The topic, and its rationale, fascinated Grice as can be grasped from e.g.
his discussion of the P.E.R.E. (Principle of Economy of Rational Effort) in
his 'Reply to Richards', and in the discussion of 'implicit reasoning' in
_Aspects of Reason_ (Clarendon, 2001).
Now, the study by R. Carston for UCL, _Pragmatics & the explicit-implicit
distinction_, is probably the first to deal explicitly with explicitness
(How's that for a nice pun!)
This below is what two neurologists (Faulkner & Foster) wrote on the issue
(explicit/implicit distinction) from a neuro perspective... (Note that
what's _explicit_ for Faulkner/Foster would be _way_ _implicit_ for, say,
Witters (Grice's pet name for Wittgenstein).
Cheers,
JL
From Psyche: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness,
vol. 8. 2002.
http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-02-faulkner.html
D. Faulkner & J Foster, 'Explicit & implicit processing: insights into the
neural basis of consciousness'.
KEYWORDS: explicit, implicit.
(c) Deborah Faulkner & Jonathan K. Foster 2002.
"A key element of the distinction between explicit and implicit
cognitive functioning is the presence or absence of conscious awareness.
Implications for the conceptualization of cognitive functioning
are also discussed."
"A key element of the distinction between explicit and implicit cognitive
processing is the presence or absence of awareness. (see, for example,
Young & Block, 1996)."
"While we acknowledge these proposed distinctions, in this piece we
choose to refer to explicit knowledge as relating to those aspects of
cognition which are available to the individual's conscious awareness,
while - by contrast - implicit processing refers to aspects of cognitive
functioning which are unavailable to consciousness."
"Thus, for example, Graf and Schacter (1985) state:
"implicit memory is revealed when performance on a task is
facilitated in the absence of conscious recollection; explicit memory is
revealed when performance on a task requires conscious recollection of
previous experiences" (p. 501).
"The methods used to test for the presence of implicit processes differ
from those used to test explicit functioning. For example, explicit
memory is typically examined directly, by asking an individual
deliberately to recall previous events. Implicit memory, on the other
hand, is typically examined by evaluating performance on tests that
depend in an indirect way on memory for previous events, as usually
exemplified by a change in behaviour."
"Of course, in healthy individuals it is difficult to decouple explicit
and implicit processing, because the two are usually concomitant and
operate in (more or less) seamless harmony. One is reminded of Kenneth
Craik's (1943) famous point, that the better a well-made system
functions, the less aware we are of its constituent mechanisms and
processes."
"Many of the
capacities referred to in this essay (especially consciousness itself)
are imbued with language, and it is especially challenging to generalize
in a clear and valid manner from non-humans to humans where language
mediation is a potentially important factor. Finally, with respect to
human research, we acknowledge the contribution of neuroimaging
studies in the investigation of the mind-brain nexus, because of the
vast scope of the neuropsychology literature (as well as some concerns
that have been expressed regarding elements of the neuroimaging
methodology - such as the use of the subtraction technique)."
"A critical (and related) conceptual issue concerns whether implicit and
explicit modes of cognitive processing are - in fact - categorically
distinct, or whether apparently preserved implicit processing in the
presence of apparently impaired explicit processing simply represents a
more degraded modus operandi of the cognitive system as a whole, i.e.
with "explicit" and "implicit" processes in fact lying on a functional
continuum."
"In this essay we consider the implications of proposing a generic
distinction between implicit and explicit processes for
our understanding of the architecture of normal cognitive functioning
and the neural basis of consciousness."
"One possible confound in the implicit-explicit literature is that
the tasks used to measure implicit and explicit memory generally require
different modes of processing. Thus, Roediger (1990) argued that the
experimental evidence for the existence of implicit ("unaware") and
explicit ("aware") memory as two distinct memory systems can be
reinterpreted in terms of the modes of processing involved in the two
types of task (see Foster & Jelicic, 1999, for a review)."
"The question remains as to whether
the implicit/explicit distinction is a valid and useful distinction.
This issue will now be examined.
The implications of the findings reviewed in
the previous sections for the neural basis of consciousness
are also considered."
"It is clear from the brief review presented here
that there is significant evidence for preserved implicit functioning
across a range of cognitive domains. But does this truly reflect
preservation of specific qualitatively distinct implicit or
non-conscious brain "modules" (as would be indicated by the
demonstration of an implicit/explicit double dissociation) or - rather --
is it more likely that this represents the preservation of merely
simpler and less resource-demanding forms of processing?"
"In other words, does the evidence cited above imply that
implicit and explicit processing are qualitatively distinct or merely
quantitatively different?"
"Is there any evidence that the implicit/explicit distinction is
valid?"
"Dissociations between implicit and explicit cognition have been
demonstrated in various modalities in healthy participants."
"The
findings of dissociations between explicit and implicit processing
significantly inform our conceptualisation of
the cognitive architecture of the mind-brain. Furthermore, these
demonstrations of the implicit/explicit distinction in healthy
individuals imply that there is distinct neural
underpinning for conscious versus nonconscious cognitive processing."
"So what is the possible neural basis of this distinction?"
"With respect to other cognitive capacities (such as, for
example, language or memory), there is evidence for mediation of
implicit phenomena via complementary cortically-mediated mechanisms."
"It
may well be the case that preserved implicit phenomena in neglect are
also mediated by complementary components of a cortical "attention"
network."
"The distinction between implicit and explicit processing is - of course
- intimately related to the nature of conscious awareness"
... or so he authors think.
After all, as Mandler thought (cited below), consciousness is not only
probably respectable and useful, but also possibly necessary...
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==
J L Speranza, Esq
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