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"Expletive Negation" in Russian: A Conspiracy Theory*

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Abstract. In this paper I provide a new analysis of so called "expletive negation" in Russian. Brown and Franks (1995) discovered that negation sometimes licenses the genitive of negation while being unable to license a particular class of negative concord items, *ni*-phrases like *nikto* 'nobody'. In the present paper I show that the assumption made in the literature according to which "expletive negation" lacks negative force or is semantically vacuous is not well grounded. "Expletive negation" is semantically real negation; it just occupies an unusually high clausal position. The asymmetry between the genitive of negation on the one hand and *ni*-phrases on the other hand is explained in terms of locality. The investigation yields a number of further results. Genitive of negation is structural Case and susceptible to Relativized Minimality. *Ni*-phrases are analyzed as polarity sensitive universal quantifiers, whose movement is constrained in ways typical of quantifier raising.

1. Prelude

There are two polarity sensitive phenomena in Russian that rely in almost identical ways on the presence of negation in some local domain; both the Genitive of Negation (GoN) and *ni*-phrases like *nikto* 'nobody', *ničego* 'nothing', etc. are licensed by clausemate negation. Thus, in (1a) structural accusative alternatives with GoN on the direct object; the direct object *ni*-phrase is licensed in (2a). If negation is absent altogether as in (1b) and (2b), neither GoN nor *ni*-phrases are licit. Finally, if negation is present non-locally, neither GoN nor *ni*-phrases are allowed, as (1c) and (2c) with superordinate negation illustrate.

(1) a. Ivan ne čitaet ✓žurnal / ✓žurnala.
Ivan NEG reads journal$_{ACC}$ journal$_{GEN}$
'Ivan doesn't read the journal/a journal.'

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(1) b. Ivan čitaet ✓žurnal / *žurnala.
Ivan reads journal$_{ACC}$ journal$_{GEN}$
'Ivan reads the journal/a journal.'

c. Ivan ne skazal, čto on čitaet ✓žurnal / *žurnala.
Ivan NEG said that he reads journal$_{ACC}$ journal$_{GEN}$
'Ivan didn't say that he reads the journal/a journal.'

(2) a. ✓Ivan ničego ne znaet.
Ivan NI-what NEG knows
'Ivan doesn't know anything.'

b. *Ivan ničego znaet.
Ivan NI-what knows

c. *Fedja ne skazal, čto on ničego znaet ob ètom.
Fedja NEG said that he NI-what knows about that

Of course, there are also substantial distributional differences between GoN and *ni*-phrases. Any argument of the verb and in fact even adjuncts can appear as *ni*-phrases ((3)), but only underlying direct objects can ever appear in GoN (for discussion of adjuncts see Franks and Dziwirek 1993). I assume that GoN is licensed only on structurally Case marked, underlying internal arguments (for discussion see Babby 1980; Bailyn 1995, 1997; Borschev and Partee 1998; Brown 1999b; Chvany 1975; Franks 1995; Mustajoki 1985; Mustajoki and Heino 1991; Neidle 1988; Partee and Borschev 2000, 2001; Pesetsky 1982 among others). This restriction is illustrated in (4). The subject in (4a) and (4b) is an underlying internal argument bearing structural Case; it can appear in the genitive. The subject in (4c) is an external argument of the verb; it cannot therefore appear in the genitive. Finally, the indirect object in (4d) is an internal argument, but it does not bear structural Case; hence, it cannot appear in the genitive of negation.

(3) ✓Nikto nikomu ničego ne dal.
NI-who$_{NOM}$ NI-whom$_{DAT}$ NI-what$_{ACC}$ NEG gave
'Nobody has given anything to anybody.'

(4) a. ✓Pis'mo / ✓pis'ma ne prišlo.
letter$_{NOM.SG.NEUT}$ letter$_{GEN.SG.NEUT}$ NEG arrived$_{PAST.SG.NEUT}$
'The letter didn't arrive./No letter arrived.'

(4) b. ✓Knig ne bylo pročitano.
books$_{GEN.PL}$ NEG was$_{3SG.NEUT}$ read
'The books weren't read.'

c. ✓Studenty / *Studentov ne čitajut.
students$_{NOM.PL}$ students$_{GEN.PL}$ NEG read
'The students aren't reading./No students are reading.'

d. Ivan ✓emu / *ego ne dal knigu.
Ivan$_{NOM}$ him$_{DAT}$ him$_{GEN}$ NEG gave book$_{ACC}$
'Ivan didn't give him the book.'

These standard data suggest that the positions where GoN is licensed are a proper subset of the positions where *ni*-phrases are licensed. A theoretical account might capitalize on this generalization by identifying a set of conditions C for the licensing of *ni*-phrases. GoN would be subject to C and some additional conditions. This is sketched in (5).

(5) a. *Ni*-phrases may be licensed iff a set of conditions C, individually necessary and jointly sufficient, is fulfilled.
b. GoN may be licensed iff the conditions C from (5a) above are fulfilled and the NP in question is an underlying direct object bearing structural Case.

Pretty though (5) may be, it is empirically inadequate as examples like (6) and (7) show. In negated polar questions with *li* GoN is acceptable (6a), but *ni*-phrases are not (7a). Similarly, negation in the complement of the verb 'fear' licenses GoN but not *ni*-phrases, (6b) vs. (7b). All of these asymmetries are first discussed in Brown and Franks (1995, 1997) and Brown (1999a, b), on whose examples (6) and (7) are modeled. The examples contradict the claim made in (5) that the environments where GoN can appear are a proper subset of the environments where *ni*-phrases can appear.

(6) a. ✓Ne / *∅ kupil li Petr žurnala?
NEG / ∅ bought Q Petr journal$_{GEN}$
'Did(n't) Petr buy any journal?'

b. ✓Ja bojus' kak by Petr ne narušil èksperimenta.
I fear how MOD Petr NEG ruined experiment$_{GEN}$
'I fear Petr might ruin the experiment.'

(7) a. *Ne / *∅ znaet li nikto iz vas, kak èto delaetsja?
NEG / ∅ know Q NI-who of you how this is-done
intended: 'Do(n't) any of you know how to do this?'

b. *Ja bojus' {kak by / čtoby} nikto ne opozdal.[1]
I fear how MOD that NI-who NEG was-late
intended: 'I fear that somebody might be late.'

Examples like these have been treated as involving a special kind of negation, "expletive negation" (EN) (cf. Borovikoff 1997; Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997; Harves 2000). According to these authors, negation is expletive (or pleonastic) in the sense that while it is formally (or morphologically) negation, it lacks negative force semantically. The emerging theory states that GoN can be licensed by formal negation (expletive or not) but that *ni*-phrases must be licensed by semantic negation. In other words, to account for the asymmetries between GoN and *ni*-phrase licensing, two moves are made: a new kind of entity, EN, is introduced, and theory (5) is given up as a general theory.[2] In principle, the two moves are independent of each other. The facts reviewed above in (6) and (7) indicate that (5) must be given up on empirical grounds, but they do not by themselves argue for the existence of a new kind of negation. In this paper I argue that giving up (5) is sufficient and that EN is not needed as a theoretical concept. This is desirable for at least two reasons.

First of all, it is implausible that the realization of two vastly different logical operators, the identity function and negation, should map onto the

[1] Dialects differ as to the acceptability of *čtoby* under *bojat'sja*.

[2] As an anonymous reviewer points out, it is not obvious that the above authors ever actually entertain theory (5). True, (5) is nowhere explicitly discussed. Nonetheless, the authors who develop the theory of EN (Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997) tacitly start out with theories whose logic is the logic of (5).

Thus Brown and Franks (1995) initially assume that GoN licensing is a strict version of the licensing of *ni*-phrases. They claim that *ni*-phrases occur in the scope of sentential negation (p. 242) and that GoN occurs in the scope of sentential negation but only if further conditions are also met (pp. 240–42). This theory clearly is an instantiation of the logic of (5). Similarly for Brown (1999b). According to her, *ni*-phrases are licensed under checking with a [NEG] feature (chapter 3). Initially (chapter 4), GoN licensing is characterized as a strict version of *ni*-phrase licensing; GoN is licensed only under checking with both the features [NEG] and [+V^{max}]. Again this is clearly a theory of the type described in (5).

In both cases this initial theory is later changed by making the two independent moves mentioned in the text: EN is introduced as a theoretical entity and theory (5) is given up.

same morpheme.[3] All authors working on EN share this concern to some extent. Thus, Brown and Franks (1995) go through no less than three distinct ways of deriving why negation is inactive in EN contexts—a clear indication that the notion of semantically vacuous negation causes apprehension. Espinal (1992, writing about EN in Romance) analyzes EN as true negation, which is logically absorbed by a higher "intrinsically negative" predicate. Other authors try to show that EN is not vacuous after all (e.g., Tovena 1996, 1998—and the present paper). Finally, Brown (1999a, 1999b) claims that EN is not semantically vacuous. For her EN lacks negative force while retaining some of the other semantic trappings of polarity licensers.[4]

Second of all, a theory without EN is, everything else being equal, simpler than one with EN. Theories with EN, like the ones just sketched, have the following four components:

(8) i. a theory of *ni*-phrase licensing (under regular negation), which explains the contrast between (2a) and (2c);
ii. a theory of GoN licensing (under regular and expletive negation), which explains the contrast between (1a) and (1c);

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[3] Brown and Franks (1995) characterize EN variously as "logically vacuous" (p. 269), as "morphological negation coupled with the lack of a negation operator" (p. 276), and as "vacuous for LF aspects of interpretation" (p. 282).

Vacuous items can either be ignored at LF or, equivalently, they can be translated as the identity function, i.e., the function that maps its argument onto itself: $f(x) = x$.

[4] In the only discussion Brown offers of the semantic contribution of the bare polarity feature [POL], which characterizes EN according to her, she says that "it will provide an indeterminate truth value" (Brown 1999a: 77 echoing a remark by Progovac (1994: 69) on a similar issue in Serbo-Croatian). Regular negation on the other hand "fixes the truth value as negative" (Brown 1999a: 71).

It is unclear what Brown has in mind. Utterances do not have truth values by virtue of operator features like [POL], they have truth values, roughly, by virtue of the model with respect to which they are evaluated. The sentence *Judy left* is true iff Judy left in the model and false iff Judy didn't leave. To assume that a feature in the syntactic representation of a sentence could somehow set the truth value of that sentence one way or another is incoherent.

Clearly Brown cannot intend to be talking about "assertion operators" either, although some of her remarks suggest that she intends to do so. "Assertion operators" are illocutionary, i.e., pragmatic, operators. They can occur, if they occur in the syntax at all, only at the root of matrix clauses, since the domain of illocutions is the utterance as opposed to the clause (CP). It follows that illocutionary operators always take widest scope. Negation (expletive or not) is not an illocutionary operator and does not necessarily take widest matrix scope; thus, calling negation an "assertion operator" would be misleading at best. It remains unclear exactly what semantics Brown intends "non-negative negation" to have.

(8) iii. a theory of the triggers for EN, which explains the contrast between (7) and (2a);
iv. a theory which gives content to the notion of *expletive negation* as opposed to *regular negation* to explain the contrast between (7) and (6).

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that (8i)–(8iii) are sufficient. Sub-theory (8iv) is then not needed.

It is important to realize at the outset that the burden of proof is on those who assume (8iv). Any theory has to countenance some version of (8i)–(8iii). If a theory has the additional component (8iv), the existence of this component must be justified. Proponents of theories incorporating (8iv) must show that (8i)–(8iii) are insufficient to account for the data or that a theory incorporating (8iv) is more elegant, more general, etc. No serious argument to this effect has been given. This is understandable, since Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997 seem to be unaware of the fact that giving up theory (5) and introducing (8iv) are two logically independent moves (see fn. 2). The existence of negation without negative force is assumed by Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997 rather than argued for.[5] In a sense then, this paper is an attempt to flesh out the simplest hypothesis, an invitation for those who assume (8iv) to make their case.

Since I argue that EN should be eliminated from the theory, I will use it as a descriptive term only. The diagnostics for EN, in the descriptive sense, are the presence of the negative marker *ne*, coupled with the ability to license GoN and the inability to license *ni*-phrases.

As I will show, the theory developed in this paper is very different from Brown's (1999b, b), where negation is treated as lexically ambiguous. Its thrust is similar to that of Brown and Franks (1995), where EN is explained through a conspiracy of independent factors. However, Brown and Franks assume that EN is semantically inactive, a position not adopted here. Rather, the asymmetries between GoN licensing and *ni*-phrase licensing follow from sub-theories (8i–iii) directly.

The paper proceeds by discussing the theoretical modules (8i–iii) in that order. It is then shown how the properties of EN fall out.

In section 2 the syntax and semantics of *ni*-phrases is discussed. It is shown that *ni*-phrases are licensed at LF and that they are polarity sensitive universal quantifiers. The locality effects observed with *ni*-phrases

[5] Unless noted otherwise, I will use the term "negation without negative force" to cover both Brown and Franks' (1995, 1997) and Brown's (1999a, b) approaches to the semantics of EN.

suggest that *ni*-phrases can only move within the minimal tensed clause containing their base position, more precisely the minimal finite TP (see already Progovac 1994: 69).

Section 3 sketches the syntax of GoN. The theory of GoN articulated here is a terminological update and substantial refinement of Brown and Franks' 1995 theory. The main claim is that GoN licensing is purely syntactic, i.e., formal. This must be so since the distribution of GoN cannot be described adequately in terms of either of the two levels of representation assumed in current minimalist (Chomsky 1993, 1995b, 2000, 2001a, b) syntactic theory (PF and LF–for more in depth discussion of why an LF theory of GoN is untenable see Abels 2002a; Partee and Borschev 2002).[6] Since GoN is licensed neither at LF nor at PF, I conclude that there is no particular level of representation at which GoN is licensed; rather, GoN is licensed in the course of the derivation which creates the LF and PF representations in the first place. I use the term "on-line licensing" for this kind of derivational licensing that applies at no particular level of representation.[7] The second main contribution of section 3 to our understanding of GoN is the tentative conclusion that GoN licensing is subject to Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990).

Section 4 shows how the asymmetries between GoN and *ni*-phrases, illustrated above in (6) and (7), can be made to follow on the assumption that negation in EN contexts is located unusually high within the clause.

The main idea is simple. Suppose that the local domain of *ni*-phrase licensing is TP and that *ni*-phrases must be immediately above negation at LF. It would then follow that, if negation is outside of TP at LF in a particular sentence, the *ni*-phrase cannot be licensed (9a), but if negation is inside of TP, it can be so licensed (9b).

(9) a. * [… neg … [$_{TP}$ … *ni*-phrase …]]
b. ✓[$_{TP}$ … *ni*-phrase [neg …]]

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[6] The issue of whether Deep Structure representations exist is discussed in Bošković 1994; Chomsky 1993; Hornstein 1999; Uriagereka 1998 among many others.

[7] There is a heated debate in the Minimalist literature on the merits and demerits of derivational as opposed to purely representational theories of syntax (see Abels 2002b; Brody 1995, 1999, 2001; Epstein 1999, 2001; Epstein, Groat, Kawashima and Kitahara 1998; Epstein and Seely 1999, 2002; Hornstein 1998, 2000; Nunes 1995, 2004; Starke 2001 among many others). Although I use the terms "derivational licensing" and "on-line licensing" in this paper, nothing significant hinges on this formulation. The conditions could easily be reformulated as purely representational conditions on chains.

The choice of terminology is intended to highlight the difference between GoN licensing and *ni*-phrase licensing, nothing more.

This logic will account for the inability of EN to license *ni*-phrases. It makes possible an account of the asymmetries between GoN and *ni*-phrase licensing. In section 4 I also discuss Brown and Franks (1995, 1997) and Brown (1999a, 1999b) in some detail.

Section 5 turns to EN environments from a semantic point of view. I claim that sentences containing EN can be characterized without appeal to semantically vacuous negation, i.e., without appeal to (8iv). Whether the concrete proposals in section 5 are correct or not, the type of argument made there demonstrates that the burden of proof really rests on the proponents of EN as a separate theoretical entity.

Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. *Ni*-Phrases

In this section I argue for an at least partially syntactic approach to *ni*-phrase licensing. Section 2.1 looks at the scope properties of *ni*-phrases and concludes that no operator may scopally intervene between negation and *ni*-phrases.[8] Based on this, a theoretical argument is made in section 2.2 for treating *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers. Section 2.3 offers additional empirical motivation for treating *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers and shows counterarguments from the literature to be inconclusive. Section 2.4 finally examines the locality conditions on *ni*-phrase licensing. I conclude that *ni*-phrases cannot escape their containing TP. This turns out to be an additional argument for treating *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers.

2.1. The Scope of *ni*-Phrases

In this section I argue that the scope of *ni*-phrases tracks the scope of negation (see Babyonyshev, Ganger, Pesetsky and Wexler 2001 for a closely related point). What I mean by this is that no scope-bearing element can, in the general case, intervene between negation and *ni*-phrases; negation and *ni*-phrases scope together relative to other operators. Suppose there is a scope-bearing element "OP" in a clause. If negation takes scope above OP (¬ > OP), then *ni*-phrases also take scope above OP (*ni*-phrase > OP), never below it (*¬ > OP > *ni*-phrase). On the other hand, if OP takes scope above negation (OP > ¬), then it also takes scope above *ni*-phrases (OP > *ni*-phrase), never below them (**ni*-phrase > OP > ¬). In this sense, the scope of *ni*-phrases "tracks" the scope of negation.

[8] As with all generalizations, there are exceptions. One such exception is example (32), which will be discussed at length below.

Notice that there are two logically independent claims here. The first claim (*¬ > OP > *ni*-phrase) is illustrated in example (10), the second claim (**ni*-phrase > OP > ¬) is illustrated by example (12) below. The logic of the argumentation is exactly parallel, but the points the examples make are independent. Consider example (10) first.

(10) Ja ničego ne zapretil emu čitat'.
I NI-what NEG forbade him to-read.

a. ✓ 'There is nothing that I forbade him to read.'
= It is not the case that there is an *x* such that I forbade him to read *x*.
= For every *x*, it is not the case that I forbade him to read *x*.

b. * 'I didn't forbid his reading (something).'
= I did not forbid it to be the case that (there is an *x* such that) he reads *(x)*.

There are three logical operators of interest in the example: negation, the intensional verb *zapretit'* 'to forbid', and the operator associated with the *ni*-phrase. Although eventually I will conclude that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers, this conclusion has not been established yet. I therefore consider two different possibilities, namely that *ni*-phrases might be universals with scope over negation and that they might be existentials with scope below negation. The scopal relations between negation and *zapretit'* are fixed. This gives rise to two distinct possible interpretations, as shown in (11).

(11) a. ¬ > ∃ > *zapretit'* ⇔ ∀ > ¬ > *zapretit'*
b. ¬ > *zapretit'* > ∃

Example (11a) corresponds to (10a) and (11b) corresponds to (10b). The paraphrases after the equal signs are intended to correspond to the existential and the universal interpretation of the *ni*-phrase respectively. Semantically they are equivalent. The example only has the reading in (10a), where no operator intervenes between negation and the *ni*-phrase. This reading is stronger than (10b), since (10b) is compatible with an injunction against specific books, while (10a) is not. Example (10) is judged false if there are specific books that I forbade. The representation ¬ > OP > *ni*-phrase must then be ruled out.

Consider now example (12), which illustrates the second claim made above (**ni*-phrase > OP > ¬).

(12) Ja zapretil emu ničego ne čitat'.
I forbade him NI-what NEG to-read
a. ✓ 'I forbade him not to read anything.'
= I forbade that the following be true: he doesn't read anything.
= I forbade that the following be true: for all things *x*, he doesn't read *x*.
b. * 'For all things *x*, I forbade him not to read *x*.'

Again there are the three operators: negation, *zapretit'*, and the *ni*-phrase. Again the scope relation between *zapretit'* and negation is fixed. We will now consider the two possible semantic analyses for the *ni*-phrase. As before, there are two possible readings (13).

(13) a. *zapretit'* > ¬ > ∃ ⇔ *zapretit'* > ∀ > ¬
b. ∀ > *zapretit'* > ¬

Example (13a) corresponds to (12a) and (13b) corresponds to (12b). The example only has the reading (12a) where no scope-bearing element intervenes between negation and the *ni*-phrase. Examples (12b) and (13b) would mean that he must read all books. Example (12) has no such reading. The examples demonstrate that independently of the analysis we choose for *ni*-phrases, whether we pick the narrow scope existential or the wide scope universal analysis, no scope-bearing element is allowed to intervene between the *ni*-phrase and negation (**ni*-phrase > OP > ¬).

I conclude from this brief discussion that the scope of *ni*-phrases tracks the scope of negation in the sense outlined above.

2.2 *Ni*-Phrases as Universal Quantifiers: A Theoretical Argument

Ni-phrases in Russian occur with clausemate negation. But they never occur without it (see Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997; Pereltsvaig 2000 among many others; see also Błaszczak 2001; Progovac 1994 for comparable facts from other Slavic languages). This characterization ("clausemateness") of the environments allowing *ni*-phrases is syntactic in nature.

In contrast, the environments in which negative polarity items (NPIs) like English *any* can occur, can be characterized in semantic terms (see Heim 1984; Kadmon and Landman 1993; Krifka 1995; Ladusaw 1980a, b; von Fintel 1999; Zwarts 1995 among many others). Błaszczak (2001 section 5.5) attempts to come to grips with the distribution of *ni*-phrases in se-

mantic terms. She suggests that *ni*-phrases can only appear in antimorphic environments that are also consistent and complete (Błaszczak 2001 section 5.5.4; for definitions of the relevant notions see van der Wouden 1997 and also Błaszczak 2001 section 5.4). The exact definitions of these notions are irrelevant for my purposes. The claim is that clausemate negation is consistent and complete and that superordinate negation is not. If this were true, superordinate negation should systematically exhibit slightly different semantic properties from clausemate negation. This expectation is not borne out, as the near-total synonymy of (14) and (15) show.[9]

(14) It is not the case that John is unhappy.

(15) It is the case that John is not unhappy.

But then the clausemateness condition on the distribution of *ni*-phrases is irreducibly syntactic.

The explanation for the distribution of *ni*-phrases ought then to be syntactic, too: *ni*-phrases need to be syntactically licensed by negation. The standard tool in the Minimalist toolbox for describing such coocurrence restrictions is licensing through agreement (see also Brown 1999b). An item α in need of a licenser may occur only if there is an appropriate licenser β and if α and β occur within some local domain. I return to the question of the local domain for agreement later. First, I would like to refine and answer some questions that arise with respect to agreement.

Our Minimalist toolbox actually contains two varieties of agreement: (i) agreement with movement and (ii) agreement without movement (in earlier versions of Minimalism agreement without movement was called "feature movement"; there may be subtle distinctions between feature movement and agreement without movement, but if they are real, they

[9] According to Błaszczak (2001: 380), Van der Wouden (1997: 129) claims that (14) and (15) are not equivalent. Błaszczak reports van der Wouden's judgment approvingly (p. 380). Van der Wouden remarks, according to Błaszczak (2001: 380 fn. 114), that "the statement *John is not unhappy* (but not the statement *It is not the case that John is unhappy*) is equivalent to *John is neither happy nor unhappy*." This remark by van der Wouden is meant to demonstrate that (14) is not equivalent to (15). I haven't found a speaker of English who shares van der Wouden's intuition. In fact, even Błaszczak, for whom this is crucial, does not appear to believe the claim fully, since only a few pages later she quotes Horn (1989: 298), again approvingly, as saying that "a man may be not unhappy because he is happy or because he is situated in the nonexcluded middle between two contrarily opposed terms" (Błaszczak 2001: 388). Obviously, van der Wouden and Horn can't both be right.

Błaszczak's semantic characterization of the distribution of *ni*-phrases rests entirely on van der Wouden's dubious claim. I do not think that it is tenable.

are irrelevant for my purposes). A complete theory of *ni*-phrase licensing will have to make a choice about whether *ni*-phrases undergo agreement with or without movement.

A first indication that *ni*-phrases are subject to agreement with movement comes from the fact that *ni*-phrases typically precede negation, as shown by example (3), even in cases where the relevant NPs would typically occur after negation otherwise. However, this is only a tendency and word order facts are difficult to interpret in Russian because of the many different factors influencing them.

We can however make use of a more important distinction between agreement with and agreement without movement: the former but not the latter creates new scope and binding relations (Dikken 1995). For scope relations this can be illustrated with examples like (16), for binding with examples like (17).

(16) a. There isn't a man in the garden.
b. A man isn't in the garden.

(17) a. There seems to {*himself / ✓Mary} to be a man in the garden.
b. A man seems to {✓himself / ✓Mary} to be in the garden.

In (16) and (17), the finite verb, or more precisely the head T^0, agrees in person and number with *a man.* In (16a) and (17a) *a man* agrees without moving to T^0, whereas in (16b) and (17b) agreement is accompanied by movement of *a man* to [Spec, TP]. Interestingly, in (16a) *a man* must take scope below negation, whereas in (16b) it may scope above negation. And in (17a) the anaphor *himself* is not bound, but in (17b) it is. The generalization is that agreement coupled with movement creates new binding and scope configurations, but agreement without movement does not.

As noted, we need to find out whether *ni*-phrases are licensed under agreement with or without movement. The paradigms in (16) and (17) give us a sophisticated probe. To find out which kind of agreement *ni*-phrases undergo, all we have to do is examine the scope relations. If *ni*-phrases take scope in their base positions, they undergo agreement only. If on the other hand they take scope above their base positions, then they agree and move.

In section 2.1 I demonstrated that *ni*-phrases do not take scope in their base positions. Rather their scope tracks the scope of negation. Therefore, it is clear that *ni*-phrases agree and move. They agree with negation and then move to the specifier position of the phrase hosting negation. For the

moment we can assume that the phrase hosting negation is NegP and that the position that *ni*-phrases move to is [Spec, NegP].[10]

Morphologically, *ni*-phrases are made up of *ni* and an interrogative pronoun. Since interrogative pronouns have no special licensing requirement that would tie them to the presence of negation, it must be *ni* that introduces this checking requirement.

I will now argue that, in addition to its morphosyntactic function, *ni* also has a semantic function, in that it acts as a universal quantifier. This conclusion flows smoothly from the system developed so far on theory internal grounds. Additional empirical grounds for the treatment of *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers will be given in sections 2.3 and 2.4.

Recall that *ni*-phrases are made up of *ni* followed by an interrogative pronoun. Semantically, interrogative pronouns are usually analyzed as indefinites, and indeed I treat interrogative pronouns within *ni*-phrases as indefinites in the sense of Heim 1982, i.e., they introduce free variables (see also Brown 1999b). The *ni*-phrase as a whole is of course not interpreted as a free variable. The quantificational force of *ni*-phrases should either reside in the morpheme *ni* or come from the syntactic environment (Brown 1999b for example assumes that negation, which triggers the semantic operation of negative closure, is the source of the quantificational force of *ni*-phrases). Before proceeding, we will now have to decide whether it is *ni* or the syntactic environment of the *ni*-phrase which provides the quantificational force.

In section 2.1 I showed that scope-bearing elements cannot intervene between negation and *ni*-phrases. This was taken as evidence that *ni*-phrases occupy [Spec, NegP] at LF. Once we assume that *ni*-phrases occupy the specifier position of the negative head for purposes of scope, they are technically outside the scope of negation itself. This is true so long as syntactic c-command (as opposed to, say, m-command) maps onto scope. In a Minimalist syntax, c-command may be a natural structural relation (Abels 2003 chapter 2.3; Chametzky 1996, 2000; Chomsky 2000; Epstein 1999, 2001; Epstein et al. 1998), but m-command certainly isn't. The unnaturalness of m-command argues against using it.

I summarize briefly Chomsky's argument about the naturalness of C-command. Syntactic trees are built through the successive application of the structure building operation "Merge", which puts two objects α and β

[10] This condition is similar but not identical to Haegeman and Zanuttini's (1991) NEG criterion. It will become clear later on that it is not quite accurate to say that *ni*-phrases are positioned in [Spec, NegP]. As we will see, *ni*-phrases take negation in their scope at LF. When negation has moved from its base position, *ni*-phrases have to move to the specifier position of whatever phrase hosts negation at LF.

together forming a new object γ. The operation Merge gives rise to two basic syntactic relations: (i) sisterhood, which holds between α and β, and (ii) immediate containment (also called immediate dominance), which holds between γ and α on the one hand and γ and β on the other. The transitive closure of "immediate dominance" is "dominance". The two relations of sisterhood and dominance can be combined to yield the relation sister-containment, i.e., c-command. C-command is thus readily definable in terms of simple, natural structural relations.

The definitions of other command relations like m-command require more than just the basic structural relations of sisterhood and containment. Concretely, m-command presupposes for its definition the notion of maximal projection, which cannot be defined solely in terms of the primitive relations of sisterhood and containment. Maximal projections can only be defined if syntactic objects are additionally labeled by a highly particular labeling function on nodes (traditionally called "projection"; see Chametzky 1996; Speas 1990 for extensive discussion and references).[11] C-command only requires the operation Merge. M-command requires Merge and labels and a more complex definition. In this sense, m-command is less natural than c-command. Chametzky and Epstein come to the same conclusion regarding c-command and m-command, albeit along different routes.

The upshot of this brief discussion of c-command is that a definition of scope in terms of c-command is to be preferred over one in terms of m-command on conceptual grounds.[12] In other words, to demand that *ni*-phrases be in [Spec, NegP] at LF, as I do, is to demand that *ni*-phrases outscope negation.

The interpretation of simple sentences with *ni*-phrases like (2a) can be derived either by letting the *ni*-phrase denote an existential quantifier scoping below negation or a universal quantifier scoping above negation. This is so, since logically $\neg\exists x\phi \equiv \forall x\neg\phi$. From all this it follows that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers. In the parlance of Giannakidou (1998) we would say that *ni*-phrases are polarity sensitive universal quantifiers.

[11] Collins 1999, 2002 has recently argued that the labeling function can and should be eliminated from the grammar. If Collins' project is on the right track, then m-command is not even definable.

[12] It is the textbook view in semantics that c-command rather than m-command determines scope (Heim and Kratzer 1998). The reason is easy enough to see and parallels the syntactic argument just given. In a system where c-command maps onto scope, only the binary compositional operation "function application" is necessary, which need not have access to syntactic labels. To devise a system in which m-command maps onto scope, a more complex n-ary compositional operation with crucial access to syntactic labels is needed. Clearly, the simpler system is to be preferred.

They need negation to be licensed, but they undergo movement to a position outside the scope of negation to be properly interpreted.

Now we know what the quantificational force of *ni*-phrases is. We still do not know where it comes from. *Ni*-phrases, being outside the scope of negation, negation cannot be responsible for conferring the universal interpretation. This suggests that the universal force resides in the *ni*-phrase itself; more precisely, it suggests that *ni* is a universal quantifier.

2.3 *Ni*-Phrases as Universal Quantifiers: Empirical Arguments

The view adopted here contradicts a tradition which takes *ni*-phrases to be narrow scope existentials (Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997). The traditional view of *ni*-phrases as existentials seems to be justified on analogy with English NPIs like *any*. Convincing arguments have been given (Carlson 1981 and for a recent review Horn 2000) to treat *any* as an existential. No such arguments exist for Russian *ni*-phrases. The crucial, Carlson-style examples have been discussed in section 2.1 and they reveal a behavior of *ni*-phrases that is substantially different from English *any*, because the scope of English *any* does not track the scope of negation, as Carlson shows.[13]

I will now review some of the arguments that have been based on the behavior of Slavic *ni*-phrases, using as my foil Błaszczak (2001), who explicitly discusses and rejects the position advocated here. Błaszczak discusses *ni*-phrases in Polish rather than Russian, but *ni*-phrases in Slavic behave alike. Therefore, the arguments carry over.

One argument which is often used in the literature (see, e.g., Dayal 1998; Giannakidou 1998) to establish that a given quantifier is a universal is based on modification with *almost* and *absolutely*. The generalization underlying the argument is that universals can, but existentials cannot, be modified by *almost* and *absolutely*. This is illustrated by the examples in (18) from Horn (2000: 1). Crucially, *any*, when used as an NPI, cannot be modified by *almost* (19).[14]

---

[13] I did not discuss Carlson's examples in section 2.1, partly to save space and partly because they involve relations between negation and *any* across fairly long distances (several clauses). Given that *ni*-phrases require negation to be local, Carlson's exact examples cannot be reproduced in Russian.

[14] Two caveats are in order here. First, the restriction to *any* in its use as an NPI is important, since in its free-choice use *any* can be modified by *almost*. This is illustrated in (i).

(i) ✓Almost anybody can do this.

Second, Błaszczak (2001: 80) observes that stressed *any* behaves like idiomatic NPIs (*lift a finger,* etc.). Idiomatic NPIs denote the endpoint of pragmatic scales and involve an abstract *even* (cf. e.g. Heim 1984 and for more recent discussion Guerzoni 2002; Lahiri 1998).

(18) a. Absolutely{everybody/nobody/*somebody} can win.
b. Absolutely{all/none/*some/*many/*few} of your friends can come.
c. Almost {everybody/nobody/*somebody} made it on time.

(19) I didn't say that he did (*almost) anything last night.

Example (20) shows that in Russian the *ni*-phrase does not pattern with English *any* but rather with English *none* and *all.* Notice furthermore that if we compare the behavior of *ni*-phrases (21a) with that of other polarity sensitive items like the *nibud'*-phrase in (21b), the *nibud'*-phrase patterns with the indefinites and existential quantifiers. This asymmetry is expected if *ni*-phrases are universals and *nibud'*-phrases are existential quantifiers. This pattern is not expected if both *nibud'*-phrases and *ni*-phrases are existential quantifiers. These facts lend a certain amount of empirical support to the idea that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers.

(20) a. Počti {✓nikto / *(*odin) student} ne prišel.
almost NI-who / one student NEG came
'Almost {no student/*some/*a/*one student} didn't come.[15]
b. ✓Počti vse studenty prišli.
almost all students came
'Almost all (of the) students came.'

(21) a. ✓Ja uverena, čto (počti) nikto ne opozdaet.
I certain that almost NI-who NEG will-be-late
'I am certain that (almost) nobody will be late.'

Horn (2000) claims that only elements that denote endpoints of scales can be modified by *almost* and *absolutely*, which would explain the behavior of stressed *any.* In example (19) this effect is controlled for; *any* appears under superordinate rather than clausemate negation. The distance should help rule out the reading where *any* denotes the endpoint of a scale.

Note that Russian *ni*-phrases have none of the scalar implicatures of English idiomatic NPIs.

[15] Note that the ungrammaticality of the indefinite cannot be attributed to the presence of negation since without *počti* the sentence is acceptable:

(i) ✓Odin student ne prišel.

(21) b. Ja uverena, čto ✓(*počti) kto-nibud' opozdaet.
I certain that almost who- NIBUD' will-be-late
'I am certain that (*almost) someone will be late.'

However, facts like those in (20) and (21) do not unambiguously establish that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers. First, items that are clearly not universal quantifiers (e.g., numerals) can be modified by *almost.* Second, the effect is not well understood. We do not know why the generalization holds, hence we cannot base strong conclusions on it. Błaszczak (2001: 169–74) is quite right in pointing this out.

Data discussed elsewhere by Błaszczak (2001: 244–45) provide a much stronger argument for the position advocated here (although Błaszczak herself does not draw this conclusion). The crucial example will be (32) below. To understand the relevance of example (32), we need a fair amount of background. I will first present this background and then turn to the example itself.

There are three facts to bear in mind: (i) regular indefinites can act as the antecedent of a donkey pronoun as shown in (22); (ii) universal quantifiers cannot act as the antecedent of donkey pronouns (23); and (iii) *ni*-phrases cannot act as the antecedent of donkey pronouns as shown in (24). (The examples are Russian adaptations of Błaszczak's original Polish examples.)

(22) ✓Esli čelovek ne xočet obidet' $osla_i$, to on ego_i ne b'et.
If man NEG wants to-hurt donkey then he it NE beats
'If a man doesn't want to hurt a $donkey_i$, he doesn't beat it_i.'

(23) *Esli čelovek ljubit každogo osla, to on ego ne b'et.
If man loves every donkey then he it NEG beats
*'If a man loves every $donkey_i$, then he doesn't beat it_i.'

(24) *Esli čelovek ne xočet obidet' nikakogo osla, to on ego ne b'et.
If man NEG wants to-hurt NI-which donkey then he it NEG beat
*'If a man doesn't want to hurt any $donkey_i$, he doesn't beat it_i.'

Assuming a theory of donkey anaphora roughly along the lines of Heim (1982), we can explain why the indefinite in (22) can antecede a donkey

pronoun. We assume that the indefinite does not have quantificational force, i.e., the indefinite is bound by a high (unselective) binder with sentential scope. This binder binds the indefinite in the *if*-clause as well as the pronoun in the main clause.

Example (23) does not allow binding of the pronoun, because the universal cannot take scope outside of the *if*-clause, a syntactic island for quantifier movement.

The fact that (24) is ungrammatical has two different potential explanations, depending on the theory of *ni*-phrases we adopt. If *ni*-phrases are narrow scope existentials, they are bound within the scope of negation in the *if*-clause. This is too low to allow pronoun binding in the main clause.[16] If on the other hand, *ni*-phrases are treated as wide scope universals, then their inability to bind donkey pronouns is also expected: universals can never bind donkey pronouns for the reasons mentioned in connection with example (23).[17]

The facts reviewed above only provide the background. As just seen, (22)–(24) are equally compatible with both approaches to *ni*-phrases. In principle it should still be possible to tease the two approaches apart. Imagine a scope-bearing element XP taking scope above negation; imagine that XP contains a pronoun *p*; and imagine that there is a *ni*-phrase in the clause. Under the view where *ni*-phrases are existentials, we would get (25). Note that the existential binder is below negation and hence too low to bind the pronoun *p* contained within XP.

(25)



Under the view where *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers, the configuration in (26) might be possible. In (26) the universal takes scope above negation. It also scopes above XP, as it might if XP is within a very local domain.

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[16] Recall that on the theory where *ni*-phrases are existentials the existential binder must be within the scope of negation to get the correct readings: (i) and (ii) are equivalent, but (i) and (iii) are not.

(i) $\neg\exists x\phi$ (ii) $\forall x\neg\phi$ (iii) $\exists x\neg\phi$

[17] I will argue below that the movement of *ni*-phrases is clause-bounded. If true, the fact that *if*-clauses are syntactic islands is actually irrelevant.

(26)



A word of clarification is in order here. Above in section 2.1 I argued that *ni*-phrases always take scope together with negation, i.e., no scope-bearing elements can intervene between negation and an associated *ni*-phrase. The configuration in (26) violates this condition: XP intervenes.

Notice, however, that the condition that *ni*-phrases take scope with negation must be formulated in such a way as to allow multiple *ni*-phrases. At first this looks like a problem, since *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers and hence scope-bearing elements.[18] Given this, how can we even formulate the condition that *ni*-phrases must take scope with negation? Suppose there are two *ni*-phrases: *ni*-phrase$_1$ > *ni*-phrase$_2$ > ¬. One of the *ni*-phrases (here *ni*-phrase$_2$) can take scope immediately above negation, but how about the other one? *Ni*-phrase$_1$ can hardly take scope immediately above negation, since the scope position immediately above negation is already occupied by *ni*-phrase$_2$.

To solve this problem, observe that the commutative law (27) applies to universal quantifiers (for this and related theorems of predicate logic see Partee, ter Meulen, and Wall 1993: 148 or any introduction to predicate logic).

(27) Commutative Law
$\forall x \forall y \phi \Leftrightarrow \forall y \forall x \phi$

It is clear how the commutative law can help us out of our dilemma. The commutative law guarantees that the equivalence in (28) holds.

(28) *ni*-phrase$_1$ > *ni*-phrase$_2$ > ¬ ⇔ *ni*-phrase$_2$ > *ni*-phrase$_1$ > ¬

We can now formulate the condition that the scope of *ni*-phrases tracks the scope of negation as follows.

[18] The same problem would also arise if we treated *ni*-phrases as existentials, since existentials are scope-bearing elements, too.

(29) Every *ni*-phrase must take negation in its "immediate scope" as defined in (30).

(30) An operator α takes another operator β in its *immediate scope* iff$_{DEF}$ every scope-bearing element γ, where γ is in the scope of α but not in the scope of β, commutes with α.

This solves the problem created by multiple *ni*-phrases. But condition (30) does more. By treating *ni*-phrases and other universal quantifiers as a natural class, it allows universal quantifiers that are not *ni*-phrases to intervene between negation and *ni*-phrases. We can allow a configuration like (26) so long as XP is a universal quantifier. Universal quantifiers are the exception mentioned in (8) to the general rule that no scope-bearing element can intervene between negation and *ni*-phrases. The commutative law explains why universal quantifiers behave in this exceptional way.

Let us go back to the structures in (25) and (26) now. The structure in (25) showed that, if *ni*-phrases are treated as existentials, then any scope-bearing element with scope over negation will necessarily also take scope over all *ni*-phrases in the sentence. The structure in (26) showed that, if *ni*-phrases are treated as universals, then certain scope-bearing elements (namely universal quantifiers by (29) and (30)) might take scope above negation and yet fall within the scope of a *ni*-phrase.

The different structures in (25) and (26) make strikingly different predictions as far as variable binding is concerned. A variable can only be bound if it is c-commanded by its binder.[19] The pronoun *p* within XP could never be bound by the existential in (25), but the same pronoun could in principle be bound by the universal in (26).

Surprisingly, examples of the relevant type, which let us distinguish between the two theories of *ni*-phrases, actually exist, as (31) (from Błaszczak 2001: 24 ex. 14b) and (32) show for Polish and Russian, respectively.

[19] C-command is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, as the phenomenon of weak-crossover demonstrates (see, e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998; Lasnik and Stowell 1991; Wasow 1972).

(31) Nie będę brała od ciebie żadnej książki$_i$, bo nie
NEG be$_{1SG.FUT}$ take from you no$_{GEN}$ book because NEG
wiem, kiedy bym mogła ci ją$_i$ zwrócić.
know$_{1SG.PRES}$ when COND$_{1SG}$ could you it$_{ACC}$ return$_{INF}$
'I won't borrow a book from you, because I don't know when I would be able to return it.'

(32) ✓Ja ne vzjala u tebja nikakoj knigi$_i$, potomu čto
I NEG took at you NI-which$_{GoN}$ book$_{GoN}$ because
ja ne znala, kogda ja mogla by tebe ee$_i$ vernut'.
I NEG knew when I could SUBJ you it return
'I didn't borrow a book from you, because I didn't know when I would be able to return it to you.'

This example has all the requisite properties. There is an additional scope-bearing element: the *because*-clause. The *because*-clause contains a bindable pronoun, *ją*/*ee*. The *because*-clause outscopes negation.[20] Finally, *because* is standardly analyzed as a universal quantifier (following Lewis 1973).

The fact is that *żadnej książki* can bind *ją*, which is indicated by subscripts in example (31). The same is true in Russian. *Nikakoj knigi* can bind *ee* in (32). This is predicted if the structure of the example is (26) and impossible if the structure is (25).

In defense of the idea that *ni*-phrases are existentials, the following might be suggested. Maybe the *because*-clause originates within the scope both of negation and the existential. In this position, the pronoun in the *because*-clause could become bound by the existential. The *because*-clause would then move to its LF-position above and outside the scope of negation and outside the scope of the existential. This hypothetical defense is not a viable alternative, though. Pronouns can only be interpreted as bound variables if they occur at LF in the scope of their binder (Heim and Kratzer 1998). But this crucial condition is not met in the scenario under discussion, because by (25) the pronoun is outside the scope of its binder at LF.

This example is the strongest individual piece of evidence for the assumption that *ni*-phrases (and their Polish counterparts) are universal quantifiers. The argument derives its strength from the fact that all the

[20] If *because* took scope below negation, the sentence would mean something different, namely 'It is not because I don't know when I will be able to return it, that I am borrowing a book from you.' But that is not the meaning under discussion.

theoretical assumptions that go into explaining the facts are fairly well understood and equally well-established.[21, 22] Remember that we had already concluded on general theoretical grounds that *ni*-phrases ought to be treated as universal quantifiers. This conclusion is now buttressed empirically.

Structure (26), the structure we settled on for examples (31) and (32), is an unlabeled tree. A complete syntax for *ni*-phrases needs to be more precise. I claimed in section 2.2 without much argument that *ni*-phrases are in [Spec, NegP] at LF. If true, it follows that the *because*-clause in (26) is also within NegP. The simplest hypothesis is that the *because*-clause occupies a specifier position within NegP, but it might just as well be adjoined. As far as I can see, nothing much rides on this. Figuring out the details of the structure would require a more detailed investigation, beyond the scope of this paper. Even without knowing the exact details of the syntax, the argument from (31) and (32) seems compelling to me.

I now turn to the remaining arguments that Błaszczak gives for treating *ni*-phrases as indefinites. The first argument concerns VP ellipsis. Błaszczak notes (2001: 206 fn. 286) that in the case of VP-ellipsis, *ni*-phrases can antecede the ellipsis of existentials.[23]

(33) ✓Jan nie może nikogo zaprosić, ale Piotr może ~~(kogo zaprosić)~~.
Jan NEG can NI-who to-invite but Piotr can (invite someone)
'John cannot invite anyone but Bill can (invite someone).'

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[21] Błaszczak (2001), the source of all the Polish data, discusses this paradigm only in passing (attributing the observation to a talk given by Peres (1998), who originally made it based on Portuguese *n*-words). Błaszczak concludes from the fact that the *ni*-phrases can antecede a pronoun in (31) that *ni*-phrases are indefinites. We have seen that this conclusion is rash and that the data actually lead to the opposite conclusion.

[22] An anonymous reviewer brings up the following acceptable English example:

(i) I won't borrow any book from you, because I don't know when I would be able to return it.

The example is problematic on the assumption that *any* in English is uniformly existential (Horn 2000). However, many people have argued (e.g., Dayal 1998 and see Horn 2000 for review and references) that *any* in English is ambiguous. If we assume that *any* in English is ambiguous, we can then explain the fact that (i) is acceptable. In (i) *any* is a universal. This does not affect Carlson's (1981) arguments mentioned in fn. 13, because those involve *any* which is not associated with negation locally. Locality conditions on universals of the type discussed in section 2.4 would bar the universal from appearing in Carlson's examples, leaving the existential *any* as the only option in the long distance cases, which would then explain Carlson's observations.

[23] Whether VP-ellipsis exists in Russian and if so, what its syntax is is not clear at the moment (see Stepanov 1998). I therefore use Błaszczak's Polish examples.

Błaszczak is doubtful that a universal could be made to antecede an existential as is necessary for this example. However, recent approaches to the identity conditions on ellipsis predict that ellipsis of the type exemplified in (33) ought to be possible even if the *ni*-word is treated as a universal. Note that negation and hence the universal quantifier is outside the ellipsis site. Therefore the antecedent for the elided VP contains the verb, an object variable, and a subject variable: *y* invite *x*. For concreteness assume Merchant's (1999) theory of ellipsis. According to Merchant, a constituent must count as given in some relevant sense (e-GIVEN) in order to be able to be elided (33). Merchant's notion of e-GIVENness builds on Schwarzschild's (1999) notion of GIVENness.

(34) e-GIVENness (Merchant 1999: 36 ex. 42)
An expression E counts as e-GIVEN iff E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo ∃-type shifting,
i. A entails F-clo(E), and
ii. E entails F-clo(A)[24]

As we saw above, the antecedent VP means '*y* invite *x*'. After ∃-type shifting, i.e., after existentially quantifying over all unbound variables, this yields ∃*y*,*x* [*y* invited *x*]. Since there is no focused element in the antecedent VP, F-closure does not play a role. The elided VP contains an existential quantifier and a subject variable: ∃*x y* invited *x*. After ∃-type shifting, the elided VP receives as its interpretation ∃*y*,*x* [*y* invited *x*]. Again F-closure does not play a role since the elided VP does not contain a focus. In other words, the ∃-closure of the antecedent and the elided VP have the same denotation. The two conditions (34i) and (34ii) are trivially satisfied. The fact that VP-ellipsis is possible can thus not be taken as an argument against the theory which treats *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers. This addresses Błaszczak's first argument.

Błaszczak's remaining arguments are largely distributional: *ni*-phrases pattern with indefinites in certain respects. They also do not pattern with other universal quantifiers in some respects. First of all, *ni*-phrases can occur in negated existential sentences even though universals, along with

[24] The relevant notions of F-closure (focus closure) and ∃-type shifting are defined as follows:

(i) F-closure (Merchant 1999: 16 ex. 18)
The F-closure of α, written F-clo(α), is the result of replacing F[ocus]-marked parts of α with ∃-bound variables of the appropriate type.

(ii) "∃-type shifting is a type shifting operation that raises expressions to type <t> and existentially binds unfilled arguments" (Merchant 1999: 15 fn. 13).

other strong quantifiers, are usually barred in these contexts (Roumyana Pancheva, p.c.; Błaszczak 2001). The same fact has been used to argue that English *any* is an existential (cf., e.g., Horn 1972; Ladusaw 1980b). The argument is not particularly strong, though. As is well known, there are counterexamples to the generalization that only weak quantifiers can appear in existentials.[25] Moreover, it is still not understood why the restriction to weak quantifiers holds generally. Therefore, it is impossible to assess whether the acceptability of *ni*-phrases in negated existentials poses a real problem or not.

The next and final point that I take up here seems to be even weaker. Błaszczak (2001: 223) (citing a talk by Pereltsvaig 1998) points out that *ni*-phrases (35c) pattern with indefinites (35a) and against universal quantifiers (35b) in that the former are allowed in cognate instrumentals, but the latter are not (examples (35a–c) are adapted from Błaszczak 2001: 223–24 ex. 157).

(35) a. ✓On nenavidit ego ljutoj nenavist'ju.
he hates him ferocious$_{INST}$ hatred$_{INST}$
'He hates him with deep hatred.'

b. *On nenavidit ego každoj nenavist'ju.
he hates him every$_{INST}$ hatred$_{INST}$
intended: 'He hates him in every way possible.'

c. ✓On ne nenavidit ego nikakoj nenavist'ju.
he NEG hates him NI-which$_{INST}$ hatred$_{INST}$
'He doesn't hate him in any way.'

The observation is interesting, to be sure. But before we know exactly why the universal is banned in (35b), it is hard to assess just how damaging the fact is that (35c) is acceptable. Moreover, it would be wrong to claim that all universal quantifiers are disallowed from cognate instrumentals as (35d) illustrates. The crucial difference appears to be that *každyj* quantifies over kinds of hatred, whereas *ves'* quantifies over amounts. They also differ in distibutivity. Presumably the fact that (35b) is

[25] Comorovski (1995: 148) gives a host of examples. Examples (i)–(iii) are from Comorovski's paper, (iv) is my own.

(i) There are all/most/several of yesterday's exams left to correct.

(ii) There is all this stuff on my desk. Can you pick it up?

(iii) Every time I go round to see George, there's his sister/*her there.

(iv) There is every reason to believe that this theory is correct.

ill-formed is connected to these properties rather than universal quantification per se.[26]

(35) d. ✓On nenavidit ego vsej svoej nenavist'ju.
he hates him all$_{INST}$ his$_{INST}$ hatred$_{INST}$
'He hates him from the depth of his soul.'

To conclude, I have argued that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers which must take negation in their immediate scope (where immediate scope is understood as in (30)). Syntactically this can be achieved by endowing *ni* with a formal feature that must enter into a checking relation with negation accompanied by movement.[27] The bulk of this subsection was devoted to motivating and defending the claim that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers. This view is forced upon us if we assume that *ni*-phrases end up as the specifiers of negation and that syntactic c-command maps onto scope.

2.3. Locality

Having established that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers that move to their scope position above negation, we can now ask what the locality condition on their movement is. So far I have been operating with the

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[26] Błaszczak has a few more minor objections to the view that *ni*-phrases are universals. They seem to carry much less weight than the objections discussed in the text and I omit discussing them here.

[27] A reviewer asks if and how the present account is compatible with a system, such as Chomsky 1995a, where every movement operation is triggered by properties of the target of movement (Attract) and no operation is triggered by properties of the moving element (Move). It seems to me that the account is indeed incompatible with a pure Attract system even if we assume a mechanism like Attract All as in Bošković 2000.

I do not regard this as a serious drawback, since there are a number of serious problems with the pure Attract view. For example, the whole class of explanations that pin movement of clitics on structural deficiency (Cardinaletti and Starke 1999) becomes unavailable. All clitic movements must then be externally triggered. No plausible account of such external triggering exists. A further general and illustrative problem for the pure Attract view comes from the fact that there is no explanation for the status of examples like (i), where the embedded complementizer attracts *what* as in (ii), but then the matrix complementizer fails to attract *what* because of superiority. This is acknowledged in Chomsky's more recent writings (2000; 2001a, 2001b), where roughly Lasnik's (1995) Enlightened Self Interest is adopted. Under Enlightened Self Interest, movements are triggered by the joint action of the target and the moving element. The theory developed in this paper is compatible with Enlightened Self Interest.

(i) *Who claims what (that) John bought ~~what~~?

(ii) ✓What does Peter claim ~~what~~ (that) John bought ~~what~~?

vague term "clausemateness", but of course we would like to be more precise. Once we know what the locality conditions are, we would like to know why they hold. I have little to offer on the second question.

Standard examples like (2c) above, repeated here as (36), show clearly that *ni*-phrases cannot move from one finite clause to another. Movement out of infinitival CPs on the other hand is possible (37).

(36) *Fedja ne skazal, čto on ničego znaet ob ètom.
Fedja NEG said that he NI-what knows about that

(37) a. ✓Ja ne pomnju kak pisat' nikakie stixi.
I NEG remember how to-write NI-which poems

b. ✓Ja nikakie stixi ne pomnju kak pisat'.
I NI-which poems NEG remember how to-write
'I don't remember how to write any poems.'

On standard assumptions this conclusion can also be reached on the basis of examples like (10), which is repeated here for convenience as (38). The complement clause in (38) is a control infinitival. Control infinitivals are traditionally assumed to be CPs (Chomsky 1981, 1999, 2000, but see, e.g., Bošković 1997; Babby 1998; Wurmbrand 2001 for differing points of view). We will have reasons not to consider control clauses to be CPs below (section 3.1), which is why (38) cannot be used in the context of the present paper to establish that movement of *ni*-phrases out of CP is possible, but examples like (37) make the point: *ni*-phrases can escape from CPs.

(38) ✓Ja ničego ne zapretil emu čitat'.
I NI-what NEG forbade him to-read.
'There is nothing that I forbade him to read.'

The contrast then seems to be between finite CPs (36) and non-finite CPs (37). The simplest way of drawing the finite/non-finite distinction is in terms of TP, since T^0 is where the finite/non-finite distinction resides. We can account for the contrast between (36) and (37) by assuming that *ni*-phrases cannot escape from a tensed TP. This conclusion is consistent with ideas in May's (1977) classic study of QR. Progovac (1994: 69) also reaches the conclusion that TP is the relevant local domain for

ni-phrases.[28] Neither May nor Progovac discuss the finite/non-finite distinction.

On the basis of the facts considered above, I will assume that *ni*-phrases cannot escape from their containing tensed TP.[29]

2.4. Summary

In section 2.1 I demonstrated that the scope of *ni*-phrases tracks the scope of negation; generally, no operator can intervene between the two. Based on this I offered a theoretical argument in favor of treating *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers in section 2.2. In section 2.3 the assumption that *ni*-phrases are universal quantifiers was discussed in light of several empirical arguments and counterarguments. The binding facts in examples (31) and (32) provided a strong argument for the present position. Finally, in section 2.4 the locality conditions on *ni*-phrase licensing were briefly discussed. I concluded that *ni*-phrases like other universal quantifiers are subject to a very strict locality condition: *ni*-phrases cannot leave their containing finite TP.

3. Genitive of Negation

This section investigates the syntactic licensing conditions for GoN and offers a (partial) solution. The discussion is necessarily brief and somewhat simplified.

In a derivational model of syntax such as Chomsky's Minimalism, two questions need to be addressed to gain a minimal understanding of any process: (i) When does it happen? and (ii) What are its locality conditions? These questions are addressed for GoN in the following two subsections. The question of timing turns out to be crucial to the account of EN developed in section 4 of the paper. The question concerning locality turns out to be less central for EN. I try to unify the locality condition regulating GoN with Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990).[30] I will simply leave aside

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[28] Unfortunately, Progovac's binding approach to NPIs is so different from the one developed here that, due to space restrictions, I cannot compare the two systems.

[29] Indefinites are notorious for being able to take scope even outside of syntactic islands (see Fodor and Sag 1982; Heim 1982; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997 and the many references cited in these works). If *ni*-phrases were indefinites (or existentials), we might expect them to pattern with indefinites as far as scope is concerned. The fact that *ni*-phrases pattern for locality with universals rather than existentials provides an additional, indirect argument for treating *ni*-phrases as universal quantifiers.

[30] I will not try to decide here between Harves' 2002 approach to GoN licensing based on a rigid theory of locality in terms of Chomsky's (2000, 2001a, 2001b) "phases" and the

certain other important questions concerning GoN. For example, I have nothing new to say about the optionality of GoN (for which see Bailyn 1995, 1997 and references cited there). I also have little to add to the debate about the function of GoN as a semantic marker (see Babby 1980; Bailyn 1995, 1997; Borschev and Partee 1998; Brown 1999b; Partee and Borschev 2000, 2001, 2002 and the many references cited there).

3.1 Locality

Following work by Franks (1995) and Neidle (1988), I assume that the following generalization is essentially correct. GoN is licensed with clausemate negation (39); it is licensed in the complement of subject control verbs (40, 41); it is not licensed long distance in embedded non-finite interrogatives (42), in finite clauses (43), or in the complement of object control verbs (44).[31]

(39) ✓Ivan ne čitaet žurnala.
Ivan NEG reads journal$_{GoN}$
'Ivan doesn't read the journal/a journal.'

(40) ✓Nataša ne xotela čitat' knig.
Nataša NEG wanted to-read books$_{GoN.PL}$
'Natasha didn't want to read any books.'

(41) ✓Ja ne poobeščala Nataše čitat' knig.
I NEG promised Nataša$_{DAT}$ to-read book$_{GoN.PL}$
'I didn't promise Natasha to read any books.'

(42) *Ja ne pomnju kak pisat' stixov.
I NEG remember how to-write poems$_{GEN.PL}$
'I don't remember how to write poems.' (Brown and Franks 1995: 254 ex. 227b)

relativized approach advocated here. The empirical distinctions are subtle and do not affect the main thrust of my argument.

[31] There are some counterexamples to this generalization, but overall it is a surprisingly accurate description of the data. I will discuss some of the counterexamples once the general approach has been outlined.

(43) *Ivan ne skazal, čto on čitaet žurnala.
Ivan NEG said that he reads journal$_{GoN}$
'Ivan didn't say that he reads the journal/a journal.'

(44) *Ja ne ugovorila Natašu čitat' knig.
I NEG persuaded Nataša$_{ACC}$ to-read books$_{GoN}$
intended: 'I didn't persuade Natasha to read books.'

An additional generalization, mentioned in section 1, is that only underlying internal arguments can ever appear in the genitive of negation (4). Only one instance of GoN is licensed per negation (45) (see Brown and Franks (1995) from where the example is taken).[32,33] Finally, GoN and structural accusative are never both licensed by the same verbal predicate (46, 47). GoN and structural accusative are in complementary distribution: if GoN is assigned by a verbal predicate, then structural accusative is not, and if structural accusative is assigned by a verbal predicate, then GoN is not.

(45) Oni i uznavat' drug o druge ✓novosti/
they even to-find-out each about other news$_{ACC}$
*novostej ne imeli prava.
news$_{GoN}$ NEG had right$_{GoN}$
'They didn't even have the right to find out news about each other.'

(46) *Svety ne čitaet žurnal.
Sveta$_{GoN}$ NEG read journal$_{ACC}$
intended: 'Sveta doesn't read a/the journal.'

(47) *Svetu ne čitaet žurnala.
Sveta$_{ACC}$ NEG read journal$_{GoN}$
intended: 'Sveta doesn't read a/the journal.'

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[32] Again, this generalization is not without counterexamples. These will be discussed later.

[33] An anonymous reviewer asks why example (i) is ungrammatical despite the fact that only one instance of GoN is present. Example (i) is ungrammatical for the same reason that example (44) is ungrammatical (see (56) below).

(i) *Oni i uznavat' drug o druge novostej ne imeli pravo.
they even to-find-out each about other news$_{GoN}$ NEG had right$_{ACC}$
'They didn't even have the right to find out news about each other.'

I account for the fact that no verb ever assigns GoN and accusative in the same clause by assuming (following Brown and Franks 1995: 247) that GoN and accusative are assigned from the same position. I will follow Chomsky (1995b chapter 4.10) and assume that an abstract verbal head v^0 is responsible for accusative Case checking.[34] In fact, I assume that there are two instances of v^0: (i) v_{ACC}, which is responsible for accusative Case, and (ii) v_{GoN}, which is responsible for GoN. In any given clause, there is at most one instance of v^0. Together these assumptions account for the complementarity of accusative and GoN.[35]

The implicit claim is that GoN is structural Case. If this is so, we expect GoN to interact in non-trivial ways with other structural Cases. We have already seen such interactions. There is the accusative-genitive alternation as in example (1a) and the nominative-genitive alternation observed with unaccusatives (4a) and passives (4b). The complementarity of GoN and structural accusative constitutes a further interaction of GoN with structural Case. The assumption that GoN is a structural Case thus seems well grounded. The most dramatic interaction between GoN and other in-

[34] There is quite a bit of terminological disarray. Chomsky (1995b chapter 4.10) labels the head responsible for accusative Case v^0; elsewhere it is called Agr^0 (e.g., Chomsky 1991, 1993; Pollock 1989). In Brown and Franks (1997), Asp^0 is responsible for accusative Case checking, etc.

[35] Brown's (1999b chapters 4, 5) Case theory fails to explain why GoN and structural accusative are never both assigned by the same verbal predicate. According to Brown, GoN may be assigned to an NP agreeing with a (possibly complex) head containing the feature $[+V^{max}]$ and a feature non-distinct from [POL]-[Neg]. Accusative may be assigned to an NP agreeing with a (possibly complex) head containing the features $[+V^{max}]$, [Asp], and [+Pred]. Verbs pick up more and more of these features as they move up through the tree by successive head adjunction. In a regular negated transitive clause the verb will end up with all the requisite features for both GoN and accusative assignment by the time it reaches T^0. This opens up the possibility of assigning accusative to the object and GoN to the subject or vice versa, i.e., (46) and (47) are incorrectly predicted to be grammatical. The only way to block assigning both cases would be to bar the feature $[+V^{max}]$, which is involved in both GoN and accusative assignment, from entering into two checking relations. In the system Brown assumes (Chomsky 1995b chapter 4) this can be achieved by designating $[+V^{max}]$ as uninterpretable. However, $[+V^{max}]$ is a categorial feature and categorial features are always interpretable. Moreover, uninterpretable features necessarily need to be checked, but $[+V^{max}]$ may remain unchecked as in verbs with dative objects. Both considerations prohibit designating $[+V^{max}]$ as uninterpretable, but then the problem remains that one and the same verb ought to be able to assign both GoN and accusative. For essentially the same reasons, Brown's system also predicts that a single verb can assign GoN and accusative to more than one argument (SU_{GoN} & OB_{GoN} or SU_{Acc} & OB_{Acc}). Given the existence of examples with non-nominative subjects in Russian as in (4a) and (4b) above or the infamous adversity impersonal, an account in terms of the inverse Case filter is unlikely to be successful.

stances of structural Case will be seen once we discuss the locality on GoN licensing in detail.

Let us return to the properties of v^0. According to Chomsky, v^0 not only assigns accusative (and GoN if I am right), but it also introduces the external argument of the verb (see also Kratzer 1996). On the assumption (Chomsky's) that a head can either assign a theta-role to an argument or Case license it (or neither) but not both, it follows that external arguments do not appear in the genitive of negation or in the structural accusative (Chomsky 1995b chapter 4; and see López 2001 for critical discussion).

To gain an understanding of the distribution of v_{GoN} and v_{ACC}, we first need to have an idea of what the basic clausal architecture of Russian is. I accept Bailyn's (1997) and Brown and Franks' (1995) arguments about the position of negation in the clause in Russian and assume that it is situated below TP but above the base position of the subject, i.e., above [Spec, vP]. The basic hierarchy for a negated clause is given in (48).

(48) $[_{CP}\,[_{TP}\,[_{NegP}\,[_{vP}\,\ldots\,[_{VP}\,\ldots\,]]]]]$

It would be tempting to capitalize on the close proximity between NegP and *v*P to explain the distribution of v_{GoN}—many possible formulations come to mind: v_{GoN} must be governed by Neg; v_{GoN} must be selected by Neg; or even GoN is assigned by Neg under government to [Spec, vP]. The first two formulations are contemplated by Brown and Franks (1995), and the third one is basically Bailyn's (1997). None of them will do, because GoN is not strictly local, as we saw in examples (40) and (41).

The basic non-local relation in the Minimalist toolbox is agreement. We demand that v_{GoN} agree with Neg to be licit. As before, there are two kinds of agreement, agreement with and agreement without movement. Since there is no evidence suggesting that $v_{GoN}{}^0$ or v_{GoN}P moves to Neg, I will assume that we are dealing here with agreement without movement. To implement this, simply assume that v_{GoN} but not v_{ACC} carries an uninterpretable feature [F] that needs to agree with a [NEG] feature. This [NEG] feature is located on negation. The reflex of the presence of [F] on v^0 is that v^0 with [F] assigns genitive instead of accusative, i.e., v_{GoN} is regular v_{ACC} with an added feature [F].

Agreement requires c-command and is subject to locality. The guiding idea will be that the locality conditions on agreement derive the distribution of GoN, i.e., (39–44), and the fact that only one instance of GoN can be licensed by negation (45).

The locality of agreement is usually taken to be some version of Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990). Basically Relativized Minimality says that

an item X can be related to another item in some class α only if no item of that same class α intervenes (49a), where intervention is defined in terms of c-command.[36] In other words, X can relate only to the closest representative of α. Intervention of items that belong to some other class β is irrelevant (49b).

(49) Relativized Minimality (Chomsky 1995a; Rizzi 1990):



The class α relevant for GoN is the class of structural Case assigners: α = {v_{ACC}, v_{GoN}, T_{NOM}, T_{NULL}}.[37] v_{GoN} will be able to enter into an agreement relation with negation only if no other structural Case assigner intervenes between negation and v_{GoN}.

The generalization concerning the distribution of GoN given above now follows from Relativized Minimality. Examples (50–55) correspond directly to (39–44). Example (50) shows how GoN is licensed under clausemate negation. Trivially, there is no structural Case assigner intervening, so the structure is licit. The arrows in the structures represent the agreement relation between negation and v_{GoN} necessary to license v_{GoN}. The arrows are marked with a smiley face if the agreement relation obeys Relativized Minimality. The smiley face is absent if the agreement relation is blocked. The relevant intervener in these cases is set in italics and preceded by "#" in the structures.

(50) ✓Ivan ne [$_{vP}$ v_{GoN} [$_{VP}$ čitaet žurnala]].
Ivan NEG reads journal$_{GoN}$
'Ivan doesn't read the journal/a journal.'

Example (51) shows the same for subject control verbs.

[36] Starke (2001) gives a lucid and enlightening discussion of the logic underlying Relativized Minimality.

[37] It is a lexical fact about Russian that T never assigns genitive Case, i.e., there is no T_{GoN} in Russian. T_{null} is a kind of T^0 that appears in infinitival clauses containing PRO (Chomsky and Lasnik 1993; Martin 1994 and discussion of example (53)). T^0 in raising infinitives does not assign structural Case.

(51) ✓Nataša ne [v$_{[\text{-}CASE]}$ xotela [v_{GoN} čitat' knig]].
Nataša NEG wanted to-read$_{INF}$ books$_{GoN.PL}$
'Natasha didn't want to read any books.'

Two assumptions are important in this example. First is the assumption that when v^0 does not assign structural Case it does not intervene. This follows straightforwardly from the characterization of the class α as the structural Case assigners. The fact that v^0 doesn't intervene when it doesn't assign structural Case might also help pinpoint the exact nature of the agreeing feature [F] that characterizes v_{GoN}. I leave this question for further research. The second important assumption underlying (51) requires a bit more discussion. If the account of GoN licensing in terms of Relativized Minimality is on the right track, then (51) indicates that there is no structural Case assigner intervening between matrix negation and the embedded v_{GoN}.

On standard accounts, control infinitivals are CPs (Chomsky 1982, 2000, 2001b). If they were CPs, we would have to assume that the "PRO" subject of the control clause does not bear structural Case. Another possibility is to deny the assumption that control infinitivals are CPs. Following work by Wurmbrand (2001), we could assume that control infinitivals are vPs and do not include a TP or CP.[38] Example (53) below will force the choice: control infinitivals in Russian are not CPs but considerably smaller clausal projections (Babby 1998).

Example (52) is again an example of a subject control verb, but it has a dative object. The fact that GoN is licensed at a distance indicates that dative is not structural. This is in line with findings by Fowler (1996), who shows that dative in Russian never enters into active/passive alternations.

(52) ✓Ja ne poobeščala Nataše v_{GoN} čitat' knig.
I NEG promised Nataša$_{DAT}$ to-read book$_{GoN.PL}$
'I didn't promise Natasha to read any books.'

Example (53) is an embedded infinitival question. On standard assumptions, the interrogative pronoun *kak* is positioned in [Spec, CP]. The presence of a CP entails that TP is present as well. There is an abstract

[38] For various proposals bearing on the issue see Babby 1998; Chierchia 1984; Comrie 1974; Kazenin 2000; Laurençot 1997.

pronoun PRO in subject position in (53) which receives an arbitrary interpretation (PRO_{ARB}). GoN is not licensed at a distance in (53). The only possible intervening structural Case assigner in the example is the embedded T^0. T^0 in infinitivals that contain PRO (as opposed to raising infinitivals) assigns a particular kind of structural Case dubbed "null Case'"(Chomsky and Lasnik 1993; Martin 1994). It is T_{NULL} which is intervening in (53). The fact that (53) is ungrammatical indicates that (51) and (52) above do not contain an embedded TP at all and that (subject) control infinitivals are smaller than TP, i.e., NegP or vP under our, presumably simplified, approach to clause structure (48).

(53) *Ja ne pomnju [$_{CP}$ kak [PRO #T [v_{GoN} pisat' stixov]]].
I NEG remember how to-write $poems_{GEN.PL}$
'I don't remember how to write poems.' (Brown and Franks 1995: 254 ex. 227b)

Example (54), with a finite embedded clause, and (55) with an object control verb are ruled out under present assumptions because in both cases a structural Case assigner intervenes. In (54) the structural Case assigner closest to negation is T_{NOM}, in (55) it is v_{ACC}. The same is true for example (i) from footnote 33, a simplified base structure of which is given as (56).

(54) *Ivan ne [$v_{[-CASE]}$ skazal čto [$_{TP}$ on #T_{NOM} [v_{GoN} čitaet žurnala].
Ivan NEG said that he reads $journal_{GoN}$
intended: 'Ivan didn't say that he reads the journal/a journal.'

(55) *Ja ne [#v_{ACC} ugovorila Natašu [v_{GoN} čitat' knig]].
I NEG persuaded N_{ACC} to-read $books_{GoN}$
intended: 'I didn't persuade Natasha to read a/the book.'

(56) *Oni ne [#v_{ACC} imeli [pravo [v_{GoN} uznavat' novostej
they NEG had right$_{ACC}$ to-find-out news$_{GoN}$
drug o druge]]].
each about other
intended: 'They didn't have the right to find out (any) news about each other.'

Finally, it is also clear why cases of multiple GoN like (45) are ruled out. If there are two instances of v_{GoN}, one will generally be closer to negation than the other. The closer one will intervene between negation and the second instance of v_{GoN}. This derives facts like (45).[39]

The facts reviewed so far are encouraging. We can now turn to some more problematic cases.

Example (57) from Brown and Franks 1995, 1997, who adopted it from Mustajoki and Heino 1991, might be problematic. Brown and Franks report that (57) is grammatical. The example is problematic, because there is an object control verb assigning structural accusative Case while at the same time allowing GoN to be assigned to the object of the embedded clause. The structure should be fully parallel to that of example (44), which is ruled out (cf. (55)).

(57) (Brown and Franks 1997: 146)
Ja ne zastavljaju ego rešat' takix zadač.
I NEG force him$_{ACC}$ to-solve such$_{GoN}$ problems$_{GoN}$
'I don't force him to solve such problems.'

I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the judgment might be questionable. None of the reviewer's informants accepted sentence (57) and my own informants reject it, too. I will set this example aside without further comment and assume that it is unacceptable.

There is still a whole class of counterexamples both to the generalization that only one instance of GoN is licensed by negation and to the generalizations concerning locality, though. Consider examples (58), pointed out by a reviewer, and (59) from Brown and Franks (1995: 256). Both contrast in minimal ways with the unacceptable example (57).

[39] More complicated cases are conceivable where the two instances of v_{GoN} do not c-command each other. Relativized Minimality predicts that in such cases multiple GoN should be possible. Relevant cases without interfering factors are hard to find. I leave the question for further research.

Example (58) is a violation of locality and (59) is a violation of both locality and of the generalization that only one instance of GoN is licensed by a single instance of negation.

(58) ✓Ja ne zastavljaju ego rešať nikakix zadač.
I NEG force him_{ACC} to-solve NI-$which_{GoN}$ $problems_{GoN}$
'I don't force him to solve any problems.'

(59) ✓Ja ne zastavljaju ni odnoj studentki rešať
I NEG force NI one_{GoN} $student_{FEM.GoN}$ to-solve
takix zadač.
$such_{GoN}$ $problems_{GoN}$
'I don't force a single student to solve such problems.'

I will offer a possible solution that is consistent with the general approach to GoN outlined here. The solution for examples (58) and (59) that I am about to propose makes many predictions that need to be checked before the approach can be adopted with any confidence. I have to leave this investigation for some future occasion.

To understand what is going on in these examples, it is important to notice that it is the presence of *ni* in the examples that seems to license both the locality violation and the presence of two instances of GoN in (58) and (59). In developing an account of these facts, I agree with Brown and Franks' intuition that the presence of *ni* can license the presence of a second instance of GoN.

When introducing the present account of GoN above, I claimed that v_{GoN} contains a feature [F] that must agree with [NEG]. I further claimed that negation contains the interpretable feature [NEG]. In section 2.2, I argued that *ni* contains a [NEG] feature, too. The [NEG] feature on *ni* is uninterpretable and needs to be checked under agreement with negation. This gives us a glimmer of an idea how to deal with cases like (58) and (59). In (58) the feature [F] on v_{GoN} can agree locally with the [NEG] feature on *nikakix*. How might this work?

Presumably, the *ni*-phrase will have to move through [Spec, v_{GoN}P] on its way to [Spec, NegP], maybe for Case reasons, maybe due to cyclicity. From the [Spec, v_{GoN}P] position, the *ni*-phrase c-commands v_{GoN}. The [F] feature can undergo agreement with the [NEG] feature on the *ni*-phrase. What is shown in (60) is a step in the derivation where the *ni*-phrase, which, as we saw in section 2, undergoes phrasal movement to [Spec, NegP], is situated in an intermediate position.

The agreement relation between v_{GoN} and the *ni*-phrase apparently satisfies the requirement of [F] but not the feature checking requirment of the [NEG] feature on *ni,* which still has to enter into an agreement relation with negation and move up to the matrix clause to satisfy it. Note incidentally how this account of additional GoN licensing by *ni*-phrases provides independent support for the assumption made in section 2 that *ni*-phrases contain a [NEG] feature and thus indirectly for the current approach to the syntax of *ni*-phrases.

(60) Ja ne zastavljaju ego [[ni$_{[NEG]}$kakix$_{GoN}$ zadač$_{GoN}$] v_{GoN}
I NEG force him$_{ACC}$ NI-which$_{GoN}$ problems$_{GoN}$
rešat' t$_{NI\text{-}PHRASE}$].
to-solve
'I don't force him to solve any problems.'

Similar reasoning applies to (59). Although *ne* itself still cannot agree with the embedded v_{GoN} (after all, the structure is in relevant respects identical to that in (55)), it can agree with the [NEG] feature of the matrix object. Two local agreement relations will be established, one between negation and the matrix v_{GoN} and another between the matrix object *ni odnoj studentki* and the embedded v_{GoN} as shown in (61).

(61) Ja ne [v_{GoN} zastavljaju ni$_{[NEG]}$ odnoj studentki [v_{GoN} rešat'
I NEG force NI one$_{GoN}$ student$_{FEM.GoN}$ to-solve
takix zadač]].
such$_{GoN}$ problems$_{GoN}$
'I don't force a single student to solve such problems.'

This concludes the discussion of the locality conditions on GoN. I suggested that GoN is licensed by a particular structural Case assigner v_{GoN}. v_{GoN} contains an uninterpretable feature [F] that must agree with a local [NEG] feature. The locality condition on agreement is Relativized Minimality. All structural Case assigners count as interveners for Relativized Minimality.[40]

[40] There are some very interesting cases that I do not, at present, have an account for. Example (ii) shows an expected obviation of Relativized Minimality induced by the presence of a *ni*-phrase, but example (i) is mysterious. Why is obviation impossible here? The paradigm is reminiscent of the 'wager'-class of ECM verbs, which can ECM the subject of

3.2. Timing

Now that we know how GoN and v_{GoN} are licensed, we need to know when GoN and v_{GoN} are licensed. Inspection of examples (60) and (61) shows that v_{GoN} is not licensed at one of the two interfaces but on-line.

The account developed here says that GoN is assigned by a structural Case assigner, v_{GoN}. If v_{GoN} were to enter into a Case agreement relation with the NP at LF, that NP would have to be in the local vicinity of v_{GoN} at LF. Since v_{GoN} is c-commanded by negation, it is also within the scope of negation. So if the NP that appears in the genitive of negation were to agree with v_{GoN} at LF, the NP would always end up in the scope of negation.

As noted in Bailyn 1997; Brown 1999b; Brown and Franks 1995; Partee and Borschev 2001, 2002, the received wisdom is that NPs in the genitive of negation are indeed interpreted in the scope of negation. If true, this would suggest that GoN is assigned at LF. However, Partee and Borschev 2001, 2002 argue convincingly that NPs in the genitive of negation are not necessarily interpreted in the scope of negation. For us this means that they are not necessarily situated in their Case licensing position at LF. The crucial example is (62), from Partee and Borschev 2001. The object NP in (62) cannot possibly be in the scope of negation. The object in the examples is a *nibud'*-indefinite. *Nibud'*-indefinites can never be interpreted in the scope of clausemate negation (see Pereltsvaig 2000; cf. also paradigm (73) below). Example (62) would not be possible if NPs in the genitive of negation had to be interpreted in the scope of negation because that would bring the *nibud'*-indefinite into the scope of negation, which is ruled out. It follows now that GoN is licensed prior to LF.

(62) ✓Možet byt', oni čego-nibud'
may be they something$_{GoN}$-NIBUD' (non-specific)
ne čitali.
NEG read
'Maybe there is something they didn't read.'

---

their complement only if it undergoes long movement (see Bošković 1997; Kayne 1984; Pesetsky 1992).

(i) *Ja ne pomnju kak pisat' nikakix stixov.
I NEG remember how to-write NI-which$_{GoN}$ poems$_{GoN}$

(ii) ✓Ja nikakix stixov ne pomnju kak pisat'.
I NI-which$_{GoN}$ poems$_{GoN}$ NEG remember how to-write
'I don't remember how to write any poems.'

In a Minimalist syntax there are only two levels of representation: LF and PF. Anything that doesn't happen at LF or PF happens during the computation that gives rise to the LF and PF representations. Something that may happen at any point during the computation happens "on-line". Given that GoN is not licensed at LF, we can ask whether it is licensed at PF or on-line. A comparison of example (58), repeated here for convenience, with example (63) reveals that GoN is licensed on-line. In (58) and (63) the *ni*-phrase marked GoN is situated in very different positions at PF. Presumably only one of them is a position where GoN can be licensed (see section 3.1 above). But that means that the licensing conditions for GoN cannot be formulated as a PF condition. The only remaining option is for it to be licensed on-line.

(58) ✓Ja ne zastavljaju ego rešat' nikakix zadač.
I NEG force him_{ACC} to-solve NI-$which_{GoN}$ $problems_{GoN}$
'I don't force him to solve any problems.'

(63) ✓Ja nikakix zadač ne zastavljaju ego rešat'.
I NI-$which_{GoN}$ $problems_{GoN}$ NEG force him_{ACC} to-solve
'I don't force him to solve any problems.'

The conclusion that GoN is not licensed at LF is roughly consonant with that of Partee and Borschev 2002. We reached the conclusion that GoN is licensed on-line independently of *ni*-phrases, but the present syntax and semantics developed for *ni*-phrases forces this interpretation anyway. According to the account of section 2, *ni*-phrases in the genitive of negation, like the objects in (58), (59), and (63), must be interpreted outside the scope of negation.

3.3. Conclusion

In this section I have argued that a theory where GoN is licensed on-line and is subject to Relativized Minimality is quite successful in dealing with the data. The conclusion concerning on-line licensing seems to me to be incontrovertible. The suggestion concerning locality of GoN is more a suggestion than a firm conclusion at this point. Too many predictions have yet to be checked; a careful comparison of the present theory with its conceptual competitor mentioned in fn. 30 would also be needed. Since the crucial results of the following section do not rely deeply on the locality theory of GoN, we need not push the issue any further at present.

4. The Asymmetry between *ni*-Phrases and GoN: A Conspiracy

This section discusses the logic of the conspiracy that leads to the emergence of typical EN effects, i.e., to sentences that allow GoN but disallow *ni*-phrases. I concentrate on the logic and on a particular paradigm christened "forced pleonastic negation" by Brown and Franks. Section 5 will then show how that logic plays out for other cases of EN. First, I briefly discuss Brown and Franks' (1995) original account. Brown and Franks' account relies heavily on locality theory and a tacit assumption about reconstruction. Once this assumption is recognized, the asymmetry between *ni*-phrase licensing and GoN licensing follows even without invokving any kind of special, semantically vacuous negation. I go on to show that the same assumption about reconstruction allows an account of the asymmetry within the current framework. The present account is therefore quite similar in spirit to that of Brown and Franks. Finally, I briefly discuss Brown's (1999a, 1999b) more recent account of the asymmetry.

The paradigm crucial throughout this section is furnished by examples (6a) and (7a), repeated here as (64) and (65).

(64) ✓Ne / *∅ kupil li Petr žurnala?
NEG / ∅ bought Q Petr journal$_{GEN}$
'Did(n't) Petr buy any journal?'

(65) *Ne / *∅ znaet li nikto iz vas, kak èto delaetsja?
NEG / ∅ know Q NI-who of you how this is-done
intended: 'Do(n't) any of you know how to do this?'

Brown and Franks' account works as follows. Regular, semantically active negation is expressed structurally by a NegP. The head of NegP is the morpheme *ne*; the specifier of NegP is a negation operator (NO). NO is the semantically active part of negation. For Brown and Franks, *ni*-phrases are licensed in the scope of semantically active negation, whereas GoN can be licensed by semantically active or expletive negation.

In examples (64) and (65) the verb and negation form a complex head. Together they move to the interrogative complementizer *li*. The interrogative CP has a structure similar to NegP. *Li* is the complementizer, the semantically active interrogative operator occupies [Spec, CP]. A simplified structure for (64), following Brown and Franks (1995: 269), is given in (66).

(66)



The structure in (66) is well formed according to Brown and Franks, but negation is semantically vacuous.[41] The reason for this, Brown and Franks claim, is that the negative operator (NO) only has negative force under certain conditions. Brown and Franks offer various formulations of these conditions (NO must take *ne* in its scope to have negative force; NO must take T in its scope to have negative force). Under either formulation, negation will lack semantic content in (66) since neither *ne* nor T are in the scope of NO. By assumption, semantically vacuous negation is able to license GoN.

Brown and Franks then ask what it would take for negation to be semantically active in example (64). NO would necessarily have to be activated. One possibility is for negation to move, as in (67). According to Brown and Franks, (67) is ruled out by Relativized Minimality. To reach its position, NO has to cross over another A'-operator, the yes/no operator. This is banned under Relativized Minimality. The fact that structure (67) is ill-formed, Brown and Franks claim, forces negation to be semantically vacuous in example (64) (and similarly for (65)), which explains why *ni*-phrases cannot be licensed.

[41] The basis for this claim and its merits will be discussed in the next section.

(67)



As it stands, the account is incomplete, however. The structure in (67) is not the only conceivable way in which NO could become semantically activated. It would be just as plausible to assume that head movement reconstructs. NO could then be activated without incurring a violation of Relativized Minimality. In other words, the tacit assumption that head movement in interrogatives is not subject to reconstruction is a crucial part of Brown and Franks' analysis.

This is quite interesting because the assumption that negation doesn't reconstruct is by itself sufficient to explain why *ni*-phrases cannot be licensed. There is no need to invoke semantically vacuous negation. To see this, I must review a further assumption that Brown and Franks make.

Early on in the paper, Brown and Franks (1995: 243) explicitly adopt Progovac's (1994) theory of *ni*-phrases. Progovac (1994: 69), as noted above in section 2.3, assumes that the local domain within which *ni*-phrases can be licensed is IP (here called TP). *Ne* ends up outside of TP and must be prevented from reconstructing back into TP as we have seen. This alone explains why *ni*-phrases cannot be licensed. Invoking semantically vacuous negation adds a theoretical entity, but it adds nothing to the account.

In fact, the account is substantially complicated. In particular, two of the crucial assumptions that go into the explanation remain arbitrary stipulations: (i) semantically inactive negation licenses GoN but not *ni*-phrases; (ii) NO is only active when taking *ne*/T^0 in its scope. This is not an explanation by any standards.

In the present system, we can account for the asymmetry between GoN and *ni*-phrase licensing in (64) and (65) as long as we borrow Brown and Franks' assumption that *ne* in negated yes/no question does not reconstruct. The final structure will be (68), which is in relevant respects identical to (66).[42]

(68)



The sentence is acceptable, because GoN is licensed on-line on the NP *žurnala*, before v_{GoN} undergoes head movement. v_{GoN} itself is in a local relation with negation both before movement and after movement, which allows v_{GoN} to check its feature [F] against the [NEG] feature on negation at any time during the derivation. Of course, if negation is absent altogether, [F] cannot be licensed on v_{GoN} and an illicit structure is formed. This explains GoN licensing in (64).

The structure for (65) is identical to that in (68), except that there is a *ni*-phrase in object position. The *ni*-phrase, according to the account argued for in section 2, would have to move at LF into a position from where it c-commands *ne*. Since, by assumption, *ne* does not reconstruct, the only possible such position is [Spec, CP]. However, by locality, the *ni*-phrase cannot leave its containing TP. There is, then, no way the *ni*-phrase can be licensed, which explains why (65) is unacceptable.

The locality approach pursued in the present paper is crucially different from Brown and Franks' account and comes closer to an actual expla-

[42] I will assume later that *ne* actually takes high scope in the kind of example diagrammed in (66). This is, to be sure, incompatible with the view from section 2 where scope was equated with c-command and c-command was defined in terms of the first branching node. This issue with Head Movement is well known. I continue to use familiar structures like (66) for expository purposes but refer the reader to Matushansky (2002) for an approach to Head Movement that is compatible with the letter of the assumptions made here. The issue of Head Movement is far too involved to be treated here.

nation, because all pieces that enter into the explanation are independently motivated. The theory of locality and licensing of *ni*-phrases were motivated on independent grounds in sections 2 and 3.

Why negation in yes/no questions with *li* does not reconstruct remains a question for further research. The assumption that negation does not reconstruct in this environment is shared by Brown and Franks' and the present account. Moreover, it is needed independently to explain the behavior of negation in yes/no questions in English, which, for example, always takes scope above modals (Horn 1972, see also the references mentioned in fn. 47). On grounds of simplicity, the present account is to be preferred.[43]

The general logic that was applied to examples (64) and (65) applies more broadly. If negation starts out clause internally, then it will be able to license GoN. If it then moves to a position outside of TP and is prevented from reconstructing, *ni*-phrases will be disallowed. In the next section this logic will be applied to other EN contexts and triggers.

Before turning to those other contexts, let me make a few remarks about Brown's (1999a, b) more recent approach to EN. She assumes that *ni*-phrases carry a [NEG] feature that has to enter into an agreement relation with a feature on negation (Brown 1999b: 106). True negation contains the feature [POL]-[NEG], a negatively valued polarity feature (Brown 1999b: 105). [POL]-[NEG] is the feature that enters into an agreement relation with the [NEG] feature on *ni*-phrases.

Brown locates the asymmetry between *ni*-phrases and GoN in their checking requirements. Where the [NEG] feature on *ni*-phrases can only be licensed under agreement with a feature identical to [POL]-[NEG], GoN only requires a feature which is non-distinct from [POL]-[NEG] (Brown 1999b: 106), i.e., either unvalued [POL] or [POL]-[NEG] (Brown 1999b: 109; see fn. 35 of the present paper for additional critical discussion of Brown's Case theory). This is the first stipulated asymmetry between GoN and *ni*-phrases. In negated yes/no questions with *li*, *ne* moves up to *li* along with the verb creating a structure that is again very similar to those

[43] In declarative contexts clause initial negation cannot be above TP at LF. This is shown by example (i), where a *ni*-phrase is possible and, crucially, a *nibud'*-indefinite is impossible. In cases like this, negation presumably never raises to C. The word order might be a result of the verb undergoing short verb movement to Neg with the subject staying in situ or it might result from topicalizing a remnant NegP. Such movement for reasons of information structure (like topicalization) is typically phrasal movement rather than head movement (compare V2 phenomena in Germanic).

(i) Ne čital on *čto-nibud' / *čego-nibud' ✓ničego.
NEG read on $what_{ACC}$-NIBUD' $what_{GoN}$-NIBUD' NI-what
'He didn't read anything.'

seen above in (66) and (68)—leaving details of clausal architecture aside that are irrelevant for present purposes. *Li* is the interrogative complementizer, which is characterized by the feature [POL]-[Q] (Brown 1999b: 105), another instance of the polarity feature. [POL]-[Q] is neither identical to [POL]-[NEG] nor non-distinct from it. Therefore, it can license neither GoN nor *ni*-phrases.

Brown observes that the complex head situated in the complementizer position of the clause now contains two differently valued instances of the polarity feature: [POL]-[Q] on *li* and [POL]-[NEG] on *ne.* The two features form part of the same complex head. According to Chomsky (1995b chapter 3 and 4), all members of a complex head are in a checking configuration. Brown assumes that the two distinct instances of the polarity feature in a checking configuration lead to a fatal violation. Under the name of feature mismatch Chomsky 1995b: 308–11 had proposed just that for structural Case features and their structural Case assigners.

This fatal violation can only be avoided if, instead of true negation, its homophone, expletive negation, occupies the position in the complex head.[44] Expletive negation is characterized by the unvalued polarity feature [POL] (Brown 1999b: 109), which does not mismatch with the interrogative feature [POL]-[Q] on *li*. By assumption, bare [POL] licenses GoN but not *ni*-phrases, which accounts for the facts in (64) and (65). To avoid rampant overgeneration, Brown assumes that the unvalued [POL] feature has to be identified in a checking configuration with a valued [POL] feature.

Let us turn to feature mismatch for a moment. Recall that Case theory originally motivated the mismatch relation (Chomsky 1995: 308–09). Chomsky has since abandoned this relation (Chomsky 2000) and Brown's Case theory does the same. This leaves feature mismatch as a theoretical tool without application outside of the explanation of the GoN/*ni*-phrase asymmetry. Feature mismatch is thus a second stipulation made exclusively to explain that one asymmetry.

Moreover, this stipulation is conceptually questionable. For Brown, feature mismatch applies to interpretable features: both [POL] and [POL]-[Q] are by assumption interpretable (see fn. 4). However, it is doubtful that feature mismatch was ever intended to apply to interpretable features. Why should a deeply syntactic notion such as checking-domain regulate the co-occurrence of semantic features? Even if it were allowed to apply to some semantic features, it could not apply to all of them. For example, in cases of noun incorporation into verbs, the complex head will

[44] Brown's semantic characterization of EN is discussed in fn. 4.

contain the interpretable categorial features [N] and [V] in a checking configuration. Why doesn't that lead to feature mismatch? Feature mismatch, even if admitted into the theory, is hardly extendable in a non-stipulative way to interpretable features.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether Brown's theory manages to avoid serious over-generation. Since Brown does not offer any discussion of this, it is hard to know where else the feature [POL] would play a role. For example, we do not know whether Brown would assume that the conditional complementizer *esli* 'if' contains a [POL] feature. Progovac, whom Brown follows in many things, certainly makes this assumption. But then EN should be licensed not only in interrogatives but also in conditionals, counter to fact. To avoid this kind of overgeneration, yet another stipulation is needed: only [POL]-[Q] is able to identify bare [POL].

Finally, Brown's theory is incomplete in that she offers no theory of locality of *ni*-phrase licensing. If the thoughts from section 2.3 are on the right track, then Brown's theory might make the notion of EN as a bare [POL] feature as superfluous as it was in Brown and Franks' theory.

As far as I can see, nothing is gained and explanatory depth is lost if we follow Brown's assumptions.

4.3. Summary

In short, an analysis of Brown and Franks' (1995, 1997) account of examples (64) and (65) revealed a tacit assumption: in negated yes/no questions with *li*, negation does not reconstruct at LF. It was shown that this assumption, together with the licensing and locality of *ni*-phrases and of GoN assumed in Brown and Franks is sufficient to derive the asymmetry even without postulating that morphological negation without negative force exists. It was shown that under present assumptions, too, it is sufficient to assume that negation does not reconstruct in negated yes/no questions with *li.* Finally, Brown's (1999a, b) more recent work was discussed. The issues brought up in fn. 4 and 35 apart, Brown's theory of EN was shown to lack explanatory power.

5. EN Triggers and Their Properties

The logic developed in the previous section demanded the assumption that negation in yes/no questions with *li* cannot reconstruct. This gives the complementizer a special role, since it must be the interrogative complementizer that prevents reconstruction. The intuition that complementizers play an important role in EN phenomena is shared by many who have

worked on EN (see Espinal 1992; Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997).

The special role of complementizers for EN is easily demonstrated. Compare examples (69=7b) and (70) (based again on data noticed by Brown and Franks 1995), which form a minimal pair. The difference lies in the choice of complementizer: *kak by* vs. *čto*. In (69), with *kak by,* negation has the characteristics of EN: it is unable to license the *ni*-phrase. With the complementizer *čto,* negation is true negation: *ni*-phrase licensing becomes possible.

(69) *Ja bojus', {kak by / čtoby} nikto ne opozdal.
I fear how MOD that NI-who NEG was-late
intended: 'I fear that somebody might be late.'

(70) ✓Ja bojus', čto nikto ne opozdal.
I fear that NI-who NEG was-late.
'I am afraid that nobody was late.'

An important role for the complementizer (or some element in its vicinity) is also suggested by the contrast between examples (71a=7a) and (71b), on the one hand, and (71c), on the other. In (71a) negation (and the verb to which negation procliticizes) appear clause initially and in front of the interrogative complementizer *li* (on the status of *li* as a complementizer cf. King 1994). In (71b) a silent interrogative complementizer is employed and the same effect holds. However, if the same string of words is pronounced with declarative intonation, the *ni*-phrase becomes possible as in (71c) (cf. for comparable examples Brown 1999a: 68 ex. 29–30). These examples strongly suggest that the specific choice of complementizer (interrogative vs. declarative) matters.

(71) a. *Ne znaet li nikto iz vas, kak èto delaetsja?
NEG knows li NI-who of you how this is-done
'Don't any of you know how to do this?'

b. *Ne znaet nikto iz vas kak èto delaetsja?
NEG knows NI-who of you how this is-done
'Don't any of you know how to do this?' (Brown and Franks 1995: 270 ex. 270c)

c. ✓Ne znaet nikto iz vas kak èto delaetsja!
NEG knows NI-who of you how this is-done
'None of you knows how to do this!'

It seems safe to assume that properties of the complementizer play a very important role in explaining the complex patterns observed with EN in Russian.

In this section I take a second look at negated yes/no questions, this time from a semantic point of view. I argue that Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997 do not offer any convincing evidence for assuming that negation is semantically vacuous (Brown and Franks 1995, 1997) or that it lacks negative force (Brown 1999a, b) in these cases. Its unusual properties can be explained by its high LF position.

I then turn to other EN contexts, trying to extend the logic developed in the previous section, i.e., the only thing that is special about EN is its high LF position. This section offers a view on the triggers of EN, i.e., (8iii), the only part of the overall theory of EN that we have not yet touched upon.

5.1. Yes/No Interrogatives

I now discuss several sets of data from Brown 1999a, b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997 that are claimed either to require negation without negative force or to give additional support for the analysis invoking negation without negative force.

The first such argument has to do with *nibud'*-indefinites. Brown and Franks (1995) and Brown (1999b) claim that negation without semantic force sometimes occurs in questions even when it is not fronted, i.e., when it appears clause medially (72a). The difference between clause initial and clause medial negation in yes/no questions is that initial negation never has negative force in yes/no questions, but clause medial negation sometimes does (72b). The question is whether (72a) has to be analyzed as an instance of EN.

(72) a. ✓A kogo-nibud' drugogo iz podpol'ščikov ty
and who-NIBUD' other of undergrounders you
ne znaeš'?
NEG know
'So don't you know any others from the underground?'

b. ✓A nikogo drugogo iz podpol'ščikov ty ne znaeš'?
and NI-who other of undergrounders you NEG know
'So don't you know any others from the underground?'

Brown and Franks' claim that clause internal negation in (72a) lacks negative force is based on the generalization alluded to before in the discussion of example (62): *nibud'*-indefinites are NPIs that never co-occur with semantically active clausemate negation (for discussion of *nibud'*-indefinites see Pereltsvaig 2000 and references cited there). The generalization is illustrated in (73). Example (73a) shows that *nibud'*-indefinites do not occur with clausemate negation; example (73b) shows that they need a polarity licenser to be licit, and (73c) shows that superordinate negation is a possible licenser.

(73) a. *Ivan čto-nibud' / čego-nibud' ne znaet.
Ivan what$_{ACC}$-NIBUD' / what$_{GoN}$- NIBUD' NEG know

b. *Ivan čto-nibud' znaet.
Ivan what-NIBUD' know

c. ✓Fedja ne skazal čto on čto-nibud'
Fedja NEG said that he what-NIBUD'
znaet ob ètom.
knows about that.
'Fedja didn't say that he knows anything about this.'

If the generalization about *nibud'*-indefinites were true, this might be an argument that negation in (72a) does not have negative force and hence does not block the *nibud'*-indefinite. The problem with the argument is that the generalization is wrong. *Nibud'*-indefinites can appear in the same clause as true negation as (74=62) shows (see Abels 2002a; Partee and Borschev 2001, 2002).

(74) ✓Možet byt', oni čego-nibud' ne čitali.
may be they what$_{GoN}$-NIBUD' (non-specific) NEG read
'Maybe there is something they didn't read.'

The *nibud'*-indefinite (which as noted behaves like an NPI and needs a licenser) is licensed by the higher modal (*možet byt'*). It takes scope above negation, which is clearly semantically active negation in this example. It seems that *nibud'*-indefinites are disallowed within the scope of clausemate negation, but they are not incompatible with regular clausemate negation per se. As long as a *nibud'*-indefinite can outscope negation and find a licenser outside the scope of negation, nothing goes wrong. The crucial difference between (73a) and example (72a) is that in (73a) there is no licenser for the *nibud'*-indefinite, but in (72a) there is. As (75) shows,

nibud′-indefinites occur regularly in questions. In (75) the *nibud′*-pronoun is licensed by the interrogative operator. The same is presumably true in (72a). There is no need to invoke semantically vacuous negation to explain these examples.[45]

(75) ✓Ty znaeš′ kogo-nibud′ drugogo iz podpol'ščikov?
you know who-NIBUD′ other of undergrounders
'Do you know anybody else from the underground?'

I have shown that the generalization underlying Brown and Franks' argument in favor of negation without negative force in example (72a) is wrong. The relevant factor in (72a) is scope. This, as a reviewer points out, is not a knock down argument against assuming semantically vacuous negation. However, it shows that the paradigm in (72) does not argue for assuming semantically vacuous negation either.[46, 47]

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[45] The following example serves to corroborate the hypothesis that all that is involved in (72a) is scope (see Abels 2002a).

(i) ✓Počemu ja, durak, ne poslal srazu rukopis′ v
why I idiot NEG sent immediately manuscript to
kakuju-nibud′ redakciju?
which-NIBUD′ publisher
'Why was I so stupid as not to send the paper to some publisher immediately?'

Example (i), from the Uppsala corpus (accessible at http://heckel.sfb.uni-tuebingen.de/cgi-bin/korpdt.pl?hello=hello), clearly contains semantically real negation as the translation shows yet the *nibud′*-pronoun is licit. This is an example where scope must be the conditioning factor. Declaring that negation lacks negative force plainly will not do here.

[46] The same is true of yet another case discussed by Brown and Franks (1995: 273 ex. 77):

(i) *Ètu li knigu ty ne podaril komu-nibud′?
this Q book you NEG gave who-NIBUD′
*'Is it this book that you did not give to anyone or not?'

Brown and Franks conclude from this example that negation must be real in (i) and cannot be expletive. We have seen that this conclusion is not warranted. The difference between example (i) and the examples discussed in the text, the previous footnote, and example (iii) is that focal questions with *li* simply do not license *nibud′*-indefinites (ii).

(ii) *Ètu li knigu podaril komu-nibud′?
this Q book gave who-NIBUD′

(iii) ✓Podaril (li) komu-nibud′ ètu knigu?
gave Q who-NIBUD′ this book
'Did he give this book to anybody?'

[47] Brown (1999a, b) finds evidence for semantically non-negative negation also in English yes/no questions. The basic datum supporting Brown's claim is a contrast involving *until* in English. (See also Linebarger (1980 especially p. 4 fn. 5.) Tovena 1998 (chapter 4, in particular p. 90–107) develops a convincing account of such cases without invoking semanti-

More generally, it will be extremely difficult for proponents of negation without negative force to construct a direct semantic argument for their position based on yes/no interrogatives, since on the standard account (Hamblin 1973) a polar question and its negation denote the same object as long as negation takes widest scope.[48] Polar interrogatives provide no reason to doubt the null assumption.

In this subsection we have considered Russian facts in some detail. Brown and Franks claim that the behavior of clause-medial negation in Russian yes/no questions may show the typical diagnostic behavior of EN. This claim was shown to be baseless. The facts can be easily accounted for in terms of scope. An account in terms of scope is to be preferred on grounds of simplicity and parsimony.

5.2. *Ne … i* (Borovikoff 1997)

Borovikoff (1997) claims that negation in *ne … i* contexts is expletive negation. She observes (1997: 79) that "[(76a)] conveys a partitive 'less than' interpretation, something along the lines of 'he was only writing for less than a minute'; [(76b)] undoubtedly renders absolute negation and means 'he did not write at all, not even for one minute'."

(76) a. On ne pisal i minuty.
he NEG wrote even minute$_{GEN}$
'He did NEG write even for a minute.'

b. On ne pisal ni minuty.
he NEG wrote NI minute$_{GEN}$
'He did not write for one minute.'

Borovikoff continues that "the *ne … i* construction induces a partitive 'less than' interpretation and may be viewed as a special type of 'pleonastic' negation. Pleonastic negation is specific in that it carries, in fact, a *positive* meaning, i.e., it is present phonologically, but semantically it is null. It has

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cally vacuous negation. Given Tovena's account, Brown's example fails to establish the existence of semantically non-negative negation.

[48] Some authors deviate from the standard view (e.g., Roberts 1998). Also see Büring and Gunlogsen 2000 for potential arguments in favor of the position that negation is real but very high in the tree in negated yes/no interrogatives. See also the distinction between eventuality and proposition negation made in Przepiórkowski and Kupść 1999. The different types of yes/no questions that Brown and Franks and Brown list should be carefully looked at and matched with the data in Büring and Gunlogsen. The task would go beyond the scope of this paper.

no interpretive value, and appears solely for the purpose of satisfying some idiosyncratic grammatical requirements (see Brown and Franks 1995)." According to Borovikoff, this pleonastic negation cum partitive interpretation "is a general phenomenon and applies with equal force to complements and adjuncts alike" (1997: 80).

First of all, it is hard to understand what the basis of the claim that negation is pleonastic in this case is. The crucial example (76a) denies that he wrote for a full minute. This is expected if negation is real and *i* is treated semantically along the lines of English *even* (for which see Karttunen and Peters 1979; Kay 1990; Lahiri 1998; Rooth 1985; Wilkinson 1996). Given her glosses and translations, Borovikoff clearly endorses the view that *i* should be treated along the lines of *even.* The semantic grounds for claiming that negation is pleonastic, or expletive in present terminology, are thus not very clear. However, Borovikoff gives a syntactic argument to bolster this claim. She gives an example where a *ni*-phrase is incompatible with the *ne … i* construction. Just as we are assuming here, Borovikoff assumes that the inability to license *ni*-phrases (77) (Borovikoff 1997: 80 ex. 31) and the simultaneous ability to license GoN (78) (Borovikoff 1997: 72 ex. 12) is the hallmark of EN.

(77) On ne pisal pis'mo / čego-to / *ničego i minuty.
he NEG wrote letter something *nothing even minute
'He didn't write a letter/something/nothing even for a minute.'

(78) Ja ne xoču čitat' i odnoj stat'i.
I NEG want read even one article$_{GEN}$
'I don't want to read even one article.'

However, it would be false to assume that the *ne … i* construction is in general unable to license *ni*-phrases:

(79) ✓Ni odin kandidat ne polučal daže i odnogo
NI one candidate NEG received even even one
golosa protiv.
vote against
'Not a single candidate got as much as a single vote against him.'

Example 79 (simplified from an item in the Uppsala corpus) invalidates Borovikoff's argument on her own assumptions. The question arises, of course, of why (77) with *ničego* is unacceptable. If Borovikoff is right and

(76a) means that he did write for a bit, just not for a whole minute, then it is clear why (77) with *ničego* is unacceptable: the example would have to assert simultaneously that he didn't write anything and that he wrote for a while.

This subsection has demonstrated that there are no grounds to follow Borovikoff and assume that the *ne … i* construction involves negation without negative force. Her assumption is justified neither semantically nor syntactically. The *ne … i* construction does not behave like EN since *ni*-phrases are possible in the *ne ... i* construction.

5.3. *Poka … ne*

Another environment which is analyzed as an EN environment (Brown 1999b; Brown and Franks 1995, 1997) is the *poka … ne* 'until' construction (examples (80) and (81) are taken from Brown and Franks 1995: 150–51 ex. 52, 55).

(80) ✓Ja podoždu poka ty ne prideš'.
I will-wait until you NEG arrive
'I'll wait for you until you arrive.'

(81) Ja podoždu poka {✓kto-nibud' / *nikto} ne pridet.
I will-wait until who- NIBUD' / NI-who NEG arrive
'I will wait until someone comes.'

On the present theory we have to assume that, at LF, negation raises to a very high position.[49] In the high, LF position, negation is outside the TP in the complement clause of *poka.* By the logic developed in section 4, negation is thus expected to pattern with superordinate negation as far as licensing of *ni-phrase*s and *nibud'*-indefinites is concerned. Example (81), when compared with (2c) and (73c) shows that this expectation is borne out. Negation is also expected to pattern with clausemate negation as far as GoN licensing goes. Two questions arise immediately. What forces negation to move to that position? Is it possible to devise a lexical entry for *poka* that is compatible with this idea? I address the semantics of *poka* first. Once the semantics of *poka* is in place, the reason why negation must move will also become clear.

[49] This raises again the specter of a theory of Head Movement, an issue that I would like to avoid. See fn. 42.

In order to construct an adequate semantics for *poka*, notice that outside of the *poka … ne* construction *poka* means something along the lines of 'for the moment':

(82) Poka èto tol'ko predpoloženie.
until that only assumption
'For the moment that's only an assumption.'

Poka relates at least two time intervals to each other. First, there is the time interval *t* determined by the clause in which *poka* appears; during this interval the proposition expressed by the clause is true (83a). Second, there is an implied time interval *t´* which comes after the first, i.e., *t*<*t´* in (83b). During this second interval the proposition expressed by the clause in which *poka* appears is false, i.e., $p(w)(t') = 0$ in (83b). The content of (83) is recast in λ-notation in (84).[50]

(83) $[\![poka_1]\!](p) = 1$ iff
a. $p(w)(t) = 1$
b. $\exists t'\ t<t' \ \&\ p(w)(t') = 0$

(84) $[\![poka_1]\!] = \lambda p.\lambda w.\lambda t.\ [p(w)(t) = 1 \ \&\ \exists t'\ [t<t' \ \&\ p(w)(t') = 0]]$

When applied to (82), (83) says (a) the referent of *èto* is only an assumption at *t* and b) there is a time *t´*, which comes after *t*, and at *t´* it is false that it is only an assumption. Notice that there is an implied point in time when the change takes place.

Although (83) is certainly good enough for my purposes, it is worth pointing out that the lexical entry is somewhat of an oversimplification. Since *poka* refers to states and changes of states it might be more profitable to say that *p* is true at the reference time and at all times up until a certain point *t´*. From that point *t´* on, *p* is false. This is expressed in (85), where *t´*, the time at which the change takes place, is not existentially closed but only λ-bound.

(85) $[\![poka_1]\!] = \lambda p\lambda w\lambda t\lambda t'\colon t<t'.[p(w)(t) = 1 \ \&\ [\forall t''[t<t''<t' \rightarrow p(w)(t'')] \ \&\ \forall t''[t'<t'' \rightarrow p(w)(t'') = 0]]]$

[50] I am taking propositions here to be functions from world-time pairs to truth values. In (83) *p* is a variable over propositions, *w* and *t* are the world and time variables, respectively. Finally "<" is the temporal precedence relation.

While this simple *poka* (*poka*$_1$) takes only one clause as its argument, in the *poka … ne* construction, *poka* (*poka*$_2$) takes two clauses as arguments. *Poka*$_1$ and *poka*$_2$ are clearly related. *Poka*$_1$ says that the clause which *poka* appears in is true for the moment. *Poka*$_2$ also says that the main clause is true for the moment. *Poka*$_2$ adds the information that the main clause will become false when a condition specified in the subordinate clause is met. While the main clause in the *poka … ne* construction is just like the argument of *poka*$_1$, the subordinate clause behaves in the exact opposite way: its descriptive content (without negation) is false now and will become true later. This switch happens for both clauses at the same point in time *t´*.

A possible paraphrase of example (80) that makes this explicit is the following: For the moment I am waiting and for the moment you haven't arrived and the time *t´* at which I'll stop waiting is also the time *t´* at which you arrive. This paraphrase makes explicit the relation between the basic lexical entry for *poka*, i.e., *poka*$_1$, and *poka* in the *poka … ne* construction, i.e., *poka*$_2$. This paraphrase was used in constructing the lexical entry for *poka*$_2$ in (86).

(86) $[\![\text{poka}_2]\!] = \lambda q.\lambda f_{<t,t>}\lambda p\lambda w\lambda t\lambda t'$: $t<t' \ \&\ f(1) = 0 \ \&\ f(0) = 1$.
$[[\![\text{poka}_1]\!](p)(w)(t)(t') \ \&$
$\exists q'\forall w', t''[t<t'' \rightarrow [q'(w')(t'') = f(q(w')(t'')) \ \&$
$[\![\text{poka}_1]\!](q')(w)(t)(t')]]] =$
$\lambda q\lambda f_{<t,t>}\lambda p\lambda w\lambda t\lambda t'$: $t<t' \ \&\ f(1) = 0 \ \&\ f(0) = 1$.
$[p(w)(t) = 1 \ \&\ \forall t''[t<t''<t' \rightarrow p(w)(t'') = 1] \ \&$
$\forall t''[t'<t'' \rightarrow p(w)(t'') = 0]]] \ \&\ f(q(w)(t)) = 1 \ \&\ \forall t''[t<t''<t' \rightarrow$
$f(q(w)(t'')) = 1] \ \&\ \forall t''[t'<t'' \rightarrow f(q(w)(t'')) = 0]]]$

Poka$_1$ takes two arguments fewer than *poka*$_2$. The two additional arguments are a proposition *q* and a one-place truth-functional operator *f*. The lexical entry for *poka*$_2$ stipulates as a presupposition that the truth-functional operator must be negation.[51] This explains the first line of (86). The second and third lines are the assertion. It is asserted in line two that *poka*$_1$ is true of *p*, where *p* is the matrix clause. With regard to example (80) this means 'for the moment I am waiting'. *Poka*$_2$ further asserts (line three) that there is a proposition *q´*, which is equal to applying the truth-functional operator *f*, i.e., negation, to the first argument *q* of *poka*$_2$, i.e., the subordinate clause without negation. This proposition *q´* when fed to *poka*$_1$

[51] I borrow the notation for presuppositions and assertions from Heim and Kratzer 1998. A lambda expression starts with the list of arguments; the presupposition is set off by a colon; the assertion follows the presupposition and is set off by a period.

(i) λaλbλc : presupposition . assertion

must be true. The moments at which *p*, the matrix clause, and *q′*, the negation of the subordinate clause, change truth values is the same future moment *t′*.

The three lines after the equal sign simply show what the result is of plugging $poka_1$ into the lexical entry of $poka_2$.

To recap, $poka_2$ takes three arguments: (i) a proposition *q* (the subordinate clause without negation); (ii) a one-place truth-functional operator *f* (which is negation by stipulation), and (iii) another proposition *p* (the matrix clause). $Poka_2$ says (i) that *p* is true and will become false ($poka_1(p)$), (ii) that while *p* is true, *q* is false, and (iii) that when *p* becomes false, *q* will be true. In other words, *p* and *q* have opposite truth values at all times. Put yet another way, *poka ja podoždu* is true and, when evaluated with respect to a specific world and time, it is the negation of *poka ty prideš′*.

We can now see why negation has to be present in the subordinate clause and why it cannot stay in its clause internal position. The lexical entry for $poka_2$ (86) allows $poka_2$ to take a truth-functional operator as its argument, *f*, and introduces the presupposition that *f* is negation. If negation is not at LF in a position where *poka* can take it as its argument, semantic interpretation cannot proceed because *poka* will lack one of its arguments. Alternatively, if the truth-functional operator is identity instead of negation, a presupposition failure will ensue. This accounts for the fact that at LF, negation must be present right above *poka*. If it is not, the sentence is either uninterpretable or a presupposition failure and hence deviant.

The question of course arises of why negation is not base generated adjoined to or as the specifier of *poka.* It seems reasonable to believe that even so-called constituent negation cannot be generated in every conceivable position. For example, if John bought a big car, but you want to deny that it was white, you have to say *John bought not a big WHITE car, but…*; you could not say *John bought a big not white car, but….* The same is true in Russian. There are only a restricted number of positions where negation can be generated. I assume that negation must be generated in its usual position in NegP if it is to move to *poka* later on (see (48) above). If this is true, we must make sure that negation does not raise overtly to *poka.* This can be done by using the standard descriptive devices of the theory that distinguish overt from covert movement, i.e., strong vs. weak features or their equivalents.

I have demonstrated that in defining $poka_2$ of the *poka … ne* construction in terms of regular *poka*, $poka_1$, we make heavy use of negation. The

role of negation is made explicit in (86), where it acts as an argument of *poka*$_2$.

Proponents of EN as a separate theoretical entity would also have to provide lexical entries for *poka*$_1$ and *poka*$_2$. *Poka*$_2$ would not take negation explicitly as its argument. The role of negation in relating *poka*$_1$ and *poka*$_2$ would still be there, albeit implicitly.[52] To account for the facts, proponents of EN would then have to add the stipulation that *poka* has a selectional requirement demanding EN to appear in its complement.

Although there is no sufficiently explicit theory of the lexicon that would force the choice between these two options, the one pursued here seems more natural. Negation necessarily plays a role in relating *poka*$_1$ and *poka*$_2$. Proponents of EN say that the negation we see in the surface of sentences like (80) and (81) has nothing to do with the negation involved in relating *poka*$_1$ to *poka*$_2$; rather, the negation we actually see lacks negative force. This would be implausible even if the theoretical entity of negation without negative force were independently motivated. Certainly then the *poka … ne* construction cannot be used as an argument in favor of the existence of negation without negative force.

5.4. *Kak by* and *čtoby*

A particularly interesting context in which EN occurs is under the verb *bojat'sja* 'to fear'. As we have seen, when 'fear' takes the complementizers *kak by* or *čtoby* negation is expletive. This was shown in examples (6b) and (7b) repeated here as (87) and (88) respectively. These examples illustrate that negation here behaves like EN: it can license GoN, but it cannot license *ni*-phrases. The complementizers *kak by* and *čtoby* introduce clauses in the subjunctive, which is syncretic in Russian with the past tense.[53] *Bojat'sja* can also appear with the complementizer *čto*; in this case the complement is in the indicative and negation behaves like regular negation (89).

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[52] The lexical entry for *poka*$_2$ under the EN hypothesis would be (i), which is a trivial variation on (86).

(i) $[\![\text{poka}_2]\!] = \lambda q \lambda p \lambda w \lambda t \lambda t'$: $t<t'$.
$[[\![\text{poka}_1]\!](p)(w)(t)(t') \;\&\; \exists q' \forall w', t''[t<t'' \rightarrow [q'(w')(t'') =$
$\neg(q(w')(t'')) \;\&\; [\![\text{poka}_1]\!](q')(w)(t)(t')]]]$

[53] This is not to suggest that this syncretism is a coincidence. See Cinque (1999 chapter 3) for several examples suggesting a close link between morphological "future of the past" and conditional interpretations typical of the subjunctive. *By* by itself is presumably an irrealis marker.

(87) ✓Ja bojus', kak by / čtoby Petr ne narušil èksperimenta.
I fear how MOD that Petr NEG ruined experiment$_{GoN}$
'I fear Petr might ruin the experiment.'

(88) *Ja bojus', kak by / čtoby nikto ne opozdal.
I fear how MOD that NI-who NEG was-late

(89) ✓Ja bojus', čto nikto ne opozdal.
I fear that NI-who NEG was-late.
'I am afraid that nobody was late.'

Apart from the superficial intuition (based on tradition and the translation into English) that negation does not have negative force here, no argument has been provided to treat negation that way.

Subjunctive in Russian occurs predominantly under the complementizer *čtoby* embedded under verbs of wishing or commanding or in unselected purpose clauses. All these contexts have the property in common that the proposition in the subjunctive is seen as desirable. In the terminology of Cinque (1999: 84–85), this is a case of "evaluative" mood. Citing work by Rescher (Rescher 1968) and Palmer (Palmer 1986), Cinque provides the following gloss for evaluative mood: "It is a good/perfectly wonderful/bad thing that *p*" (Cinque 1999: 84). Evaluative mood does not "affect the truth of the proposition, but rather express[es] the speaker's (positive, negative, or other) evaluation of the state of affairs described in it" (Cinque 1999: 84). Given the contexts where subjunctive occurs in Russian, it seems plausible to assume that subjunctive carries positive evaluative mood in Russian.[54]

It is unclear what the basis for Cinque's claim is that evaluative mood always expresses only the speaker's evaluation of the propositional content. In embedded clauses, evaluative mood could just as easily reflect the evaluation by the subject of some higher propositional attitude predicate.[55]

If this is true and subjunctive in Russian has a positive evaluative component, then we may begin to understand why negation occurs in subjunctive clauses under the verb 'fear'. Fearing *p* is incompatible with

[54] The evaluative mood head is abstract. Presumably it resides between the base position of the particle *by* and the complementizer *čto*. The two are morphologically glued together in the complex complementizer *čtoby* and nothing can intervene between them. In other contexts, *by* can appear on its own and is mobile.

[55] Effects like this are familiar from sequence of tense phenomena, where matrix tense is interpreted deictically, but embedded tense ends up being interpreted relative to matrix tense.

having a positive evaluation of *p*. Negation under fear would have to negate the positive evaluation of *p* rather than *p* itself. Negating the content of evaluative mood has no truth-functional effect presumably because evaluative mood itself does not have a truth-functional effect.

A further point to note about evaluative mood is that, according to Cinque, it occupies a position in the clause which is extremely high. In fact, of the 32 functional heads that Cinque assumes in a clause, evaluative mood is the second highest. It is topped only by one modal head, namely speech act.

Given that evaluative mood resides very high in the clause and that negation must move to that position to be able to take it in its scope, we can also understand why negation shows all the signs of EN, i.e., why it can license GoN but not *ni*-phrases. As with *poka*, negation is generated in NegP and then raises at LF to evaluative mood.[56] Incidentally, this conclusion agrees with another claim made by Cinque, namely that there is no base generated negation as high as the evaluative mood head. This would explain why negation has to move to that position, an assumption we need in order to account for GoN licensing.

This account, sketchy though it may be, ties together the inherent semantics of subjunctive in Russian (positive evaluative mood), with the meaning of 'fear'. I claimed that positive evaluative mood is incompatible with a verb like 'fear'. Negation needs to come to the rescue to negate that positive evaluation. Many questions remain, of course, but I believe that the intuition itself is reasonably clear.

Let us examine the account that proponents of the EN-hypothesis would give of these facts. First, they would have to invoke a selectional requirement: *bojat'sja*, when embedding a subjunctive complement and only then, requires the presence of negation lacking negative force. This is, at best, a restatement of the facts. No explanation is offered for why this happens only in subjunctive complements. No explanation is offered for why this happens under the verb *bojat'sa* but not under verbs of commanding and wishing. The present account, on the other hand, offers a glimmer of an understanding of these facts. Crucially, the present account does not rely on negation ever lacking negative force.

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[56] In this context it might be interesting to recall that, according to Espinal (1992), the occurrence of EN under verbs of fear or doubt is quite common. This might be tied, along the lines suggested here, to the inherent semantics of the subjunctive employed in the complements of these verbs. Languages differ with regard to whether subjunctive carries the positive evaluative mood component that it apparently has in Russian or not. A proper compositional analysis of these facts must wait for a later occasion.

I conclude that the fact that EN occurs in subjunctive complements embedded under the verb *bojat'sja* can hardly be taken as an argument for the existence of negation lacking negative force.[57]

5.5. Summary

In this section I have surveyed the environments that have been claimed to involve negation without negative force in Russian. Two such contexts, clause-medial negation in yes/no questions and the *ne … i* construction, were shown not to exhibit the typical diagnostic properties of EN (licensing of GoN, no licensing of *ni*-phrases) at all. I further argued that there is no convincing evidence from yes/no questions that would force us to assume that negation lacks negative force in questions. In fact, such evidence would be difficult to come by, since yes/no questions are standardly treated as pairs of propositions where one is the opposite of the other (Hamblin 1973). On this view, a yes/no question with (high scope) negation and a yes/no question without negation denote the same object. Finally, I discussed the *poka … ne* construction and the subjunctive complements of the verb *bojat'sja*. In both cases it was shown that the analysis in terms of negation without negative force is non-explanatory and that the assumption that negation always has negative force sheds more light on these constructions.

The overall conclusion is that no evidence has been offered to support the notion that negation without negative force exists. The null assumption that it does not exist is, in fact, better equipped to deal with the facts.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I have investigated some asymmetries in the distribution of GoN and *ni*-phrases in Russian. The paradigms have previously been dis-

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[57] There is a final context in which negation without negative force is invoked (Brown and Franks 1995: 261, Brown 1999a: 95), the *čut´… ne* construction (i). However, in this construction neither GoN nor *ni*-phrases are licensed (ii). This indicates that we are dealing here with true cases of constituent negation, which is known not to license GoN or *ni*-phrases in Russian. Again, there is no need to invoke negation without negative force, as the negated sentence without *čut´* is in fact true, i.e., (i) entails that he didn't break the glass.

(i) ✓On čut' {ne uronil stakan / stakan ne uronil}.
he almost NEG broke glass / glass NEG broke
'He almost broke the glass.'

(ii) *On čut' ne uronil stakana / nikakoj stakan.
he almost NEG broke $\text{glass}_{\text{GoN}}$ / $\text{NI-which}_{\text{ACC}}\text{glass}_{\text{ACC}}$

I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of these facts.

cussed under the heading of EN. A special variety of negation without negative force is invoked by these theories. As discussed at the outset, such theories are made up of four components:

(8i) a theory of *ni*-phrase licensing (under regular negation), which explains the contrast between (2a) and (2c);
(8ii) a theory of GoN licensing (under regular and expletive negation), which explains the contrast between (1a) and (1c);
(8iii) a theory of the triggers for EN, which explains the contrast between (7) and (2a);
(8iv) a theory which gives content to the notion of *expletive negation* as opposed to regular *negation* to explain the contrast between (7) and (6). For Brown and Franks (1995, 1997), EN is characterized by an inactive operator. For Brown (1999a, b), it is characterized by the absence of a negation feature.

The theories of locality and timing for GoN and *ni*-phrase licensing are needed independently of EN as indicated, i.e., the modules (8i) and (8ii) cannot be eliminated. The theory of triggering environments for EN is also needed independently (8iii). Once these three subtheories have been stated with sufficient care and precision, as I have tried to do in this paper, there is no more need for a special theory giving content to the notion *expletive negation* (8iv).

A number of interesting results were obtained on the way to a more precise statement of the subtheories (8i–iii). First of all, *ni*-phrases turn out to be universal quantifiers (recall the crucial example (31)). They must be licensed syntactically by Spec-Head agreement with negation, and semantically, they must take negation in their immediate scope. Second of all, GoN is licensed on-line and the locality conditions on GoN licensing follow from Relativized Minimality once it is assumed that GoN is structural Case. Finally, there is no evidence (beyond a vague intuition) that expletive negation is indeed semantically vacuous. On the contrary, evidence has been given to show that negation is semantically active in the relevant contexts.

An issue that has not been addressed here is the question of the extent to which the same treatment carries over to expletive negation in other languages, in particular in Romance (see in addition to the sources already cited Espinal 1997; Muller 1978; Portner and Zanuttini 2000 among others). No easy answer is possible. The distributional similarities between expletive negation in Russian (and other Slavic languages, which have been ignored here for the most part) and expletive negation in Ro-

mance suggest that we are dealing with a unified phenomenon. This is also the most probable hypothesis on grounds of learnability, since the principles involved are quite abstract. The main obstacle to a simple unification of the Romance with the Slavic case is that in Romance, according to standard descriptions, expletive negation is optional. Of course, these descriptions are not universally accepted (see Tovena 1996, 1998, where arguments are provided that the optionality of expletive negation is only apparent). Another way to go might be to treat the exponent of expletive negation (e.g., *ne* in French) as an NPI (see van der Wouden and Zwarts 1993), which might help explain why it only optionally surfaces and only in the prestigious dialect. This behavior of *ne* in French is paralleled in cases of regular negation (colloquial: *J'ai pas peur* 'I am not afraid' vs. standard: *Je n'ai pas peur*).

I hope to take up these and many related questions in future work.

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