Paul Grice, saying and meaning *

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Abstract

The notions of 'saying' and 'what is said' are fundamental to Paul Grice's work. This paper argues, however, that the versions of these notions most often attributed to Grice may not be the ones he intended. To support this claim, I examine the original typescripts of Grice's *William James Lectures*, and discuss comparisons made by fellow Gricean researcher—Bob Arundale—between the lectures, original published versions of the lectures and revised versions included in Grice (1989). I also discuss similarities between Grice's notions and the notion of 'dictiveness' introduced by a contemporary of his at Oxford—R. M. Hare.

1 Introduction

No formal training in linguistics is required to know that whatever 'saying' is, it does not necessarily amount to the same thing as 'meaning'. Most people share the intuition that what a speaker says may fall short of what they mean, or that by (or in) saying one thing a speaker might mean another thing entirely. Of course, some people always say exactly what they mean (to the awe-struck admiration or horrified embarrassment of people—such as myself—who often find it difficult to say what they mean), but this is not trivially true, and the fact that it is not is further intuitive evidence that saying and meaning are distinct.

But whilst they can be shown to be distinct, what a speaker says and what a speaker means are, of course, interrelated: there is a sense of 'saying' on which you can't say anything without meaning something; and if you didn't mean anything, it's hard to see how you can be regarded as having said something. So although saying (and the derivative notion 'what is said') will be the main focus of this paper, it will be necessary at times to underpin the discussion by looking at some of the ways in which an utterer or an utterance might be said to mean

something. In fact, one of the main premises on which the arguments in this paper rest is that those aspects of Paul Grice's work that deal with 'saying' and those that deal with 'meaning' are mutually illuminating to the extent that we fail to do justice to either if we consider them independently of one another. It might even be argued that his work on saying forms *part of* his work on meaning.[1]

My aim is to discuss (with a view to answering) two[2] questions:

(A)   What did Grice mean by 'say'?
(B)   What did Grice mean by 'what is said'?

These are important questions; saying was central to Grice's work, particularly to that area of his work concerned with distinguishing what speakers say from what they imply or *implicate*. Indeed, although Grice is probably remembered more for his work on implicature, without some concept of saying his famous distinction could not have been drawn at all.

Despite the centrality of the notion to his work, Grice is often regarded as having failed to provide an adequate characterisation of saying. Matters are not helped by the fact that in his attempts to do so, he appears to be drawn in two different directions. In the first, he admits that he is using (or at least seeking) a "favored", to some degree "artificial" (1989: 118) sense of *say*, and devotes time to developing a formal analysis. But as Stephen Neale points out, Grice only takes us so far with this analysis before reaching what might be construed as "a rather disappointing terminus" (1992: 557). Certainly, what is widely regarded as his final analysis of saying—broadly speaking, those facets of speaker meaning that overlap with sentence meaning—leaves crucial issues unresolved. In the second direction, Grice is true to his Ordinary Language Philosophy roots[3], and admits he will "have to assume to a considerable extent an intuitive understanding of the meaning of *say*" (1989: 24-25). This, though, is equally problematic. For while it's

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[1] I follow Stephen Neale here: "It is at least arguable that the Theory of Conversation is a component of the Theory of Meaning. And even if this interpretation is resisted, it is undeniable that the theories are mutually informative and supportive, and that they are of more philosophical, linguistic, and historical interest if the temptation is resisted to discuss them in isolation from one another" (1992: 512). The discussion in Section 3 below is particularly important in this regard.

[2] During the writing of this paper, it's become increasingly clear to me that even though the answer to Question (B) depends entirely on the answer to Question (A), it helps to consider them separately.

[3] Though one of Grice's aims in the *William James Lectures* was to argue *against* what he regarded as excesses of the Ordinary Language Philosophy movement.

easy enough to make intuitive distinctions between saying and meaning of the kind described outlined in the introductory paragraph of this paper, it is by no means easy to give a precise and exhaustive *intuitive* characterization of saying on its own.[4] There's no small amount of irony in the fact that any attempt to characterise Grice's notions of saying and what is said is largely a matter of working out what he *meant* by what he said (and wrote) about it.

There is, at least, fairly broad agreement that Grice intended what is said to coincide with the truth-conditional content of an utterance, or the proposition expressed by a given utterance of a sentence on a particular occasion. Many theorists have claimed, however, that Grice's notion falls some way short of satisfying this intention. In a nutshell, the current thinking goes, not only do we often mean more than we say, but—if what is said is to be coextensive with truth-conditional content—we typically say$_{(T\text{-}C\ CONTENT)}$ more than we say$_{(GRICE)}$, and what is said$_{(GRICE)}$ does not exhaust what is said$_{(T\text{-}C\ CONTENT)}$. As a result, a great deal of work since Grice has been devoted to bridging a perceived gap between his notion of what is said and the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Philosophers and linguists have supplied countless examples to demonstrate that such a gap exists, and various theoretical tools and corresponding terminological devices have been proposed in attempts to bridge it.

It is not my aim in the following discussing to question any of the advances that have been made in this area. Far from it, what follows can only lend support to them. Nor, incidentally, do I hope to rehabilitate the notions of saying and what is said. What I would like to do, however, is question the received wisdom on where Grice himself might have stood in the debate which his work has prompted. This will involve charting a grey area between the notions of saying and what is said commonly ascribed to Grice, and those which I will suggest are closer to the ones he had in mind. At the very least, I hope to convince the reader that there is evidence that Grice—were he still here to participate—would have gone along with many of the recent philosophical and linguistic attempts to bridge the gap between say$_{(GRICE)}$ and say$_{(T\text{-}C\ CONTENT)}$; at most, I hope to show that for Grice the gap simply did not exist.

In the next section I sketch the relationship between the notion of what is

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[4] Recanati (1993) argues that *what is said* is a consciously accessible level, to which users do have reliable intuitions. I agree with Robyn Carston that "the variety of views that have been expressed in the literature […] reflects the variability of intuitions" (2002: 168), and with Wilson & Sperber (2002: 246), who "doubt that there is any common sense notion of *what is said* capable of playing a useful role in the study of verbal comprehension". This doesn't mean, however, that we shouldn't make an effort to get straight exactly what Grice meant when he used the notion.

said$_{(GRICE)}$ and truth-conditional content. In Section 3 I explore, with the help of the original typescripts of Grice's *William James Lectures*[5], the original published versions of those lectures (Grice 1968, 1969, 1975, 1978) and the revised versions of those articles in Grice's 1989 anthology *Studies in the Way of Words*[6], some of the ways in which it might be argued that Grice was actually working with notions that are different to the ones often attributed to him. This section also makes considerable use of some exhaustive exegetical work contained in Arundale (1991). In Section 4 I examine some implications arising from the following discussion.

2 What is said
2.1 Saying and truth-conditions

Despite the fact that Grice avoided the term 'truth conditions', it is generally agreed that his notion of what is said was to have coincided with the proposition expressed by the speaker[7], or the truth-conditional content of an utterance. The

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[5] I am indebted to Deirdre Wilson for making her copies of the original typescripts of those lectures (which she herself typed from Grice's handwritten notes) available to me. Note: quotations from the typescripts are given in the following format—IV: 21—where the lecture number is in Roman numerals (as in the typescripts). Where it is of (potential) interest or relevance I have correlated references between the typescripts, the original published versions and the versions produced in *Studies in the Way of Words*.

[6] Hereinafter abbreviated as *Studies*.

[7] Though see Jennifer Saul (forthcoming) for a different view. Saul argues that some post-Gricean enterprises (in particular, Relevance Theory—Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995) have misinterpreted Grice's notion of *what is said*. I too will suggest that there has been widespread misinterpretation of what Grice meant by what is said, but not for the reasons Saul suggests. Saul claims that the notion of what is said that interested Grice was a *normative* version—what is *actually* said—as opposed to what the speaker intended to say (though she does later modify this claim) or what the hearer takes the speaker to have said. But given that notions such as belief, desire and intention are so central (not to say fundamental) to Grice's work, whether on language, philosophical psychology, reason and rationality, evolution or, for that matter, happiness, it seems highly implausible to suggest Grice only had some abstract, speaker-and-hearer-independent notion in mind.

As well as failing to mesh with the overall fabric of Grice's philosophy, I find it hard to see what theoretical significance a normative conception of what is said might have. I suppose it might conceivably be of some use in a Court of Law, where the accused's innocence or guilt can turn on what was actually said in an utterance of an ambiguous sentence (cf. the famous British case of Derek Bentley and Christopher Craig, where Bentley, on seeing his friend drawing a gun on a policeman, uttered the ambiguous "Let him have it!"—Craig fired the gun, fatally injuring

following quotes from Steve Levinson, Herb Clark and Stephen Neale (echoing my earlier remarks about Grice's failure to provide a definitive characterisation) are representative of this view:

> Grice uses the phrase *what is said* as a technical term for the truth-conditional content of an expression, which may in fact be somewhat less than the full conventional content (Levinson 1983: 97 *n.*).

> What is said (in Grice's special sense) is what speakers mean mostly through the conventional content of the sentences they utter—indeed, through only that part that affects the truth of their utterances (Clark 1996: 141).

> Although Grice is not as explicit as he might have been, it is clear upon reflection (and from scattered remarks) that *what is said* is to do duty (with a proviso I will get to in a moment[8]) for *the statement made* or *the proposition expressed* by *U*. Where the sentence uttered is of the type conventionally associated with the speech act of asserting (i.e. when it is

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the policeman). But notice that even in situations such as this, the cases for the prosecution and the defence will depend on what the hearer could be legitimately presumed to have taken the speaker to have intended to say; this may coincide with, or underpin, some normative notion but still has a reference to the speaker's intention built in.

It has independently been suggested to me that a notion of what is actually said might be of relevance in cases of slips of the tongue etc. This is an interesting point, but is of course totally irrelevant to any discussion of what Grice meant by 'say', since for Grice saying entailed meaning, and in slips of the tongue nothing was actually said at all. As a further consideration, I wonder about cases in which a speaker is deliberately ambiguous and intends two different interpretations to two different hearers. Suppose a particularly demanding student—*X*—says to me "Tim, I'm trying", and I reply to the student (within earshot of my teaching colleague, who also teaches *X*) "Yes, we all know that you're trying"—intending the student to interpret me as saying "We all know you—*X*—are making an effort", and my colleague to interpret me as saying "We all know you—*X*—are very demanding": what is actually said here? Do I actually say two things? Do I only actually say one thing, and remain unaware of the other? Who cares anyway?. Where some normative level of meaning is absolutely *vital* is at the level of semantics, but there is an increasing consensus that we cannot expect the semantics to deliver something co-extensive with *what is said* i.e. something fully propositional or truth-conditional (see Section 2).

The second part of Saul's paper, which—since it falls beyond the scope of this paper—I will not address in any detail, is a sustained attack on relevance theory. It's true that if the version of relevance theory she attacks were the one proposed by Sperber & Wilson, then some of Saul's arguments might have some force. However, it isn't, so they don't.

[8] Neale's proviso is that for something to be a part of what *U* said, it must also be a part of what *U* meant.

in the indicative mood) what is said will be straightforwardly *truth-conditional*[9] (Neale 1992: 520-521).

Thus, what is said is to be distinguished not only from what is implied—or conversationally implicated—but also from conventional *non*-truth conditional meaning. So in (1) below, the contrast introduced by the word 'but' between 'Xanthe is seven' and 'she's very tall' does not form part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance, and hence is not part of what is said:

(1)   Xanthe is seven, but she's very tall.

According to Grice, words such as 'but' and 'moreover', and expressions such as 'on the other hand', conventionally implicate[10]—or indicate—the performance of a higher-order, or "non-central" speech act.

This analysis is reminiscent of the speech-act distinction between describing and indicating (Austin 1962, Searle 1969, 1979). On this approach, sentences both express propositions, which describe the world (corresponding to truth-conditional content), and may contain non-truth-conditional indicators, which indicate the speech (illocutionary) act a speaker is intending to perform, or the propositional attitude a speaker is intending to express. The difference in meaning between (2abc) below is captured by proposing that although all three sentences have the same propositional, or *descriptive* content—Xanthe goes to school at time *t*—they differ in their illocutionary force[11]: (2a) has the force of a question; (2b) of a request for action; (2c) of an assertion.

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[9] I think it only fair to point out that this quote is not representative of Neale's final position on 'saying' in his 1992 paper, which pays close attention to the points of contact between Grice's theories of Meaning and Conversation in a manner not typical of some commentators on Grice in the literature.

[10] A failure to adequately separate what is said from what is conventionally implicated is one of the criticisms Neale offers of Grice's final analysis of saying (1992: 555).

[11] This distinction between propositional/descriptive content and illocutionary force is one version of John Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts (though arguably not the one Austin intended). See Recanati (1987: 236-266) for detailed discussion of Austin's distinctions and the various interpretations (and reinterpretations) of his work. This is not a debate I intend to get too involved in—though I will return to aspects of it in Section 3.3; nonetheless, the confusion and uncertainty that abound serve as a useful reminder that nothing should be taken for granted in the philosophy-of-language neck-of-the-woods (and thus form a neat backdrop to the (re)interpretive work being attempted in this paper).

(2)   a.   Does Xanthe go to school?
      b.   Xanthe, go to school!
      c.   Xanthe goes to school.

Despite the similarities with aspects of the speech-act approach, and obvious affinities with speech-act philosophers, Grice had good reason to use the terminology he did, and hence avoid the term 'truth-conditions'. As Neale points out (1992: 556), "[Grice] cannot make a direct appeal to truth-conditions for fear of undermining one part of his project". That project (or at least part of it) was to characterize sentence meaning as depending on a convention[12] among speakers to use certain words with certain *intentions*. To appeal directly to truth-conditions would have been inconsistent with such a view. In Grice's picture, truth-conditions are a derivative notion. Rather than the starting point for an analysis of meaning, they are a property of utterances only (ultimately) in virtue of the intentions behind those utterances. As Grice himself puts it in the Retrospective Epilogue of *Studies*: "what words mean is a matter of what people mean by them" (1989: 340).

Although it seems clear that Grice did intend what is said to equate with truth conditional content, on one reading at least he appears to have had a fairly minimalist view of what saying (and hence what is said) actually was. Herb Clark again:

> But what is saying? According to Grice—though he was vague on this point—it is the literal meaning of the sentence uttered with its ambiguities resolved and its referents specified (Clark 1996: 143).[13]

This widely held view can be traced back to an often-quoted section of Lecture II of the *William James Lectures* delivered at Harvard in 1967, and published in Cole & Morgan (1975) as 'Logic and Conversation'[14] (later published as Chapter 2 of *Studies*):

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[12] Though Grice was not completely happy with the notion of convention. As Neale points out: "Grice's use of the word 'conventional' in 'conventional meaning' should not be taken too literally, for it is Grice's view that linguistic meaning is not to be explicated in terms of what other philosophers might think of as convention" (1991: 520 *n.*).

[13] Footnote 2 was written with quotes such as this in mind. It's not entirely clear to me whether Clark is characterizing *what is said* or the speech-act of *saying*.

[14] Also published in Davidson & Harman (1975).

> In the sense in which I am using the word 'say', I intend what someone
> has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words
> (the sentence) which he has uttered. Suppose someone to have uttered
> the sentence He is in the grip of a vice. Given a knowledge of he
> English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the
> utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said,
> on the assumption that he was speaking standard English, and speaking
> literally. One would know that he had said, about some particular male
> person or animal x, that at the time of the utterance (whatever that was)
> either (i) x was unable to rid himself of a certain bad kind of character-
> trait or (ii) that some part of x's person was caught in a certain kind of
> tool or instrument. (Approximate account, of course). But for a full
> identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know (a)
> the identity of x, (b) the time of utterance, and (c) the meaning, on the
> particular occasion of utterance, of the phrase "in the grip of a vice" (a
> decision between (i) and (ii)) (II: 5, cf.1989: 25).

Many people building on Grice's saying-implicating distinction have noticed that, actually, this construal of what is said need not exhaust the truth-conditional content of an utterance. As Kent Bach (1994: 124) puts it: "…in Gricean terms, the distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not exhaustive." There has thus been a tremendous amount of work (Wilson & Sperber 1981, Levinson 1989, Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, Bach 1994, Recanati 1993, forthcoming, Clark 1996, Carston 2002) which uses Grice's distinction as a point of departure from which to chart the territory between the Gricean notion of what is said, construed in the sense of the above quote, and the *broader* notion of truth-conditional content.

The idea that there is some kind of gap between what is said$_{(GRICE)}$ and the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance has come to form one part of the semantic underdeterminacy (or underdetermination) thesis. (See Carston 2002: Chapter One, for a comprehensive – and engaging – presentation of this thesis). In the next sub-section I review some of the ideas behind this thesis, and look at a few of the ways that linguists and philosophers have tried to bridge the gap.

2.2 Underdeterminacy: bridging the gap

Grice's saying-implicating distinction (together with his Co-operative Principle and Maxims) provided the first systematic way of distinguishing what a speaker says from the wider meaning she might intend to convey. Consider cases of

metaphor or irony[15] such as those in (3) and (4), or the implicature carried by Jack's reply in (5):

(3)   The face of Greece is a palimpsest bearing twelve successive inscriptions.[16]
       [*meaning that Greece is rich in history and culture*]

(4)   There's nothing remotely interesting in Greece.
       [*meaning that Greece is rich in history and culture*]

(5)   Lily: I want a holiday somewhere rich in history and culture.
       Jack: Have you ever visited Greece?
       [*meaning that Greece is rich in history and culture*]

There are, however, a variety of ways in which what is said, construed in the fairly minimal sense of conventional meaning plus reference assignment and disambiguation, falls short of not only the speaker's intended meaning, but also of providing a truth-evaluable proposition at all. Consider (6), (7) and (8):

(6)   Everyone is ready.
(7)   Jack drinks too much.
(8)   Have you seen Joe's picture?

In (6), there seems little doubt that some process of contextual development distinct from reference assignment and disambiguation must take place before a hearer of this utterance is in a position to derive the proposition expressed. Firstly, in order to specify the domain over which the quantifier is to range there has to be some sort of contextual narrowing of the word 'everyone'. Secondly, it must be clear to the hearer what it is precisely that everyone is 'ready' for—everyone might, for example, be ready to begin the exam, or to listen to the talk, or get on the plane. Likewise, the proposition expressed by an utterance of (7) will include information concerning what it is that Jack drinks too much to do—to operate heavy machinery, for example, or to be entrusted with driving everyone home from the office party. In (8), the precise nature of the relationship between Joe and the picture—e.g. whether it is one that he has painted, one that he likes, or one that he owns—will be part of the proposition expressed by the speaker.

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[15] Actually, it's far from clear that Grice actually has a treatment of either metaphor or irony that goes through. See Wilson & Sperber (2002) for discussion.

[16] From *Travels in Greece*, Nikos Kazantzakis (see bibliography).

Various proposals have been made as to how this gap might be bridged. One current view is that quantifiers such as 'everyone', expressions such as 'ready', 'too *x*' and the genitive '*s*' construction contribute a hidden, implicit argument—or covert indexical—to the linguistically-encoded logical form of utterances containing them. This provides—in a manner analogous to overt indexicals and pronouns—a linguistic mandate for the contextual development necessary to derive the proposition expressed. A hearer of (6), then, must assign values to these covert indexicals in order to specify the domain over which the quantifier is to range, find what it is that everyone is ready for, and hence derive the truth-evaluable proposition the speaker is expressing. In example (7), the expression 'too much' sets up a covert slot to be filled (too much [for what?]), as does the genitive construction in (8), which only encodes some, as yet unspecified, relation between Joe and the picture.

Different approaches have different proposals to make as to exactly how a (broadly) Gricean inferential framework might be adapted to assimilate these extra processes. These proposals impact in various ways on how we might conceive of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and the relationship between these notions and the notion of what is said. Kent Bach regards them as best analysed as a separate level of meaning *between* what is said and what is implicated. He calls this the level of *impliciture*, and his construal of what is said is necessarily a more minimal, semantic one (see Bach 1994 for further discussion). Francois Recanati, on the other hand, calls them instances of *saturation*, and regards saturation as one of a group of processes that takes place in the derivation of pragmatic aspects of an enriched version of what is said (see Recanati forthcoming). Those working within relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, Carston 2002, Wilson & Sperber 2002) do away with the notion of what is said entirely, and regard the specification of the domain of quantifiers and the enrichment of concepts generally as part of the development of the linguistically-encoded logical form of the utterance into an *explicature*, which they contrast with the level of implicature.

Many different frameworks recognize that the kind of bottom-up, linguistically-mandated processes discussed above are necessary before a hearer can construct a hypothesis about the proposition expressed by the speaker. More controversial, however, is the existence of cases in which this kind of contextual development takes place in the absence of any covert indexicals or linguistic mandate—i.e. of any slot provided in the linguistically-encoded form. Consider again examples (7) and (8). In (7) most theorists are happy to interpret the contribution of the verb 'drinks' to the truth conditions of the sentence as one in which it has already been narrowed down to mean 'drinks *alcohol*' (I assumed this implicitly in my two example cases of what Jack might drink too much to do, and doubt that many

readers objected). However, it is not hard to think of a context in which it would be narrowed down in a different way. Perhaps, for example, two parents are discussing the reasons why little Rupert keeps wetting his bed. By using the present perfect tense (aspect), a speaker of (8) asks whether someone has seen Joe's picture at some time in the past (cf. Jack's question in (5)). But if the speaker of (8) is trying to find a picture a child has drawn so that the child can take it to school, she will be understood to be asking if someone has seen it recently—i.e. since some *contextually-specified* time—most likely in full knowledge that hearer has seen it at some point in the past.

Some, in fact, deny that this kind of *free enrichment* occurs at all (see Stanley 2000, Recanati (forthcoming) and Carston (2000) for discussion). The details are somewhat tangential to the concerns of this paper, but I find myself convinced by Recanati and Carston's arguments that there are good reasons to think that the processes responsible for this kind of contextual development are not linguistically-mandated and, therefore, that the words/expressions in question do not encode hidden indexicals. This is not to say that the development of a linguistically encoded form is unconstrained, simply that the constraints are provided by pragmatic principles, as opposed to linguistic ones.

A final group of cases relevant to the discussion here is one that has been the focus of much attention in relevance theory (Carston 1996, 2002, Wilson & Sperber 1998, 2002). As a kind of parallel process to the narrowing (or enrichment or strengthening) processes that supply the contextual developments discussed above, relevance-theorists also recognize a process they call *loosening* (or broadening or weakening) in which conceptually encoded material might be used less-than-literally. Consider, for example, (9) and (10):

(9)   The head-teacher is a fascist.
(10) I see you've spoken to my secretary.
      [*referring to your six-year-old daughter, who has just answered your telephone*]

Although these examples do not strike one as metaphorical in the extended, stylistic sense of (3), there is clearly some contextual loosening process needed to bridge the gap between the literal meaning and the looser interpretation intended by the speaker. To describe a particular head-teacher as a fascist is not necessarily to ascribe to that individual any particular right-wing political views (though of course it might), only to ascribe to them certain fascist-*like* tendencies: perhaps, for example, she is a dogmatic, unreasonable, inflexible disciplinarian. To refer to your six-year-old daughter as a secretary might, on a particular occasion, merely convey that she has performed a certain secretary-*like* duty (i.e. answered your

telephone for you).

Carston and Wilson & Sperber argue that this kind of loose use of concepts should also be regarded as one aspect of the explicit side of what is communicated by an utterance. The exact machinery need not concern us here (see Wilson & Sperber 2002 for a full account), but essentially, it involves the creation of *ad hoc* concepts that are constructed according to considerations of relevance (see Wilson & Sperber 1998). It is worth noting that aspects of this analysis can indeed be carried over to cases of metaphor such as (3); indeed, it provides an interesting motivation for the very existence of metaphor, which can then be analysed as an extension of the kind of loose use speakers habitually employ.[17]

The debate over free enrichment continues[18], though it's worth noting that the more weight placed on hidden constituents and semantic incompleteness, the more need there is for powerful, pragmatic principles to guide and constrain the interpretation process (and hence what a speaker can legitimately intend to 'say' or 'have said'). There seems little doubt, however, that there is more to deriving the truth-conditional content of an utterance than merely knowing the conventional meaning of the words uttered, assigning reference and disambiguating ambiguous expressions.

So, to return to questions (A) and (B) from the introduction, we are left with two possibilities. First, we might stop there, and leave it that Grice's notions of saying and what is said are hopelessly flawed, unsuited in crucial ways to the very function that they were designed to perform and hence in serious need of review (if not dismantling entirely). Second, we might return to Grice's writings, and wonder whether he really could have had such plainly unsatisfactory notions in mind. In the next section I explore the second possibility, and suggest he did not.

3 Saying
3.1 Grice's wider programme

In a paper presented in 1991 to the *International Communication Association* in Chicago, Bob Arundale develops a range of carefully researched arguments based on some painstaking comparison of the original *William James Lectures*, the original published versions of some of those lectures (Grice 1968, 1969, 1975),

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[17] This approach has implications for any theory of utterance interpretation based on maxims or conventions of truthfulness (such as the one developed by Grice and also Lewis 1967)—see Wilson & Sperber 2002 for discussion.

[18] Despite the 'controversy' I refer to above, there seems little doubt that 'free enrichment' *does* exist. Sentence fragments, for example.

and the revised versions of the original published papers—published as various chapters in *Studies*. He summarizes his main arguments thus:

> I argue in what follows that in the well-known 1967 *William James Lectures* Grice had laid out a program with regard to meaning that he had never finished. I argue, as well, that the "new material" in … *Studies* includes significant clarification of and departure from certain of Grice's earlier positions on issues relating to the concept of meaning. I argue that in view of these "new directions", Grice's 1989 work on meaning can be seen as completing that unfinished program. And I argue, finally, that maintaining these new directions in pursuing Grice's program leads not only to reconceptualizing concepts such as timeless meaning, natural versus non-natural meaning, and the said versus the implied, but also to a conception of the Gricean program highly consistent with current research and theory in language pragmatics (1991: 2).

My aim here is not to outline the "new directions" to which Arundale refers[19],

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[19] Although, actually, the third of these "new directions" is highly relevant to the present paper. On the strength of his comparisons, Arundale proposes a new definition of *what is said*, and while he openly admits that we can never be sure whether or not Grice would have assented to this definition, he maintains it is consistent with the other new directions he identifies in *Studies* in a way that earlier conceptions of the notion are not. The new definition is: "Those psychological states that an individual assumes other mature members of his or her language community would generally attribute to a speaker using a given linguistic expression" (1991:27). I suspect this condition is necessary, but is hard to see how it would be sufficient; how, for example, can *what is said* in *U*'s utterance of *S* (on this construal of *what is said*) be distinguished from *what is linguistically-encoded* in *S*?

Also central to this third new direction is Grice's characterisation of the processes at work behind the conventionalization of meaning as a "semi-inferential sequence" (1989: 364). I agree with Bob Arundale (p.c.) that this direction is worth pursuing but this task lies beyond the limits I can realistically set myself for this paper. On an equally speculative note, however, there do seem to me to be clear parallels between the rationale behind Grice's "semi-inferential sequence" and the rationale behind some comments made on language change in Sperber & Wilson (1998). In particular, I am thinking about Sperber & Wilson's suggestion that an inferential model allows us to focus on what they call the *micro-processes* involved in the stabilization of new encoded meanings, and the population-scale *macro-processes* that are the result of the accumulation of those micro-processes (and hence result in the stabilization of innovation). On this approach we might also focus on possible interactions between cognitive and social factors influencing the direction of language change. The notion of 'attractor' is currently being used in *epidemiological* models of ephemeral and longer-lasting *cultural* change (see Sperber 1996), and although such a model has not yet been applied to historical linguistics, it could shed useful light on the

nor is it to assess whether Arundale is right to identify them as such.[20] But I would like here to acknowledge the valuable work he has done (see Arundale 1991), which has confirmed some suspicions that originally prompted me to write this paper.

Instead, I would like to focus on two of the claims made in the above quote[21]. My hope is that these will form a discernible thread running through this and the ensuing sub-sections. Firstly, I focus on Arundale's claim that in the *William James Lectures* Grice had laid out a wider programme for himself that he never finished. I will then focus on one particular unfinished stage of this wider programme, which I see as highly relevant in any attempt to answer the questions posed in my introduction. The second is Arundale's claim that Grice returns to reconsider this wider programme in *Studies*. This is also pertinent to questions (A) and (B) from my introduction.

Whatever programme we do take Grice to have been engaged in at the time of the *William James Lectures*, there was nothing overtly programmatic (or, perhaps better, strategic) about the order in which the lectures were published. For various reasons, the first of the lectures to be published were Lectures VI and VII, which appeared in revised form as Grice (1968), and Lectures V and VI, which were published, again in revised form, as Grice (1969). Stephen Neale offers a plausible explanation:

> Although [Grice] produced dozens of first-rate papers, he was always reluctant to go into print—by all accounts heroic efforts were required by editors and friends to extract from him the handful of papers that he deemed worthy of publication.[22]

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distinction between short-term linguistic fashions and longer-lasting trends. This issue forms part of a wider programme I address in Wharton (forthcoming b).

[20] Arundale tells me (p.c.) that Steve Levinson, for example, once told him that he did not see any "new directions" in *Studies*.

[21] I should add that I prefer to see what follows (which is, it should be pointed out, a considerably *less* ambitious task than the one Arundale sets himself), in terms of the *re*discovery of an *old* direction.

[22] Grice, apparently, did not even regard his seminal 1957 paper 'Meaning' as worthy of publication. In his City University of New York thesis *Theory of Meaning* Russell Dale notes (as a result of conversation with Stephen Schiffer): "Grice originally wrote the paper for a seminar that he and Strawson were to give in 1948, but was reluctant to publish it. Strawson had the article typed out and submitted it for publication without Grice's knowledge. Strawson only told Grice after the article was accepted for publication" (1996).

As Neale points out, one possible effect of this is that there is a temptation to overlook the points of interaction between Grice's work on saying and his work on meaning.

> The *William James Lectures* trickled into print in diverse places between 1968 and 1978 and consequently important connections between the Theory of Conversation and the Theory of Meaning have tended to be missed, ignored or downplayed (1992: 556).

Arundale suggests this is a temptation to which some researchers have succumbed:

> Most researchers who have commented on Grice's program on meaning have identified its components in terms similar to Suppes' description (1986: 109, cf. Grandy & Warner[23], 1986) (1991: 6).

> As readers of Grice will remember, his programme is to use [the fundamental concept of utterer's occasion-meaning—RA] to explicate at the next level of abstraction the concept of utterance-type occasion-meaning. At the next higher level is the analysis of the concept of applied timeless meaning of an utterance type (complete or incomplete) on a particular occasion of utterance. Finally we reach the timeless meaning of an utterance-type…

But as Arundale points out, this four-step progression—outlined and developed in Grice 1968 and 1969—is a somewhat narrower programme than the one Grice had set for himself in the original lectures. Indeed, Grice is quite explicit on this in the 1968 paper in which aspects of the four-step progression[24] are his main concern:

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[23] Personally, I would prefer to remain neutral on the question of whether either Suppes or Grandy & Warner did equate Grice's entire programme on meaning with the one developed in the 1968 and 1969 papers. However, Arundale's quote provides a neat framework within which we might look at ways in which the important connections between saying and meaning referred to in the Neale quote above might be overlooked.

[24] I say "*aspects* of the four-stage progression" because Grice does not actually consider the level of *utterance-type occasion-meaning* in the 1968 paper, so it might be more accurate (when discussing that paper at least) to speak of a *three*-stage progression. It's clear, however, that Grice does not regard assimilating utterance-type occasion-meaning into this three-stage progression as problematic. He remarks in Grice 1969: "In that paper [1968—TW] I do not distinguish utterance-type occasion-meaning from utterer's occasion-meaning; but once the distinction is made, it should not prove too difficult to difficult to distinguish utterance-type occasion-meaning in terms of utterer's occasion-meaning" (1969: 150).

Quote (I)[25]

The account of the (for me) basic notion of meaning is one which I shall not today seek to defend; I should like its approximate correctness to be assumed, so that attention might be focused on its utility, if correct, in the explication of other and (I hope) derivative notions of meaning. This enterprise forms part of a wider program which I shall in a moment delineate, though its later stages lie beyond the limits I have set for this essay.

   The wider program just mentioned arises out of a distinction which, for purposes which I need not here specify, I wish to make within the total signification of a remark: a distinction between what the speaker has said (in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of 'said'), and what he has 'implicated' (e.g., implied, indicated, suggested), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may be either conventionally implicated…or non-conventionally implicated. The programme is directed toward an explication of the favored sense of 'say' and a clarification of its relation to the notion of conventional meaning.

<div align="right">(1968: 225; cf. 1989: 117-118)</div>

In the 1968 paper Grice goes on to outline this wider programme, but focuses very much on the early stages of that programme, which are, after all, to be the main concern of both that and the 1969 paper. This can be contrasted with an outline of the wider programme that Grice provides in Lecture V of the original lectures:

Quote (II)

Let us take stock. My main efforts so far have been directed as follows:
  (1) I have suggested a provisional account of a kind of non-conventional implicature, viz. conversational implicature.
  (2) I have attempted to see to what extent the explanation of implicature is useful for deciding about the connection of some of the theses which in Lecture I I listed under the heading of A-philosophical theses.

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[25] I'll be referring back to this and the following quotes.

A lot of unanswered questions remain:

(1) The reliance (without much exposition) on a favoured notion of 'saying' which needs to be further elucidated.

(2) The notion of conventional force (conventional meaning) has not received enough attention; (but the notion itself needs to be characterized.)

(3) The notion of conventional implicature needs attention; the relation between what is conventionally implicated and what is said needs characterization.

(4) 'Implicature' is a blanket word to avoid having to make choices between words like 'imply', 'suggest', 'indicate', and 'mean'. These words are worth analyzing.

(5) Also needed: a clarification of the notion of relevance, and a more precise specification of when relevance is expected (filling out the maxim of relevance) and also a further consideration of why there is a general expectation that this maxim (and indeed all maxims) be observed.

I doubt if I shall be able, in the time, to address myself to all of these questions. I shall, in the first instance, try to pursue (1) further: this will carry with it some attention to (2) and (3).

(V: 12-13 cf. 1989: 86-87)

He then turns immediately to the first of these unanswered questions, and begins elucidating this favoured notion of saying. Notice that since this lay "beyond the limits" Grice had set himself for the 1968 and 1969 papers, it is not included in them.

Quote (III)

Saying that p (in the favoured sense of 'say'). What follows is a sketch of a direction, not a formulation of a thesis.

(1) I want to say that (A) "U (utterer) said that p" entails (B) U did something x by which U meant that p"[…]

Let us try substituting:

(2) (C) "U did something x   (1)   by which U meant that p
                             (2)   which is of a type which means 'p'"[…]

(3) We want doing x to be a linguistic act; with hideous oversimplification we might try (D)[…]

I will abbreviate this to:

(D') "U did something x (1) by which U meant that p

(2) which is an occurrence of a type S which means "p" in a linguistic system."[…]

(4) I want to introduce some such idea as that of 'central meaning'; I want to be able to explain or talk about what (within what U meant) U centrally meant to give a sense to 'In meaning that p, U centrally meant that q'.

So 'U said that p' may finally come out as meaning:

'U did something x:

(1)   by which U centrally meant that p'

(2)   which is an occurrence of a type S part of the meaning of which is 'p'.'

This leaves various questions to be pursued:

(1)[26] How is 'U meant that p' to be explicated?

(2)   How is 'W (word or phrase) means '...'' to be explicated and how is this locution related to 'U meant that p'?

(3)   How is 'S means (would mean) 'p'' (also 'S meant 'p' here, on this occasion' and 'U meant by S 'p'') to be explicated, how does this relate to the locutions mentioned in (1) and (2)?

(4)   How is 'U centrally meant that p' to be explicated?

(V: 14 cf. 1989: 87-88)

On the strength of the three quotations given above, Arundale summarizes the wider programme Grice sets himself in the original lectures as follows:

(A) Explicating the concept of what is said, particularly in relation to the concept of conventional meaning, which itself required characterisation. According to Grice's "sketch of a direction", this key step was to be accomplished by means of four, more specific steps:

(A1)   Explicating the expression "U meant that p"…or more specifically utterer's occasion meaning.

(A2)   Explicating the expression "W (or S) means '…'", that is, the concept of timeless meaning…and how this is related to utterer's occasion meaning.

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[26] These are my italics; I'll referring back to these sub-stages of the wider programme (and I'm aware that there are lots of (1)'s and (2)'s in the direct quotation).

(A3)   Explicating the expressions "S meant 'p' here" and "U meant by S 'p'", that is, the concepts of applied timeless meaning and of utterance-type occasion-meaning, and how this is related to utterer's occasion meaning.

(A4)   Explicating the expression "U centrally meant that p".

(B)   Examining the concept of what is "implicated", i.e. the concept of implicature [and] characterizing how conventional implicature is distinct from what is said.

(C)   Analyzing terms like "imply", "suggest", "indicate" and "mean" with regard to the concept of implicature.

(D)   Clarifying the concept of "relevance" and specifying why there is an expectation that this and other maxims be observed in conversation

(Arundale 1991: 7-8)

Arundale investigates this wider programme in some depth; obviously, however, only certain aspects of it are directly relevant to the concerns in this paper. Stages (C) and (D), for example, do not immediately involve the notions of saying and what is said, and while stage (B) does, I do not intend to elaborate on the (very) brief discussion in section 2 on the relationship between saying and conventional implicature. The stage of the unfinished programme most relevant to the aims of this paper is stage (A)—the explication of the concept of what is said, and it is clear that even this single stage is not completed in the 1968 and 1969 papers, which only deal with sub-stages (A1), (A2) and (A3) (which correlate with questions *(1)*, *(2)* and *(3)* from Quote (III)). It is also clear, and this point seems to me to have been overlooked entirely, that the four-step progression was intended as a means of illuminating the notions of saying and what is said, and is therefore crucial to answering the two questions posed in my introduction.

3.2 Saying and meaning

As my source for a rough outline of the four-step progression, or narrower programme discussed extensively in Grice 1968 and 1969, I use a section of Chapter 5 (pp. 88-91 of *Studies*. This section is a considerably revised version of a short section of Lecture VI(:11), which appears in the 1969 paper as an introduction to the analysis of utterer's occasion meaning. The basic strategy I will adopt is to briefly consider the different levels of meaning in turn, and pause at each to consider whether they shed any light on the notions of 'say' and 'what is said'; this fits in with what appear to have been Grice's original intentions.

The example sentence—*S*—Grice discusses in the section of Chapter 5 to which I refer is:

> If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading

The first type of non-natural meaning Grice distinguishes is:

- *Timeless meaning(s)*—"*x* (utterance-type[27]) means '….'"

This is the level of conventional meaning(s), or formal content. In the kind of modern parlance adopted in Section 2 this level might be referred to as the level of linguistically-encoded meaning. The timeless meaning(s) of a complete utterance-type such as *S* is (roughly) 'If I shall then be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to grow, I shall have no time for reading' and 'If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I shall have no time for reading'. A specification of the timeless meaning(s) of an incomplete utterance-type—'grass', for example—would be 'the kind of thing of which lawns are composed' and 'marijuana'; in my ideolect at least, another possibility would be 'police informant'.

In the case of pronouns and indexicals, it might help to adapt some terminology from the philosopher David Kaplan, and distinguish between the character of a pronoun, and its truth-conditional/propositional content. So while the content of a given utterance of 'I' will be the person it refers to, the character is the rule (i.e. the timeless meaning) for identifying the referent in any given context. It seems clear that knowledge of the timeless meaning (or character) of *S* would be a necessary condition for knowledge of what *U* says by uttering *S*.

The second type of non-natural meaning Grice distinguishes is:

- *Applied timeless meaning(s)*—"*x meant here '…'*"

Fairly transparently, applied timeless meaning is timeless meaning applied to context. Ambiguous expressions have been disambiguated. So in *S*, the applied timeless meaning of 'grass' is 'the kind of thing of which lawns are composed'. In other contexts it might easily be 'marijuana', or 'police informant'. The question of whether reference has been assigned at this level—in other words, whether this

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[27] By which Grice actually had in mind linguistic *or* non-linguistic acts: a sentence or a gesture (hand-signal or headshake).

is the level at which Kaplan's content is derived—is harder to answer. Is the referent of an indexical one of its *applied* timeless meanings? I return to this issue below.

The third type of non-natural meaning is:

- *Utterance-type occasion-meaning—"U(tterer) meant by x '…'"*

Grice has an extremely subtle distinction in mind here. I quote him at length:

> It might be true to say that when a particular utterer *U* uttered *S*, *he* meant *by S* (by the words of *S*):
> *(i)*   "If I am dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world," and possibly, in addition,
> *(ii)* "One advantage of being dead will be that I shall be protected from the horrors of the world"
> If it were true to say of *U* that, when uttering *S*, he meant by *S (i)*, it would also be true to say that of *U* that *he* meant *by the words*, "I shall be helping the grass to grow" (which occur within *S*), "I shall then be dead"
> On the assumption (which I make) that the phrase "helping the grass to grow," unlike the phrase "pushing up the daisies" is not a recognised idiom[28], none of the specifications just given of what *U* meant by *S* (or by the words "I shall be helping the grass to grow") would be admissible as specifications of a timeless meaning or of the applied timeless meaning of *S* (or of the words constituting the antecedent in *S*). The words "I shall be helping the grass to grow" neither mean not mean *here* "I shall then be dead."
>
> (1989: 90, cf. 1969: 148, VI: 11)

Personally, I find assimilating this level of meaning into the overall picture a far from straightforward task. In one way it appears that Grice is describing a level of meaning *between* applied timeless meaning and what is meant (utterer's occasion-meaning). If by the words in *S*, *U* means *(i)* (and *(ii)*), then *by the words* 'I shall be helping the grass to grow' *U* means (utterance-type occasion-meaning) "I shall then be dead". This is clearly a level of meaning distinct from applied timeless meaning: "…the words 'I shall be helping the grass to grow" neither mean nor

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[28] What Grice is getting at here is that since 'pushing up the daisies' *is* a recognized idiom, one of the specifications of the timeless meanings of 'If I shall then be pushing up daisies…' would be 'If I shall then be dead…' (cf. 'If I shall have kicked the bucket…').

mean *here* "I shall then be dead'’". In other words, "I shall then be dead"—a specification of the utterance-type occasion-meaning—is neither a specification of the timeless meaning nor the applied timeless meaning of the words 'I shall be helping the grass to grow'.

To illustrate how this level falls short of the fourth type of non-natural meaning Grice distinguished, it's worth briefly considering that level:

- *Utterer's occasion-meaning—"U meant by uttering x that[29]…"*

Whilst it may be true that *U* meant—utterance-type occasion-meaning—by the words, 'I shall be helping the grass to grow' (from *S*), 'I shall then be dead', it is certainly *not* true that *U* meant by those words *that* he would be dead (it would follow from this that he was, in fact, dead). Specifications of the utterer's occasion-meaning of *S*, then, would be as follows: '*U* meant by uttering *S* that if he would then be dead, he would not know what is going on in the world'; or '*U* meant by uttering *S* that one advantage of being dead would be that he would be protected from the horrors of the world'.

In another way, however, there is a sense in which it may not be accurate to see utterance-type occasion-meaning as a level *between* applied timeless meaning and utterer's occasion-meaning. In the introductory chapter to his 1972 book *Meaning*, Stephen Schiffer sets out the various notions of meaning he (following Grice) is working with. He begins by introducing two basic senses of mean$_{NN}$: 'means$_S$'— as in 'He meant something by that remark', and 'means$_X$'—as in 'That word means something'. I have illustrated the further distinctions he then draws in *fig. 1* below[30]:

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[29] The absence of the quotation marks is crucial.

[30] A few notes on the diagram: firstly, Schiffer does not use exactly the same terminology as Grice, but the distinctions he draws appear to me to be roughly parallel (though it should be noted that Schiffer's analysis of 'means$_X$' is considerably more complex than my over-simplified diagram suggests); secondly, Schiffer uses *double* quotation marks to enclose *what is meant*. Grice (though he is inconsistent—compare the way in which he sets out the four levels in 1989: 90-91, with his discussion of utterance-type occasion-meaning on page 90) tends to use single quotation marks (I don't think much rides on this); thirdly, in *Meaning*, Schiffer uses '*S*' to denote the speaker. To avoid confusion, and since I have been using '*S*' to signify the *sentence* and '*U*' to signify the speaker (or utterer), I use *my* abbreviation here.

fig. 1

means$_{NN}$

means$_X$ means$_S$

timeless meaning   **applied timeless**   **utterance-type**   **utterer's**
               meaning   **occasion-meaning**   **occasion-meaning**
(x means "…")   *(x means here "…")*   *(U means "…")*   *(U means that…)*

Seen in terms of the above diagram, it is less obvious that the level of utterance-type occasion-meaning is indeed a level *between* applied timeless meaning and utterer's occasion meaning. Rather, it is a necessary level of abstraction in order that 'means$_X$' and 'means$_S$' can be separated; recall that for Grice, ultimately, the former was to be analysed in terms of the latter, so each node on the bottom of the diagram is to be analysed in terms of the notion(s) of meaning corresponding to the nodes to its right.

As I said, the intuitions behind utterance-type occasion-meaning are by no means straightforward. According to Schiffer, utterances of the form '*U* means "…"' are used "to report the sense or meaning of *x* *S* intended to have (or be operative) on the occasion of his producing (or doing) *x*" (1972: 3). The problem, as far as I can see, is not that that it is hard to see what an occasion-specific meaning might be, but rather how, on a certain occasion, it might distinguished from the fourth level of meaning. In other words, where utterance-type occasion-meaning would *end*.

At this point, one question that seems to me to be very much in the spirit of reconciling the narrower programme outlined in the 1968 and 1969 papers with stage (A) of the wider programme set out above (and the problem outlined in the previous paragraph) is the question of whether or not Grice would have regarded knowledge of the utterance-type occasion meaning of an utterance of *S* as a necessary part of knowing what *U* had *said* in an utterance of *S*. By uttering *S*, does *U* say *(i)* or *(ii)*?

Regarding *(ii)*, it seems highly unlikely: the words in *S* take the form of a conditional, and the words in *(ii)* do not. It is hard to see how it could be argued that *(ii)* is 'centrally meant' by *U*'s utterance of *S*. Grice, in fact, confirms this in the section of the original lectures of which the above quote is a considerably revised version. There (but not, for some reason, in the revised section in Chapter 5 of *Studies*), he writes:

When he said *S*, *X* [*U*—TW] meant that:
  (a) Since he would be dead, he would know nothing of what is happening in the world; and possibly <u>also</u> (in context):
  (b) One advantage of being (as he would be) dead would be that he would be protected from the horrors of the world; (*though maybe one would prefer that he implied that* (b)).

<div align="right">(VI: 11—my italics, TW)</div>

But does *U*, by uttering *S*, *say (i)*? Since none of the discussion of the four types of non-natural meaning Grice distinguishes in Chapter 5 of *Studies* actually features the word 'say', all this largely a matter of interpretation. But notice that if it were the case that Grice regarded knowledge of utterance-type occasion-meaning—i.e. *(i)*—as a necessary part of knowing what *U* said in an utterance of *S*, then the interpretation of 'say' (and the derivative notion what is said) would be crucially different to the minimal sense(s) outlined in Section 2. My own interpretation is that Grice *would indeed* have regarded *U* as saying *(i)* (and regarded knowledge of *(i)* as a necessary condition for knowing what is said by (or in) *U*'s utterance of *S*), but I will leave discussion of my reasons until the next sub-section, where I hope to equip myself with the right kind of (hopefully, watertight) terminology to keep myself afloat in some pretty perilous philosophical waters.

  Returning momentarily to the question of on which level reference would be assigned, Schiffer is (not surprisingly) quite clear that pronouns have timeless meaning (or character):

> … quite roughly speaking, to know the meaning of an indicator word *n* is to know a rule or set of rules such that on the assumption that $\Sigma(n)$[31] was issued with its full conventional force (and assuming one knows the meaning of the other words contained in Σ etc.), one will be able to determine… by the application of those rules to the particular circumstances of the issuing of $\Sigma(n)$ what S meant by uttering $\Sigma(n)$.
>
> <div align="right">(1972: 113)</div>

However, he appears to be unwilling to see reference as having been assigned *even at the level of utterance-type occasion-meaning*, let alone applied timeless meaning.

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[31] "Let 'Σ' stand for any complete utterance, and read '$\Sigma(x)$' *as* 'Σ containing x'" (1972: 110).

> [...] [S]uppose that *S* utters 'He is a conservative' and means thereby that the President of the U.S.A. in 1972 is a conservative. In such an event it would be true to say that *S* said$_i$[32] that the President of the U.S.A. was a conservative; but it would not be true to say that by 'he' *S*[33] meant "the President of the U.S.A. in 1972." (1972: 112-113)

This is confusing, since these seem to me to be the only two plausible levels. Early in *Meaning*, though, Schiffer is necessarily precise on the sense(s) of the word 'mean' with which he is to be concerned. And whilst he admits that there will of course be important connections between those senses he chooses to concern himself with and those he will ultimately choose to ignore, the 'refers to' sense is one that he does not look at in any detail, and so cannot admit into the framework he builds. He goes on the confirm this:

> It could perhaps be said that by 'he' *S* meant the President of the U.S.A in 1972. This is what might be said in response to the question "Whom did you mean by 'he'?" But here 'mean' has the force of 'refer to', and the expression occurring to the right of the verb 'mean' would not be placed (by me) within double quotation marks. (1972: 112-113).

Of course, it may be that in the end we may simply have to abstract away from the problems that indexicals raise for Grice's account generally ; this, in fact, is the strategy adopted by Neale 1992. However, I should add that Grice's example sentence *S* contains the word 'I', and he quite clearly cannot have imagined that it contributed nothing at *any* level. If the level of utterance-type occasion-meaning really is the "…sense or meaning of *x S* intended to have (or be operative) on the occasion of his producing (or doing) *x*", then it seems to me that reference must be assigned at this level. For whilst the question of whether the referent of an indexical is one of its *applied* timeless meanings is an open one, given the fact that they make a clear contribution to truth-conditions, to analyse the content of pronouns as being derived at the level of *implicature* seems to me to be clearly wrong.

In the next sub-section I look at the second of Arundale's claims, that Grice returns in Studies to reconsider the wider programme. Since, as I said, I am

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[32] The subscript is Schiffer's notation to distinguish 'say' as used with direct quotation and 'say' as used with indirect quotation.

[33] It's crucial that the reader notes that by 'S' Schiffer means "the speaker" and not the *S*entence, which is the abbreviation I, following Grice, am using.

abstracting away from stages (B), (C) and (D), this will involve considering sub-stage (A4), which Grice did not address in either the 1968 or the 1969 paper.

3.3 Riddle of the strands: dictiveness and dictive meaning

As I said, in reworking Lectures VI and VII for the 1968 paper, and Lectures V and VI for the 1969 paper, Grice chose to omit the outline he provides in quotes *(II)* and *(III)*. Interestingly, though, he chose to re-insert it in the revised version of the 1969 paper published as Chapter 5 of *Studies*, and included both quotes in an introduction—newly entitled 'Saying and Meaning'—to that chapter. (It should also be noted that the material Grice selected for Chapters 5 and 6 reflects the chronology of the original lectures, rather than the date of publication of the revised versions of those lectures.) Of course, we can only speculate on why Grice omitted these sections from the original published versions and then chose to reintroduce them into *Studies*; Arundale speculates as follows:

> …between the 1968 and 1969 articles, and the new work on meaning included in *Studies* in 1989, Grice did not return to the issues of the wider program outlined in William James Lecture V. Given this observation, one is led again to wonder why he decided to reinsert the same initial outline as the introduction to Chapter 5 of *Studies in the Way of Words*. I maintain that in reinserting the outline, Grice was refocusing attention on the issue of explicating what is said, and thereby providing a frame for his moves in the Retrospective Epilogue…toward completing the unfinished wider program (1991: 9).

This is a possibility worthy of investigation. It is certainly true that while Grice (1968) and (1969) address sub-stages (A1), (A2) and (A3) of stage (A), neither of the papers gets as far as sub-stage (A4). Of the various questions Grice addresses in beginning his attempt to elucidate saying in quote *(III)*, questions which he raises as a result of the "unanswered questions" remarked on in quote *(II)* — questions which *themselves* should be seen in the light of the overall aim of stage (A)—only questions *(1)*, *(2)* and *(3)* are dealt with in any detail in the 1968 and 1969 papers. Other than the few lines devoted to the latter stages of the wider programme in the outline provided in the 1968 paper, question *(4)*—"How is '*U* centrally meant that p' to be explicated?"—is not addressed at all.

  In Strand Five of his Retrospective Epilogue (1989: 339-385), Grice returns to consider it. Some of his comments here might be construed as being at odds with the minimalist view of what is said attributed to him on the basis of the quote from Lecture II above; they might even be interpreted as evidence of inconsistency in

his work. What I would like to suggest, however, is that we go some way to resolving this apparent inconsistency if we interpret these final thoughts bearing in mind that Grice was returning to consider aspects of the wider programme outlined in the original lectures.

Grice's concern in Strand Five is to discuss two candidates for:

> …any kind, type, mode or region of signification which has special claims to centrality, and so might offer itself as a core around which more peripheral cases of signification might cluster, perhaps in a dependent posture (1989: 359).

The two candidates are *dictiveness* and *formality*. Grice is explicit (1989: 360-361) that the former is to be taken as equivalent to what is said, and the latter as equivalent to conventional meaning. He then goes on to outline various ways in which the two notions can be shown to be mutually independent. So as well as the existence of utterances that have both dictive and formal content, and those that have neither dictive nor formal content, we find utterances in which only one of the two candidates is present. Utterances containing the kind of non-truth conditional connectives considered briefly in Section 2—'but', 'moreover', 'on the other hand'—would contain as a component formal, non-dictive content (+ formal – dictive), in virtue of the fact that (according to Grice's analysis) these expressions indicate the performance of non-central speech acts, and their contribution to the overall speaker meaning is not part of what is said.

As a further consideration, and as further evidence of the dissociation between dictiveness and formality, Grice then discusses example utterances where the dictive content might be regarded as "nonformal" (– formal + dictive):

> Suppose someone, in a suitable context, says 'Heigh Ho'. It is possible that he might thereby mean something like "Well that's the way the world goes"[34]. Or again, if someone were to say "He's just an evangelist", he might mean, perhaps, "He is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber". If in each case his meaning were as suggested, it might well be claimed that what he meant

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[34] For those who think that I am crediting Grice with notions of 'saying' and 'what is said' that extend too far beyond what Grice (allegedly) envisaged in Lecture II (1975, 1989: Chapter 2) (i.e. by suggesting earlier that Grice would indeed have regarded *(i)* as being said in *U*'s utterance of *S*), I think the 'Heigh Ho' example is highly suggestive that I am not. I should add that, actually, I would not go along with Grice's analysis of 'Heigh Ho' (see Wharton (forthcoming a) for some analysis of interjections).

was in fact what his words said; in which case his words would be dictive but their dictive content would be nonformal and not part of the conventional meaning of the words used. We should thus find dictiveness without formality (1989: 361).

Given the interpretation of 'what is said' discussed in Section 2 (and based on the quote on *pp.* 7-8 above from Lecture II), this is puzzling. What exactly does Grice mean by dictiveness, and how can it be reconciled with the construal of what is said outlined in Section 2?

I will assume that Grice was not a person to introduce new terminology without good reason. We can, for example, speculate why he chose to use the term 'formal' as opposed to 'conventional' in these, his final comments. From early on in his work (Grice 1957, reprinted as Chapter 14 of *Studies*) Grice is seeking alternatives to the word 'conventional'[35]:

> This question about the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction between 'natural' and 'conventional' signs. But I think my formulation is better. For some things which can mean$_{NN}$ are not signs (e.g. words are not), and some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g. certain gestures) (1989: 215).

Regarding *dictive* content or *dictiveness*, however, there are no clues either in the original publications of the lectures (1968, 1969, 1975 or 1978), nor in the revised papers in *Studies* (Chapters 6, 5, 2 and 3 respectively). Again, though, the original typescripts of the lectures are illuminating.

In the final lecture (Lecture VII) of the *William James Lectures* Grice provides a detailed outline of his progress in addressing the wider programme outlined in Lecture V. This section of Lecture VII appeared in revised (and more finely detailed) form as the outline for the wider programme presented in Grice 1968. Points (4) and (5) are highly significant:

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[35] See *fn.* 13.

Recapitulation. In Lecture V I set before myself the task of doing something to elucidate my notion of 'saying' and my use of 'conventional meaning' ('conventional force'). This enterprise resolved itself into…

(1) […]

(2) […]

(3) […]

(4) An attempt to identify the core of conventional meaning, or more exactly an attempt to define 'U dictively meant that *p' where the specification of what U dictively meant need/would not exhaust the account of what U (conventionally) meant.

(5) An attempt to show how elements in what U meant, which do not belong to what U dictively meant, get in (how they are relative to U's dictive meaning). A specification of at least one class of 'conventional implicatures' (hopefully).

(VII: 1 cf. 1968: 225-229)

The crucial point to note here is that Grice identifies 'dictively meaning that p' with 'saying that p'. Not only, then, does Grice return in Strand Five to reconsider sub-stage (A4), but he returns to terminology he used in setting out the wider programme in the original lectures to do so.[36]

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[36] Arundale points to what he considers to be some inconsistencies in Grice's thinking here. If, he claims, Grice's aim "in examining 'centrality' was to aid in distinguishing what is said from what is implied…, then to identify one of the candidates for centrality as the presence or absence of 'dictive content' is patently tautological because the candidate concept is simply another label for the distinction between the said and the implied!" (1991: 26). Also, Arundale claims, "Grice first introduced the phrase 'dictively meant' in place of the phrase 'centrally meant'…at the start of Lecture VII […]. Evidently, Grice himself saw dictive meaning and what is said as synonymous, so that examining dictiveness as one of the candidates for centrality that might elucidate what is said would not appear to be a productive move" (1991: 26). Regarding the second claim, it's not immediately clear to me that Grice did regard the notion of dictive meaning as *synonymous* with that of central meaning—it appears to me that Grice was seeking to refine the notion in order to capture his intuitions, rather than merely give it another name; I would admit that the relationship is rather unclear, but I think Grice had good reason (though he did not give it at the time) to use the term 'dictive meaning' rather than 'central meaning' in Lecture VII, and, equally, return to the term 'dictiveness' in Strand Five; this I explore below.

Also, we shouldn't forget that Grice himself admits that, given the breadth of the programme on which he is embarking in the lectures that his exposition includes moments of "hideous oversimplification" and that he can only offer "a sketch of a direction, not a formulation of a thesis". The fact that, nearly 40 years on, Grice's work is still so rich and rewarding suggests to

Arundale points out that in Lecture VII Grice used the term 'dictive meaning' "without explanation". What I will offer is (I hope) an explanation; in this regard I will suggest that there are similarities between Grice's notion and a notion introduced by another postwar Oxford philosopher—R. M. Hare—and, furthermore, that that these similarities extend to more than mere etymology.

In his (1949/1971) paper *Imperative Sentences*, Hare attacks the view that only a certain class of sentences—summarized in the following quote—are "the proper subject-matter of logic":

> The sort of sentences which are to be admitted into the logical fold are variously referred to as 'scientific', 'cognitive', 'informative', 'fact-stating', 'true-or-false', 'theoretical', 'referential', 'symbolic', etc.; and the sort of sentences which are to be excluded are called 'emotive', 'evocative', 'non-fact-stating', etc. The latter are held not to state genuine propositions, and therefore, since propositions are the bricks out of which a logical system is built, to be altogether beyond the pale of such a system. They are sometimes even said to be 'literally senseless'. (1971: 1)

Hare does this by arguing that logic can be used to shed light on imperative sentences too. Essentially, his argument goes, imperative sentences can also be shown to have properties that enter into logical relations. These logical relations hold because indicative and imperative sentences share similar properties.

I adapt my example sentences in (2bc) in order to illustrate the distinctions Hare introduces to demonstrate these shared properties. Consider the indicative and imperative sentences in (14ab):

(14a) Xanthe goes to school.
(14b) Xanthe, go to school!

For Hare, both these sentences have the same *descriptive* content (or, as he later termed it, *phrastic*), represented below as (14ab$_{desc.}$). The part of a sentence that performs the descriptive function is known as the *descriptor*, which, as can be seen, is identical to the speech-act notion of descriptive content or propositional content.

(14ab$_{desc.}$)   Xanthe goes to school at time *t*.

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me that Grice's "sketch of a direction" is worth more than most researchers' highly detailed maps.

Following Hare's original mode of presentation, an alternative way in which the difference in meaning between (14a) and (14b) might be represented is by adding the words 'yes' and 'please' to the descriptive content, as in (14a$_{dict.}$) and (14b$_{dict.}$):

(14a$_{dict.}$)   Xanthe goes to school at time *t*, *yes*.
(14b$_{dict.}$)   Xanthe goes to school at time *t*, *please*.

'Yes' and 'please' in these sentences have no other function than to indicate the mood of the sentence and the illocutionary force with which the sentence is uttered. Hare calls this function the *dictive* function, and he calls words that perform this function *dictors*. For Hare, it is the dictor that does the saying; the descriptor simply describes what it is that is being said. In most languages, Hare points out, dictors are implicit: "Even in English, however, we can say of a sentence what mood it is in; there must, therefore, be something about it which tells us this. This, then, is the dictor and the rest is the descriptor" (1971: 9).

In an appendix to the chapter in Hare (1971) in which the 1949 paper is published, Hare discusses the relationship between his notion of dictor (indicative mood, assertive force) and the 'assertion-sign' as used by Frege and Russell. Whilst on the face of it the two notions appear to be the same, Hare points out that there are important differences (1971: 22-24). Frege and Russell, for example, assume tacitly throughout their work that all sentences are indicative, and their 'assertion-sign' only serves to indicate subscription to a particular proposition, i.e. to *assert* that it is true.[37] This, as Hare points out, is one, but not the only, function of the dictor (Hare's counterpart to the assertion-sign), which serves to indicate *mood* as well as force.

In his later work (1970/1971) Hare refines his dictor/descriptor distinction and takes account of this by separating the dictor into two other notions: the *neustic* and the *tropic*.[38] The function of the tropic is to indicate mood, as distinct from *subscription* to the phrastic (or descriptive) content, which is indicated by the neustic. Thus, as an illustration, when a declarative sentence is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, or appears in direct quotation marks, whilst retaining its indicative tropic, it does not have the requisite neustic, since it appears unasserted. As far as Hare is concerned, however: "Neustics are normally

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[37] Recanati (1987) discusses this in detail, and how it might shed light on Dummett's (1973) interpretation of Frege.

[38] He also introduces a separate notion—*clistic*—to represent 'completeness', but this is not directly relevant to the discussion in hand.

understood with uttered sentences unless something special is done to indicate that they are not being subscribed to" (1968/1971: 91).

3.3.1 The neustic.

Grice was clearly aware of Hare's distinctions; in fact, in the latter part of Strand Five he makes explicit mention of "philosophers…who, in one way or another, have drawn a distinction between 'phrastics' and 'neustics'" (1989: 367): presumably, as the originator of the distinction, Hare is one of these. It seems plausible to suggest, then, that when Grice equates what is said with what is *dictively* meant, he is surely doing so with the notion of Hare's *dictor* (i.e. neustic and tropic) in mind.

It is clear that for Grice 'saying' and speaker commitment (or, more accurately, those psychological attitudes involved in a speaker's commitment) were inextricably linked in a way Grice saw as absolutely central to providing any satisfactory characterization of 'saying'. He remarks on this in Lecture III:

> It is not a natural use of language to describe one who has said that *p* as having, for example, 'implied', 'indicated', or 'suggested' that he believes that *p*; the natural thing to say is that he has <u>expressed</u> (or at least purported to express) the belief that *p*. He has of course committed himself, in a certain way, to its being the case that be believes that *p*; and while this commitment is not a case of <u>saying</u> that he <u>believes</u> that *p*, it is bound up, in a special way, with saying <u>that *p*</u>. (III: 2, cf. 1989: 42)

A highly detailed discussion of Hare's distinctions, and the relationship between them and Austin's locutionary/illocutionary distinction, Peter Strawson and John Searle's reinterpretation of it, and Hare and Jonathan Cohen's arguments contra-Austin, is to be found in the section of Recanati (1987) referred to in *fn.* 12. One passage from Recanati's discussion brings Grice's views on the relation between saying and speaker commitment (and the notion of dictive meaning) neatly into focus. Recanati is presenting Hare's phrastic-tropic-neustic distinction and how it might relate to saying and asserting:

> In example (6)…a single proposition is expressed twice, at first asserted then mentioned, without this being indicated by quotation marks:
>
> (6) — You are an imbecile.
>   — Oh, I am an imbecile! Thank you very much!

> … In (6), in particular, the [*second—TW*] speaker 'says that' he is an imbecile, but does not subscribe to what he says. His utterance is a case of 'saying that'…by virtue of its declarative tropic, but it is not a bona fide assertion—it lacks what Hare calls the neustic (1987: 263).

But for Grice, the second speaker does not 'say' *anything* (or at least not this): saying entails meaning, and the speaker here clearly does not mean here that she is an imbecile. The fact that the second speaker's utterance lacks the neustic *precludes* it from being a case of 'saying that' for Grice. 'Saying' *must* involve a 'neustic', otherwise it would not be meant (and hence could not be said).

It is this, I believe, that lies behind Grice's use of the terms 'dictive meaning' and 'dictively meant' in Lecture VII, and 'dictiveness' in Strand Five. At the level of applied timeless meaning ambiguous expressions have been disambiguated (and, possibly, reference has been assigned), but *this is not enough to exhaust what is said*. Before *S* can be regarded as having been said by *U*, *S* must have been *asserted* by *U* . In her utterance of *S* "If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading" *U* says "If I am dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world" because that is what *U* asserts or dictively means; parallel to this, in her utterance of "He's just an evangelist" *U* dictively means "He is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber". For Grice, what is said is what is asserted: it is not just the proposition expressed by the speaker, it is *the proposition expressed by the speaker as being true*.

Returning to question (A), what Grice meant by 'saying' was 'asserting'. Naturally, it follows from this that what Grice meant by what is said (question (B)) was what is asserted. In the next sub (sub-)section I will return to the claim that this actually contained the other part of Hare's dictor, the tropic. However, before turning to that, I would like to tie together a few loose ends.

For if knowledge of utterance-type occasion-meaning of *S* does indeed also form part of knowing what *U* had said in an utterance of *S*, it might go some way to solving what is in some way one of the biggest mysteries of Grice's notion of dictiveness without formality: how might dictive content be 'nonformal', and hence not part of the conventional meaning of the words uttered? Just as by uttering *S*, *U* might mean something like *(i)* above, *U* might also mean by uttering "He's just an evangelist", "He's just a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber". As with the notion of utterance-type occasion-meaning, the idea in Strand Five is that this is what *U does* with the words; the content of the central act—the *saying*—performed by the speaker of those words. Notice, crucially, that this meaning does not necessarily form part of the conventional meaning (timeless and applied timeless meaning) of the words,

though it is *closely enough related to* the conventional meaning[39] to be distinct from implicated meaning (utterer's occasion-meaning)[40] and hence part of what is said. In both the "grass to grow" and the "evangelist" examples, what is said clearly goes beyond conventional meaning, and it might we thus be inferred that what we have is 'dictiveness' *without* 'formality'.

The relationships between the different types of meaning introduced in the narrower programme are complex and worthy of a brief discussion. Applied timeless meaning, for example, might coincide with utterer's occasion-meaning (that is, the latter might be exhausted by the former). To adapt an example from Grice 1968[41], consider (15) (S_2):

(15)   Tim Henman thrashed Andre Agassi.

When *U* uttered S_2, it meant—applied timeless meaning—'Tim Henman beat Andre Agassi easily' rather than, say, 'Tim Henman hit Andre Agassi repeatedly with a cane'. Now it may well be that when *U* uttered S_2, he meant *that*—utterer's occasion meaning—*(i)* Tim Henman beat Andre Agassi easily. In which case,

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[39]   Arundale is not impressed with Grice's example, and clearly does not attach as much importance to it as I do. "[It] purported to show dictive content without formality, but did so only on the grounds that a special language convention shared by a small group is not the convention shared by the larger population" (1991: 26). I, however, prefer to see these occasion-specific senses (either the example of utterance-type occasion-meaning from 1989: 90, or the example of [– formality + dictiveness] from Strand Five) as *nonce*-senses, constructed 'on-the-fly', as it were. I don't believe for a second that Grice thought this could only be achieved in virtue of a convention shared by a small group of language-users; that would surely be [+ formality] anyway. Grice saw communication as a rational activity to be characterised (ultimately) as a *meeting-of-minds*, not mere adherence to convention (a notion which, recall, he was unhappy with anyway).

[40] Of course, it may indeed be the case that by uttering "He's just an evangelist" (S_α) *U* might mean *that* Billy Graham is an evangelist, but he need not. Another specification, for example, of the utterer's occasion meaning of S_α might be "*U* meant by uttering S_α that he did not want to do business with Mr. Hamilton". I wonder if the notion of *utterer's occasion-meaning* might be one of the reasons that so many people equate *implicated* meaning with *natural* meaning? (Robyn Carston (p.c.) has confirmed to me that she has also come across this view elsewhere.) To say "*U* means *that P*" is (in some way) related to saying that *P follows from U*. To demonstrate, consider another example sentence (S_β)—"You'd be mad to go out without your umbrella". What I'm suggesting is that the kind of meaning (non-natural) we have in the sentence (a) '*U* meant by uttering S_β that it will rain' is reminiscent of the kind of (natural) meaning we have in the sentence (b) 'Those black clouds mean that it will rain'. The way out, of course, is that if it *doesn't* rain, the black clouds in (b) didn't mean rain after all, but S_β in (a) did (and still does).

[41] "Palmer gave Nicklaus quite a beating" (1968: 227).

applied timeless meaning (and presumably one of the timeless meanings of S_2) and utterer's occasion meaning all coincide (or, put differently, applied timeless meaning exhausts utterer's occasion meaning). However, it is equally possible that *U* was being ironic, and that by uttering S_2, *U* actually meant that *(ii)* Andre Agassi beat Tim Henman easily. In this case, the proposition in *(ii)* is false, while the proposition in *(i)* is true. As Grice points out, this is one reason we should not regard applied timeless meaning and utterer's occasion meaning as equivalent notions. Since saying entails meaning, we have a good illustration of Grice's analysis of irony, for instance, in which by an utterance of S_2 meaning that *(ii) U* would only have *made as if to say (i)*. This analysis can also be applied to the Recanati example above.

So timeless, applied timeless and utterer's occasion meaning—though they are not equivalent—might sometimes all coincide. What, though, of utterance-type occasion- meaning? Although in *U*'s utterance of *S* above, utterance-type occasion-meaning diverges from applied timeless meaning, clearly the two can coincide. Utterance-type occasion-meaning is not some *ad hoc* notion, to be wheeled out in cases where there is a divergence from applied timeless meaning. In fact, the intuition that *U* might indeed mean—utterance-type occasion-meaning—by his words exactly what *S* means—applied timeless meaning—is an intuition I regard as certainly indeed worth holding on to. It illustrates neatly the fact that while knowledge of applied timeless meaning is a necessary condition for deriving what is said in an utterance of that sentence, it is not sufficient[42].

3.3.2 The tropic. As for what is said containing a tropic, a related point, which as far as I know has been little remarked on, and which is highly relevant to any

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[42] Notice, this is not to say that utterance-type occasion-meaning cannot occur independently from utterer's occasion meaning. Schiffer gives an example (reciting a poem) where *U* might mean (utterance-type occasion-meaning) "he is sad" by his utterance of 'he is blue', but might not mean (utterer's occasion-meaning) that he is sad. On first glance, this might be seen to cause a problem for my analysis. I do not, however, think this is the case. To propose that knowing the utterance-type occasion-meaning of *U*'s utterance of *S* is a necessary condition for knowing what *U* has *said* in an utterance of *S* is not to propose that it follows—though it invariably does—that someone meaning (utterance-type occasion-meaning) *"p"* always *says that p*. Even when nothing is said (because nothing is meant (utterer's occasion-meaning)) a word or expression is still used with an intended sense, that potentially diverges from that word or expression's applied timeless meaning. Returning to Recanati's example above, B might mean "I am a stupid person" by the words 'I am an imbecile' (as opposed to "I am mentally defective") without meaning that (and hence *saying that*) she is a stupid person. It should be clear from this that any notion of saying is not in good shape at all. Grice himself remarks that this is so in Strand Five. None of this, however, affects my claim that the notions of saying and what is said attributed to Grice in this paper are closer to what he had in mind than the ones standardly attributed to him.

attempt to answer Question (B), is that in many of Grice's formalisms, it is *not just* the propositional (descriptive, phrastic) content which is embedded under 'saying that'. Grice writes in Lecture VII, for example, that he is attempting to find a definiens for "U said that *p[43]" or "U dictively meant that *p" (VII: 1). According to these formulations it is quite clear that what is said *includes* what Grice refers to as a 'dummy' mood indicator: '*': what is said, then, includes Hare's 'tropic', as well as his 'phrastic'.

This suggests another way on which Grice's conception of what is said might diverge, not only from the minimalist view sketched in Section 2, but also from the kind of speech-act approach championed by John Searle also discussed in that section; in fact, it might thus line up better with John Austin's original version of the locutionary/illocutionary distinction than Searle's version of it as a distinction between descriptive content and illocutionary force (see Recanati 1987 for discussion).

It could be argued that Grice's is a slightly 'loose' use of the expression 'mood indicator'. If this is so, however, it is by no means one that was untypical of him. Richard Warner remarks (Grice 2001: *xiv*) that during the *Immanuel Kant Lectures* Grice delivered at Stanford in 1977, Julius Moravscik objected to Grice's use of the word 'mood', on the grounds that he was using it in a sense other than the standard linguistic sense. As can be see from the discussion so far, it's certainly clear that Grice did not have the standard *syntactic* sense of mood in mind—in which it simply means some kind of verbal inflection—at all, and that he intended it in a broader, *semantic* sense, as those properties that distinguish standard declarative utterances, for example, from interrogative or imperative ones.

In his later work (see the *John Locke Lectures* delivered at Oxford in 1979—and published as *Aspects of Reason* in 2001) Grice makes clear that he is actually working with an entirely different conception of mood. So much so, that (presumably in the light of Moravscik's objection) he ceased calling *his* notion 'mood' at all):

> I am … talking about 'modes' rather than 'moods' to make it clear that I am not trying to characterize what linguists would be likely to call 'moods' (though I would expect there to be important links between their 'moods' and my 'modes'). I would justify (or explain)[44] my use of

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[43] In his John Locke Lectures delivered at Oxford in 1979 Grice uses the term *radical* to refer to the 'phrastic'—i.e. '*p*'. This has anticipatory echoes of Bach's terminology, briefly discussed in Section 2. I wonder if, for Grice, this might have been some similarly 'skeletal' level of linguistic meaning.

[44] Grice's idiosyncratic use of parentheses is (so I have found) one that is (highly) contagious.

the term 'mode' by reference to my views about meaning. According to these views, *what a speaker means* is to be explained in terms of the effect which he intends to produce in an actual or possible hearer; and *what a sentence in a language means* is to be explained in terms of directives with respect to the employment of that sentence, in a primitive (basic) way, with a view to inducing in a hearer a certain kind of effect; […] The intended effect on a hearer is (in my view) one or other of a set of psychological attitudes with respect to some 'propositional content' (to borrow momentarily a phrase I do not normally use), and my mode-markers each correspond with one element in this set of attitudes (or set of 'modes of thinking'). (2001: 68-69)[45]

Mode (mood), was a matter of *thought*[46].

   This aspect of Grice's approach raises interesting questions concerning Grice's view of the relationship between language and thought. For whereas Hare saw 'tropics' and 'phrastics' as properties of sentences, Grice appears to have been moving in another direction entirely. He is quite explicit that the propositional content of utterances did not (or need not) mirror exactly the propositional content of thoughts: "I regard it as an undecided question whether there are any sentences in a natural language which contain a part which is a distinct surface counterpart of a radical" (2001: 50). A possible objection to a proposal that what is said contains a mood indicator would be that it is difficult to get an intuitive grasp on how what is said, so construed, would look. However, given the above, when Grice proposes that what is said includes a tropic, I don't think that we should be surprised if there is no intuitive surface counterpart in natural language to equate with it.

   Nor, however, do I think it follows from the fact that what is said includes mood that Grice required each individual clause of the propositions (or representations) that form the vehicles of thought to have their own mood 'built in', as it were. Recall that for Grice, even basic semantic notions such as sentence meaning were ultimately to be characterised in terms of propositional-attitude psychology. Under this approach, *semantic* mood is as derivative a notion as syntactic mood, to be analysed ultimately in terms of the manner in which a particular thought is entertained, rather than the surface appearance of the language with which a speaker may choose to express it.

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   [45] This quote is taken from a section in which Grice is attempting to account for the difference between practical and alethic modals in terms of mode.

   [46] The project Grice that is engaged in during this later work—broadly speaking, an enquiry into *reason* and *rationality*—also ties up in interesting ways with Grice's work on meaning and conversation. I hope in the future to examine some of these.

4 Implications

Reassessing Grice's notions of say and what is said in this way has a number of implications, a few of which I have attempted to address at the appropriate stage of the presentation above. However, there are two others, and I would like to discuss them briefly here.

The first concerns cases of metaphor. Grice regarded these as cases of categorial falsehood. So when *U* utters "Beckham's right foot is once more the bow that delivers the fatal arrow", the Maxim of Quality is flouted and a related comparison is implicated. But if I say of an atheist acquaintance of mine "He's just an evangelist", and by uttering those words the sense or meaning of *S* I intend to have on the occasion of producing *S* (i.e. the utterance-type occasion-meaning) is "He is just a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist…etc." (and this is what I say), then am I not in some sense at least also uttering a categorial falsehood (since, presumably, he is not an evangelist)? In cases such as these, how can a line be drawn between occasion-specific senses and what is implicated? Just how closely related to the conventional meaning of a word (or sentence) does utterance-type occasion-meaning have to be. In this I return to the issue I mentioned early in Section 3 of where utterance-type occasion-meaning might end.

Carston (2002) draws interesting parallels between Grice's examples in Strand Five and the relevance theory treatment of 'loose use' in terms of *ad hoc* concepts mentioned briefly in Section 2:

> [T]he intended interpretation [of 'He's just an evangelist'—TW] has the characteristics of the sort of loose use of lexical concepts that I'm interested in here. It seems to involve a dropping of the encoded (conventional) PREACHER concept and the picking out of a set of relevant encyclopaedic properties: HYPOCRITICAL, REACTIONARY, etc. (Carston 2002: 330).

So stepping back, and surveying the scene from a more current, cognitivist perspective, we might say that the encoded linguistic content of *U*'s utterance of 'He's just an evangelist' would be (16):

(16)   He$_x$ is just an evangelist.

But Grice had intuitions that what *U* 'says' in his utterance of this sentence is what she asserts. So what is asserted—including applied timeless meaning and utterance-type occasion-meaning—is (17):

(17)   He$_x$ is an evangelist* (i.e. 'sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist…etc.')

Where, in a cognitive sense, 'evangelist*' is an *ad hoc* concept constructed on the fly, as it were, or in Grice's sense—[– formal + dictive]—word meaning. Since as I mentioned in Section 2, relevance theorists extend this treatment to metaphor, it is interesting to speculate that Grice might have been led eventually to propose that metaphor worked in a similar way (and hence differently to irony).[47]

   The second, major implication should be clear: and it concerns the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. If 'saying' is co-extensive with 'asserting', then what a speaker says is co-extensive with what a speaker asserts.[48] But what is *asserted* in examples (6)-(10) (repeated below as (18)-(22)) has to be a proposition in which the gap between the minimal notion of what is said introduced in Section 2 and the intuitive truth-conditions has already been bridged.[49] If not, *U* does not *mean* what *U* utters (and hence does not *say* anything at all):

(18)   Everyone is ready.
(19)   Jack drinks too much.
(20)   Have you seen Jack's picture?
(21)   The head-teacher is a fascist.
(22)   I see you've spoken to my secretary.

In (18), for example, what is asserted must include the domain over which the quantifier is to range and, furthermore, for what it is precisely that 'everyone' is ready. Parallel arguments can be constructed for (19)-(22). In fact, the last two examples (particularly (21)) are highly suggestive of the examples Grice himself provides for utterance-type occasion-meaning and dictiveness without formality. Since saying is asserting, what is said cannot be, as Herb Clark remarks, simply

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[47] Schiffer (1971: 111) considers this issue of the relationship between utterance-type occasion-meaning and metaphor: "Notice, too, that in order for *S* [*U*—TW] to mean "…" by *x*, *S* must think that *x* means "…".[…] There are apparent counter-examples to this feature of our definition, but I believe that they are not actual counter-examples. For example, *S* may utter 'Richard is a lion' and mean thereby that Richard is brave. In such a case one might be inclined to say that *S* meant "brave" by 'lion'. However, I should want to say that one who said this would either be speaking incorrectly or speaking elliptically." My intuition is that *U* does indeed mean "brave" by 'lion', and that she is speaking neither incorrectly nor elliptically, simply—as most speakers do—loosely.

[48] I *think* I'm in good company here: "(I should like to add that, as far as my intuitions go, in uttering σS stated (asserted) that *p* just in case in uttering σS said that *p*.)" (Schiffer 1971: 114).

[49] It also includes a mood indicator (see section 3.3.2).

"the literal meaning of the sentence uttered with its ambiguities resolved and its referents specified", it is a *fully truth-evaluable proposition*. For Grice, the 'gap' simply did not exist, and the minimal notion of what is said so often attributed to him *cannot* be what he meant.

Exactly how Grice expected hearers to derive those aspects of what said that go beyond conventional meaning is unclear. A natural solution, of course, would be his Cooperative Principle and Maxims themselves. Neale (1992: 530) uncovers the following quote (from Grice 1957), in which Grice hints that the Maxims (or, more accurately, factors that the Maxims were eventually designed to account for) may indeed play a role in inferring the speaker's intentions behind an utterance containing an ambiguous expression:

> [I]n cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g. a man who calls for a 'pump' at a fire would not want a bicycle pump). Nonlinguistic parallels are obvious: context is a criterion in settling the question why a man who has just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket; relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull. (1989: 222)

But in the end (see 1989: 375) Grice seems strangely reluctant to make what seems like a fairly natural step.

It should be noted, however, that this issue is a problem even for those who maintain the kind of minimal notion of what is said discussed in Section 2. 'Context' (undefined) is often regarded as sufficient to assign reference and disambiguate ambiguous expressions (and hence derive the minimal notion of what is said), but it is clear in the above quote that Grice regards disambiguation certainly as a process of working out which reading of an ambiguous word a speaker *intends* to convey; it is far from clear how this might take place without some (surely) pragmatic machinery by which these intentions might be recovered.

In any case, the purpose of his paper has not been to make the stronger claim that Grice saw a role for his Maxims in deriving what is said, simply to reassess what Grice meant by say (and derivatively, what is said). Regarding this, I hope I have at least revealed the prospect that views often ascribed to Grice, views that are sometimes presented in the literature as cornerstones of the traditional Gricean approach, may well turn out to be ones that he never held. And yes, I realize there's a great deal of *interpretation* here, and that a great deal of the above

depends on a very personal view of what one takes Grice to have meant by what he said and wrote, but since that is where we came in, and since it is *Grice* we are talking about here, I hope I am justified in doing so.

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