_ evidentials,
including sentence adverbials, parenthetical constructions and hearsay
particles."
'Hearsay particles'? Such as 'they say'. Must confess to always them kinda
tricky -- for who's _them_? Another nice hearsay particle (three rather) is
"Hearsay has it" -- and surely one is doing nothing to stop it! A third
hateful quartette this time of particles is "as rumour has it".
"This book offers convincing evidence that not all evidentials behave
similarly with respect to the above distinctions and offers an explanation
for why this is so."
Pity it's such an expensive book. Shall wait for the paperback.
(book reviewed by J. L. S., of the Grice Circle).
==
J L Speranza, Esq
Country Town
St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
Telefax 00542214259205
http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
jls@netverk.com.ar
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